File #2323: "2018_Book_AristotleOnEmotionsInLawAndPol.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|7
1|Contents|9
1|Contributors|12
1|Part I: Introduction|14
2|Chapter 1: The Debate About Emotion in Law and Politics|15
3|1.1 Theme of the Book|15
3|1.2 Practice and Theory|16
3|1.3 Multidisciplinarity|17
3|1.4 Cognition, Moral Agency and Legitimation|18
4|1.4.1 Cognition|18
4|1.4.2 Moral Agency|19
4|1.4.3 Legitimation|21
3|References|22
2|Chapter 2: Judicial Emotion as Vice or Virtue: Perspectives Both Ancient and New|23
3|2.1 Introduction|23
3|2.2 Aristotelian Thought Within Law and Emotion Scholarship|24
4|2.2.1 Some Background on Law and Emotion|24
4|2.2.2 Aristotle´s Theory of the Emotions and Contemporary Appraisal Theory|26
3|2.3 Emotion as a Judicial Virtue|27
4|2.3.1 The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion|28
4|2.3.2 Judicial Emotion Through the Lens of Aristotelian Virtue: The Case of Anger|29
5|2.3.2.1 Seneca and Aristotle on Anger|30
5|2.3.2.2 Judicial Anger Through an Aristotelian Lens|32
3|2.4 Conclusion|35
3|References|36
3|Cases|38
2|Chapter 3: Dispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians|39
3|3.1 An Amateurish Case for the Ideal of Dispassionate Judges|40
3|3.2 The Emotional Approach in Legal Studies|41
3|3.3 Judges Getting Angry|42
3|3.4 Some Quick and Dirty Comments|45
3|3.5 How Aristotle Comes In|46
3|3.6 Aristotle and Angry Judges: A Mismatch?|48
3|3.7 Aristotelian Emotions and Virtue Theory|51
3|3.8 Aristotle and the Alleged Rationality of Emotions|54
3|3.9 Angry Judges in Aristotle´s Rhetoric|57
3|3.10 Conclusion|59
3|References|60
1|Part II: Cognition|62
2|Chapter 4: Emotion and Rationality in Aristotle´s Model: From Anthropology to Politics|63
3|4.1 Introduction|63
3|4.2 A Circular Anthropology|64
3|4.3 Analysis of Some Key-Concepts|70
4|4.3.1 Sensation (Aisthesis): A Complex Structure|71
4|4.3.2 Emotion (Pathos): Linguistic Dimension|77
4|4.3.3 Pity (Eleos) and Fear (Phobos)|80
5|4.3.3.1 Intermezzo|84
4|4.3.4 Desire (Orexis)|84
4|4.3.5 Impulse (Thumos)|87
3|4.4 A Recap and Some Remarks|89
3|4.5 Some Concluding Remarks About the Feasibility of Aristotle´s Theory in View of a Post-Cartesian Model of Human Identity|90
3|References|94
2|Chapter 5: Logoi enuloi. Aristotle´s Contribution to the Contemporary Debate on Emotions and Decision-Making|100
3|5.1 Introduction|100
3|5.2 Organism as Integrated Unity|103
3|5.3 Emotion and Feeling|104
3|5.4 The ``Crown Jewel´´|106
3|5.5 The Need of Forms: From Damasio to Aristotle|108
3|5.6 Emotions as logoi enuloi|110
3|5.7 Emotion as Mediation|113
3|5.8 Emotion and Decision-Making|115
3|5.9 Conclusion: Managing Emotion in Juridical Experience|116
3|References|118
2|Chapter 6: Aristotle´s Functionalism and the Rise of Nominalism in Law and Politics: Law, Emotion and Language|121
3|6.1 Introduction: Two Premises|122
3|6.2 Functionalism|124
3|6.3 Practical Truth and Functionalism in Law and Politics|128
4|6.3.1 Practical Truth|128
4|6.3.2 Functionalism in Law and Politics|130
3|6.4 Function Argument in Aquinas´ and Ockham´s Political Writings|131
