File #2509: "2018_Book_WhiteCollarCrimeAndRisk.pdf"
Testo
1|Editorial Team|7
1|Acknowledgements|8
1|Contents|9
1|Notes on Contributors|12
1|1: Introduction|17
1|Part 1: Bribery and Corruption|20
2|2: Corruption, Development, Financial Institutions and Politically Exposed Persons|21
3|2.1 Introduction|21
3|2.2 Development, Growth and Corruption|23
3|2.3 Money Laundering, Corruption and the Anti-corruption Conventions|30
4|2.3.1 Addressing Money Laundering Through the Anti-corruption Conventions|31
4|2.3.2 The FATF Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regime|34
3|2.4 Preventing Money Laundering by Politically Exposed Persons|36
3|2.5 Conclusion|44
2|3: Anti-Bribery and Corruption: Perceptions, Risks and Practice for UK Banks|57
3|3.1 Introduction|57
3|3.2 The Origin and Meaning of Corruption|59
3|3.3 The Threat of Corruption|62
3|3.4 Extent of Corruption|63
3|3.5 What Is Bribery?|63
3|3.6 The Extent of Bribery, International Trends and Counter-Measures|64
3|3.7 The European Union|66
3|3.8 The Crime of Bribery in the UK|69
4|3.8.1 Anti-Corruption and Bribery Enforcement Agencies|74
4|3.8.2 Sentencing and Enforcement|76
3|3.9 Risks and Banking Standards|79
3|3.10 Findings and Conclusions|83
1|Part 2: Financial Crime|106
2|4: The EU Sanctions and the Fight Against Financial Crime|107
3|4.1 Introduction|107
3|4.2 Financial Regulation and EU’s Fight Against Financial Crimes: Brief History|108
3|4.3 The Eternal Debate: Criminal or Administrative Sanctions?|111
3|4.4 EU Anti-money Laundering Action and Administrative Sanctions|114
3|4.5 Market Abuse Sanctions|116
3|4.6 The Proposal for a European Public Prosecutor Office|118
4|4.6.1 Does the EPPO Comply with the Idea of “Better Regulation”?|120
3|4.7 Conclusion|121
2|5: Tackling the Risks of Money Laundering|126
3|5.1 Money Laundering|127
3|5.2 Risks of Money Laundering|127
4|5.2.1 Associational Risks|128
4|5.2.2 Non-derivative Risk/Risk Exclusive to Money Laundering|131
3|5.3 Tackling Money Laundering Risks|132
4|5.3.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering and Confiscation Regimes|132
4|5.3.2 Dismantling Secrecy: Anti-money Laundering Regulation|135
4|5.3.3 Other Aspects of Fortification|137
3|5.4 Risk, Merits and Appearances|139
1|Part 3: Market Manipulation|150
2|6: Market Abuse and the Risk to the Financial Markets|151
3|6.1 Introduction|151
3|6.2 History and Background|152
3|6.3 The Management of Risk|153
3|6.4 The Philosophical Difficulties|155
3|6.5 The Criminal Provisions|157
3|6.6 The Civil Regime and Market Abuse as a Wider Concept|159
3|6.7 The Difficulties of the Civil Regime|164
3|6.8 The Market Abuse Regulation and MAD II|166
3|6.9 Market Abuse Outside the CJA1993 and Part VIII FSMA 2000|167
3|6.10 Getting Tough|168
3|6.11 Conclusion|169
3|References|170
2|7: Competition Law and LIBOR in Three Jurisdictions: The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the European Union|173
3|7.1 LIBOR and Manipulation|174
3|7.2 Competition Law Provisions and Regimes of the United States of America, the European Union and the United Kingdom|176
4|7.2.1 The United States of America|177
5|7.2.1.1 Civil Public Enforcement|177
5|7.2.1.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|178
5|7.2.1.3 Civil Private Enforcement|178
4|7.2.2 The European Union|180
5|7.2.2.1 Civil Public Enforcement|180
5|7.2.2.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|181
5|7.2.2.3 Civil Private Enforcement|181
4|7.2.3 The United Kingdom|182
