File #2294: "2018_Book_OperationalLawInInternationalS.pdf"
Testo
1|Contents|6
1|Introduction: Challenges in Operational Maritime Law|8
2|1 Introduction|9
2|2 Today´s Maritime Challenges|9
3|2.1 Maritime Security|10
3|2.2 Persons|11
3|2.3 Non-international Armed Conflict|12
2|3 Traditional Conflict Is Not a Thing of the Past|12
2|4 Operational Maritime Law|13
2|References|14
1|Part I: International Straits|16
2|Minelaying and the Impediment of Passage Rights|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 The Law of International Armed Conflict on Naval Mines and Passage Rights|19
4|2.1 The 1907 Hague Convention VIII and the Freedom of Navigation|19
4|2.2 Subsequent Practice and Developments|23
5|2.2.1 The Two World Wars|23
5|2.2.2 Post-1945 Mining During International Armed Conflicts|23
5|2.2.3 Some Preliminary Conclusions|27
4|2.3 Belligerent Minelaying and Passage Rights: Contemporary Law|28
5|2.3.1 Access to and from Neutral Waters|28
5|2.3.2 Belligerent National Waters and the Right of Innocent Passage|29
5|2.3.3 Transit Passage and Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage Through Belligerent Waters|30
5|2.3.4 Neutral Navigation in International Waters|32
4|2.4 Notification|33
4|2.5 Demining Operations by Neutral States|34
3|3 Peacetime Mining|34
4|3.1 National Positions on Peacetime Mining Operations|35
4|3.2 The Corfu Channel Judgment|37
4|3.3 Peacetime Mining and UNCLOS Navigational Provisions|38
5|3.3.1 Innocent Passage|38
5|3.3.2 Transit Passage and Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage|39
5|3.3.3 Freedom of Navigation in High Seas Areas|39
3|4 Concluding Remarks|40
3|References|41
2|``Left of Splash´´ Legal Issues Related to the Use of Force to Counter Mining in the Strait of Hormuz|44
3|1 Foreword by Rear Admiral (Ret.). Kenneth M. Perry, U.S. Navy, Former Vice Commander of Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare...|45
3|2 Could a Nation Maintain a Persistent MCM Presence in the SOH?|46
3|3 Could Iran Lawfully Mine Its TTS?|47
3|4 Could Iran Lawfully Mine the SOH?|47
3|5 Is Iranian Mining ``An Act of War?´´|48
3|6 Are There Any Rules Concerning Responses to Unlawful Mining?|48
3|7 Could a Nation Use Force If Mines Are Emplaced Directly in the Path of a Vessel?|50
3|8 Could a Nation Use Force After a Mine Strike When the Mine Was Not Emplaced ``Directly in the Path´´ of a Transiting Vessel?|51
3|9 During Peacetime, Could a Nation Use Force to Counter Mining in Sea Lanes Leading Toward the SOH and Its Approaches?|51
3|10 During Peacetime, Could Nations Use Force Against Minelaying Assets ``Left of Splash´´ or ``In the Act of´´ Mining the SOH ...|52
3|11 Could Nations Use Force If Iran Did Mine the SOH or Its Approaches?|53
3|References|53
2|International Straits: Peacetime Rights and Obligations|55
3|1 Introduction|56
3|2 The True Nature of the Right of Transit Passage|57
3|3 Where to Pass through|59
3|4 Territorial Scope of the Right of Transit Passage|61
3|5 Duty to Render Assistance|63
3|6 The Problematic Notion of `Normal Mode´: How to Pass Through|65
3|7 The Right of Self-Defence During Transit Passage|67
3|8 Conclusion|68
3|References|69
2|Belligerent Rights and Obligations in International Straits|71
3|1 Preliminary Remark|72
3|2 Findings|73
4|2.1 The Right of Passage|73
5|Offensive Operations|73
5|Base for Naval Operations|73
5|No Sanctuary|74
5|Self-Defence|74
4|2.2 Passage Right Scenarios|78
4|2.3 Belligerent Waters|79
4|2.4 Neutral Waters and Neutral States´ Rights|80
3|3 Recommendations|85
3|References|86
2|The Legal Status of Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands Including a Brief History of the Legal Dispute|88
3|1 Introduction|89
3|2 Geographical Setting and Strategic Importance|90