4|6.4.1 Aquinas´ De regimine principum|132
4|6.4.2 Ockham´s Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico|135
3|6.5 Conclusion|136
3|References|137
2|Chapter 7: On Logos, Pathos and Ethos in Judicial Argumentation|140
3|7.1 Introduction|140
3|7.2 Aristotle´s Rhetorical Categories|142
4|7.2.1 Logos|143
4|7.2.2 Pathos|145
4|7.2.3 Ethos|146
3|7.3 Rhetorical Empirical Analysis of Judicial Decisions|148
4|7.3.1 Problematic Thinking and the Role of Topos in Judicial Discourse|148
4|7.3.2 Rhetorical Empirical Method|150
3|7.4 The Rhetorical Categories in the International Judicial Argumentation|152
4|7.4.1 Human Dignity as Topos in International Law|152
4|7.4.2 Rhetorical Analysis at International Court of Justice (ICJ)|154
3|7.5 Conclusions|158
3|References|159
3|Cases|160
2|Chapter 8: Religion of Humanity: A Shift from a Dialogical to a Categorical Model of Rationality|161
3|8.1 Introduction|161
3|8.2 Aristotle´s Zoology|164
4|8.2.1 Diversity and Functionality|164
4|8.2.2 Zoological Method, Subject and Predicate|165
4|8.2.3 Theory and Religion|166
4|8.2.4 The Dialogical Good|167
4|8.2.5 Laws|168
3|8.3 Civic Morality: Aristotle´s Subjective Authority|170
4|8.3.1 Office|170
4|8.3.2 Deliberation and the Act|171
4|8.3.3 Subjective Authority|172
4|8.3.4 The Judicial Procedure: Separation Between Formal and Substantial Decisions|172
4|8.3.5 Partnership in the Perception of Good and Bad|174
4|8.3.6 Pure Theory|175
3|8.4 Political Education|177
4|8.4.1 Aristotle´s View on Political Education|177
4|8.4.2 Intermediate Conclusion|179
4|8.4.3 Enlightened View on Political Education|180
4|8.4.4 Categorical Rationality|181
3|8.5 Three Religions of Humanity|183
4|8.5.1 Rousseau|184
5|8.5.1.1 State of Nature|184
5|8.5.1.2 The Sacrifice|186
5|8.5.1.3 Religion and Tolerance|188
5|8.5.1.4 The Democratic Spirit: Critical Culture|190
4|8.5.2 Kant|191
5|8.5.2.1 Epistemology|191
5|8.5.2.2 Critical Discussion|193
5|8.5.2.3 Kant´s Religion of Humanity|195
4|8.5.3 Comte|196
5|8.5.3.1 Positivist Science|196
5|8.5.3.2 Comte´s Three Stages of Development: Theological, Metaphysical and Positive|197
5|8.5.3.3 Comte´s Religion of Humanity|199
3|8.6 Conclusion|201
3|References|202
1|Part III: Moral Agency|207
2|Chapter 9: Aristotle on Emotions in Ethics and in Criminal Justice|208
3|9.1 Introduction|208
3|9.2 The Dialectical Definition of Emotion in the Rhetoric|209
3|9.3 The Scientific Definition of Emotion in De Anima|210
3|9.4 Kinds of Desire and Parts of the Soul|211
3|9.5 Athenian Law on Homicide and Plato´s Proposal|212
3|9.6 Aristotle on Voluntary and Involuntary Homicide and on Prohairesis|213
3|9.7 Moral Action, Omission and Negligence|217
3|9.8 The Cases of Weakness of the Will (Akrasia)|219
3|References|220
2|Chapter 10: Ethical Theory and Judicial Practice: Passions and Crimes of Passion in Plato, Aristotle and Lysias|222
3|10.1 Passion, Actions and Criminal Law|223
3|10.2 Plato, The Laws, Book IX|224
3|10.3 Aristotle|227
4|10.3.1 The Portrayal of Anger in the ``Rhetoric of Passions´´|228
