File #2455: "2018_Book_ProportionalityInLaw.pdf"
Testo
1|Introduction|5
1|Contents|9
1|About the Editors|10
1|Part I The Principle of Proportionality and Fundamental Rights|11
2|Proportionality as a Universal Human Rights Principle|12
3|1 Introduction|12
3|2 The Universal Character of the Principle of Proportionality|13
4|2.1 The Notion of Universality|13
4|2.2 The Structure of Principles|14
4|2.3 A Priori-Validity|17
4|2.4 Necessary Validity in Each Legal System|18
4|2.5 Conclusion|19
3|3 The Content of the Principle of Proportionality|19
4|3.1 The Standard Test of Proportionality|20
4|3.2 Proportionality and Balancing|21
4|3.3 The Model of Optimisation|23
5|3.3.1 The Criterion of Pareto-Optimality|24
5|3.3.2 Indifference Curves|25
5|3.3.3 Optimality|25
5|3.3.4 Rules of Balancing|26
3|4 Simplifying Proportionality|27
3|5 Generalising Proportionality|27
4|5.1 Adequacy and Necessity Within the Structure of Balancing|28
4|5.2 Abstract Weight in the Structure of Balancing|29
4|5.3 Concrete Weight in the Structure of Balancing|30
3|6 The General Structure of the Test of Proportionality|30
3|7 Conclusion|31
3|References|32
2|Proportionality in Social Rights Adjudication: Making It Workable|34
3|1 Introduction|34
3|2 Evolving Literature|37
3|3 Making Proportionality Workable|41
4|3.1 Proportionality by Positive Rights Adjudication: Two Scenarios. Regression and Insufficiency|43
4|3.2 Proportionality in the Case of Insufficient Means|44
5|3.2.1 The Suitability Test|46
5|3.2.2 The Alternative Means Test|48
5|3.2.3 The Proportionality Test in the Narrow Sense|50
3|4 Conclusions|53
3|References|54
2|Gains and Losses in Balancing Social Rights|58
3|1 Brief Notes on Balancing and Proportionality|58
4|1.1 Legal Conditions for Balancing|58
4|1.2 Normative Conflicts Without Norms of Conflicts|59
4|1.3 Why Balancing|60
4|1.4 Proportionality As a “Kind of Residual Norm of Conflicts”|60
3|2 Understanding (or When) a “Social Right” As (Is) a Claim Right|61
4|2.1 Indeterminacy About What a Social Right Is|61
4|2.2 Going Through Legal Positions|61
4|2.3 Liberties and Claim Rights|62
5|2.3.1 Liberties|62
5|2.3.2 Claim Rights|62
4|2.4 Social Claim Rights|63
3|3 Prima facie and Definitive Liberties and Social Claim Rights|63
4|3.1 Prima facie and Its Extent|63
4|3.2 In Liberties|64
4|3.3 In Social Claim Rights|64
4|3.4 The Workability Difference|65
4|3.5 Attenuating the Difference|65
4|3.6 The Potential Conflicting Norms Difference|67
4|3.7 The Principle of Financial Capacity|67
3|4 The (Abstract) Balancing Scheme in a Liberty|68
4|4.1 The Scheme|68
4|4.2 Bidirectionality|69
4|4.3 Gradualness|70
4|4.4 Alternativeness|70
3|5 The (Abstract) Balancing Scheme in a Social Claim Right|71
4|5.1 The Scheme|71
4|5.2 Bidirectionality|72
4|5.3 Gradualness|72
4|5.4 Alternativeness|73
3|6 Suitability and Necessity in Social Claim Rights|73
4|6.1 Suitability|73
4|6.2 Necessity|74
4|6.3 Eliminatory Effect|75
3|7 Underinclusiveness (and Insufficiency) in Social Claim Rights|75
4|7.1 The Underinclusiveness Situation|75
4|7.2 Underinclusiveness and Inequality: Not Here|76
4|7.3 Proportionality in the Narrow Sense|76
4|7.4 Insufficiency|77
3|References|77
2|Proportionality in Its Narrow Sense and Measuring the Intensity of Restrictions on Fundamental Rights|79
3|1 Preliminary Aspects|80
3|2 Between Balancing and Proportionality|82
4|2.1 General Aspects About Norms: Some Conceptual Premises|82
4|2.2 The Operation of Balancing: Balancing as a Residual Norm to Solve Normative Conflicts|86
4|2.3 Proportionality as a Balancing Regulating Norm|88
3|3 Proportionality in Its Narrow Sense and the Measuring Operation|90
4|3.1 General Aspects|90
4|3.2 The Meaning of Proportionality's Balancing and the Problem of Incommensurability|91
5|3.2.1 Alexy's Balancing Law and Weight Formula|91
5|3.2.2 The Objection of Incommensurability|93
4|3.3 Measuring the Intensity of Restrictions|97
4|3.4 The Weight Formula Reinterpreted|104
5|3.4.1 The Compressive Strength Law|104
5|3.4.2 Mapping the Criteria for Measuring|109
3|4 Concluding Remarks|114