3|3 History of the Legal Dispute from the Perspective of Both States|90
4|3.1 General Background|91
4|3.2 The Perspective of Iran|93
5|3.2.1 The Historical Supremacy of Iran in the Gulf Region and Its State Sovereignty Over the Islands|93
5|3.2.2 The Qawasim As Persian Subjects|93
5|3.2.3 The Doctrine of Revocation|93
5|3.2.4 A Package Deal with Great Britain|94
4|3.3 The Perspective of the UAE|94
5|3.3.1 A Priority in Occupation and Control|94
5|3.3.2 The Qawasim Were Independent Rulers Exercising Their Sovereignty Over the Islands|94
5|3.3.3 The Emirates As Protected States Were Subjects of Public International Law|95
5|3.3.4 Persian Occupation of the Islands was Temporary|95
3|4 Legal Assessment|95
4|4.1 The Factual Challenges Inherent to the Dispute Over the Islands|95
4|4.2 The Assessment of the Arguments of the UAE and Iran|96
4|4.3 The Actions of Iran and the Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force in International Relations|96
4|4.4 The Situation of the Tunbs Under the Rules Concerning the Determination of Borders in Public International Law|97
4|4.5 A Derivative Acquisition of the Islands: Annexation and Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter|98
4|4.6 Possible Modes of Settling the Dispute Between the UAE and Iran|99
3|5 Conclusion|100
3|References|100
1|Part II: Maritime Safety and Maritime Security|102
2|International Law and Search and Rescue|103
3|1 Introduction|104
3|2 Overview: Global Search-and-Rescue System|107
4|2.1 Search-and-Rescue Regions|109
4|2.2 Rescue Coordination Center (RCC)/Rescue Subcenter (RSC)|111
4|2.3 Obligations of the Shipmaster and the Coastal State: Persons Rescued at Sea|112
5|2.3.1 Shipmaster|113
5|2.3.2 Coastal State|118
4|2.4 Mixed Migration by Sea|121
3|3 Assistance Entry|125
4|3.1 Scenario A|128
4|3.2 Scenario B|129
4|3.3 Scenario C|131
4|3.4 Scenario D|132
4|3.5 Scenario E|132
4|3.6 Scenario F|133
4|3.7 Scenario G|133
3|4 Forcible Evacuation for SAR|136
3|5 Summary|140
3|References|141
2|A Review of Selected Measures for Reducing Potential Conflict Among Naval Vessels in the South China Sea|144
3|1 Introduction|145
3|2 The Meaning of Conflict|147
4|2.1 `Armed Conflict´ and `Armed Attack´|147
3|3 Regulation of Activities at Sea|149
3|4 The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention|151
3|5 The Maritime Environment|154
3|6 Implications for Naval Operations in the South China Sea|156
3|7 Conclusion|158
3|References|159
4|International Instruments and Court Rulings|160
2|What Went Wrong When Regulating Private Maritime Security Companies|162
3|1 Introduction|163
3|2 The Private Security Regulatory Initiatives That Were Rejected|164
4|2.1 The Montreux Document|164
4|2.2 The International Code of Conduct|165
4|2.3 The ICoC Association|167
4|2.4 ANSI/ASIS PSC.4 Standard|167
4|2.5 None of the Above|168
3|3 What Has Been Done to Regulate PMSCs|169
4|3.1 IMO Circulars|169
4|3.2 ISO 28007|171
4|3.3 Nongovernmental Initiatives|172
3|4 Private Maritime Security Beyond Transits|174
4|4.1 The Current State of Transits and Decline in the Industry|174
4|4.2 Other Private Maritime Security|175
3|5 Conclusion|178
3|References|179
2|`in These Exceptional and Specific Circumstances´: The EU Military Operation Against Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the So...|182
3|1 Introduction|183
3|2 EU Mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA|184
3|3 UN Security Council Resolution 2240(2015)|185
3|4 Flag State Consent and UNSCR 2240(2015)|186
3|5 Rescue of Persons at Sea|187
3|6 Disembarkation of Rescued and Apprehended Persons|188
3|7 Collection and Transition of Personal Data|189
3|8 Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement|190
3|9 Conclusion|192
3|References|193
