File #2275: "2018_Book_TheFutureOfTradeDefenceInstrum.pdf"
Testo
1|Editorial|6
1|Contents|9
1|About the Authors|11
1|Part I: Introduction: TDI in Context|15
2|The Multilateral and EU Legal Framework on TDIs: An Introduction|16
3|1 Introduction|17
4|1.1 The Pertinent WTO Agreements|17
4|1.2 The EU Instruments|18
3|2 The WTO Trade Remedies Regime: A System in Crisis|19
4|2.1 The China Shock|19
4|2.2 The Trump Shock|23
4|2.3 WTO TDI Law Without Appellate Body Monitoring?|25
3|3 The EU Reaction|26
3|4 Conclusion|28
3|References|29
2|The Politics of TDI and the Different Views in EU Member States: Necessary Safety-Valve or Luxurious Rent-Seeking Device?|30
3|1 Introduction|31
3|2 The EU’s Anti-Dumping Framework: Some Figures|32
3|3 The Special Case of Chemicals and the Rise of the Dragon|35
3|4 The European Union Has Its Eye on China|38
3|5 The Debate on China’s MES Within Industry|49
3|6 Conclusions: Rethinking TDI in a Globalised Interconnected World—An Illusion|52
3|References|54
1|Part II: TDI in a Changing Global Framework|56
2|The EU’s New Trade Defence Laws: A Two Steps Approach|57
3|1 Introduction|58
3|2 Modernisation Package|58
4|2.1 Legislative History|58
4|2.2 Key Features of the December Trilogue Compromise|59
5|2.2.1 Improved Calculation of the Injury Margin|59
5|2.2.2 Pre-Disclosure Prior to Provisional Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Measures|62
5|2.2.3 Price Undertakings|63
5|2.2.4 Recognition of the Role of Trade Unions|64
5|2.2.5 Extension of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Duties to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf|64
5|2.2.6 Strengthening the Role of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)|65
5|2.2.7 Procedural Rules|66
5|2.2.8 “Housekeeping”|67
5|2.2.9 Changes to the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation|67
3|3 New Calculation Methodology|68
4|3.1 When Does the New Calculation Methodology Apply?|69
4|3.2 How Is the Normal Value To Be Calculated in Case of Distortions?|70
4|3.3 Procedural Aspects|70
5|3.3.1 Use of Reports|70
5|3.3.2 The Investigation|72
4|3.4 Changed Scope of Article 2(7) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation|73
3|4 Conclusion|73
3|References|74
2|The New Rules Adopted by the European Union to Address “Significant Distortions” in the Anti-Dumping Context|75
3|1 Introduction|76
3|2 Background|76
3|3 The Significant Distortions Provisions|81
4|3.1 Assessing “Significant Distortions”|82
4|3.2 Addressing “Significant Distortions”|84
3|4 The TDI Modernisation Proposal and Possible Removal of the LDR|85
3|5 Assessment|87
4|5.1 Assessment of the Significant Distortions Provisions|87
4|5.2 Questionable WTO-Compatibility of the Significant Distortions Provisions|90
4|5.3 Possible WTO-Inconsistency Due to the Concurrent Application of the “Significant Distortions” Provisions and the Removal of the LDR|95
3|6 Conclusions|97
3|References|99
2|The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union: A Breach of WTO Law?|100
3|1 Introduction|101
3|2 The Expiry of Article 15(a)(ii) of China’s Accession Protocol|102
3|3 The New Methodology of the European Union|104
4|3.1 Overview of the Legislative Procedure|104
4|3.2 Analysis of the New Provisions of the EU’s Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation|106
3|4 Conformity with WTO Law|108
4|4.1 The “Significant Distortions”-Approach|109
5|4.1.1 Ordinary Course of Trade|109
5|4.1.2 Particular Market Situation|110
4|4.2 Normal Value Construction Method|112
4|4.3 Transitional Provisions|113
3|5 Conclusion|114
3|References|114
2|EU – Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Interpretation of Section 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol|117
3|1 Introduction|118
3|2 Interpretation of Section 15 CAP: Rebuttal to the Legal Opinions of the European Union and United States|119
4|2.1 Interpretation of Section 15 CAP by the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners|119
4|2.2 The Legal Consequence of the “Expiry” of Section 15(a)(ii) CAP|121
4|2.3 Are the Chapeau and Paragraph (i) of Section 15(a) of the Protocol Expired?|123
