File #2505: "2018_Book_TheRuleOfCrisis.pdf"
Testo
1|Contents|6
1|Contributors|8
1|1 Introduction|10
2|Abstract|10
2|1 Background Remarks|10
2|2 Methodological Remarks|12
2|3 Structure of This Book|14
2|4 Concluding Remarks|19
2|Reference|20
1|2 Conceptual Analysis and Emergency Legislation|21
2|Abstract|21
2|1 Terrorism, Emergency and Rule of Law|21
2|2 A Conflict of Rights|26
2|3 Concluding Remarks|40
2|References|41
1|Concepts and Justification of Emergency Legislations|42
1|3 Emergencies in Sober Hobbesianism|43
2|Abstract|43
2|1 From Unreconstructed Hobbes to Sober Hobbesianism|43
3|1.1 The Liberalism in Sober Hobbesianism|48
3|1.2 The Anti-fundamentalism of Sober Hobbesianism|52
3|1.3 ‘Good Law’ and Emergency Powers Under Sober Hobbesianism|55
2|2 Post 9/11 Security|57
3|2.1 Detention|58
3|2.2 Surveillance|61
2|3 Conclusion|65
2|References|65
1|4 The State of Exception and the Terrorist Threat—An Obsolete Combination|67
2|Abstract|67
2|1 Premodern Conceptions of the State of Exception|67
2|2 French Revolution and the Real State of Siege|69
2|3 1791–1849: Keeping the State-of-Siege Technique|70
2|4 The Compelled Creation of the State-of-Exception Technique During the Decolonisation Time|72
2|5 The Mismatch Between the State-of-Exception Technique and the Fight Against Contemporary Waves of Terrorism|74
2|References|76
1|5 The Continued Exceptionalism of the American Response to Daesh|77
2|Abstract|77
2|1 Introduction|77
2|2 The USA and Daesh-Inspired Terrorism|83
3|2.1 Low Profile Acts of Terrorism and Gun Violence|85
3|2.2 Higher Profile Acts of Terrorism: Boston, San Bernardino and Orlando|88
2|3 The American Domestic Response to Daesh-Inspired Terrorism|90
3|3.1 The Use of Informers and the Illusory Entrapment Defence|90
2|4 Why Has the American Domestic Response Been Comparatively Restrained?|92
3|4.1 USA Freedom Act and Legislative Restrictions on Torture|93
3|4.2 US Constitutional Restrictions on Citizenship Stripping|94
3|4.3 The Lack of Response to Gun Violence|95
3|4.4 Comparisons to Canada’s Less Restrained Domestic Response|96
2|5 The American External Military Response|98
2|6 Conclusion|100
2|Acknowledgements|105
2|References|105
1|6 Dignity, Emergency, Exception|106
2|Abstract|106
2|1 Introduction|106
2|2 The Elusiveness of Dignity|107
2|3 Necessary Violations|111
2|4 Exceptions|114
2|5 Conclusion: Emergency and Exception|121
2|References|122
1|Risk and Failure of Emergency Legislations|124
1|7 Reconciling International Human Rights Law with Executive Non-trial-Based Counter-Terror Measures: The Case of UK Temporary Exclusion Orders|125
2|Abstract|125
2|1 Introduction|126
2|2 DownGrading Recalibrations of Rights in Post-9/11 UK Non-trial-Based Measures|127
2|3 Reconciling TEOs with Human Rights’ Norms|131
2|4 The Introduction of TEOs as Opposed to Deprivation of Citizenship Orders|132
2|5 TEO Imposition Requirements|133
2|6 Restrictions Imposed: Varying Roles of TEOs|134
3|6.1 Temporary Exclusion from the UK|134
3|6.2 Management of the Return|136
3|6.3 “Permitted Obligations” After Return|136
2|7 International Human Rights Obligations: TEOs and de Facto Statelessness?|137
2|8 Reliance on the ECHR—Territoriality and Jurisdictional Competence|138
3|8.1 Exceptions to the Territoriality Principle|139
3|8.2 Routes to Reliance on the ECHR for TEO Subjects Abroad|142
2|9 TEOs and Violations of Article 8 ECHR?|142
2|10 The Right to Liberty Under Article 5 ECHR and Detention Abroad|144
2|11 Potential Risk of Article 3 ECHR Treatment Abroad During Detention|147