2|From Piracy to Palermo: The Changing Challenges of Maritime Crime|195
3|1 Introduction|196
3|2 The Wave of Piracy|196
3|3 Resolution 2240|199
3|4 Human Trafficking vs Migrant Smuggling|201
3|5 Combatting Transnational Crime Under Resolution 2240|202
3|6 Combatting Transnational Crime Under a Future Resolution|205
3|7 Conclusion|206
3|References|207
1|Part III: Law of Armed Conflict|209
2|Prize Law and Contraband in Modern Naval Warfare|210
3|1 Introduction|211
3|2 Definition of Prize and Contraband|211
3|3 History|212
3|4 Contemporary Public International Law|215
4|4.1 Existence of an Armed Conflict|215
4|4.2 Areas of Naval Warfare|216
5|4.2.1 Land Territory and Internal Waters, Territorial Sea|216
5|4.2.2 High Seas, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf|217
5|4.2.3 The Final Theatre of Naval Warfare|217
4|4.3 Subject to Prize Law and the Law of Contraband|217
5|4.3.1 Civilian Objects|218
5|4.3.2 Neutral or Enemy Character of Vessels and Aircraft|219
5|4.3.3 Enemy or Neutral Character of Goods|221
4|4.4 Right to Visit, Search and Diversion, Capture/Seizure|221
5|4.4.1 Entitlement to Exercise the Rights of Visit, Search and Diversion, Capture/Seizure and Condemnation|222
5|4.4.2 Visit, Search, Diversion|222
5|4.4.3 Measures of Supervision|224
5|4.4.4 Resistance to Visit and Search|225
5|4.4.5 Capture/Seizure of Enemy Vessels or Aircraft|226
5|4.4.6 Capture/Seizure of Cargo on Board of Enemy Vessels or Aircraft|228
5|4.4.7 Capture/Seizure of Neutral Vessels or Aircraft|230
6|4.4.7.1 Carriage of Contraband|231
6|4.4.7.2 Un-neutral Service|233
6|4.4.7.3 Consequences of the Exceptional Liability to Capture of Neutral Vessels or Aircraft|234
5|4.4.8 Capture/Seizure of Cargo on Board of Neutral Vessels and Aircraft|235
4|4.5 Prize Court Proceedings|236
5|4.5.1 The General Rule of Prize Court Proceedings|236
5|4.5.2 Consequences of Improper Exercise of Rights|238
3|5 Concluding Remarks|238
3|References|240
2|The Right of Visit of Foreign-Flagged Vessels on the High Seas in Non-international Armed Conflict|243
3|1 Introduction|243
3|2 Three Theories for Ship Boarding During a NIAC|244
4|2.1 Theory One: Self-Defence As a Basis for a Single-Action Ship Boarding|245
4|2.2 Theory Two: A Self-Defence Right of Visit|246
4|2.3 Theory Three: The Vessel As Military Objective|247
3|3 Purpose of a NIAC Visit|248
3|4 Advantages|248
3|5 Concerns|249
3|6 Concluding Remarks|250
3|References|250
2|Occupation of Sea Territory: Requirements for Military Authority and a Comparison to Art. 43 of the Hague Convention IV|252
3|1 Legal Basis and Scope: Law of Occupation and Sea Territory|252
4|1.1 Legal Basis|253
4|1.2 Scope and Applicability of the Law of Occupation|254
5|1.2.1 The Hague Convention (IV) and the Hague Regulations|254
5|1.2.2 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV)|258
5|1.2.3 Additional Protocol I (AP I)|258
5|1.2.4 Human Rights Law|259
5|1.2.5 UN Security Council Resolutions|259
3|2 Military Authority: Requirements and Application to Sea Territory|260
4|2.1 Meaning of Military Authority|260
4|2.2 Requirements and Scope|260
5|2.2.1 Requirements|260
5|2.2.2 Effective Control in the Context of Belligerent Occupation|262
5|2.2.3 Scope and Limits of Military Authority|263
4|2.3 Transfer and Scope of Military Authority Over Sea Territory|264
5|2.3.1 Authority and Effective Control Over Sea Territory|264
5|2.3.2 Scope|268
3|3 Rights and Duties of the Occupying Power: Reference and Transfer of Art. 43 of Hague Convention IV|271
4|3.1 Art. 43 of Hague Convention IV|271
5|3.1.1 Public Order and Life|272
5|3.1.2 Legislation and the Existing Legal System|273
4|3.2 Transfer and Adaption of Art. 43 Over Occupied Sea Territory|278
3|4 Conclusion|283
3|References|283
4|Books and Articles|283