4|2.4 Interpretation of Section 15(d) CAP|124
4|2.5 Is Section 15 CAP an Exception Clause?|126
3|3 General Methodological Issues Concerning the Interpretation of China’s Accession Protocol|129
3|4 Conclusion|133
3|References|134
2|Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China: The “Great Leap Forward” in Reforming EU Trade Defence?|135
3|1 Introduction|136
3|2 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|139
4|2.1 The General WTO Legal Framework on Alternative Benchmark Methodologies|139
4|2.2 The Country-Specific WTO Legal Frameworks|141
5|2.2.1 The Rationale for the Introduction of Country-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regimes|141
5|2.2.2 The China- and Viet Nam-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regimes|142
3|3 Applying the Alternative Benchmark Methodologies: EU Anti-Subsidy Investigation Practice Against China|143
4|3.1 The EU Anti-Subsidy Legal Framework on the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|143
4|3.2 Indications from EU Anti-Subsidy Investigation Practice Against China|144
5|3.2.1 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Cases of Loan Subsidies (Article 6(b) BASR)|145
5|3.2.2 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Cases of Undue Government Provision of Goods (Article 6(d) BASR)|146
3|4 WTO Law Compatibility of the EU Approach on the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|147
4|4.1 The Applicable Overall WTO Anti-Subsidy Legal Framework for China|148
4|4.2 Compatibility “As Such”|149
4|4.3 Compatibility “As Applied”|149
3|5 WTO Law Compatibility of the Adoption of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|151
4|5.1 Compatibility with Article XII WTO Agreement|152
4|5.2 Justifying the Violation of Article XII WTO Agreement?|155
3|6 The Future of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Law: The Missing Reform|160
4|6.1 The Doha Development Agenda|160
4|6.2 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321|162
3|7 Conclusion and Future Prospects|163
3|References|164
1|Part III: TDI in the Context of Special (Regional) Trading Relationships|166
2|What Role for TDIs Between the EU and the UK After Brexit: A Trade or Competition Solution to a Future Problem?|167
3|1 Introduction|168
3|2 The UK’s Post-Brexit WTO Membership and Commitments|169
4|2.1 The UK as a Founding Member of the WTO with No Independent Schedule|170
4|2.2 The Issuance of Independent Schedules of Commitment|172
4|2.3 State Succession Issues and Identifying the UK’s Own Commitments|175
3|3 On the Importance of TDIs and Their Widespread Use by the EU|177
4|3.1 Anti-Dumping Measures|178
4|3.2 Anti-Subsidies Measures|181
4|3.3 The EU’s Approach to TDIs|184
3|4 Building Up the UK’s TDI Capabilities in the Post-Brexit Era|185
4|4.1 Post-Brexit Trade Defence Uncertainty|186
4|4.2 Establishing an Independent Investigative Authority|188
3|5 Post-Brexit Trade Defence Options in a Customs Union: The EU-Turkey Case Study|191
4|5.1 Trade Defence Modalities in the EU-Turkey Customs Union|192
4|5.2 Lessons for UK’s Trade Defence Options in a Customs Union|194
3|6 Post-Brexit Competition Law Option|195
3|7 Conclusion|196
3|References|197
2|EU Trade Defence Instruments and Free Trade Agreements: Is Past Experience an Indication for the Future? Implications for Brexit?|198
3|1 Introduction|199
3|2 Analytical Framework|200
4|2.1 Rationale and Preconditions for Dumping Practices|200
4|2.2 Rationale for Subsidisation|202
4|2.3 Rationale for Combatting Dumping and Subsidisation|203
5|2.3.1 Combatting Dumping|203
5|2.3.2 Combatting Subsidisation|205
4|2.4 Combatting the Underlying Root Cause|206
3|3 Can (or Must) TDI Be Eliminated Between Members of a Customs Union or Free Trade Area?|207
4|3.1 The Rationale Behind the Exceptions for RTAs|208
4|3.2 The Substantive Conditions Under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Elimination of Intra-Regional Trade Defence Instruments|209
5|3.2.1 Are TDI Measures Duties and Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce in the Sense of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994?|210