4|10.3.2 Unjust and Voluntary|230
4|10.3.3 Lack of Control of the Impulsive Desire (Thumos)|232
4|10.3.4 A Case of a ``Crime of Honour´´: Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthenes|234
4|10.3.5 Anger: Negative Pathos or Civil Pathos?|237
3|References|239
2|Chapter 11: What Does Nemesis Have to Do with the Legal System? Discussing Aristotle´s Neglected Emotion and Its Relevance for...|242
3|11.1 Introduction|243
3|11.2 Nemesis Defined in Aristotelian Terms|243
4|11.2.1 Nemesis as a Moral Emotion|243
5|11.2.1.1 Nemesis and Aischune|244
5|11.2.1.2 Nemesis and Eleos|244
5|11.2.1.3 Nemesis and Envy|245
5|11.2.1.4 Nemesis and Zelos|246
5|11.2.1.5 Nemesis as a Moderate Emotion|246
5|11.2.1.6 Merit|247
5|11.2.1.7 Nemesis and Ploutos|248
5|11.2.1.8 Nemesis in Synthesis|248
4|11.2.2 Aristotle´s Nemesis and the Idea of Justice|249
4|11.2.3 Nemesis and Rectificatory Justice|250
3|11.3 Aristotelian Nemesis and Indignation in Contemporary Discourse: Differences and Similarities|252
3|11.4 Pain at Unmerited Good Fortune in Politics|255
3|11.5 Nemesis and Legal Reasoning|257
3|11.6 Law and Unmerited Fortune: The Double Face of Indignation|260
3|11.7 Conclusions|261
3|References|262
3|Cases|264
2|Chapter 12: Rethinking Legal Education from Aristotle´s Theory of Emotions and the Contemporary Challenges of the Practical Re...|265
3|12.1 Introduction|265
3|12.2 Aristotle and Emotions|266
3|12.3 The Education of Desire Through Reason and Practical Deliberation|268
3|12.4 The Excellence of Phronesis and Law|271
3|12.5 The Juridical Decision as a Special Kind of Practical Decision|272
3|12.6 Legal Education: A Critical Reflection in the Light of Aristotle´s Understanding of Emotions, Combined with the Contribut...|275
4|12.6.1 A Re-Founder Reflection for a Renewed Law School|275
4|12.6.2 Final Notes|278
3|References|278
2|Chapter 13: Remorse and Virtue Ethics|280
3|13.1 Introduction|280
3|13.2 Dirty Hands|281
3|13.3 Overall Evaluations|283
3|13.4 Dirty Hands According to Nielsen|285
3|13.5 Aristotle|286
4|13.5.1 Eudaimonia, Function, and Soul|286
4|13.5.2 Acquiring the Moral Excellence|288
4|13.5.3 Performing the Moral Excellence|289
4|13.5.4 Community and Upbringing|290
3|13.6 Being Concerned with Other Things|290
4|13.6.1 Eudaimonia|291
4|13.6.2 Others|292
4|13.6.3 Character|294
4|13.6.4 Walzer|295
3|13.7 Psychological Versus Moral|296
3|References|297
2|Chapter 14: Virtue as a Synthesis of Extremes Versus Virtue as a Mean Between Extremes: A Comparison of Chesterton´s Account o...|299
3|14.1 Introduction|299
3|14.2 The Chestertonian Account: Reconstruction|300
3|14.3 The Chestertonian Account: Evaluation|303
4|14.3.1 Weak Points|303
4|14.3.2 Strong Points|305
4|14.3.3 Unclear Points|308
5|14.3.3.1 Firstly|308
5|14.3.3.2 Secondly|310
3|14.4 Concluding Remarks|311
3|References|313
2|Chapter 15: The Place of Slavery in the Aristotelian Framework of Law, Reason and Emotion|314
3|15.1 Introduction|314
3|15.2 Excursus on the Position of the Slave|318
3|15.3 The Politics, Book 1|319
3|15.4 The Platonic Background|325