2|12 Compliance with Article 6 ECHR: The Quality of Judicial Oversight in the TEO Scheme|149
3|12.1 Introduction|149
3|12.2 Initial Review|150
3|12.3 Subsequent Review|152
3|12.4 The Standard of Review|153
3|12.5 Closed Material Proceedings and Special Advocates in TEO Proceedings: Minimising Due Process?|153
3|12.6 Right to a Hearing Which Is Also in the Presence of the Applicant?|157
2|13 Conclusions|158
2|References|159
1|8 Polish Martial Law on the Docket—Judging the Past and the Clash of Judicial Narratives|161
2|Abstract|161
2|1 Setting the Scene|161
2|2 Polish Supreme Court on the Martial Law—Five Minutes of Anti-philosophy of Anti-law|164
2|3 Polish Constitutional Tribunal—Politics of Law or Politics Over Law?|173
2|4 Epilogue—Judging Martial Law: On the Constitutional Fidelity and the Weight of the Past|180
2|References|185
1|9 Emergency as a State of Mind—The Case of Israel|188
2|Abstract|188
2|1 Introduction|189
2|2 The Constitutional Background|189
3|2.1 The Birth of a New State (of Emergency)|189
3|2.2 A Constitution ‘in Stages’|192
2|3 The Legal Framework for Governmental Emergency Powers|194
3|3.1 British Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945|194
3|3.2 Emergency Regulations|196
3|3.3 Administrative Detention|197
3|3.4 The New Anti-terrorism Law|198
3|3.5 Governmental Residual Powers and Declaration of War|198
2|4 Emergency and Judicial Review|200
3|4.1 Judicial Limitations on Emergency Regulations|202
3|4.2 Judicial Review of Administrative Detentions|203
3|4.3 The Supreme Court and the War on Terror|205
2|5 The Migration of Emergency Mechanisms|208
3|5.1 Economic and Financial Ends|209
3|5.2 Temporary Legislation|211
3|5.3 Temporary Constitutional Amendments|212
3|5.4 The New Anti-terrorism Law|213
2|6 Conclusion|214
2|Acknowledgements|215
2|References|215
1|10 The French Case or the Hidden Dangers of a Long-Term State of Emergency|216
2|Abstract|216
2|1 Introduction|217
2|2 Calling into Question the Balance of Power|220
3|2.1 The Primacy of the Executive|220
3|2.2 Parliamentary One-Upmanship|221
3|2.3 The Absence of Any a Priori Referral to the Constitutional Council|223
2|3 The Lack of Guaranteed Rights|225
3|3.1 Removal of the Ordinary Judge in Favour of the Administrative Judge|225
3|3.2 The Failure of a Posteriori Controls|227
2|References|230
1|11 “Anything Goes”: How Does French Law Deal with the State of Emergency?|232
2|Abstract|232
2|1 Introduction|232
2|2 Two French Versions of the State of Exception: The State of Emergency and Article 16|234
3|2.1 The State of Emergency: A State of Exception That Is Stricter Than What Is Believed|234
3|2.2 Article 16 of the Constitution: “A Reserve Constitution”?|236
2|3 State of Exception and Constitutionalism: Re-examination of the Case of France|237
3|3.1 The Constitutionalist Model and the State of Exception|237
3|3.2 The Authoritarian Aspect of the French Example Is Revealed by Its Comparison with the Constitutionalist Model|239
2|References|242
1|12 The German Reticence Vis-à-Vis the State of Emergency|244
2|Abstract|244
2|1 Introduction|244
2|2 The Long Shadow of Weimar and the “Third Reich”|245
2|3 The Later Constitutional Amendments Concerning the Rearmament and the State of Defence (“Wehrverfassung” and “Notstandsverfassung”)|247
2|4 The Terrorism of the Red Army Faction and the Acoustic Surveillance of Private Homes (“Großer Lauschangriff”)|249
2|5 The Security Legislation After 11 September 2001 and the Federal Constitutional Court|251