5|3.2.2 Is the Exceptions List in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 Illustrative or Exhaustive?|212
4|3.3 Limitations Resulting from General Non-Discrimination Obligations Under the GATT Generally and the Implementing Agreement on Article VI in Particular|213
4|3.4 Conclusion|215
3|4 The EU’s Customs Unions|215
4|4.1 The European Union Itself|215
4|4.2 The Customs Union with Turkey|217
3|5 The Union’s Free Trade Agreements|220
4|5.1 The European Economic Area|220
4|5.2 EC-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement of 1972|223
4|5.3 Europe Agreements: The Example of Poland|225
4|5.4 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia|227
4|5.5 EuroMed Agreements: The Example of Israel|229
4|5.6 Free Trade Agreement with Singapore|231
4|5.7 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada – CETA|233
3|6 Lessons To Be Learned: Is There an Identifiable Pattern?|235
3|7 Implications for Brexit|236
3|References|238
2|Trade Defense Instruments: The Leading Edge of U.S. Trade Policy|239
3|1 U.S. Trade Policy Undergoes a Profound Change in Direction|240
3|2 The Contribution of Recent Changes in U.S. Trade Laws to the Enhancement of TDIs in Current U.S. Trade Policy|242
4|2.1 Trade Promotion Authority Renewal in 2015 and the Commencement of the Use of Renegotiating Authority|243
4|2.2 The Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 and Enhancements in Provisions Affecting the Outcome of U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations|244
4|2.3 The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 and Enhancements in Anti-Circumvention Enforcement by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders|247
3|3 Expanded Use of Existing Trade Laws and Resurrection of Other Avenues of Import Relief|249
4|3.1 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974|249
4|3.2 National Security Import Restrictions Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962|251
4|3.3 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930|254
4|3.4 Safeguard Actions Under Sections 201–204 of the Trade Act of 1974 (a.k.a. the “Escape Clause”)|254
4|3.5 International Emergency Economic Powers Act|257
4|3.6 Tax Law Changes That Could Affect Trade|257
3|4 Executive Branch Authority Applied in Furtherance of a More Aggressive Trade Policy|258
4|4.1 Stricter Conditions Applied to Standard Practices in the Conduct of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations|258
4|4.2 Intensification of Participation in the WTO and Other Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements|260
4|4.3 New Trade Enforcement Initiatives Begun Through Executive Orders|261
3|5 Conclusion|262
3|Annexes|263
3|Reference|266
2|Trade Defence Instruments and Switzerland: The Big Sleep|267
3|1 Introduction|268
3|2 Legal Framework|270
4|2.1 Legal Basis for the Imposition of Trade Defence Instruments|270
4|2.2 Lack of Formal Procedures to Approach the Government|272
3|3 Reasons for the Big Sleep|274
4|3.1 Open Trade Regime|275
4|3.2 Cautious Approach in External Relations|276
4|3.3 Structure of the Swiss Industry|278
4|3.4 Free Riding|281
4|3.5 Lack of Expertise and Procedures in Domestic Legislation|284
3|4 Conclusion|285
3|References|286
2|Anti-Dumping Laws and Implementation in China: A 16 Years Review After Accession to the WTO|288
3|1 Introduction|289
3|2 China’s Anti-Dumping Regime|289
4|2.1 General Feature|289
4|2.2 Legal Framework|290
4|2.3 Judicial Review Rules|292
3|3 Implementation of Anti-Dumping Laws in China|293
3|4 WTO Cases Involving China’s Anti-Dumping Measures|294
4|4.1 Overview|294
4|4.2 Some Horizontal Issues|296
5|4.2.1 Due Process and Transparency|297
5|4.2.2 Price Effects Analyses|297
5|4.2.3 All Others Rate|298
3|5 Concluding Remarks|299
3|References|299
2|The Latest on the Best? Reflections on Trade Defence Regulation in EU-Vietnam FTA|300
3|1 Introduction|301
3|2 Drivers to the EVFTA Trade Defence Provisions|303
3|3 Dumping and Subsidies Regulation|307
4|3.1 Transparency|308
4|3.2 Consideration of Public Interest|309
4|3.3 Lesser Duty Rule|310
3|4 Safeguards|311
4|4.1 Transparency|311
4|4.2 Definitions|312
4|4.3 Application of a Bilateral Safeguard Measure|313