3|15.5 The Slave: Reason, Emotion and Law|328
3|15.6 Conclusion|331
3|References|332
1|Part IV: Legitimation|335
2|Chapter 16: Empathic Political Animal: What a North Korean Prison Camp Can Reveal About the Aristotelian Political Association|336
3|16.1 Introduction: The Memoir of Shin Dong-hyuk|337
3|16.2 The First Line of Inquiry in Politics I.2|338
3|16.3 Two Lines of Inquiry Meet|340
3|16.4 Is Incapability of Associating About Empathy?|341
3|16.5 Reward Marriage as the Sole Association|342
3|16.6 Developing a Scale of Selfishness|344
3|16.7 Towards Inferring Empathy in Aristotle|346
3|16.8 The Preliminary Question of Projective Empathy|347
3|16.9 Concepts Close to Empathy in Aristotle|349
4|16.9.1 Feeling the Same as a Friend Does|350
4|16.9.2 Emotional Contagion in `Problems Arising from Sympathy´|351
4|16.9.3 Discernment and Understanding: Their Relation to Empathy and Sympathy|353
4|16.9.4 Education from Music|356
3|16.10 Conclusion: An Aristotelian Concept of Empathy|356
3|References|357
2|Chapter 17: Emotions: Impediment or Basis of Political Life?|360
3|17.1 Introduction|360
3|17.2 Natural Approach of Aristotle´s Theory|363
3|17.3 Emotions as Condition of Possibility for Being a Citizen|365
4|17.3.1 The War Lover|365
4|17.3.2 Women, Children and Slaves|368
3|17.4 Love as Social Bond|372
4|17.4.1 Love of Family|372
4|17.4.2 Love for Money|374
4|17.4.3 Love for Oneself|377
3|17.5 The Role of the Multitude for the Rule of Law|378
4|17.5.1 Rule of Law|378
4|17.5.2 The Multitude|379
3|17.6 Conclusions|381
3|References|382
2|Chapter 18: Aristotle´s Rhetoric and the Persistence of the Emotions in the Courtroom|384
3|18.1 Introduction|384
3|18.2 Defining the Art of Rhetoric|389
3|18.3 The Role of the Emotions|391
3|18.4 The Rule of Law|394
3|18.5 Conclusion|396
3|References|397
2|Chapter 19: Rhetoric, Emotions and the Rule of Law in Aristotle|399
3|19.1 Introduction|399
3|19.2 The Austere Conception of Rhetoric and Judicial Speeches|402
3|19.3 The Austere Conception of Rhetoric and Deliberative Speeches|406
3|19.4 Judging What Is Best for the Whole in Political Deliberation|408
3|19.5 Conclusion|413
3|References|414
2|Chapter 20: Aristotle´s Political Friendship (politike philia) as Solidarity|415
3|20.1 Introduction|415
3|20.2 Personal Friendship (philia) and Political Friendship (politike philia)|418
3|20.3 Homonoia (Concord)|420
3|20.4 Political Friendship for Utility or for Virtue?|422
3|20.5 Political Friendship (politike philia) in Different Constitutions|425
3|20.6 Political Friendship (politike philia) in Relation to Different Objects (Especially Between Human Beings)|425
3|20.7 Public Education|429
3|References|430
2|Chapter 21: Between Nomos and Pathos: Emotions in Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication and the Dual Process Theory|432
3|21.1 Introduction|432
3|21.2 Virtue Centered Theory of Justice as a Union of Legal Rule (nomos) and Fairness (epieikeia)|434
3|21.3 Dual Process Theory Within the Light the Theory of Legal Decision|436
3|21.4 DPT and the Adjudication Under the Shadow of Emotions|441
