File #2477: "2018_Book_TheLegalOrder.pdf"

2018_Book_TheLegalOrder.pdf

Testo

1|Acknowledgements|7
1|Contents|8
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|14
2|1.1 Law and Jurisprudence: Ars Juridica|14
3|1.1.1 The Lawyer as Law-Applier|18
3|1.1.2 The Lawyer as Legal Strategist|19
3|1.1.3 The Lawyer as Draftsman|20
3|1.1.4 The Lawyer as Investigator|20
3|1.1.5 The Lawyer as Jurist (Legal Scholar)|21
2|1.2 L-Concepts and J-Concepts: J-Concepts Systemised|22
3|1.2.1 Technical-Juridical Concepts|23
4|1.2.1.1 Morphological J-Concepts|24
4|1.2.1.2 Topological J-Concepts|24
4|1.2.1.3 Praxeological J-Concepts|26
4|1.2.1.4 Methodological J-Concepts|26
3|1.2.2 Ideological-Juridical Concepts|27
3|1.2.3 JL-Terms|29
2|1.3 Juridical Modes of Thinking|30
2|1.4 Legal Doctrines and Juridical Systematisation|31
2|1.5 Philosophical Jurisprudence|34
2|1.6 The Law and the Juridical Handling of the Law: ``Legal Order´´ as the Fundamental Juridical Concept|35
2|References|40
1|Chapter 2: The Legal Order: Morphological Levels|41
2|2.1 The Legal Alternative|41
2|2.2 Elements of the Legal Order (LO-Elements): Morphological Levels|42
2|2.3 A First Step Towards a General Morphological Conception of the Legal Order: The ``Nucleus´´ of Legal Orders|43
2|2.4 Some Remarks on Legal Sources and Legal Rules|45
2|2.5 The Morphology of Legal Orders: Juridical Accidence and Juridical Syntax|49
2|2.6 Pre-legal Basic Normative Units (Normative Nuclei)|49
2|2.7 Morphological Level I: The Level of Basic Legal Positions (Micropositions)|50
2|2.8 Morphological Level II: The Level of Compound Legal Positions (Macropositions)|51
2|2.9 Morphological Level III: The Level of Legal Rules|52
3|2.9.1 Introduction|52
3|2.9.2 Standard Forms for Ordinary Regulatory Rules|53
3|2.9.3 A Taxonomy of Legal Rules|54
2|2.10 ``Soft Law´´|65
2|2.11 Morphological Level IV: The Level of Legal Systems|67
3|2.11.1 System-Inherent N-Relations|68
4|2.11.1.1 Syntactical N-Relations|68
4|2.11.1.2 Application Guiding N-Relations|71
3|2.11.2 Genetic (System-Transcending) N-Relations|72
3|2.11.3 Choice-of-Law Relations|72
2|2.12 Morphological Level V: The Level of Legal Orders|73
2|2.13 Legal Phenomena Outside the Legal Order|78
2|2.14 Concluding Remark|79
2|References|80
1|Chapter 3: The Juridical Rule Thinking|81
2|3.1 Introduction|81
2|3.2 The Function of Legal Rules in Juridical Thinking|81
2|3.3 The Ontology of Legal Rules (LO-Elements)|87
2|3.4 The Generality of Legal Rules|92
2|3.5 The Strength of Legal Rules|94
2|References|96
1|Chapter 4: The Addressee Problem|97
2|4.1 Introduction|97
2|4.2 The Problem|98
2|4.3 The Legal System in a Spelled-Out Version|99
2|4.4 Transformation of Legal Rules|100
2|4.5 Reversed Transformation|105
2|4.6 Whom Shall the Legislator Address?|106
2|4.7 Conclusion|107
2|References|107
1|Chapter 5: Normative Modalities|108
2|5.1 Introduction|108
2|5.2 On Modalities Generally|109
3|5.2.1 Modalities in a Very Wide Sense|109
3|5.2.2 Modalities as Semantic Phenomena. Their Structuring Function: To Presuppose All and Block Certain Alternatives|109
3|5.2.3 Presupposing Alternatives. Formulation of Initial Positions|110
3|5.2.4 Blocking Alternatives|111
2|5.3 On Normative Modalities Exclusively|112
3|5.3.1 Presupposing Alternatives|112
3|5.3.2 Accepting Alternatives. A Permission Is an Expressed Acceptance|112
3|5.3.3 Blocking Alternatives|115
3|5.3.4 Norm Components Apart from Modality and Norm-Theme: Demystifying the Normative Modality (and Normativity)|116
1|Chapter 6: The Place of the Normative in the Ontological Universe|118
2|6.1 Shapes of Reality|118
2|6.2 The Logic of Change|122
2|6.3 Transformational Mechanisms|123
2|6.4 Instituting Legislators|124
2|6.5 Normative Mechanisms|125
2|6.6 The Enforcement of Norms|126
2|6.7 Kelsen´s Norm-Exclusiveness|128
2|References|134
1|Chapter 7: The Juridical Topology: Some Basic Concepts|136
2|7.1 Introduction|136
2|7.2 Legal Case, Operative Fact, Potential Operative Fact|137
2|7.3 The Structure of Legal Cases|138
2|7.4 Ontologically Mixed Cases|140
2|7.5 Topological Relations: Single-System Static and Dynamic Topology|141
2|7.6 Evidentiary Fact|142
2|7.7 Normativised Fact|145
2|7.8 Topological Spheres|146
2|References|148
1|Chapter 8: Genetic-Topological Norm-Relations|149
2|8.1 Introduction|149
