File #2527: "2018_Book_TheUseOfAlternativeBenchmarksI.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|6
1|Contents|8
1|Abbreviations|14
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|16
2|1.1 Research Objective|19
2|1.2 Object and Scope of the Study|20
2|1.3 Methodical Approach and Course of the Study|20
1|Chapter 2: The Significance of the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in the Process of WTO Anti-Subsidy Investigations|22
2|2.1 The WTO as Institution of International Trade Regulation|22
3|2.1.1 The GATT 1947 as Predecessor of the WTO|23
3|2.1.2 The Foundation of the WTO|24
3|2.1.3 The WTO in 2018|25
2|2.2 The Case for the Regulation of Subsidisation in International Trade Law|27
3|2.2.1 Free Trade as Guarantor of Maximum National Welfare|27
3|2.2.2 Subsidisation as Trade Distortion|29
3|2.2.3 The Necessity of Regulating Subsidisation|30
2|2.3 WTO Regulation of Subsidies|31
3|2.3.1 The Theoretical Concept of Subsidisation in WTO Law|31
3|2.3.2 The WTO Legal Framework for Subsidies Regulation|32
3|2.3.3 The Substantive Prerequisites for Imposing a Countervailing Duty|34
4|2.3.3.1 Countervailable Subsidy|34
4|2.3.3.2 Injury|36
4|2.3.3.3 Causation|36
3|2.3.4 The Course of Procedure of an Anti-Subsidy Investigation|37
4|2.3.4.1 Initiation|37
4|2.3.4.2 Investigation|38
4|2.3.4.3 Imposition of the Countervailing Duty|38
2|2.4 The Calculation of the Amount of Benefit|39
3|2.4.1 The Benefit as Countervailable Part of the Governmental Financial Contribution|39
3|2.4.2 Benefit Calculation in MES|41
4|2.4.2.1 Article 14 ASCM as Framework for the Benefit Calculation|41
4|2.4.2.2 The Market Benchmark as Foundation of the Benefit Calculation|43
4|2.4.2.3 The Determination of the Relevant Market|44
4|2.4.2.4 The Market Conception in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|45
5|2.4.2.4.1 Indications in the Wording of Article 14 ASCM|45
6|2.4.2.4.1.1 The Chapeau of Article 14 ASCM|45
6|2.4.2.4.1.2 Article 14(a) ASCM|46
6|2.4.2.4.1.3 Article 14(b) ASCM|46
6|2.4.2.4.1.4 Article 14(c) ASCM|47
6|2.4.2.4.1.5 Article 14(d) ASCM|48
5|2.4.2.4.2 Indications in WTO Jurisprudence|48
6|2.4.2.4.2.1 Canada - Aircraft|48
6|2.4.2.4.2.2 Brazil - Aircraft|49
6|2.4.2.4.2.3 US - Softwood Lumber III|51
6|2.4.2.4.2.4 US - Softwood Lumber IV|51
6|2.4.2.4.2.5 US - Carbon Steel (India)|52
6|2.4.2.4.2.6 Canada - Renewable Energy and Canada - FIT Program|53
3|2.4.3 Benefit Calculation in NMES|54
4|2.4.3.1 The Necessity of a Meaningful Market Benchmark|54
4|2.4.3.2 The Alternative Benchmark Methodologies|55
5|2.4.3.2.1 Price Construction|55
5|2.4.3.2.2 Out-of-Country Methodologies|55
6|2.4.3.2.2.1 The Rationale of Out-of-Country Benchmarks|56
6|2.4.3.2.2.2 The Different Kinds of Out-of-Country Benchmarks|56
2|2.5 Chapter Summary|56
1|Chapter 3: The WTO Framework for the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|58
2|3.1 The General Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|58
3|3.1.1 Excursus: Alternative Benchmark Regimes Outside the ASCM|59
4|3.1.1.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime in Article VI:1 GATT 1947|59
5|3.1.1.1.1 The Range of Alternative Methodologies|59
5|3.1.1.1.2 The Applicability of Article VI:1 GATT in Anti-Subsidy Investigations|60
4|3.1.1.2 The Alternative Benchmark Regime in Article 15 Subsidies Code|61
5|3.1.1.2.1 The Range of Alternative Methodologies|61
6|3.1.1.2.1.1 Third-Country Benchmark and Constructed Price|61
6|3.1.1.2.1.2 Adjustment of the Existing In-Country Price in the Country Investigated|62
5|3.1.1.2.2 The Legal Force of the Subsidies Code|62
4|3.1.1.3 The Alternative Benchmark Regime in the ADA|63
4|3.1.1.4 Conclusion|64
3|3.1.2 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14 ASCM|65
4|3.1.2.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14(d) ASCM|65
5|3.1.2.1.1 The Permissibility of Using Alternative Benchmarks|66
6|3.1.2.1.1.1 US - Softwood Lumber IV|66
7|3.1.2.1.1.1.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|66
7|3.1.2.1.1.1.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|67
6|3.1.2.1.1.2 Further WTO Jurisprudence|68
5|3.1.2.1.2 The Prerequisites for Using Alternative Benchmarks|69
6|3.1.2.1.2.1 US - Softwood Lumber IV|69
6|3.1.2.1.2.2 US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)|70
7|3.1.2.1.2.2.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|70
7|3.1.2.1.2.2.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|71
6|3.1.2.1.2.3 US - Countervailing Measures (China)|72
5|3.1.2.1.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|73
5|3.1.2.1.4 Derogation from the Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14(d) ASCM|73
6|3.1.2.1.4.1 The Facts of the Cases|74
6|3.1.2.1.4.2 The Reasoning of the Panel|75
6|3.1.2.1.4.3 The Reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body|75
7|3.1.2.1.4.3.1 The Limited Permissibility to Use Alternative Benchmarks|75
7|3.1.2.1.4.3.2 The Prerequisites for Using Alternative Benchmarks|76
7|3.1.2.1.4.3.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|76
5|3.1.2.1.5 Conclusion|77
4|3.1.2.2 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14(b) ASCM|77
5|3.1.2.2.1 The Permissibility of Using Alternative Benchmarks|78
6|3.1.2.2.1.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|78
