File #2278: "2018_Book_NetherlandsYearbookOfInternati.pdf"

2018_Book_NetherlandsYearbookOfInternati.pdf

Testo

1|Board of Editors|6
2|Aims and Scope|7
2|T.M.C. Asser Instituut|7
1|Preface|9
2|Shifts in International Economic Law: Mapping Trends and Developments|9
2|References|12
1|Contents|14
1|Shifting Forms and Levels of Cooperation in International Economic Law|22
1|1 The Development of the US and the EU Preferential Trade Agreement Networks: A Tale of Power and Prestige|23
2|Abstract|23
2|1.1 Introduction|24
2|1.2 The Establishment of the Preferential Trade Agreement Networks|28
3|1.2.1 The Use of Power and Prestige in the US FTA Negotiations|30
3|1.2.2 The Use of Power and Prestige in the EU EPA and Association Agreement Negotiations|34
2|1.3 The Effects of the Preferential Trade Agreement Networks|38
3|1.3.1 The Asymmetric Trade Liberalisation|39
3|1.3.2 The Vertical Forum Shifting|44
2|1.4 Conclusion|50
2|References|52
1|2 From the Tripartite to the Continental Free Trade Areas: Designs, Outcomes and Implications for African Trade and Integration|57
2|Abstract|57
2|2.1 Background|58
2|2.2 Launching the Tripartite and Continental FTAs|60
2|2.3 Outcomes of the TFTA Negotiations|62
2|2.4 The TFTA as a Legal Construct|66
2|2.5 The AfCFTA and Existing African Trade Regimes|72
2|2.6 Concluding Observations|74
2|References|76
1|3 From TRIPS to FTAs and Back: Re-Conceptualising the Role of a Multilateral IP Framework in a TRIPS-Plus World|77
2|Abstract|77
2|3.1 Introduction|78
2|3.2 The Context: Problems Arising from Detailed TRIPS-Plus Provisions as Trade-Offs in Bilateral and Regional Agreements|81
2|3.3 Articles 7 and 8 TRIPS as Patrons of a Flexible Global IP Framework|85
3|3.3.1 The Basic Idea of Tailoring IP Protection to Domestic Needs, and Mindful of the Wider Public Interest|86
4|3.3.1.1 Negotiation History|87
4|3.3.1.2 Balancing Objectives and Public Interest Principles: Exploring Possible Meanings|90
3|3.3.2 Articles 7 and 8 in the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health|94
3|3.3.3 Discretion for Balancing in Domestic Implementation of TRIPS|98
3|3.3.4 Collective Calls to Retain and Protect TRIPS Flexibilities|102
2|3.4 Limits on Modifying TRIPS Inter Se|105
3|3.4.1 More Extensive IP Protection Under Article 1(1) TRIPS|106
3|3.4.2 Inter Se Modifications Under Article 41 VCLT|109
4|3.4.2.1 Applicability in the WTO Context|110
4|3.4.2.2 Operationalising the Principles in Article 41 VCLT|112
2|3.5 Conclusion: Arguing for a More Resilient Multilateral IP Framework|122
2|References|125
1|4 External Consultants as Actors in European Trade and Investment Policymaking|128
2|Abstract|128
2|4.1 Introduction|129
2|4.2 The Role of Policy Consultants in Contemporary Governments|133
2|4.3 Consultants and Trade and Investment Policymaking|139
3|4.3.1 Independence and Autonomy of Consultants|139
3|4.3.2 Impact Assessment as a Legitimacy Tool?|143
3|4.3.3 Between Technical Advice and Political Judgment|145
2|4.4 Concluding Remarks|149
2|References|151
1|5 Prosumers: New Actors in EU Energy Security|158
2|Abstract|159
2|5.1 Introduction|159
2|5.2 Drivers of Change|161
3|5.2.1 Energy Security Challenges|161
3|5.2.2 Climate Change and Sustainable Development|162
3|5.2.3 The ‘Gig’ Economy and New Technologies|164
2|5.3 EU Energy Law Reform: Decentralisation|167
2|5.4 Energy Actors: Old and New|173
3|5.4.1 Old Actors|173
3|5.4.2 New Actors|175
2|5.5 Prosumers: Key Issues|179
3|5.5.1 Supply Security|179
3|5.5.2 Sustainability|182
3|5.5.3 Digital Security|183
2|5.6 Conclusion, Recommendations and a Future Research Agenda|185
2|References|188
1|6 The Evolving Role of Sub-National Actors in International Economic Relations: Lessons from the Canada-European Union CETA|192
2|Abstract|192
2|6.1 Introduction|193