4|4.4 Provisional Measures|315
4|4.5 Compensation|315
3|5 Conclusion|316
3|References|318
1|Contents|9
1|About the Authors|11
1|Part I: Introduction: TDI in Context|15
2|The Multilateral and EU Legal Framework on TDIs: An Introduction|16
3|1 Introduction|17
4|1.1 The Pertinent WTO Agreements|17
4|1.2 The EU Instruments|18
3|2 The WTO Trade Remedies Regime: A System in Crisis|19
4|2.1 The China Shock|19
4|2.2 The Trump Shock|23
4|2.3 WTO TDI Law Without Appellate Body Monitoring?|25
3|3 The EU Reaction|26
3|4 Conclusion|28
3|References|29
2|The Politics of TDI and the Different Views in EU Member States: Necessary Safety-Valve or Luxurious Rent-Seeking Device?|30
3|1 Introduction|31
3|2 The EU’s Anti-Dumping Framework: Some Figures|32
3|3 The Special Case of Chemicals and the Rise of the Dragon|35
3|4 The European Union Has Its Eye on China|38
3|5 The Debate on China’s MES Within Industry|49
3|6 Conclusions: Rethinking TDI in a Globalised Interconnected World—An Illusion|52
3|References|54
1|Part II: TDI in a Changing Global Framework|56
2|The EU’s New Trade Defence Laws: A Two Steps Approach|57
3|1 Introduction|58
3|2 Modernisation Package|58
4|2.1 Legislative History|58
4|2.2 Key Features of the December Trilogue Compromise|59
5|2.2.1 Improved Calculation of the Injury Margin|59
5|2.2.2 Pre-Disclosure Prior to Provisional Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Measures|62
5|2.2.3 Price Undertakings|63
5|2.2.4 Recognition of the Role of Trade Unions|64
5|2.2.5 Extension of Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Duties to the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and the Continental Shelf|64
5|2.2.6 Strengthening the Role of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs)|65
5|2.2.7 Procedural Rules|66
5|2.2.8 “Housekeeping”|67
5|2.2.9 Changes to the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation|67
3|3 New Calculation Methodology|68
4|3.1 When Does the New Calculation Methodology Apply?|69
4|3.2 How Is the Normal Value To Be Calculated in Case of Distortions?|70
4|3.3 Procedural Aspects|70
5|3.3.1 Use of Reports|70
5|3.3.2 The Investigation|72
4|3.4 Changed Scope of Article 2(7) of the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation|73
3|4 Conclusion|73
3|References|74
2|The New Rules Adopted by the European Union to Address “Significant Distortions” in the Anti-Dumping Context|75
3|1 Introduction|76
3|2 Background|76
3|3 The Significant Distortions Provisions|81
4|3.1 Assessing “Significant Distortions”|82
4|3.2 Addressing “Significant Distortions”|84
3|4 The TDI Modernisation Proposal and Possible Removal of the LDR|85
3|5 Assessment|87
4|5.1 Assessment of the Significant Distortions Provisions|87
4|5.2 Questionable WTO-Compatibility of the Significant Distortions Provisions|90
4|5.3 Possible WTO-Inconsistency Due to the Concurrent Application of the “Significant Distortions” Provisions and the Removal of the LDR|95
3|6 Conclusions|97
3|References|99
2|The New Anti-Dumping Methodology of the European Union: A Breach of WTO Law?|100
3|1 Introduction|101
3|2 The Expiry of Article 15(a)(ii) of China’s Accession Protocol|102
3|3 The New Methodology of the European Union|104
4|3.1 Overview of the Legislative Procedure|104
4|3.2 Analysis of the New Provisions of the EU’s Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation|106
3|4 Conformity with WTO Law|108
4|4.1 The “Significant Distortions”-Approach|109
5|4.1.1 Ordinary Course of Trade|109
5|4.1.2 Particular Market Situation|110
4|4.2 Normal Value Construction Method|112
4|4.3 Transitional Provisions|113
3|5 Conclusion|114
3|References|114
2|EU – Price Comparison Methodologies (DS516): Interpretation of Section 15 of China’s WTO Accession Protocol|117
3|1 Introduction|118
3|2 Interpretation of Section 15 CAP: Rebuttal to the Legal Opinions of the European Union and United States|119
4|2.1 Interpretation of Section 15 CAP by the Appellate Body in EC – Fasteners|119
4|2.2 The Legal Consequence of the “Expiry” of Section 15(a)(ii) CAP|121
4|2.3 Are the Chapeau and Paragraph (i) of Section 15(a) of the Protocol Expired?|123