6|3.1.2.2.1.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|78
5|3.1.2.2.2 The Prerequisites for Using Alternative Benchmarks|80
6|3.1.2.2.2.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|80
6|3.1.2.2.2.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|81
5|3.1.2.2.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|81
6|3.1.2.2.3.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|81
6|3.1.2.2.3.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|82
5|3.1.2.2.4 Conclusion|83
4|3.1.2.3 The Alternative Benchmark Regimes Under Article 14(a) and (c) ASCM|83
4|3.1.2.4 The Legal Impact of the Appellate Body´s Alternative Benchmark Regime on Article 14 ASCM|84
5|3.1.2.4.1 The Legal Impact of WTO Jurisprudence|84
5|3.1.2.4.2 The Legal Status of the Alternative Benchmark Regimes in Article 14 ASCM|85
3|3.1.3 Conclusion|86
2|3.2 The China-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regime for Anti-Subsidy Investigations|87
3|3.2.1 The Background of the Adoption of China-Specific WTO Rules|87
4|3.2.1.1 The WTO Accession Process of China|87
4|3.2.1.2 The Legal Basis for the Integration of a Country-Specific Legal Regime into WTO Law|88
4|3.2.1.3 The Rationale of the China-Specific Provisions|90
3|3.2.2 The China-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Section 15(b) CAP|91
4|3.2.2.1 The Permissibility of Using Alternative Benchmarks|92
4|3.2.2.2 The Prerequisites for the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|92
5|3.2.2.2.1 ``Special Difficulties´´|92
6|3.2.2.2.1.1 The Meaning of ``Special Difficulties´´|93
6|3.2.2.2.1.2 The Context of ``Special Difficulties´´|93
6|3.2.2.2.1.3 ``Special Difficulties´´ in the Light of the Rationale of the CAP|94
6|3.2.2.2.1.4 The Genesis of ``Special Difficulties´´|94
7|3.2.2.2.1.4.1 The Origin of ``Special Difficulties´´|95
7|3.2.2.2.1.4.2 The Evolution of ``Special Difficulties´´|96
7|3.2.2.2.1.4.3 The Application of ``Special Difficulties´´ Towards China|97
5|3.2.2.2.2 ``Appropriateness´´ of Using Existing Chinese Benchmarks|99
4|3.2.2.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|99
5|3.2.2.3.1 The Meaning of ``Practicable´´|100
5|3.2.2.3.2 The Compulsory Nature of the Adjustment Requirement|100
5|3.2.2.3.3 The Range of Potential Alternative Benchmark Methodologies|101
3|3.2.3 The Integration of the China-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regime into General WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|101
4|3.2.3.1 The Rank of Accession Protocols in WTO Law|102
5|3.2.3.1.1 The Rank of Accession Protocols According to the Protocol Provisions|102
5|3.2.3.1.2 The Rank of Accession Protocols According to the WTO Appellate Body|102
4|3.2.3.2 The Implications of the Chapeau for China´s Alternative Benchmark Regime|103
5|3.2.3.2.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of China at the Time of Conclusion|104
5|3.2.3.2.2 The Impact of US - Softwood Lumber IV|104
5|3.2.3.2.3 The Impact of US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)|106
5|3.2.3.2.4 The Comprehensive WTO Alternative Benchmark Regime for China in Anti-Subsidy Law|107
6|3.2.3.2.4.1 The Different Models of Alternative Benchmark Regimes|107
6|3.2.3.2.4.2 Indications Regarding Prevalence of a Dynamic Applicability Model from WTO Jurisprudence|107
3|3.2.4 Conclusion|109
2|3.3 Chapter Summary|109
1|Chapter 4: The Current EU Approach in the Application of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|111
2|4.1 The Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in EU Anti-Subsidy Cases Against China: A Case Study|111
3|4.1.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of the EU|112
4|4.1.1.1 Article 6 BASR|112
5|4.1.1.1.1 The Regulatory Content of Article 6(d)(ii) BASR|113
5|4.1.1.1.2 The Reason for the Enactment of Alternative Benchmark Regime in EU Anti-subsidy Law|114
4|4.1.1.2 Guidelines of the Commission (98/C 394/04)|114
5|4.1.1.2.1 The Regulatory Content of the Guidelines|114
5|4.1.1.2.2 The Legal Nature of the Guidelines|115
3|4.1.2 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in EU Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|115
4|4.1.2.1 The EU Anti-Subsidy Investigation Procedure|116
4|4.1.2.2 An Overview on EU Anti-Subsidy Cases Against China|117
4|4.1.2.3 Case Study on the Use of Alternative Benchmarks in NMES|119
5|4.1.2.3.1 Coated Fine Paper (China) (2011)|119
6|4.1.2.3.1.1 Preferential Lending|119
7|4.1.2.3.1.1.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|120
7|4.1.2.3.1.1.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|121
6|4.1.2.3.1.2 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|122
7|4.1.2.3.1.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|122
7|4.1.2.3.1.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|122
5|4.1.2.3.2 Certain Organic Coated Steel Products (2013)|123
6|4.1.2.3.2.1 Preferential Loans and Interest Rates|123
7|4.1.2.3.2.1.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|124
7|4.1.2.3.2.1.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|125
6|4.1.2.3.2.2 The Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|125
7|4.1.2.3.2.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|125
7|4.1.2.3.2.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|126