3|6.1.1 Aims, Objectives, and Scope of the Chapter|196
2|6.2 Contextualising the Analysis: Federal Sub-National Governments in International Economic Law|197
2|6.3 Shifting Forms of Cooperation: Sub-National Governments and National Governments|200
3|6.3.1 Sub-National Participation in CETA: The Canada Perspective|200
3|6.3.2 Sub-National Participation in CETA: The EU Perspective|207
2|6.4 Shifting Forms of Cooperation: Sub-National Governments and Non-State Actors (NGOs)|212
3|6.4.1 Social Movement Mobilisation Against CETA Within Canada|213
3|6.4.2 Social Movement Mobilisation Against CETA Within the EU|215
2|6.5 CETA and Implications for the Future|217
3|6.5.1 Traditional Federal Systems Acting as Checks and Balance for New Styled Deep Integration PTAs?|217
3|6.5.2 Need for Review of the EU’s System of Internal Dialogue During the Negotiation of International Trade Deals|218
3|6.5.3 The Evolution of Social Movement Mobilisation Across the Atlantic|219
3|6.5.4 Excluded Stakeholders and the Opt-Out Option from Mega-Regional Trade Agreements|220
2|6.6 Conclusion|221
2|References|222
1|7 The Potential of Transnational Regulations: The Interactions Between Traditional and Non-Traditional Sources of International Economic Law|225
2|Abstract|225
2|7.1 Introduction|226
2|7.2 A Short Account of Transnational Regulations|228
2|7.3 Transnational Regulations as a Non-Traditional Source of International Economic Law|232
2|7.4 The Interactions Between Traditional and Non-Traditional Sources of International Economic Law|234
2|7.5 Non-Traditional Sources of International Economic Law and Social Aspirations: Building Bridges?|239
2|7.6 The Empowerment of Socially Vulnerable Actors as a Trigger for Interactions Between International Economic Law and Transnational Regulations|241
2|7.7 Conclusion|244
2|References|245
1|8 International Regulatory Cooperation in the Field of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: Drawing Multilateral Lessons from the Regional Dimension|248
2|Abstract|248
2|8.1 Introduction|249
2|8.2 Shifting Forms and Levels of Cooperation: The Multilateral and the Regional Dimensions|252
3|8.2.1 Regulatory Cooperation Methods at the Multilateral Level|252
3|8.2.2 Regulatory Cooperation Methods at the Regional Level|258
2|8.3 Challenges at the Multilateral Level and Lessons from the Regional Level|266
3|8.3.1 Achievements and Challenges at the Multilateral Level|267
3|8.3.2 Multilaterising Lessons from the Regional Level|273
2|8.4 Conclusion|279
2|References|280
1|9 The Growing Tendency of Including Investment Chapters in PTAs|283
2|Abstract|283
2|9.1 Introduction|284
2|9.2 Is There a Growing Tendency of Including Investment Chapters in PTAs?|285
3|9.2.1 How is the Data Gathered?|286
3|9.2.2 The North-Atlantic|288
3|9.2.3 Asia-Pacific|293
3|9.2.4 Latin America|299
3|9.2.5 Africa|301
3|9.2.6 Interim Conclusions|304
2|9.3 Potential Drivers behind the Inclusion/Exclusion of Investment Chapters in/from PTAs and Their Implications|304
3|9.3.1 Readily Apparent Drivers|305
3|9.3.2 Drivers that Require a More Thorough Discussion|306
4|9.3.2.1 Low-Capacity Governments Accepting/Using Existing Templates|307
4|9.3.2.2 Pursuing More Comprehensive and Resource-Friendly Negotiations|309
4|9.3.2.3 A More Coherent Application of International Economic Law?|312
2|9.4 Conclusions|316
2|References|317
1|10 Trade in the Digital Era: Prospects and Challenges for an International Single Window Environment|321
2|Abstract|321
2|10.1 Introduction|322
2|10.2 Contribution of International Institutions to Create ISWE|325
2|10.3 ASW—Interoperability in Operation|330
2|10.4 Integration of Commercial Requirements in ISWE|332
2|10.5 Governance Responses—Forms and Levels of Cooperation in International Economic Law|336