5|7.2.3.1 Civil Public Enforcement|182
5|7.2.3.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|182
5|7.2.3.3 Civil Private Enforcement|183
3|7.3 Competition Law Actions|184
4|7.3.1 The United States|184
5|7.3.1.1 Civil Public Enforcement|184
5|7.3.1.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|184
5|7.3.1.3 Civil Private Enforcement|185
4|7.3.2 The European Union|189
5|7.3.2.1 Civil Public Enforcement|189
5|7.3.2.2 Criminal Public and Civil Private Enforcement|190
4|7.3.3 The United Kingdom|190
5|7.3.3.1 Civil Public Enforcement|190
5|7.3.3.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|191
5|7.3.3.3 Civil Private Enforcement|191
3|7.4 Competition Law’s Impact on LIBOR and Post-LIBOR|192
4|7.4.1 How Effective Was Antitrust Regulation of Banking Activity?|192
4|7.4.2 Why Was the Cartel Offence Not Used in the United Kingdom?|193
4|7.4.3 What Policy Considerations Led to Limited Antitrust LIBOR Regulation?|195
4|7.4.4 Justifications for Competition Law|197
3|7.5 Conclusion|198
1|Part 4: Technology and White Collar Crime|211
2|8: The Financial Crisis and Digital Currencies|212
3|8.1 Introduction|212
3|8.2 Digital Currencies|213
3|8.3 Countries’ Regulation of Digital Currencies|215
3|8.4 Platform-Based Digital Currencies|218
3|8.5 Bitcoin|219
3|8.6 Financial Crisis and Digital Currencies|221
3|8.7 Greece|222
3|8.8 Advantages and Disadvantages of Using a Digital Currency for a Crisis-hit Country|224
4|8.8.1 Disadvantages|225
4|8.8.2 Advantages|226
3|8.9 Conclusion|227
3|References|236
2|9: Financial Crime in the Twenty-First Century: The Rise of the Virtual Collar Criminal|240
3|9.1 Introduction: White Collar Crime|241
3|9.2 The Lure of the Internet|242
3|9.3 The Power Balance and the Changing Conception of White Collar Crime|244
3|9.4 Future Virtual Collar Crime|245
4|9.4.1 The Internet of Things|245
4|9.4.2 The Sharing Economy|248
4|9.4.3 Cryptocurrencies|249
4|9.4.4 The Dark Web (and the Light Web)|250
4|9.4.5 Online Dating, Companionship and Revenge Porn|250
4|9.4.6 Algorithms|252
3|9.5 Virtual Collar Crime Solutions?|252
3|9.6 Conclusion|254
1|Part 5: The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime|261
2|10: Is ‘This Time’ Really ‘Different’?: Reflections on ‘Risk’ in Financial Impropriety and Criminal Liability Past and Present in Looking to the Future|262
3|10.1 Background and Context|263
3|10.2 Tackling the Time and the Aphorism Head On: This Time Is Different|266
3|10.3 Financial Crisis and Financial Crime: New Directions and Perspectives on ‘This Time’ Being ‘Different’|268
3|10.4 Financial Crime and the Potential Benefits of ‘Risk’ and Long Timeframe Analyses|270
3|10.5 Financial Crime and Risk: Perspectives Across Time|274
3|10.6 Concluding Thoughts|280
2|11: Corporate Crime and Corporate Culture in Financial Institutions: An Australian Perspective|290
3|11.1 Introduction|291
3|11.2 The Problem of Corporate Culture|295
3|11.3 Theorising About Corporate Culture and Corporate Crime|300
3|11.4 Using Corporate Culture as a Legal Tool|307
3|11.5 Conclusions|311
2|12: The Financial Crisis and Mortgage Fraud: The Unforeseen Circumstances of the War on Terrorism and the Financial War on Terrorism, a Critical Reflection|323
3|12.1 Introduction|323
3|12.2 The War on Terrorism and the Financial War on Terrorism|325
3|12.3 The Evolution of the US Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategy|331
3|12.4 The Financial Crisis and Mortgage Fraud|335
3|12.5 An Alteration of Policy|338