6|4.1.2.3.2.3 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|126
7|4.1.2.3.2.3.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|126
7|4.1.2.3.2.3.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|127
5|4.1.2.3.3 Solar Panels (2013)|127
6|4.1.2.3.3.1 Preferential Lending|127
7|4.1.2.3.3.1.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|127
7|4.1.2.3.3.1.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|128
6|4.1.2.3.3.2 The Provision of Credit Lines|128
7|4.1.2.3.3.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|128
7|4.1.2.3.3.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|129
6|4.1.2.3.3.3 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|129
7|4.1.2.3.3.3.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|129
7|4.1.2.3.3.3.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|130
5|4.1.2.3.4 Solar Glass (2014)|130
6|4.1.2.3.4.1 Preferential Lending|130
6|4.1.2.3.4.2 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|131
5|4.1.2.3.5 Certain Filament Glass Fibre Products (2014)|131
6|4.1.2.3.5.1 Preferential Lending|131
6|4.1.2.3.5.2 Provision of Land-Use Rights|132
3|4.1.3 Conclusion|132
2|4.2 WTO Law Conformity of the EU´s Alternative Benchmark Approach in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|133
3|4.2.1 Conformity with Article 14 ASCM|133
4|4.2.1.1 Conformity As Such|133
5|4.2.1.1.1 The Transposed Parts of the BASR|134
5|4.2.1.1.2 The EU Genuine Part of the BASR|134
4|4.2.1.2 Conformity As Applied|135
5|4.2.1.2.1 The ``General Application´´ in the Guidelines|135
5|4.2.1.2.2 The EU Approach Regarding Preferential Lending|136
6|4.2.1.2.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|136
6|4.2.1.2.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|137
5|4.2.1.2.3 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Credit Lines|138
6|4.2.1.2.3.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|138
6|4.2.1.2.3.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|138
5|4.2.1.2.4 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Land-Use Rights|139
6|4.2.1.2.4.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|139
6|4.2.1.2.4.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|140
5|4.2.1.2.5 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|141
6|4.2.1.2.5.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|141
6|4.2.1.2.5.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|142
3|4.2.2 Conformity with Section 15(b) CAP|143
4|4.2.2.1 Conformity As Such|143
4|4.2.2.2 Conformity As Applied|144
5|4.2.2.2.1 The ``General Application´´ in the Guidelines|144
5|4.2.2.2.2 The EU Approach Regarding Preferential Lending|144
5|4.2.2.2.3 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Credit Lines|144
5|4.2.2.2.4 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Land-Use Rights|145
5|4.2.2.2.5 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|145
3|4.2.3 Overall WTO Law Conformity of the EU Approach on the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investig...|146
4|4.2.3.1 Conformity As Such|146
4|4.2.3.2 Conformity As Applied|146
5|4.2.3.2.1 The ``General Application´´ in the Guidelines|147
5|4.2.3.2.2 The EU Approach Regarding Preferential Lending|147
5|4.2.3.2.3 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Credit Lines|147
5|4.2.3.2.4 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Land-Use Rights|148
5|4.2.3.2.5 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|148
3|4.2.4 Conclusion|148
2|4.3 Prospective Developments of the EU Approach on the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investigatio...|150
3|4.3.1 Prospects on the Basis of the WTO Framework in the Current 2011 State of Appellate Body Interpretation|150
4|4.3.1.1 General Changes|150
4|4.3.1.2 China-Specific Changes|151
3|4.3.2 Prospects upon Possible Developments at WTO Level|151
4|4.3.2.1 General Changes|151
4|4.3.2.2 China-Specific Changes|152
3|4.3.3 Conclusion|152
2|4.4 Chapter Summary|152
1|Chapter 5: The Need for Reforming the Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|154
2|5.1 The Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in NMES: A Global Perspective|154
3|5.1.1 The Existence of Country-Specific Anti-Subsidy Rules in the WTO Legal Hemisphere|154
3|5.1.2 Alternative Benchmark Regimes for NMES in the Anti-Subsidy Law of Other Countries|155
4|5.1.2.1 US Anti-Subsidy Law|156
4|5.1.2.2 Canadian Anti-Subsidy Law|157
4|5.1.2.3 Australian Anti-Subsidy Law|157
3|5.1.3 The Role of the Use of Alternative Benchmarks in NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law in WTO Dispute Settlement|158
2|5.2 Justification of Current Developments in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law and Practice Concerning the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|159
3|5.2.1 Concepts for the Justification of the Exercise of Authority in the WTO|160
4|5.2.1.1 The Concepts of Legality and Legitimacy|160
4|5.2.1.2 The Significance of Legality and Legitimacy for the WTO|161
5|5.2.1.2.1 The Significance of Legality for the WTO|161
5|5.2.1.2.2 The Significance of Legitimacy for the WTO|162
4|5.2.1.3 The Parameters for the Assessment of Legality and Legitimacy in the WTO|163