2|6 Conclusion|253
2|References|254
1|Contributors|8
1|1 Introduction|10
2|Abstract|10
2|1 Background Remarks|10
2|2 Methodological Remarks|12
2|3 Structure of This Book|14
2|4 Concluding Remarks|19
2|Reference|20
1|2 Conceptual Analysis and Emergency Legislation|21
2|Abstract|21
2|1 Terrorism, Emergency and Rule of Law|21
2|2 A Conflict of Rights|26
2|3 Concluding Remarks|40
2|References|41
1|Concepts and Justification of Emergency Legislations|42
1|3 Emergencies in Sober Hobbesianism|43
2|Abstract|43
2|1 From Unreconstructed Hobbes to Sober Hobbesianism|43
3|1.1 The Liberalism in Sober Hobbesianism|48
3|1.2 The Anti-fundamentalism of Sober Hobbesianism|52
3|1.3 ‘Good Law’ and Emergency Powers Under Sober Hobbesianism|55
2|2 Post 9/11 Security|57
3|2.1 Detention|58
3|2.2 Surveillance|61
2|3 Conclusion|65
2|References|65
1|4 The State of Exception and the Terrorist Threat—An Obsolete Combination|67
2|Abstract|67
2|1 Premodern Conceptions of the State of Exception|67
2|2 French Revolution and the Real State of Siege|69
2|3 1791–1849: Keeping the State-of-Siege Technique|70
2|4 The Compelled Creation of the State-of-Exception Technique During the Decolonisation Time|72
2|5 The Mismatch Between the State-of-Exception Technique and the Fight Against Contemporary Waves of Terrorism|74
2|References|76
1|5 The Continued Exceptionalism of the American Response to Daesh|77
2|Abstract|77
2|1 Introduction|77
2|2 The USA and Daesh-Inspired Terrorism|83
3|2.1 Low Profile Acts of Terrorism and Gun Violence|85
3|2.2 Higher Profile Acts of Terrorism: Boston, San Bernardino and Orlando|88
2|3 The American Domestic Response to Daesh-Inspired Terrorism|90
3|3.1 The Use of Informers and the Illusory Entrapment Defence|90
2|4 Why Has the American Domestic Response Been Comparatively Restrained?|92
3|4.1 USA Freedom Act and Legislative Restrictions on Torture|93
3|4.2 US Constitutional Restrictions on Citizenship Stripping|94
3|4.3 The Lack of Response to Gun Violence|95
3|4.4 Comparisons to Canada’s Less Restrained Domestic Response|96
2|5 The American External Military Response|98
2|6 Conclusion|100
2|Acknowledgements|105
2|References|105
1|6 Dignity, Emergency, Exception|106
2|Abstract|106
2|1 Introduction|106
2|2 The Elusiveness of Dignity|107
2|3 Necessary Violations|111
2|4 Exceptions|114
2|5 Conclusion: Emergency and Exception|121
2|References|122
1|Risk and Failure of Emergency Legislations|124
1|7 Reconciling International Human Rights Law with Executive Non-trial-Based Counter-Terror Measures: The Case of UK Temporary Exclusion Orders|125
2|Abstract|125
2|1 Introduction|126
2|2 DownGrading Recalibrations of Rights in Post-9/11 UK Non-trial-Based Measures|127
2|3 Reconciling TEOs with Human Rights’ Norms|131
2|4 The Introduction of TEOs as Opposed to Deprivation of Citizenship Orders|132
2|5 TEO Imposition Requirements|133
2|6 Restrictions Imposed: Varying Roles of TEOs|134
3|6.1 Temporary Exclusion from the UK|134
3|6.2 Management of the Return|136
3|6.3 “Permitted Obligations” After Return|136
2|7 International Human Rights Obligations: TEOs and de Facto Statelessness?|137
2|8 Reliance on the ECHR—Territoriality and Jurisdictional Competence|138
3|8.1 Exceptions to the Territoriality Principle|139
3|8.2 Routes to Reliance on the ECHR for TEO Subjects Abroad|142
2|9 TEOs and Violations of Article 8 ECHR?|142
2|10 The Right to Liberty Under Article 5 ECHR and Detention Abroad|144
2|11 Potential Risk of Article 3 ECHR Treatment Abroad During Detention|147