4|Judgments and Court Decisions|285
4|Treaties and Resolutions|285
1|Introduction: Challenges in Operational Maritime Law|8
2|1 Introduction|9
2|2 Today´s Maritime Challenges|9
3|2.1 Maritime Security|10
3|2.2 Persons|11
3|2.3 Non-international Armed Conflict|12
2|3 Traditional Conflict Is Not a Thing of the Past|12
2|4 Operational Maritime Law|13
2|References|14
1|Part I: International Straits|16
2|Minelaying and the Impediment of Passage Rights|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 The Law of International Armed Conflict on Naval Mines and Passage Rights|19
4|2.1 The 1907 Hague Convention VIII and the Freedom of Navigation|19
4|2.2 Subsequent Practice and Developments|23
5|2.2.1 The Two World Wars|23
5|2.2.2 Post-1945 Mining During International Armed Conflicts|23
5|2.2.3 Some Preliminary Conclusions|27
4|2.3 Belligerent Minelaying and Passage Rights: Contemporary Law|28
5|2.3.1 Access to and from Neutral Waters|28
5|2.3.2 Belligerent National Waters and the Right of Innocent Passage|29
5|2.3.3 Transit Passage and Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage Through Belligerent Waters|30
5|2.3.4 Neutral Navigation in International Waters|32
4|2.4 Notification|33
4|2.5 Demining Operations by Neutral States|34
3|3 Peacetime Mining|34
4|3.1 National Positions on Peacetime Mining Operations|35
4|3.2 The Corfu Channel Judgment|37
4|3.3 Peacetime Mining and UNCLOS Navigational Provisions|38
5|3.3.1 Innocent Passage|38
5|3.3.2 Transit Passage and Archipelagic Sea-Lane Passage|39
5|3.3.3 Freedom of Navigation in High Seas Areas|39
3|4 Concluding Remarks|40
3|References|41
2|``Left of Splash´´ Legal Issues Related to the Use of Force to Counter Mining in the Strait of Hormuz|44
3|1 Foreword by Rear Admiral (Ret.). Kenneth M. Perry, U.S. Navy, Former Vice Commander of Naval Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare...|45
3|2 Could a Nation Maintain a Persistent MCM Presence in the SOH?|46
3|3 Could Iran Lawfully Mine Its TTS?|47
3|4 Could Iran Lawfully Mine the SOH?|47
3|5 Is Iranian Mining ``An Act of War?´´|48
3|6 Are There Any Rules Concerning Responses to Unlawful Mining?|48
3|7 Could a Nation Use Force If Mines Are Emplaced Directly in the Path of a Vessel?|50
3|8 Could a Nation Use Force After a Mine Strike When the Mine Was Not Emplaced ``Directly in the Path´´ of a Transiting Vessel?|51
3|9 During Peacetime, Could a Nation Use Force to Counter Mining in Sea Lanes Leading Toward the SOH and Its Approaches?|51
3|10 During Peacetime, Could Nations Use Force Against Minelaying Assets ``Left of Splash´´ or ``In the Act of´´ Mining the SOH ...|52
3|11 Could Nations Use Force If Iran Did Mine the SOH or Its Approaches?|53
3|References|53
2|International Straits: Peacetime Rights and Obligations|55
3|1 Introduction|56
3|2 The True Nature of the Right of Transit Passage|57
3|3 Where to Pass through|59
3|4 Territorial Scope of the Right of Transit Passage|61
3|5 Duty to Render Assistance|63
3|6 The Problematic Notion of `Normal Mode´: How to Pass Through|65
3|7 The Right of Self-Defence During Transit Passage|67
3|8 Conclusion|68
3|References|69
2|Belligerent Rights and Obligations in International Straits|71
3|1 Preliminary Remark|72
3|2 Findings|73
4|2.1 The Right of Passage|73
5|Offensive Operations|73
5|Base for Naval Operations|73
5|No Sanctuary|74
5|Self-Defence|74
4|2.2 Passage Right Scenarios|78
4|2.3 Belligerent Waters|79
4|2.4 Neutral Waters and Neutral States´ Rights|80
3|3 Recommendations|85
3|References|86
2|The Legal Status of Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands Including a Brief History of the Legal Dispute|88
3|1 Introduction|89
3|2 Geographical Setting and Strategic Importance|90