3|5.2.2 Justification of the Introduction of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|164
4|5.2.2.1 Legality of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|164
5|5.2.2.1.1 Violation of Article XII:1 WTO Agreement|164
6|5.2.2.1.1.1 The ``Terms´´ of Accession|165
6|5.2.2.1.1.2 Article XII WTO Agreement in Context|165
6|5.2.2.1.1.3 The Rationale of Accession Protocols|167
6|5.2.2.1.1.4 Country-Specific Rule-Making in the GATT Era|167
5|5.2.2.1.2 Violation of Article I:1 GATT|168
6|5.2.2.1.2.1 Applicability of Article I:1 GATT on the Pre-accession Phase|168
6|5.2.2.1.2.2 Conflict of Law with the Country-Specific Accession Commitments|169
5|5.2.2.1.3 Justification of the WTO Law Violations|170
6|5.2.2.1.3.1 Compliance with Articles 27 and 29 ASCM|171
6|5.2.2.1.3.2 Compliance with Article VI:1 GATT|171
6|5.2.2.1.3.3 Compliance as Reservation|171
6|5.2.2.1.3.4 Compliance as Waiver|172
6|5.2.2.1.3.5 Compliance as Amendment|173
6|5.2.2.1.3.6 Compliance as Authoritative Interpretation|174
6|5.2.2.1.3.7 Compliance as Agreement of Non-application|175
6|5.2.2.1.3.8 Compliance as Subsequent Agreement|176
6|5.2.2.1.3.9 Compliance as Subsequent Practice|177
6|5.2.2.1.3.10 Compliance as Non-WTO Agreement|180
4|5.2.2.2 Legitimacy of the Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|181
5|5.2.2.2.1 Rationale of the Country-Specific Anti-Subsidy Rules in Accession Protocols|181
5|5.2.2.2.2 Coherence of Attributable Rationale and Adopted Country-Specific Rules|181
5|5.2.2.2.3 Conformity with WTO Law and General International Law Principles|182
4|5.2.2.3 Conclusion|184
3|5.2.3 Justification of the Establishment of a General Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|185
4|5.2.3.1 Legality of the Establishment of a General Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|185
5|5.2.3.1.1 Compliance with Article 14 ASCM|185
5|5.2.3.1.2 Compliance with Article 19.3 ASCM|186
5|5.2.3.1.3 Compliance with Article 19.4 ASCM|187
5|5.2.3.1.4 Compliance with Article VI:3 GATT|188
5|5.2.3.1.5 Compliance with WTO Anti-Dumping Law|189
5|5.2.3.1.6 Compliance with Articles IX:2 and X WTO Agreement and Articles 3.2 and 19.2 DSU|189
4|5.2.3.2 Legitimacy of the Establishment of a General Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|191
5|5.2.3.2.1 The Rationale of NMES Rules in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|191
5|5.2.3.2.2 Coherence of Rationale and Adopted NMES Rules|191
5|5.2.3.2.3 Conformity with WTO and International Law Principles|192
6|5.2.3.2.3.1 Violation of the Principle of Mandatory Market Economy Transition|192
6|5.2.3.2.3.2 Violation of the WTO Transparency Principle|193
2|5.3 Chapter Summary|194
1|Chapter 6: Rethinking the Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|196
2|6.1 Substantive Issues of Reform|196
3|6.1.1 The Problematic Issues of the Present Alternative Benchmark Approach|197
4|6.1.1.1 Problematic Issues in the Determination of Market Distortion|197
4|6.1.1.2 Problematic Issues in the Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|198
3|6.1.2 The Objectives of the Reform Proposal|199
3|6.1.3 Test Criteria for Legal Reform|200
3|6.1.4 Substantive Legal Reform Proposals|200
4|6.1.4.1 Reforming the Determination of Market Distortion|200
5|6.1.4.1.1 The Conception of Market Underlying WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|200
6|6.1.4.1.1.1 Indications from the Systemic Regulatory Concept of the ASCM|201
6|6.1.4.1.1.2 Indications from the Regulation of Actionable Subsidies|202
5|6.1.4.1.2 Suitability of the Present Indicators for the Determination of Market Distortion|203
6|6.1.4.1.2.1 The Rationale Behind the Selection of the Indicators|203
6|6.1.4.1.2.2 Assessment of the Indicator of Market Shares|203
6|6.1.4.1.2.3 Assessment of the Indicator of Market Power|205
5|6.1.4.1.3 Redefining the Indicator of Market Power|206
6|6.1.4.1.3.1 Potential New Parameters for the Determination of Market Power|207
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.1 Number-of-Firms Criterion|207
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.2 Concentration Ratio|208
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.3 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index|209
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.4 Excess Profitability Criterion|210
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.5 Lerner Index|211
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.6 Criterion of Cross-Price Elasticity by Triffin|211
6|6.1.4.1.3.2 Adaption of the Potential Parameters for the Determination of Market Power|212
7|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 Centralisation of the Exercise of Discretion|212
8|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 Existing Structures for Centralised Reasoning in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|213
8|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 Suitability of the Existing Structures for Legal Reform|213
8|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 The New Expert Group for the Determination of Market Distortion|214
7|6.1.4.1.3.2.2 Introduction of a Preliminary Distinction Analysis|214
7|6.1.4.1.3.2.3 Introduction of the Criterion of Non-profitability|215
5|6.1.4.1.4 Conclusion|215