4|2.4 Interpretation of Section 15(d) CAP|124
4|2.5 Is Section 15 CAP an Exception Clause?|126
3|3 General Methodological Issues Concerning the Interpretation of China’s Accession Protocol|129
3|4 Conclusion|133
3|References|134
2|Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China: The “Great Leap Forward” in Reforming EU Trade Defence?|135
3|1 Introduction|136
3|2 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|139
4|2.1 The General WTO Legal Framework on Alternative Benchmark Methodologies|139
4|2.2 The Country-Specific WTO Legal Frameworks|141
5|2.2.1 The Rationale for the Introduction of Country-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regimes|141
5|2.2.2 The China- and Viet Nam-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regimes|142
3|3 Applying the Alternative Benchmark Methodologies: EU Anti-Subsidy Investigation Practice Against China|143
4|3.1 The EU Anti-Subsidy Legal Framework on the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|143
4|3.2 Indications from EU Anti-Subsidy Investigation Practice Against China|144
5|3.2.1 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Cases of Loan Subsidies (Article 6(b) BASR)|145
5|3.2.2 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in Cases of Undue Government Provision of Goods (Article 6(d) BASR)|146
3|4 WTO Law Compatibility of the EU Approach on the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|147
4|4.1 The Applicable Overall WTO Anti-Subsidy Legal Framework for China|148
4|4.2 Compatibility “As Such”|149
4|4.3 Compatibility “As Applied”|149
3|5 WTO Law Compatibility of the Adoption of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|151
4|5.1 Compatibility with Article XII WTO Agreement|152
4|5.2 Justifying the Violation of Article XII WTO Agreement?|155
3|6 The Future of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Law: The Missing Reform|160
4|6.1 The Doha Development Agenda|160
4|6.2 Regulation (EU) 2017/2321|162
3|7 Conclusion and Future Prospects|163
3|References|164
1|Part III: TDI in the Context of Special (Regional) Trading Relationships|166
2|What Role for TDIs Between the EU and the UK After Brexit: A Trade or Competition Solution to a Future Problem?|167
3|1 Introduction|168
3|2 The UK’s Post-Brexit WTO Membership and Commitments|169
4|2.1 The UK as a Founding Member of the WTO with No Independent Schedule|170
4|2.2 The Issuance of Independent Schedules of Commitment|172
4|2.3 State Succession Issues and Identifying the UK’s Own Commitments|175
3|3 On the Importance of TDIs and Their Widespread Use by the EU|177
4|3.1 Anti-Dumping Measures|178
4|3.2 Anti-Subsidies Measures|181
4|3.3 The EU’s Approach to TDIs|184
3|4 Building Up the UK’s TDI Capabilities in the Post-Brexit Era|185
4|4.1 Post-Brexit Trade Defence Uncertainty|186
4|4.2 Establishing an Independent Investigative Authority|188
3|5 Post-Brexit Trade Defence Options in a Customs Union: The EU-Turkey Case Study|191
4|5.1 Trade Defence Modalities in the EU-Turkey Customs Union|192
4|5.2 Lessons for UK’s Trade Defence Options in a Customs Union|194
3|6 Post-Brexit Competition Law Option|195
3|7 Conclusion|196
3|References|197
2|EU Trade Defence Instruments and Free Trade Agreements: Is Past Experience an Indication for the Future? Implications for Brexit?|198
3|1 Introduction|199
3|2 Analytical Framework|200
4|2.1 Rationale and Preconditions for Dumping Practices|200
4|2.2 Rationale for Subsidisation|202
4|2.3 Rationale for Combatting Dumping and Subsidisation|203
5|2.3.1 Combatting Dumping|203
5|2.3.2 Combatting Subsidisation|205
4|2.4 Combatting the Underlying Root Cause|206
3|3 Can (or Must) TDI Be Eliminated Between Members of a Customs Union or Free Trade Area?|207
4|3.1 The Rationale Behind the Exceptions for RTAs|208
4|3.2 The Substantive Conditions Under Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 and the Elimination of Intra-Regional Trade Defence Instruments|209
5|3.2.1 Are TDI Measures Duties and Other Restrictive Regulations of Commerce in the Sense of Article XXIV of the GATT 1994?|210
5|3.2.2 Is the Exceptions List in Article XXIV of the GATT 1994 Illustrative or Exhaustive?|212