3|3 History of the Legal Dispute from the Perspective of Both States|90
4|3.1 General Background|91
4|3.2 The Perspective of Iran|93
5|3.2.1 The Historical Supremacy of Iran in the Gulf Region and Its State Sovereignty Over the Islands|93
5|3.2.2 The Qawasim As Persian Subjects|93
5|3.2.3 The Doctrine of Revocation|93
5|3.2.4 A Package Deal with Great Britain|94
4|3.3 The Perspective of the UAE|94
5|3.3.1 A Priority in Occupation and Control|94
5|3.3.2 The Qawasim Were Independent Rulers Exercising Their Sovereignty Over the Islands|94
5|3.3.3 The Emirates As Protected States Were Subjects of Public International Law|95
5|3.3.4 Persian Occupation of the Islands was Temporary|95
3|4 Legal Assessment|95
4|4.1 The Factual Challenges Inherent to the Dispute Over the Islands|95
4|4.2 The Assessment of the Arguments of the UAE and Iran|96
4|4.3 The Actions of Iran and the Prohibition of Threat or Use of Force in International Relations|96
4|4.4 The Situation of the Tunbs Under the Rules Concerning the Determination of Borders in Public International Law|97
4|4.5 A Derivative Acquisition of the Islands: Annexation and Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter|98
4|4.6 Possible Modes of Settling the Dispute Between the UAE and Iran|99
3|5 Conclusion|100
3|References|100
1|Part II: Maritime Safety and Maritime Security|102
2|International Law and Search and Rescue|103
3|1 Introduction|104
3|2 Overview: Global Search-and-Rescue System|107
4|2.1 Search-and-Rescue Regions|109
4|2.2 Rescue Coordination Center (RCC)/Rescue Subcenter (RSC)|111
4|2.3 Obligations of the Shipmaster and the Coastal State: Persons Rescued at Sea|112
5|2.3.1 Shipmaster|113
5|2.3.2 Coastal State|118
4|2.4 Mixed Migration by Sea|121
3|3 Assistance Entry|125
4|3.1 Scenario A|128
4|3.2 Scenario B|129
4|3.3 Scenario C|131
4|3.4 Scenario D|132
4|3.5 Scenario E|132
4|3.6 Scenario F|133
4|3.7 Scenario G|133
3|4 Forcible Evacuation for SAR|136
3|5 Summary|140
3|References|141
2|A Review of Selected Measures for Reducing Potential Conflict Among Naval Vessels in the South China Sea|144
3|1 Introduction|145
3|2 The Meaning of Conflict|147
4|2.1 `Armed Conflict´ and `Armed Attack´|147
3|3 Regulation of Activities at Sea|149
3|4 The Impact of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention|151
3|5 The Maritime Environment|154
3|6 Implications for Naval Operations in the South China Sea|156
3|7 Conclusion|158
3|References|159
4|International Instruments and Court Rulings|160
2|What Went Wrong When Regulating Private Maritime Security Companies|162
3|1 Introduction|163
3|2 The Private Security Regulatory Initiatives That Were Rejected|164
4|2.1 The Montreux Document|164
4|2.2 The International Code of Conduct|165
4|2.3 The ICoC Association|167
4|2.4 ANSI/ASIS PSC.4 Standard|167
4|2.5 None of the Above|168
3|3 What Has Been Done to Regulate PMSCs|169
4|3.1 IMO Circulars|169
4|3.2 ISO 28007|171
4|3.3 Nongovernmental Initiatives|172
3|4 Private Maritime Security Beyond Transits|174
4|4.1 The Current State of Transits and Decline in the Industry|174
4|4.2 Other Private Maritime Security|175
3|5 Conclusion|178
3|References|179
2|`in These Exceptional and Specific Circumstances´: The EU Military Operation Against Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the So...|182
3|1 Introduction|183
3|2 EU Mandate of EUNAVFOR MED Operation SOPHIA|184
3|3 UN Security Council Resolution 2240(2015)|185
3|4 Flag State Consent and UNSCR 2240(2015)|186
3|5 Rescue of Persons at Sea|187
3|6 Disembarkation of Rescued and Apprehended Persons|188
3|7 Collection and Transition of Personal Data|189
3|8 Use of Force and the Rules of Engagement|190
3|9 Conclusion|192
3|References|193
2|From Piracy to Palermo: The Changing Challenges of Maritime Crime|195
3|1 Introduction|196