4|6.1.4.2 Reforming the Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|216
5|6.1.4.2.1 Potential Alternative Benchmark Methodologies for Legal Reform|216
6|6.1.4.2.1.1 Price Construction|216
6|6.1.4.2.1.2 Out-of-Country Methodologies|217
7|6.1.4.2.1.2.1 Third-Country Methodology|217
7|6.1.4.2.1.2.2 World Market Price|218
6|6.1.4.2.1.3 Adjustment of Existing Distorted In-Country Prices|218
6|6.1.4.2.1.4 Artificial Pricing|219
6|6.1.4.2.1.5 Injury-Based Determination|220
5|6.1.4.2.2 Assessment|221
5|6.1.4.2.3 The Default Alternative Benchmark Methodology|223
5|6.1.4.2.4 Further Necessary Adaptions|224
6|6.1.4.2.4.1 Cap at the Injury Margin|224
6|6.1.4.2.4.2 Centralisation of the Process of Reasoning|224
5|6.1.4.2.5 Conclusion|225
2|6.2 Implementation of the Reform Proposal at WTO Level|225
3|6.2.1 Necessity of Amendment as Suitable Means of Implementation|225
3|6.2.2 Risks of an Amendment|226
3|6.2.3 Realisability of an Amendment|227
4|6.2.3.1 The Status Quo of the Current Doha Development Agenda|227
4|6.2.3.2 The Doha Round´s Reform Proposals on the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies (2008)|228
5|6.2.3.2.1 The Article 1 ASCM Reform Proposals|229
5|6.2.3.2.2 The Article 14 Reform Proposals|229
4|6.2.3.3 Substantive Overlap of the 2008 Draft Proposals and the Study´s Reform Proposals|230
5|6.2.3.3.1 Overlap in the Definition of Benefit in Draft Article 14.1 ASCM|230
5|6.2.3.3.2 Overlap in the Addition of Long-Term Loss-Incurring Financing as Type of Subsidy to Draft Articles 14(b) and (c) ASCM|231
5|6.2.3.3.3 Overlap in the Alternative Benchmark Regime of Draft Article 14.1(d) ASCM|231
4|6.2.3.4 Realisability of the Study´s Reform Proposals|232
3|6.2.4 Conclusion|232
2|6.3 Draft Reform Proposal for an Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|233
2|6.4 Chapter Summary|235
1|Chapter 7: Summary|236
2|7.1 Major Findings of the Study|236
3|7.1.1 China´s Applicable WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|236
3|7.1.2 WTO Law Compatibility As Such and As Applied of Current EU Anti-Subsidy Law and Practice|237
3|7.1.3 Legality and Legitimacy of the Introduction of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|238
3|7.1.4 Legality and Legitimacy of the Introduction of an Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in General WTO Anti-Subsidy Law ...|239
2|7.2 A Reform Proposal Concerning the Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|239
2|7.3 Future Prospects and Developments|240
1|Table of Treaties and Legal Instruments (as of 1 January 2018)|242
1|Tables of Cases (as of 1 January 2018)|245
2|WTO Cases|245
2|EU Cases|249
2|ICJ Cases|249
2|US Cases|249
1|Tables of Investigations (as of 1 January 2018)|250
2|EU Investigations|250
2|US Investigations|252
1|Bibliography|253
1|Index|263
1|Contents|8
1|Abbreviations|14
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|16
2|1.1 Research Objective|19
2|1.2 Object and Scope of the Study|20
2|1.3 Methodical Approach and Course of the Study|20
1|Chapter 2: The Significance of the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in the Process of WTO Anti-Subsidy Investigations|22
2|2.1 The WTO as Institution of International Trade Regulation|22
3|2.1.1 The GATT 1947 as Predecessor of the WTO|23
3|2.1.2 The Foundation of the WTO|24
3|2.1.3 The WTO in 2018|25
2|2.2 The Case for the Regulation of Subsidisation in International Trade Law|27
3|2.2.1 Free Trade as Guarantor of Maximum National Welfare|27
3|2.2.2 Subsidisation as Trade Distortion|29
3|2.2.3 The Necessity of Regulating Subsidisation|30
2|2.3 WTO Regulation of Subsidies|31
3|2.3.1 The Theoretical Concept of Subsidisation in WTO Law|31
3|2.3.2 The WTO Legal Framework for Subsidies Regulation|32
3|2.3.3 The Substantive Prerequisites for Imposing a Countervailing Duty|34
4|2.3.3.1 Countervailable Subsidy|34
4|2.3.3.2 Injury|36
4|2.3.3.3 Causation|36
3|2.3.4 The Course of Procedure of an Anti-Subsidy Investigation|37
4|2.3.4.1 Initiation|37
4|2.3.4.2 Investigation|38
4|2.3.4.3 Imposition of the Countervailing Duty|38
2|2.4 The Calculation of the Amount of Benefit|39
3|2.4.1 The Benefit as Countervailable Part of the Governmental Financial Contribution|39
3|2.4.2 Benefit Calculation in MES|41
4|2.4.2.1 Article 14 ASCM as Framework for the Benefit Calculation|41
4|2.4.2.2 The Market Benchmark as Foundation of the Benefit Calculation|43
4|2.4.2.3 The Determination of the Relevant Market|44
4|2.4.2.4 The Market Conception in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|45
5|2.4.2.4.1 Indications in the Wording of Article 14 ASCM|45
6|2.4.2.4.1.1 The Chapeau of Article 14 ASCM|45
6|2.4.2.4.1.2 Article 14(a) ASCM|46
6|2.4.2.4.1.3 Article 14(b) ASCM|46
6|2.4.2.4.1.4 Article 14(c) ASCM|47
6|2.4.2.4.1.5 Article 14(d) ASCM|48
5|2.4.2.4.2 Indications in WTO Jurisprudence|48
6|2.4.2.4.2.1 Canada - Aircraft|48
6|2.4.2.4.2.2 Brazil - Aircraft|49
6|2.4.2.4.2.3 US - Softwood Lumber III|51
6|2.4.2.4.2.4 US - Softwood Lumber IV|51
6|2.4.2.4.2.5 US - Carbon Steel (India)|52
6|2.4.2.4.2.6 Canada - Renewable Energy and Canada - FIT Program|53
3|2.4.3 Benefit Calculation in NMES|54
4|2.4.3.1 The Necessity of a Meaningful Market Benchmark|54
4|2.4.3.2 The Alternative Benchmark Methodologies|55