2|12 Compliance with Article 6 ECHR: The Quality of Judicial Oversight in the TEO Scheme|149
3|12.1 Introduction|149
3|12.2 Initial Review|150
3|12.3 Subsequent Review|152
3|12.4 The Standard of Review|153
3|12.5 Closed Material Proceedings and Special Advocates in TEO Proceedings: Minimising Due Process?|153
3|12.6 Right to a Hearing Which Is Also in the Presence of the Applicant?|157
2|13 Conclusions|158
2|References|159
1|8 Polish Martial Law on the Docket—Judging the Past and the Clash of Judicial Narratives|161
2|Abstract|161
2|1 Setting the Scene|161
2|2 Polish Supreme Court on the Martial Law—Five Minutes of Anti-philosophy of Anti-law|164
2|3 Polish Constitutional Tribunal—Politics of Law or Politics Over Law?|173
2|4 Epilogue—Judging Martial Law: On the Constitutional Fidelity and the Weight of the Past|180
2|References|185
1|9 Emergency as a State of Mind—The Case of Israel|188
2|Abstract|188
2|1 Introduction|189
2|2 The Constitutional Background|189
3|2.1 The Birth of a New State (of Emergency)|189
3|2.2 A Constitution ‘in Stages’|192
2|3 The Legal Framework for Governmental Emergency Powers|194
3|3.1 British Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945|194
3|3.2 Emergency Regulations|196
3|3.3 Administrative Detention|197
3|3.4 The New Anti-terrorism Law|198
3|3.5 Governmental Residual Powers and Declaration of War|198
2|4 Emergency and Judicial Review|200
3|4.1 Judicial Limitations on Emergency Regulations|202
3|4.2 Judicial Review of Administrative Detentions|203
3|4.3 The Supreme Court and the War on Terror|205
2|5 The Migration of Emergency Mechanisms|208
3|5.1 Economic and Financial Ends|209
3|5.2 Temporary Legislation|211
3|5.3 Temporary Constitutional Amendments|212
3|5.4 The New Anti-terrorism Law|213
2|6 Conclusion|214
2|Acknowledgements|215
2|References|215
1|10 The French Case or the Hidden Dangers of a Long-Term State of Emergency|216
2|Abstract|216
2|1 Introduction|217
2|2 Calling into Question the Balance of Power|220
3|2.1 The Primacy of the Executive|220
3|2.2 Parliamentary One-Upmanship|221
3|2.3 The Absence of Any a Priori Referral to the Constitutional Council|223
2|3 The Lack of Guaranteed Rights|225
3|3.1 Removal of the Ordinary Judge in Favour of the Administrative Judge|225
3|3.2 The Failure of a Posteriori Controls|227
2|References|230
1|11 “Anything Goes”: How Does French Law Deal with the State of Emergency?|232
2|Abstract|232
2|1 Introduction|232
2|2 Two French Versions of the State of Exception: The State of Emergency and Article 16|234
3|2.1 The State of Emergency: A State of Exception That Is Stricter Than What Is Believed|234
3|2.2 Article 16 of the Constitution: “A Reserve Constitution”?|236
2|3 State of Exception and Constitutionalism: Re-examination of the Case of France|237
3|3.1 The Constitutionalist Model and the State of Exception|237
3|3.2 The Authoritarian Aspect of the French Example Is Revealed by Its Comparison with the Constitutionalist Model|239
2|References|242
1|12 The German Reticence Vis-à-Vis the State of Emergency|244
2|Abstract|244
2|1 Introduction|244
2|2 The Long Shadow of Weimar and the “Third Reich”|245
2|3 The Later Constitutional Amendments Concerning the Rearmament and the State of Defence (“Wehrverfassung” and “Notstandsverfassung”)|247
2|4 The Terrorism of the Red Army Faction and the Acoustic Surveillance of Private Homes (“Großer Lauschangriff”)|249
2|5 The Security Legislation After 11 September 2001 and the Federal Constitutional Court|251
2|6 Conclusion|253
2|References|254