3|References|115
2|Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights Norms|119
3|1 What Kind of a Conflict?|120
3|2 An Alternative Approach to Solving Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights Norms|122
3|References|125
1|Part II Proportionality, Balancing and Legal Principles|126
2|Consistency in Balancing: From Value Assessments to Factor-Based Rules|127
3|1 Value-Based Assessments in Cases|127
3|2 Running Example: Publishing Photos|128
3|3 Value-Based Preferences|129
3|4 Value-Based Consistency|132
3|5 From Values to Factors|133
3|6 The Formulation of Rules|135
3|7 From Factors to Value-Based Consistency|137
3|8 Defeasibility|139
3|9 Conclusions|140
3|References|141
2|Balancing Principles and A Fortiori Reasoning|143
3|1 Sartor's Main Premises and Goals|144
3|2 Principles, Fulfillment to Varying Degrees and praktische Konkordanz|146
3|3 Balancing, Conditions of Precedence, Rule-Formulations and Properties of Cases|150
3|4 A Fortiori Arguments in Balancing Principles|154
3|References|161
2|Some Fundamental Problems Concerning Alexy's Notion of Legal Principles|163
3|1 Robert Alexy's Theory of Law (A Non-Positivist Concept of Law)|163
3|2 Principles as Optimisation Mandates (The First Version of Robert Alexy's Theory)|165
3|3 Principles as Mandates to Be Optimised (The Second Version of Robert Alexy's Theory of Legal Principles)|170
3|4 Conclusion|175
3|References|175
2|Some Thoughts About the Limits of Alexy's Conception of Principles and Balancing|177
3|1 Introduction|177
3|2 Alexy on Legal Principles|178
4|2.1 Legal Principles as Optimisation Mandates|179
4|2.2 Legal Principles as Mandates to Be Optimised|180
4|2.3 Optimisation as a Criterion of Justice|183
3|3 Alexy on Balancing|184
4|3.1 The Link Between Legal Principles and Balancing|184
4|3.2 The Link Between Balancing and the Proportionality Principle|186
4|3.3 The Universalist or Particularist Character of the Proportionality Principle|189
4|3.4 Proportionality in the Narrow Sense and the `Weight Formula'|192
3|4 Concluding Remarks|196
3|References|197
1|Contents|9
1|About the Editors|10
1|Part I The Principle of Proportionality and Fundamental Rights|11
2|Proportionality as a Universal Human Rights Principle|12
3|1 Introduction|12
3|2 The Universal Character of the Principle of Proportionality|13
4|2.1 The Notion of Universality|13
4|2.2 The Structure of Principles|14
4|2.3 A Priori-Validity|17
4|2.4 Necessary Validity in Each Legal System|18
4|2.5 Conclusion|19
3|3 The Content of the Principle of Proportionality|19
4|3.1 The Standard Test of Proportionality|20
4|3.2 Proportionality and Balancing|21
4|3.3 The Model of Optimisation|23
5|3.3.1 The Criterion of Pareto-Optimality|24
5|3.3.2 Indifference Curves|25
5|3.3.3 Optimality|25
5|3.3.4 Rules of Balancing|26
3|4 Simplifying Proportionality|27
3|5 Generalising Proportionality|27
4|5.1 Adequacy and Necessity Within the Structure of Balancing|28
4|5.2 Abstract Weight in the Structure of Balancing|29
4|5.3 Concrete Weight in the Structure of Balancing|30
3|6 The General Structure of the Test of Proportionality|30
3|7 Conclusion|31
3|References|32
2|Proportionality in Social Rights Adjudication: Making It Workable|34
3|1 Introduction|34
3|2 Evolving Literature|37
3|3 Making Proportionality Workable|41
4|3.1 Proportionality by Positive Rights Adjudication: Two Scenarios. Regression and Insufficiency|43
4|3.2 Proportionality in the Case of Insufficient Means|44
5|3.2.1 The Suitability Test|46
5|3.2.2 The Alternative Means Test|48
5|3.2.3 The Proportionality Test in the Narrow Sense|50
3|4 Conclusions|53
3|References|54
2|Gains and Losses in Balancing Social Rights|58
3|1 Brief Notes on Balancing and Proportionality|58
4|1.1 Legal Conditions for Balancing|58
4|1.2 Normative Conflicts Without Norms of Conflicts|59
4|1.3 Why Balancing|60
4|1.4 Proportionality As a “Kind of Residual Norm of Conflicts”|60
3|2 Understanding (or When) a “Social Right” As (Is) a Claim Right|61
4|2.1 Indeterminacy About What a Social Right Is|61
4|2.2 Going Through Legal Positions|61