5|2.4.3.2.1 Price Construction|55
5|2.4.3.2.2 Out-of-Country Methodologies|55
6|2.4.3.2.2.1 The Rationale of Out-of-Country Benchmarks|56
6|2.4.3.2.2.2 The Different Kinds of Out-of-Country Benchmarks|56
2|2.5 Chapter Summary|56
1|Chapter 3: The WTO Framework for the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|58
2|3.1 The General Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|58
3|3.1.1 Excursus: Alternative Benchmark Regimes Outside the ASCM|59
4|3.1.1.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime in Article VI:1 GATT 1947|59
5|3.1.1.1.1 The Range of Alternative Methodologies|59
5|3.1.1.1.2 The Applicability of Article VI:1 GATT in Anti-Subsidy Investigations|60
4|3.1.1.2 The Alternative Benchmark Regime in Article 15 Subsidies Code|61
5|3.1.1.2.1 The Range of Alternative Methodologies|61
6|3.1.1.2.1.1 Third-Country Benchmark and Constructed Price|61
6|3.1.1.2.1.2 Adjustment of the Existing In-Country Price in the Country Investigated|62
5|3.1.1.2.2 The Legal Force of the Subsidies Code|62
4|3.1.1.3 The Alternative Benchmark Regime in the ADA|63
4|3.1.1.4 Conclusion|64
3|3.1.2 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14 ASCM|65
4|3.1.2.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14(d) ASCM|65
5|3.1.2.1.1 The Permissibility of Using Alternative Benchmarks|66
6|3.1.2.1.1.1 US - Softwood Lumber IV|66
7|3.1.2.1.1.1.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|66
7|3.1.2.1.1.1.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|67
6|3.1.2.1.1.2 Further WTO Jurisprudence|68
5|3.1.2.1.2 The Prerequisites for Using Alternative Benchmarks|69
6|3.1.2.1.2.1 US - Softwood Lumber IV|69
6|3.1.2.1.2.2 US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)|70
7|3.1.2.1.2.2.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|70
7|3.1.2.1.2.2.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|71
6|3.1.2.1.2.3 US - Countervailing Measures (China)|72
5|3.1.2.1.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|73
5|3.1.2.1.4 Derogation from the Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14(d) ASCM|73
6|3.1.2.1.4.1 The Facts of the Cases|74
6|3.1.2.1.4.2 The Reasoning of the Panel|75
6|3.1.2.1.4.3 The Reasoning of the WTO Appellate Body|75
7|3.1.2.1.4.3.1 The Limited Permissibility to Use Alternative Benchmarks|75
7|3.1.2.1.4.3.2 The Prerequisites for Using Alternative Benchmarks|76
7|3.1.2.1.4.3.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|76
5|3.1.2.1.5 Conclusion|77
4|3.1.2.2 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of Article 14(b) ASCM|77
5|3.1.2.2.1 The Permissibility of Using Alternative Benchmarks|78
6|3.1.2.2.1.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|78
6|3.1.2.2.1.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|78
5|3.1.2.2.2 The Prerequisites for Using Alternative Benchmarks|80
6|3.1.2.2.2.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|80
6|3.1.2.2.2.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|81
5|3.1.2.2.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|81
6|3.1.2.2.3.1 The Reasoning of the Panel|81
6|3.1.2.2.3.2 The Reasoning of the Appellate Body|82
5|3.1.2.2.4 Conclusion|83
4|3.1.2.3 The Alternative Benchmark Regimes Under Article 14(a) and (c) ASCM|83
4|3.1.2.4 The Legal Impact of the Appellate Body´s Alternative Benchmark Regime on Article 14 ASCM|84
5|3.1.2.4.1 The Legal Impact of WTO Jurisprudence|84
5|3.1.2.4.2 The Legal Status of the Alternative Benchmark Regimes in Article 14 ASCM|85
3|3.1.3 Conclusion|86
2|3.2 The China-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regime for Anti-Subsidy Investigations|87
3|3.2.1 The Background of the Adoption of China-Specific WTO Rules|87
4|3.2.1.1 The WTO Accession Process of China|87
4|3.2.1.2 The Legal Basis for the Integration of a Country-Specific Legal Regime into WTO Law|88
4|3.2.1.3 The Rationale of the China-Specific Provisions|90
3|3.2.2 The China-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Section 15(b) CAP|91
4|3.2.2.1 The Permissibility of Using Alternative Benchmarks|92
4|3.2.2.2 The Prerequisites for the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|92
5|3.2.2.2.1 ``Special Difficulties´´|92
6|3.2.2.2.1.1 The Meaning of ``Special Difficulties´´|93
6|3.2.2.2.1.2 The Context of ``Special Difficulties´´|93
6|3.2.2.2.1.3 ``Special Difficulties´´ in the Light of the Rationale of the CAP|94
6|3.2.2.2.1.4 The Genesis of ``Special Difficulties´´|94
7|3.2.2.2.1.4.1 The Origin of ``Special Difficulties´´|95
7|3.2.2.2.1.4.2 The Evolution of ``Special Difficulties´´|96
7|3.2.2.2.1.4.3 The Application of ``Special Difficulties´´ Towards China|97
5|3.2.2.2.2 ``Appropriateness´´ of Using Existing Chinese Benchmarks|99
4|3.2.2.3 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|99
5|3.2.2.3.1 The Meaning of ``Practicable´´|100
5|3.2.2.3.2 The Compulsory Nature of the Adjustment Requirement|100
5|3.2.2.3.3 The Range of Potential Alternative Benchmark Methodologies|101
3|3.2.3 The Integration of the China-Specific Alternative Benchmark Regime into General WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|101
4|3.2.3.1 The Rank of Accession Protocols in WTO Law|102
5|3.2.3.1.1 The Rank of Accession Protocols According to the Protocol Provisions|102