3|21.5 Conclusion|445
3|References|446
1|About the Editors and Contributors|448
1|Glossary|454
1|Contents|9
1|Contributors|12
1|Part I: Introduction|14
2|Chapter 1: The Debate About Emotion in Law and Politics|15
3|1.1 Theme of the Book|15
3|1.2 Practice and Theory|16
3|1.3 Multidisciplinarity|17
3|1.4 Cognition, Moral Agency and Legitimation|18
4|1.4.1 Cognition|18
4|1.4.2 Moral Agency|19
4|1.4.3 Legitimation|21
3|References|22
2|Chapter 2: Judicial Emotion as Vice or Virtue: Perspectives Both Ancient and New|23
3|2.1 Introduction|23
3|2.2 Aristotelian Thought Within Law and Emotion Scholarship|24
4|2.2.1 Some Background on Law and Emotion|24
4|2.2.2 Aristotle´s Theory of the Emotions and Contemporary Appraisal Theory|26
3|2.3 Emotion as a Judicial Virtue|27
4|2.3.1 The Persistent Cultural Script of Judicial Dispassion|28
4|2.3.2 Judicial Emotion Through the Lens of Aristotelian Virtue: The Case of Anger|29
5|2.3.2.1 Seneca and Aristotle on Anger|30
5|2.3.2.2 Judicial Anger Through an Aristotelian Lens|32
3|2.4 Conclusion|35
3|References|36
3|Cases|38
2|Chapter 3: Dispassionate Judges Encountering Hotheaded Aristotelians|39
3|3.1 An Amateurish Case for the Ideal of Dispassionate Judges|40
3|3.2 The Emotional Approach in Legal Studies|41
3|3.3 Judges Getting Angry|42
3|3.4 Some Quick and Dirty Comments|45
3|3.5 How Aristotle Comes In|46
3|3.6 Aristotle and Angry Judges: A Mismatch?|48
3|3.7 Aristotelian Emotions and Virtue Theory|51
3|3.8 Aristotle and the Alleged Rationality of Emotions|54
3|3.9 Angry Judges in Aristotle´s Rhetoric|57
3|3.10 Conclusion|59
3|References|60
1|Part II: Cognition|62
2|Chapter 4: Emotion and Rationality in Aristotle´s Model: From Anthropology to Politics|63
3|4.1 Introduction|63
3|4.2 A Circular Anthropology|64
3|4.3 Analysis of Some Key-Concepts|70
4|4.3.1 Sensation (Aisthesis): A Complex Structure|71
4|4.3.2 Emotion (Pathos): Linguistic Dimension|77
4|4.3.3 Pity (Eleos) and Fear (Phobos)|80
5|4.3.3.1 Intermezzo|84
4|4.3.4 Desire (Orexis)|84
4|4.3.5 Impulse (Thumos)|87
3|4.4 A Recap and Some Remarks|89
3|4.5 Some Concluding Remarks About the Feasibility of Aristotle´s Theory in View of a Post-Cartesian Model of Human Identity|90
3|References|94
2|Chapter 5: Logoi enuloi. Aristotle´s Contribution to the Contemporary Debate on Emotions and Decision-Making|100
3|5.1 Introduction|100
3|5.2 Organism as Integrated Unity|103
3|5.3 Emotion and Feeling|104
3|5.4 The ``Crown Jewel´´|106
3|5.5 The Need of Forms: From Damasio to Aristotle|108
3|5.6 Emotions as logoi enuloi|110
3|5.7 Emotion as Mediation|113
3|5.8 Emotion and Decision-Making|115
3|5.9 Conclusion: Managing Emotion in Juridical Experience|116
3|References|118
2|Chapter 6: Aristotle´s Functionalism and the Rise of Nominalism in Law and Politics: Law, Emotion and Language|121
3|6.1 Introduction: Two Premises|122
3|6.2 Functionalism|124
3|6.3 Practical Truth and Functionalism in Law and Politics|128
4|6.3.1 Practical Truth|128
4|6.3.2 Functionalism in Law and Politics|130
3|6.4 Function Argument in Aquinas´ and Ockham´s Political Writings|131