4|3.3 Limitations Resulting from General Non-Discrimination Obligations Under the GATT Generally and the Implementing Agreement on Article VI in Particular|213
4|3.4 Conclusion|215
3|4 The EU’s Customs Unions|215
4|4.1 The European Union Itself|215
4|4.2 The Customs Union with Turkey|217
3|5 The Union’s Free Trade Agreements|220
4|5.1 The European Economic Area|220
4|5.2 EC-Switzerland Free Trade Agreement of 1972|223
4|5.3 Europe Agreements: The Example of Poland|225
4|5.4 Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Serbia|227
4|5.5 EuroMed Agreements: The Example of Israel|229
4|5.6 Free Trade Agreement with Singapore|231
4|5.7 Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with Canada – CETA|233
3|6 Lessons To Be Learned: Is There an Identifiable Pattern?|235
3|7 Implications for Brexit|236
3|References|238
2|Trade Defense Instruments: The Leading Edge of U.S. Trade Policy|239
3|1 U.S. Trade Policy Undergoes a Profound Change in Direction|240
3|2 The Contribution of Recent Changes in U.S. Trade Laws to the Enhancement of TDIs in Current U.S. Trade Policy|242
4|2.1 Trade Promotion Authority Renewal in 2015 and the Commencement of the Use of Renegotiating Authority|243
4|2.2 The Trade Preferences Extension Act of 2015 and Enhancements in Provisions Affecting the Outcome of U.S. Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations|244
4|2.3 The Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 and Enhancements in Anti-Circumvention Enforcement by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Orders|247
3|3 Expanded Use of Existing Trade Laws and Resurrection of Other Avenues of Import Relief|249
4|3.1 Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974|249
4|3.2 National Security Import Restrictions Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962|251
4|3.3 Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930|254
4|3.4 Safeguard Actions Under Sections 201–204 of the Trade Act of 1974 (a.k.a. the “Escape Clause”)|254
4|3.5 International Emergency Economic Powers Act|257
4|3.6 Tax Law Changes That Could Affect Trade|257
3|4 Executive Branch Authority Applied in Furtherance of a More Aggressive Trade Policy|258
4|4.1 Stricter Conditions Applied to Standard Practices in the Conduct of Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations|258
4|4.2 Intensification of Participation in the WTO and Other Bilateral and Plurilateral Agreements|260
4|4.3 New Trade Enforcement Initiatives Begun Through Executive Orders|261
3|5 Conclusion|262
3|Annexes|263
3|Reference|266
2|Trade Defence Instruments and Switzerland: The Big Sleep|267
3|1 Introduction|268
3|2 Legal Framework|270
4|2.1 Legal Basis for the Imposition of Trade Defence Instruments|270
4|2.2 Lack of Formal Procedures to Approach the Government|272
3|3 Reasons for the Big Sleep|274
4|3.1 Open Trade Regime|275
4|3.2 Cautious Approach in External Relations|276
4|3.3 Structure of the Swiss Industry|278
4|3.4 Free Riding|281
4|3.5 Lack of Expertise and Procedures in Domestic Legislation|284
3|4 Conclusion|285
3|References|286
2|Anti-Dumping Laws and Implementation in China: A 16 Years Review After Accession to the WTO|288
3|1 Introduction|289
3|2 China’s Anti-Dumping Regime|289
4|2.1 General Feature|289
4|2.2 Legal Framework|290
4|2.3 Judicial Review Rules|292
3|3 Implementation of Anti-Dumping Laws in China|293
3|4 WTO Cases Involving China’s Anti-Dumping Measures|294
4|4.1 Overview|294
4|4.2 Some Horizontal Issues|296
5|4.2.1 Due Process and Transparency|297
5|4.2.2 Price Effects Analyses|297
5|4.2.3 All Others Rate|298
3|5 Concluding Remarks|299
3|References|299
2|The Latest on the Best? Reflections on Trade Defence Regulation in EU-Vietnam FTA|300
3|1 Introduction|301
3|2 Drivers to the EVFTA Trade Defence Provisions|303
3|3 Dumping and Subsidies Regulation|307
4|3.1 Transparency|308
4|3.2 Consideration of Public Interest|309
4|3.3 Lesser Duty Rule|310
3|4 Safeguards|311
4|4.1 Transparency|311
4|4.2 Definitions|312
4|4.3 Application of a Bilateral Safeguard Measure|313
4|4.4 Provisional Measures|315
4|4.5 Compensation|315
3|5 Conclusion|316
3|References|318