5|3.2.3.1.2 The Rank of Accession Protocols According to the WTO Appellate Body|102
4|3.2.3.2 The Implications of the Chapeau for China´s Alternative Benchmark Regime|103
5|3.2.3.2.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of China at the Time of Conclusion|104
5|3.2.3.2.2 The Impact of US - Softwood Lumber IV|104
5|3.2.3.2.3 The Impact of US - Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China)|106
5|3.2.3.2.4 The Comprehensive WTO Alternative Benchmark Regime for China in Anti-Subsidy Law|107
6|3.2.3.2.4.1 The Different Models of Alternative Benchmark Regimes|107
6|3.2.3.2.4.2 Indications Regarding Prevalence of a Dynamic Applicability Model from WTO Jurisprudence|107
3|3.2.4 Conclusion|109
2|3.3 Chapter Summary|109
1|Chapter 4: The Current EU Approach in the Application of Alternative Benchmarks in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|111
2|4.1 The Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in EU Anti-Subsidy Cases Against China: A Case Study|111
3|4.1.1 The Alternative Benchmark Regime of the EU|112
4|4.1.1.1 Article 6 BASR|112
5|4.1.1.1.1 The Regulatory Content of Article 6(d)(ii) BASR|113
5|4.1.1.1.2 The Reason for the Enactment of Alternative Benchmark Regime in EU Anti-subsidy Law|114
4|4.1.1.2 Guidelines of the Commission (98/C 394/04)|114
5|4.1.1.2.1 The Regulatory Content of the Guidelines|114
5|4.1.1.2.2 The Legal Nature of the Guidelines|115
3|4.1.2 The Use of Alternative Benchmarks in EU Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|115
4|4.1.2.1 The EU Anti-Subsidy Investigation Procedure|116
4|4.1.2.2 An Overview on EU Anti-Subsidy Cases Against China|117
4|4.1.2.3 Case Study on the Use of Alternative Benchmarks in NMES|119
5|4.1.2.3.1 Coated Fine Paper (China) (2011)|119
6|4.1.2.3.1.1 Preferential Lending|119
7|4.1.2.3.1.1.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|120
7|4.1.2.3.1.1.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|121
6|4.1.2.3.1.2 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|122
7|4.1.2.3.1.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|122
7|4.1.2.3.1.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|122
5|4.1.2.3.2 Certain Organic Coated Steel Products (2013)|123
6|4.1.2.3.2.1 Preferential Loans and Interest Rates|123
7|4.1.2.3.2.1.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|124
7|4.1.2.3.2.1.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|125
6|4.1.2.3.2.2 The Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|125
7|4.1.2.3.2.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|125
7|4.1.2.3.2.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|126
6|4.1.2.3.2.3 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|126
7|4.1.2.3.2.3.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|126
7|4.1.2.3.2.3.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|127
5|4.1.2.3.3 Solar Panels (2013)|127
6|4.1.2.3.3.1 Preferential Lending|127
7|4.1.2.3.3.1.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|127
7|4.1.2.3.3.1.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|128
6|4.1.2.3.3.2 The Provision of Credit Lines|128
7|4.1.2.3.3.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|128
7|4.1.2.3.3.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|129
6|4.1.2.3.3.3 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|129
7|4.1.2.3.3.3.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|129
7|4.1.2.3.3.3.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|130
5|4.1.2.3.4 Solar Glass (2014)|130
6|4.1.2.3.4.1 Preferential Lending|130
6|4.1.2.3.4.2 The Provision of Land-Use Rights|131
5|4.1.2.3.5 Certain Filament Glass Fibre Products (2014)|131
6|4.1.2.3.5.1 Preferential Lending|131
6|4.1.2.3.5.2 Provision of Land-Use Rights|132
3|4.1.3 Conclusion|132
2|4.2 WTO Law Conformity of the EU´s Alternative Benchmark Approach in Anti-Subsidy Investigations Against China|133
3|4.2.1 Conformity with Article 14 ASCM|133
4|4.2.1.1 Conformity As Such|133
5|4.2.1.1.1 The Transposed Parts of the BASR|134
5|4.2.1.1.2 The EU Genuine Part of the BASR|134
4|4.2.1.2 Conformity As Applied|135
5|4.2.1.2.1 The ``General Application´´ in the Guidelines|135
5|4.2.1.2.2 The EU Approach Regarding Preferential Lending|136
6|4.2.1.2.2.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|136
6|4.2.1.2.2.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|137
5|4.2.1.2.3 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Credit Lines|138
6|4.2.1.2.3.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|138
6|4.2.1.2.3.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|138
5|4.2.1.2.4 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Land-Use Rights|139
6|4.2.1.2.4.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|139
6|4.2.1.2.4.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|140
5|4.2.1.2.5 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|141
6|4.2.1.2.5.1 The Establishment of Market Distortion|141
6|4.2.1.2.5.2 The Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|142
3|4.2.2 Conformity with Section 15(b) CAP|143
4|4.2.2.1 Conformity As Such|143
4|4.2.2.2 Conformity As Applied|144
5|4.2.2.2.1 The ``General Application´´ in the Guidelines|144
5|4.2.2.2.2 The EU Approach Regarding Preferential Lending|144