2|8.2 The Spectrum of a Legal Rule: GT-Relations 1-16|153
2|8.3 The Antithetic Spectrum of a Legal Rule: GT-Relations 17-32|157
2|Reference|162
1|Chapter 9: On Analogical Use of Legal Rules|163
2|9.1 Introduction|163
2|9.2 The Formal Analogy-Relation|167
3|9.2.1 More About Analogies as GT-Relations|167
3|9.2.2 Analogical and Other Uses of Rules Described in Terms of Manipulations with Requisites|170
2|9.3 The Material Analogy-Relation: Similarity and Analogy Argumentation|173
3|9.3.1 Introduction|173
3|9.3.2 The Argument from Analogy in Inductive Logic|174
3|9.3.3 Similarity Sets and Analogy Sets|179
3|9.3.4 Legal Bases|182
3|9.3.5 Analogy-Basing Properties|187
3|9.3.6 Some Remarks on the Formal Properties of Analogy Relations|192
2|9.4 The Technique and Ideology of Analogical Reasoning|193
3|9.4.1 Introduction|193
3|9.4.2 The Technique of Analogical Reasoning|193
3|9.4.3 The Ideology of Analogical Reasoning|196
2|References|198
1|Chapter 10: On Conflicts Between Legal Rules|199
2|10.1 Choices of Law|199
2|10.2 Some General Remarks Concerning Collision and Competition|200
2|10.3 Rule Collision|204
2|10.4 Rule Competition|209
3|10.4.1 Introduction|209
3|10.4.2 Some General Conditions of Competition|209
3|10.4.3 One-Case Competition|212
3|10.4.4 Multi-Case Competition|213
2|Reference|214
1|Chapter 11: On Relations Between Legal Systems|215
2|11.1 Introduction|215
2|11.2 On Ranges of Adjudication of State Legal Systems|215
3|11.2.1 Introduction|215
3|11.2.2 The Maximum Range of Adjudication|216
3|11.2.3 The Concept ``Range of Adjudication´´|217
2|11.3 On Connection Problems Between Legal Systems|219
2|11.4 The Concept ``Connection´´|221
2|11.5 On Attitudes Towards Coexistence Between State Legal Systems|224
1|Chapter 12: Retroactivity, Simulactivity and Infraactivity|226
2|12.1 Transitional Law|226
2|12.2 Basic Concepts of Transitional Law|232
2|12.3 Problems and Solutions in Transitional Law|239
3|12.3.1 Introduction|239
3|12.3.2 Rule r′ Coming into D-Force|241
3|12.3.3 Infraactivity|241
3|12.3.4 Retropendency and Infrapendency|242
3|12.3.5 Retroactivity|245
3|12.3.6 Restitutive Retroactivity|247
3|12.3.7 Imposing Time Limits on Rules´ Being-in-Force|248
2|References|249
1|Chapter 13: Some Basic Praxeological Concepts: Application of Law and Validity of Law|250
2|13.1 Introduction: Some Remarks on General Praxeology|250
2|13.2 Juridical Praxeology|254
2|13.3 Application of Legal Rules|258
3|13.3.1 Introduction|258
3|13.3.2 Direct Application|259
3|13.3.3 Rejection of Application|268
3|13.3.4 Iterative Application|269
2|13.4 Validity of Law|270
3|13.4.1 Introduction|270
3|13.4.2 Validity of Legal Rules, Systems, and Orders Clarified|272
3|13.4.3 Validity of Products of Legal Systems (Individual Legal Norms, Judgments, Positions, Acts-in-the-Law, and Legal Instrum...|280
3|13.4.4 Validity and Legal Dogmatics|282
2|References|283
1|Chapter 14: Statutory Interpretation Against the Background of a General Typology of Interpretation|284
2|14.1 Introduction|284
2|14.2 A General Typology of Interpretation|285
3|14.2.1 Introduction|285
3|14.2.2 Transposing Interpretation|285
3|14.2.3 Elucidating Interpretation|288
3|14.2.4 Pragmatic Interpretation|293
2|14.3 Statutory Interpretation|293
3|14.3.1 The Special Character of Statutory Interpretation: Principles of Statutory Interpretation|293
3|14.3.2 Statutory Interpretation by Means of Mediate Use of Legal Rules|300
3|14.3.3 Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Roles|301
2|References|304
1|Chapter 15: Operative Goals and Background Goals in Legislative Argumentation|305
2|15.1 Introduction|305
2|15.2 Operative Goals and Background Goals|307
2|15.3 Systematic Background Goals|309
2|15.4 Praxeological Background Goals|313
2|15.5 Legal-Ideological Background Goals|315
2|15.6 Economic Background Goals|316
2|References|317
1|Chapter 16: Stability and Change: A Study in Juridical Ideology|318
2|16.1 Introduction|318
2|16.2 Stability and Change on the Position Level|321
2|16.3 Stability and Change on the Rule Level|323
3|16.3.1 Introduction|323
3|16.3.2 Ideas Pertaining to the Administration of Justice|323
3|16.3.3 Ideas Pertaining to Legislation|326
2|References|328
1|Chapter 17: Epilogue: Intellectualism as a Cardinal Virtue of the Lawyer|329
2|References|339