3|10.5.1 Living Apart Together|336
3|10.5.2 Converging Trends|337
3|10.5.3 Greater Role of Industry Bodies|339
2|10.6 Concluding Remarks|340
2|References|341
1|11 Between Shifts and Continuum in Cooperation: The International Securities Regulatory Regime and its Gradual Evolution|343
2|Abstract|343
2|11.1 Introduction|344
2|11.2 International Financial Architecture and Securities Regulatory Regime|345
3|11.2.1 Architecture and Regime Characterised by Informality|346
3|11.2.2 GFC as Catalyst for Reforms|350
3|11.2.3 Global Governance Norms|352
2|11.3 Institutional Dynamics and Changes in Decision-Making Processes|355
3|11.3.1 Inclusiveness of the Plenary Body|356
3|11.3.2 Practical Power and Influence of the Plenary Body|358
3|11.3.3 Representation and Participation in the Key Decision-Making Body|361
4|11.3.3.1 IOSCO Board Constitution Determined by the Presidents Committee|363
4|11.3.3.2 Eligibility Criteria Introduced|364
4|11.3.3.3 Mix of Nominated and Elected Members|365
4|11.3.3.4 Increased Regional and Emerging Markets Representation|368
4|11.3.3.5 Expansion of Observing Members|370
3|11.3.4 Elections and Decision-Making Processes|371
4|11.3.4.1 Electing Office-Holders and Representatives to the IOSCO Board|371
4|11.3.4.2 Voting on Policy Matters|372
4|11.3.4.3 Risk of Eroding Consensus in Matters of Regulatory Policy?|372
2|11.4 Regulatory Philosophy and Cooperation in Policy-Making|374
3|11.4.1 Legitimate Difference and Pluralism|374
4|11.4.1.1 Effects of IOSCO Reforms|374
4|11.4.1.2 IOSCO Principles and IOSCO MMOU|375
4|11.4.1.3 The Challenges of Cross-Border Regulation|376
3|11.4.2 Cooperation and Positive Comity|378
3|11.4.3 Shifting Levels of Cooperation?|381
4|11.4.3.1 Cross-Border Initiatives in Asia|381
4|11.4.3.2 Recent IOSCO Developments|384
4|11.4.3.3 Final Observations Regarding Cooperation|387
2|11.5 Some Tentative Conclusions|387
3|11.5.1 Clarity of Function and Focus for Appropriate Governance Arrangements|388
3|11.5.2 Complementary and Possibly Mutually Reinforcing Norms|389
2|References|390
1|Dutch Practice in International Law|394
1|12 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in (National) Action: The Dutch Agreement on Sustainable Garment and Textile|395
2|Abstract|395
2|12.1 Introduction|396
2|12.2 The International Regulation of Global Value Chains Through Due Diligence|398
3|12.2.1 The Concept of Human Rights Due Diligence in the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights|400
3|12.2.2 Operationalising Due Diligence Through the Work of the OECD|403
2|12.3 The Dutch Agreement on Sustainable Garment and Textile|405
3|12.3.1 Background and Goals|406
3|12.3.2 The Commitments Made by the Enterprises in the Framework of Their Due Diligence Obligations|408
3|12.3.3 Institutional Features and the Mechanism for Review of Companies’ Action Plans|410
3|12.3.4 The Dispute Settlement Provisions|413
4|12.3.4.1 The Dispute Procedure|414
4|12.3.4.2 The Complaint Procedure|415
4|12.3.4.3 Does the Agreement’s Grievance Mechanism Fall Short of the UNGPs’ Effectiveness Requirements Enshrined in Principle 31?|416
2|12.4 Conclusion|418
2|References|421
1|13 Recognition of Sign Language Under International Law: A Case Study of Dutch Sign Language in the Netherlands|424
2|Abstract|424
2|13.1 Introduction|425
2|13.2 Dutch Sign Language, the Personal Experience of a Deaf Person|425
2|13.3 Recognition of Dutch Sign Language in the Netherlands|428
2|13.4 The Government’s Position on the Recognition of Dutch Sign Language|429
2|13.5 The UN Convention on Rights of Persons with Disabilities|431
2|13.6 Recognition of Dutch Sign Language Following Ratification of the Convention|440
2|13.7 The Future Ahead|442
2|References|443
1|Table of Cases|445
2|INTERNATIONAL|445
1|Index|447