3|12.6 Conclusion|343
3|References|345
1|Erratum to: White Collar Crime and Risk|355
1|Index|356
1|Acknowledgements|8
1|Contents|9
1|Notes on Contributors|12
1|1: Introduction|17
1|Part 1: Bribery and Corruption|20
2|2: Corruption, Development, Financial Institutions and Politically Exposed Persons|21
3|2.1 Introduction|21
3|2.2 Development, Growth and Corruption|23
3|2.3 Money Laundering, Corruption and the Anti-corruption Conventions|30
4|2.3.1 Addressing Money Laundering Through the Anti-corruption Conventions|31
4|2.3.2 The FATF Anti-money Laundering (AML) Regime|34
3|2.4 Preventing Money Laundering by Politically Exposed Persons|36
3|2.5 Conclusion|44
2|3: Anti-Bribery and Corruption: Perceptions, Risks and Practice for UK Banks|57
3|3.1 Introduction|57
3|3.2 The Origin and Meaning of Corruption|59
3|3.3 The Threat of Corruption|62
3|3.4 Extent of Corruption|63
3|3.5 What Is Bribery?|63
3|3.6 The Extent of Bribery, International Trends and Counter-Measures|64
3|3.7 The European Union|66
3|3.8 The Crime of Bribery in the UK|69
4|3.8.1 Anti-Corruption and Bribery Enforcement Agencies|74
4|3.8.2 Sentencing and Enforcement|76
3|3.9 Risks and Banking Standards|79
3|3.10 Findings and Conclusions|83
1|Part 2: Financial Crime|106
2|4: The EU Sanctions and the Fight Against Financial Crime|107
3|4.1 Introduction|107
3|4.2 Financial Regulation and EU’s Fight Against Financial Crimes: Brief History|108
3|4.3 The Eternal Debate: Criminal or Administrative Sanctions?|111
3|4.4 EU Anti-money Laundering Action and Administrative Sanctions|114
3|4.5 Market Abuse Sanctions|116
3|4.6 The Proposal for a European Public Prosecutor Office|118
4|4.6.1 Does the EPPO Comply with the Idea of “Better Regulation”?|120
3|4.7 Conclusion|121
2|5: Tackling the Risks of Money Laundering|126
3|5.1 Money Laundering|127
3|5.2 Risks of Money Laundering|127
4|5.2.1 Associational Risks|128
4|5.2.2 Non-derivative Risk/Risk Exclusive to Money Laundering|131
3|5.3 Tackling Money Laundering Risks|132
4|5.3.1 Criminalization of Money Laundering and Confiscation Regimes|132
4|5.3.2 Dismantling Secrecy: Anti-money Laundering Regulation|135
4|5.3.3 Other Aspects of Fortification|137
3|5.4 Risk, Merits and Appearances|139
1|Part 3: Market Manipulation|150
2|6: Market Abuse and the Risk to the Financial Markets|151
3|6.1 Introduction|151
3|6.2 History and Background|152
3|6.3 The Management of Risk|153
3|6.4 The Philosophical Difficulties|155
3|6.5 The Criminal Provisions|157
3|6.6 The Civil Regime and Market Abuse as a Wider Concept|159
3|6.7 The Difficulties of the Civil Regime|164
3|6.8 The Market Abuse Regulation and MAD II|166
3|6.9 Market Abuse Outside the CJA1993 and Part VIII FSMA 2000|167
3|6.10 Getting Tough|168
3|6.11 Conclusion|169
3|References|170
2|7: Competition Law and LIBOR in Three Jurisdictions: The United States of America, the United Kingdom and the European Union|173
3|7.1 LIBOR and Manipulation|174
3|7.2 Competition Law Provisions and Regimes of the United States of America, the European Union and the United Kingdom|176
4|7.2.1 The United States of America|177
5|7.2.1.1 Civil Public Enforcement|177
5|7.2.1.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|178
5|7.2.1.3 Civil Private Enforcement|178
4|7.2.2 The European Union|180
5|7.2.2.1 Civil Public Enforcement|180
5|7.2.2.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|181
5|7.2.2.3 Civil Private Enforcement|181
4|7.2.3 The United Kingdom|182
5|7.2.3.1 Civil Public Enforcement|182