3|2 The Wave of Piracy|196
3|3 Resolution 2240|199
3|4 Human Trafficking vs Migrant Smuggling|201
3|5 Combatting Transnational Crime Under Resolution 2240|202
3|6 Combatting Transnational Crime Under a Future Resolution|205
3|7 Conclusion|206
3|References|207
1|Part III: Law of Armed Conflict|209
2|Prize Law and Contraband in Modern Naval Warfare|210
3|1 Introduction|211
3|2 Definition of Prize and Contraband|211
3|3 History|212
3|4 Contemporary Public International Law|215
4|4.1 Existence of an Armed Conflict|215
4|4.2 Areas of Naval Warfare|216
5|4.2.1 Land Territory and Internal Waters, Territorial Sea|216
5|4.2.2 High Seas, Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf|217
5|4.2.3 The Final Theatre of Naval Warfare|217
4|4.3 Subject to Prize Law and the Law of Contraband|217
5|4.3.1 Civilian Objects|218
5|4.3.2 Neutral or Enemy Character of Vessels and Aircraft|219
5|4.3.3 Enemy or Neutral Character of Goods|221
4|4.4 Right to Visit, Search and Diversion, Capture/Seizure|221
5|4.4.1 Entitlement to Exercise the Rights of Visit, Search and Diversion, Capture/Seizure and Condemnation|222
5|4.4.2 Visit, Search, Diversion|222
5|4.4.3 Measures of Supervision|224
5|4.4.4 Resistance to Visit and Search|225
5|4.4.5 Capture/Seizure of Enemy Vessels or Aircraft|226
5|4.4.6 Capture/Seizure of Cargo on Board of Enemy Vessels or Aircraft|228
5|4.4.7 Capture/Seizure of Neutral Vessels or Aircraft|230
6|4.4.7.1 Carriage of Contraband|231
6|4.4.7.2 Un-neutral Service|233
6|4.4.7.3 Consequences of the Exceptional Liability to Capture of Neutral Vessels or Aircraft|234
5|4.4.8 Capture/Seizure of Cargo on Board of Neutral Vessels and Aircraft|235
4|4.5 Prize Court Proceedings|236
5|4.5.1 The General Rule of Prize Court Proceedings|236
5|4.5.2 Consequences of Improper Exercise of Rights|238
3|5 Concluding Remarks|238
3|References|240
2|The Right of Visit of Foreign-Flagged Vessels on the High Seas in Non-international Armed Conflict|243
3|1 Introduction|243
3|2 Three Theories for Ship Boarding During a NIAC|244
4|2.1 Theory One: Self-Defence As a Basis for a Single-Action Ship Boarding|245
4|2.2 Theory Two: A Self-Defence Right of Visit|246
4|2.3 Theory Three: The Vessel As Military Objective|247
3|3 Purpose of a NIAC Visit|248
3|4 Advantages|248
3|5 Concerns|249
3|6 Concluding Remarks|250
3|References|250
2|Occupation of Sea Territory: Requirements for Military Authority and a Comparison to Art. 43 of the Hague Convention IV|252
3|1 Legal Basis and Scope: Law of Occupation and Sea Territory|252
4|1.1 Legal Basis|253
4|1.2 Scope and Applicability of the Law of Occupation|254
5|1.2.1 The Hague Convention (IV) and the Hague Regulations|254
5|1.2.2 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (GC IV)|258
5|1.2.3 Additional Protocol I (AP I)|258
5|1.2.4 Human Rights Law|259
5|1.2.5 UN Security Council Resolutions|259
3|2 Military Authority: Requirements and Application to Sea Territory|260
4|2.1 Meaning of Military Authority|260
4|2.2 Requirements and Scope|260
5|2.2.1 Requirements|260
5|2.2.2 Effective Control in the Context of Belligerent Occupation|262
5|2.2.3 Scope and Limits of Military Authority|263
4|2.3 Transfer and Scope of Military Authority Over Sea Territory|264
5|2.3.1 Authority and Effective Control Over Sea Territory|264
5|2.3.2 Scope|268
3|3 Rights and Duties of the Occupying Power: Reference and Transfer of Art. 43 of Hague Convention IV|271
4|3.1 Art. 43 of Hague Convention IV|271
5|3.1.1 Public Order and Life|272
5|3.1.2 Legislation and the Existing Legal System|273
4|3.2 Transfer and Adaption of Art. 43 Over Occupied Sea Territory|278
3|4 Conclusion|283
3|References|283
4|Books and Articles|283
4|Judgments and Court Decisions|285
4|Treaties and Resolutions|285