4|6.4.1 Aquinas´ De regimine principum|132
4|6.4.2 Ockham´s Breviloquium de principatu tyrannico|135
3|6.5 Conclusion|136
3|References|137
2|Chapter 7: On Logos, Pathos and Ethos in Judicial Argumentation|140
3|7.1 Introduction|140
3|7.2 Aristotle´s Rhetorical Categories|142
4|7.2.1 Logos|143
4|7.2.2 Pathos|145
4|7.2.3 Ethos|146
3|7.3 Rhetorical Empirical Analysis of Judicial Decisions|148
4|7.3.1 Problematic Thinking and the Role of Topos in Judicial Discourse|148
4|7.3.2 Rhetorical Empirical Method|150
3|7.4 The Rhetorical Categories in the International Judicial Argumentation|152
4|7.4.1 Human Dignity as Topos in International Law|152
4|7.4.2 Rhetorical Analysis at International Court of Justice (ICJ)|154
3|7.5 Conclusions|158
3|References|159
3|Cases|160
2|Chapter 8: Religion of Humanity: A Shift from a Dialogical to a Categorical Model of Rationality|161
3|8.1 Introduction|161
3|8.2 Aristotle´s Zoology|164
4|8.2.1 Diversity and Functionality|164
4|8.2.2 Zoological Method, Subject and Predicate|165
4|8.2.3 Theory and Religion|166
4|8.2.4 The Dialogical Good|167
4|8.2.5 Laws|168
3|8.3 Civic Morality: Aristotle´s Subjective Authority|170
4|8.3.1 Office|170
4|8.3.2 Deliberation and the Act|171
4|8.3.3 Subjective Authority|172
4|8.3.4 The Judicial Procedure: Separation Between Formal and Substantial Decisions|172
4|8.3.5 Partnership in the Perception of Good and Bad|174
4|8.3.6 Pure Theory|175
3|8.4 Political Education|177
4|8.4.1 Aristotle´s View on Political Education|177
4|8.4.2 Intermediate Conclusion|179
4|8.4.3 Enlightened View on Political Education|180
4|8.4.4 Categorical Rationality|181
3|8.5 Three Religions of Humanity|183
4|8.5.1 Rousseau|184
5|8.5.1.1 State of Nature|184
5|8.5.1.2 The Sacrifice|186
5|8.5.1.3 Religion and Tolerance|188
5|8.5.1.4 The Democratic Spirit: Critical Culture|190
4|8.5.2 Kant|191
5|8.5.2.1 Epistemology|191
5|8.5.2.2 Critical Discussion|193
5|8.5.2.3 Kant´s Religion of Humanity|195
4|8.5.3 Comte|196
5|8.5.3.1 Positivist Science|196
5|8.5.3.2 Comte´s Three Stages of Development: Theological, Metaphysical and Positive|197
5|8.5.3.3 Comte´s Religion of Humanity|199
3|8.6 Conclusion|201
3|References|202
1|Part III: Moral Agency|207
2|Chapter 9: Aristotle on Emotions in Ethics and in Criminal Justice|208
3|9.1 Introduction|208
3|9.2 The Dialectical Definition of Emotion in the Rhetoric|209
3|9.3 The Scientific Definition of Emotion in De Anima|210
3|9.4 Kinds of Desire and Parts of the Soul|211
3|9.5 Athenian Law on Homicide and Plato´s Proposal|212
3|9.6 Aristotle on Voluntary and Involuntary Homicide and on Prohairesis|213
3|9.7 Moral Action, Omission and Negligence|217
3|9.8 The Cases of Weakness of the Will (Akrasia)|219
3|References|220
2|Chapter 10: Ethical Theory and Judicial Practice: Passions and Crimes of Passion in Plato, Aristotle and Lysias|222
3|10.1 Passion, Actions and Criminal Law|223
3|10.2 Plato, The Laws, Book IX|224
3|10.3 Aristotle|227
4|10.3.1 The Portrayal of Anger in the ``Rhetoric of Passions´´|228
4|10.3.2 Unjust and Voluntary|230