5|7.2.3.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|182
5|7.2.3.3 Civil Private Enforcement|183
3|7.3 Competition Law Actions|184
4|7.3.1 The United States|184
5|7.3.1.1 Civil Public Enforcement|184
5|7.3.1.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|184
5|7.3.1.3 Civil Private Enforcement|185
4|7.3.2 The European Union|189
5|7.3.2.1 Civil Public Enforcement|189
5|7.3.2.2 Criminal Public and Civil Private Enforcement|190
4|7.3.3 The United Kingdom|190
5|7.3.3.1 Civil Public Enforcement|190
5|7.3.3.2 Criminal Public Enforcement|191
5|7.3.3.3 Civil Private Enforcement|191
3|7.4 Competition Law’s Impact on LIBOR and Post-LIBOR|192
4|7.4.1 How Effective Was Antitrust Regulation of Banking Activity?|192
4|7.4.2 Why Was the Cartel Offence Not Used in the United Kingdom?|193
4|7.4.3 What Policy Considerations Led to Limited Antitrust LIBOR Regulation?|195
4|7.4.4 Justifications for Competition Law|197
3|7.5 Conclusion|198
1|Part 4: Technology and White Collar Crime|211
2|8: The Financial Crisis and Digital Currencies|212
3|8.1 Introduction|212
3|8.2 Digital Currencies|213
3|8.3 Countries’ Regulation of Digital Currencies|215
3|8.4 Platform-Based Digital Currencies|218
3|8.5 Bitcoin|219
3|8.6 Financial Crisis and Digital Currencies|221
3|8.7 Greece|222
3|8.8 Advantages and Disadvantages of Using a Digital Currency for a Crisis-hit Country|224
4|8.8.1 Disadvantages|225
4|8.8.2 Advantages|226
3|8.9 Conclusion|227
3|References|236
2|9: Financial Crime in the Twenty-First Century: The Rise of the Virtual Collar Criminal|240
3|9.1 Introduction: White Collar Crime|241
3|9.2 The Lure of the Internet|242
3|9.3 The Power Balance and the Changing Conception of White Collar Crime|244
3|9.4 Future Virtual Collar Crime|245
4|9.4.1 The Internet of Things|245
4|9.4.2 The Sharing Economy|248
4|9.4.3 Cryptocurrencies|249
4|9.4.4 The Dark Web (and the Light Web)|250
4|9.4.5 Online Dating, Companionship and Revenge Porn|250
4|9.4.6 Algorithms|252
3|9.5 Virtual Collar Crime Solutions?|252
3|9.6 Conclusion|254
1|Part 5: The Financial Crisis and White Collar Crime|261
2|10: Is ‘This Time’ Really ‘Different’?: Reflections on ‘Risk’ in Financial Impropriety and Criminal Liability Past and Present in Looking to the Future|262
3|10.1 Background and Context|263
3|10.2 Tackling the Time and the Aphorism Head On: This Time Is Different|266
3|10.3 Financial Crisis and Financial Crime: New Directions and Perspectives on ‘This Time’ Being ‘Different’|268
3|10.4 Financial Crime and the Potential Benefits of ‘Risk’ and Long Timeframe Analyses|270
3|10.5 Financial Crime and Risk: Perspectives Across Time|274
3|10.6 Concluding Thoughts|280
2|11: Corporate Crime and Corporate Culture in Financial Institutions: An Australian Perspective|290
3|11.1 Introduction|291
3|11.2 The Problem of Corporate Culture|295
3|11.3 Theorising About Corporate Culture and Corporate Crime|300
3|11.4 Using Corporate Culture as a Legal Tool|307
3|11.5 Conclusions|311
2|12: The Financial Crisis and Mortgage Fraud: The Unforeseen Circumstances of the War on Terrorism and the Financial War on Terrorism, a Critical Reflection|323
3|12.1 Introduction|323
3|12.2 The War on Terrorism and the Financial War on Terrorism|325
3|12.3 The Evolution of the US Counter-Terrorist Financing Strategy|331
3|12.4 The Financial Crisis and Mortgage Fraud|335
3|12.5 An Alteration of Policy|338
3|12.6 Conclusion|343
3|References|345
1|Erratum to: White Collar Crime and Risk|355
1|Index|356