4|2.3 Liberties and Claim Rights|62
5|2.3.1 Liberties|62
5|2.3.2 Claim Rights|62
4|2.4 Social Claim Rights|63
3|3 Prima facie and Definitive Liberties and Social Claim Rights|63
4|3.1 Prima facie and Its Extent|63
4|3.2 In Liberties|64
4|3.3 In Social Claim Rights|64
4|3.4 The Workability Difference|65
4|3.5 Attenuating the Difference|65
4|3.6 The Potential Conflicting Norms Difference|67
4|3.7 The Principle of Financial Capacity|67
3|4 The (Abstract) Balancing Scheme in a Liberty|68
4|4.1 The Scheme|68
4|4.2 Bidirectionality|69
4|4.3 Gradualness|70
4|4.4 Alternativeness|70
3|5 The (Abstract) Balancing Scheme in a Social Claim Right|71
4|5.1 The Scheme|71
4|5.2 Bidirectionality|72
4|5.3 Gradualness|72
4|5.4 Alternativeness|73
3|6 Suitability and Necessity in Social Claim Rights|73
4|6.1 Suitability|73
4|6.2 Necessity|74
4|6.3 Eliminatory Effect|75
3|7 Underinclusiveness (and Insufficiency) in Social Claim Rights|75
4|7.1 The Underinclusiveness Situation|75
4|7.2 Underinclusiveness and Inequality: Not Here|76
4|7.3 Proportionality in the Narrow Sense|76
4|7.4 Insufficiency|77
3|References|77
2|Proportionality in Its Narrow Sense and Measuring the Intensity of Restrictions on Fundamental Rights|79
3|1 Preliminary Aspects|80
3|2 Between Balancing and Proportionality|82
4|2.1 General Aspects About Norms: Some Conceptual Premises|82
4|2.2 The Operation of Balancing: Balancing as a Residual Norm to Solve Normative Conflicts|86
4|2.3 Proportionality as a Balancing Regulating Norm|88
3|3 Proportionality in Its Narrow Sense and the Measuring Operation|90
4|3.1 General Aspects|90
4|3.2 The Meaning of Proportionality's Balancing and the Problem of Incommensurability|91
5|3.2.1 Alexy's Balancing Law and Weight Formula|91
5|3.2.2 The Objection of Incommensurability|93
4|3.3 Measuring the Intensity of Restrictions|97
4|3.4 The Weight Formula Reinterpreted|104
5|3.4.1 The Compressive Strength Law|104
5|3.4.2 Mapping the Criteria for Measuring|109
3|4 Concluding Remarks|114
3|References|115
2|Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights Norms|119
3|1 What Kind of a Conflict?|120
3|2 An Alternative Approach to Solving Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights Norms|122
3|References|125
1|Part II Proportionality, Balancing and Legal Principles|126
2|Consistency in Balancing: From Value Assessments to Factor-Based Rules|127
3|1 Value-Based Assessments in Cases|127
3|2 Running Example: Publishing Photos|128
3|3 Value-Based Preferences|129
3|4 Value-Based Consistency|132
3|5 From Values to Factors|133
3|6 The Formulation of Rules|135
3|7 From Factors to Value-Based Consistency|137
3|8 Defeasibility|139
3|9 Conclusions|140
3|References|141
2|Balancing Principles and A Fortiori Reasoning|143
3|1 Sartor's Main Premises and Goals|144
3|2 Principles, Fulfillment to Varying Degrees and praktische Konkordanz|146
3|3 Balancing, Conditions of Precedence, Rule-Formulations and Properties of Cases|150
3|4 A Fortiori Arguments in Balancing Principles|154
3|References|161
2|Some Fundamental Problems Concerning Alexy's Notion of Legal Principles|163
3|1 Robert Alexy's Theory of Law (A Non-Positivist Concept of Law)|163
3|2 Principles as Optimisation Mandates (The First Version of Robert Alexy's Theory)|165
3|3 Principles as Mandates to Be Optimised (The Second Version of Robert Alexy's Theory of Legal Principles)|170
3|4 Conclusion|175
3|References|175
2|Some Thoughts About the Limits of Alexy's Conception of Principles and Balancing|177
3|1 Introduction|177
3|2 Alexy on Legal Principles|178
4|2.1 Legal Principles as Optimisation Mandates|179
4|2.2 Legal Principles as Mandates to Be Optimised|180
4|2.3 Optimisation as a Criterion of Justice|183
3|3 Alexy on Balancing|184
4|3.1 The Link Between Legal Principles and Balancing|184
4|3.2 The Link Between Balancing and the Proportionality Principle|186
4|3.3 The Universalist or Particularist Character of the Proportionality Principle|189
4|3.4 Proportionality in the Narrow Sense and the `Weight Formula'|192
3|4 Concluding Remarks|196
3|References|197