4|10.3.3 Lack of Control of the Impulsive Desire (Thumos)|232
4|10.3.4 A Case of a ``Crime of Honour´´: Lysias, On the Murder of Eratosthenes|234
4|10.3.5 Anger: Negative Pathos or Civil Pathos?|237
3|References|239
2|Chapter 11: What Does Nemesis Have to Do with the Legal System? Discussing Aristotle´s Neglected Emotion and Its Relevance for...|242
3|11.1 Introduction|243
3|11.2 Nemesis Defined in Aristotelian Terms|243
4|11.2.1 Nemesis as a Moral Emotion|243
5|11.2.1.1 Nemesis and Aischune|244
5|11.2.1.2 Nemesis and Eleos|244
5|11.2.1.3 Nemesis and Envy|245
5|11.2.1.4 Nemesis and Zelos|246
5|11.2.1.5 Nemesis as a Moderate Emotion|246
5|11.2.1.6 Merit|247
5|11.2.1.7 Nemesis and Ploutos|248
5|11.2.1.8 Nemesis in Synthesis|248
4|11.2.2 Aristotle´s Nemesis and the Idea of Justice|249
4|11.2.3 Nemesis and Rectificatory Justice|250
3|11.3 Aristotelian Nemesis and Indignation in Contemporary Discourse: Differences and Similarities|252
3|11.4 Pain at Unmerited Good Fortune in Politics|255
3|11.5 Nemesis and Legal Reasoning|257
3|11.6 Law and Unmerited Fortune: The Double Face of Indignation|260
3|11.7 Conclusions|261
3|References|262
3|Cases|264
2|Chapter 12: Rethinking Legal Education from Aristotle´s Theory of Emotions and the Contemporary Challenges of the Practical Re...|265
3|12.1 Introduction|265
3|12.2 Aristotle and Emotions|266
3|12.3 The Education of Desire Through Reason and Practical Deliberation|268
3|12.4 The Excellence of Phronesis and Law|271
3|12.5 The Juridical Decision as a Special Kind of Practical Decision|272
3|12.6 Legal Education: A Critical Reflection in the Light of Aristotle´s Understanding of Emotions, Combined with the Contribut...|275
4|12.6.1 A Re-Founder Reflection for a Renewed Law School|275
4|12.6.2 Final Notes|278
3|References|278
2|Chapter 13: Remorse and Virtue Ethics|280
3|13.1 Introduction|280
3|13.2 Dirty Hands|281
3|13.3 Overall Evaluations|283
3|13.4 Dirty Hands According to Nielsen|285
3|13.5 Aristotle|286
4|13.5.1 Eudaimonia, Function, and Soul|286
4|13.5.2 Acquiring the Moral Excellence|288
4|13.5.3 Performing the Moral Excellence|289
4|13.5.4 Community and Upbringing|290
3|13.6 Being Concerned with Other Things|290
4|13.6.1 Eudaimonia|291
4|13.6.2 Others|292
4|13.6.3 Character|294
4|13.6.4 Walzer|295
3|13.7 Psychological Versus Moral|296
3|References|297
2|Chapter 14: Virtue as a Synthesis of Extremes Versus Virtue as a Mean Between Extremes: A Comparison of Chesterton´s Account o...|299
3|14.1 Introduction|299
3|14.2 The Chestertonian Account: Reconstruction|300
3|14.3 The Chestertonian Account: Evaluation|303
4|14.3.1 Weak Points|303
4|14.3.2 Strong Points|305
4|14.3.3 Unclear Points|308
5|14.3.3.1 Firstly|308
5|14.3.3.2 Secondly|310
3|14.4 Concluding Remarks|311
3|References|313
2|Chapter 15: The Place of Slavery in the Aristotelian Framework of Law, Reason and Emotion|314
3|15.1 Introduction|314
3|15.2 Excursus on the Position of the Slave|318
3|15.3 The Politics, Book 1|319
3|15.4 The Platonic Background|325
3|15.5 The Slave: Reason, Emotion and Law|328
3|15.6 Conclusion|331
3|References|332
1|Part IV: Legitimation|335
2|Chapter 16: Empathic Political Animal: What a North Korean Prison Camp Can Reveal About the Aristotelian Political Association|336
3|16.1 Introduction: The Memoir of Shin Dong-hyuk|337
3|16.2 The First Line of Inquiry in Politics I.2|338
3|16.3 Two Lines of Inquiry Meet|340
3|16.4 Is Incapability of Associating About Empathy?|341
3|16.5 Reward Marriage as the Sole Association|342
3|16.6 Developing a Scale of Selfishness|344
3|16.7 Towards Inferring Empathy in Aristotle|346
3|16.8 The Preliminary Question of Projective Empathy|347
3|16.9 Concepts Close to Empathy in Aristotle|349
4|16.9.1 Feeling the Same as a Friend Does|350
4|16.9.2 Emotional Contagion in `Problems Arising from Sympathy´|351
4|16.9.3 Discernment and Understanding: Their Relation to Empathy and Sympathy|353
4|16.9.4 Education from Music|356
3|16.10 Conclusion: An Aristotelian Concept of Empathy|356
3|References|357
2|Chapter 17: Emotions: Impediment or Basis of Political Life?|360
3|17.1 Introduction|360
3|17.2 Natural Approach of Aristotle´s Theory|363
3|17.3 Emotions as Condition of Possibility for Being a Citizen|365
4|17.3.1 The War Lover|365
4|17.3.2 Women, Children and Slaves|368
3|17.4 Love as Social Bond|372
4|17.4.1 Love of Family|372
4|17.4.2 Love for Money|374
4|17.4.3 Love for Oneself|377
3|17.5 The Role of the Multitude for the Rule of Law|378
4|17.5.1 Rule of Law|378
4|17.5.2 The Multitude|379
3|17.6 Conclusions|381
3|References|382
2|Chapter 18: Aristotle´s Rhetoric and the Persistence of the Emotions in the Courtroom|384
3|18.1 Introduction|384
3|18.2 Defining the Art of Rhetoric|389
3|18.3 The Role of the Emotions|391
3|18.4 The Rule of Law|394
3|18.5 Conclusion|396
3|References|397
2|Chapter 19: Rhetoric, Emotions and the Rule of Law in Aristotle|399
3|19.1 Introduction|399
3|19.2 The Austere Conception of Rhetoric and Judicial Speeches|402
3|19.3 The Austere Conception of Rhetoric and Deliberative Speeches|406
3|19.4 Judging What Is Best for the Whole in Political Deliberation|408
3|19.5 Conclusion|413
3|References|414
2|Chapter 20: Aristotle´s Political Friendship (politike philia) as Solidarity|415
3|20.1 Introduction|415
3|20.2 Personal Friendship (philia) and Political Friendship (politike philia)|418
3|20.3 Homonoia (Concord)|420
3|20.4 Political Friendship for Utility or for Virtue?|422
3|20.5 Political Friendship (politike philia) in Different Constitutions|425
3|20.6 Political Friendship (politike philia) in Relation to Different Objects (Especially Between Human Beings)|425
3|20.7 Public Education|429
3|References|430
2|Chapter 21: Between Nomos and Pathos: Emotions in Aristotelian Theory of Adjudication and the Dual Process Theory|432
3|21.1 Introduction|432
3|21.2 Virtue Centered Theory of Justice as a Union of Legal Rule (nomos) and Fairness (epieikeia)|434
3|21.3 Dual Process Theory Within the Light the Theory of Legal Decision|436
3|21.4 DPT and the Adjudication Under the Shadow of Emotions|441
3|21.5 Conclusion|445
3|References|446
1|About the Editors and Contributors|448
1|Glossary|454