5|4.2.2.2.3 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Credit Lines|144
5|4.2.2.2.4 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Land-Use Rights|145
5|4.2.2.2.5 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|145
3|4.2.3 Overall WTO Law Conformity of the EU Approach on the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investig...|146
4|4.2.3.1 Conformity As Such|146
4|4.2.3.2 Conformity As Applied|146
5|4.2.3.2.1 The ``General Application´´ in the Guidelines|147
5|4.2.3.2.2 The EU Approach Regarding Preferential Lending|147
5|4.2.3.2.3 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Credit Lines|147
5|4.2.3.2.4 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Land-Use Rights|148
5|4.2.3.2.5 The EU Approach Regarding the Provision of Hot-Rolled and Cold-Rolled Steel|148
3|4.2.4 Conclusion|148
2|4.3 Prospective Developments of the EU Approach on the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in Anti-Subsidy Investigatio...|150
3|4.3.1 Prospects on the Basis of the WTO Framework in the Current 2011 State of Appellate Body Interpretation|150
4|4.3.1.1 General Changes|150
4|4.3.1.2 China-Specific Changes|151
3|4.3.2 Prospects upon Possible Developments at WTO Level|151
4|4.3.2.1 General Changes|151
4|4.3.2.2 China-Specific Changes|152
3|4.3.3 Conclusion|152
2|4.4 Chapter Summary|152
1|Chapter 5: The Need for Reforming the Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|154
2|5.1 The Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies in NMES: A Global Perspective|154
3|5.1.1 The Existence of Country-Specific Anti-Subsidy Rules in the WTO Legal Hemisphere|154
3|5.1.2 Alternative Benchmark Regimes for NMES in the Anti-Subsidy Law of Other Countries|155
4|5.1.2.1 US Anti-Subsidy Law|156
4|5.1.2.2 Canadian Anti-Subsidy Law|157
4|5.1.2.3 Australian Anti-Subsidy Law|157
3|5.1.3 The Role of the Use of Alternative Benchmarks in NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law in WTO Dispute Settlement|158
2|5.2 Justification of Current Developments in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law and Practice Concerning the Use of Alternative Benchmarks|159
3|5.2.1 Concepts for the Justification of the Exercise of Authority in the WTO|160
4|5.2.1.1 The Concepts of Legality and Legitimacy|160
4|5.2.1.2 The Significance of Legality and Legitimacy for the WTO|161
5|5.2.1.2.1 The Significance of Legality for the WTO|161
5|5.2.1.2.2 The Significance of Legitimacy for the WTO|162
4|5.2.1.3 The Parameters for the Assessment of Legality and Legitimacy in the WTO|163
3|5.2.2 Justification of the Introduction of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|164
4|5.2.2.1 Legality of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|164
5|5.2.2.1.1 Violation of Article XII:1 WTO Agreement|164
6|5.2.2.1.1.1 The ``Terms´´ of Accession|165
6|5.2.2.1.1.2 Article XII WTO Agreement in Context|165
6|5.2.2.1.1.3 The Rationale of Accession Protocols|167
6|5.2.2.1.1.4 Country-Specific Rule-Making in the GATT Era|167
5|5.2.2.1.2 Violation of Article I:1 GATT|168
6|5.2.2.1.2.1 Applicability of Article I:1 GATT on the Pre-accession Phase|168
6|5.2.2.1.2.2 Conflict of Law with the Country-Specific Accession Commitments|169
5|5.2.2.1.3 Justification of the WTO Law Violations|170
6|5.2.2.1.3.1 Compliance with Articles 27 and 29 ASCM|171
6|5.2.2.1.3.2 Compliance with Article VI:1 GATT|171
6|5.2.2.1.3.3 Compliance as Reservation|171
6|5.2.2.1.3.4 Compliance as Waiver|172
6|5.2.2.1.3.5 Compliance as Amendment|173
6|5.2.2.1.3.6 Compliance as Authoritative Interpretation|174
6|5.2.2.1.3.7 Compliance as Agreement of Non-application|175
6|5.2.2.1.3.8 Compliance as Subsequent Agreement|176
6|5.2.2.1.3.9 Compliance as Subsequent Practice|177
6|5.2.2.1.3.10 Compliance as Non-WTO Agreement|180
4|5.2.2.2 Legitimacy of the Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|181
5|5.2.2.2.1 Rationale of the Country-Specific Anti-Subsidy Rules in Accession Protocols|181
5|5.2.2.2.2 Coherence of Attributable Rationale and Adopted Country-Specific Rules|181
5|5.2.2.2.3 Conformity with WTO Law and General International Law Principles|182
4|5.2.2.3 Conclusion|184
3|5.2.3 Justification of the Establishment of a General Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|185
4|5.2.3.1 Legality of the Establishment of a General Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|185
5|5.2.3.1.1 Compliance with Article 14 ASCM|185
5|5.2.3.1.2 Compliance with Article 19.3 ASCM|186
5|5.2.3.1.3 Compliance with Article 19.4 ASCM|187
5|5.2.3.1.4 Compliance with Article VI:3 GATT|188
5|5.2.3.1.5 Compliance with WTO Anti-Dumping Law|189
5|5.2.3.1.6 Compliance with Articles IX:2 and X WTO Agreement and Articles 3.2 and 19.2 DSU|189
4|5.2.3.2 Legitimacy of the Establishment of a General Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|191
5|5.2.3.2.1 The Rationale of NMES Rules in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|191
5|5.2.3.2.2 Coherence of Rationale and Adopted NMES Rules|191
5|5.2.3.2.3 Conformity with WTO and International Law Principles|192
6|5.2.3.2.3.1 Violation of the Principle of Mandatory Market Economy Transition|192
6|5.2.3.2.3.2 Violation of the WTO Transparency Principle|193
2|5.3 Chapter Summary|194
1|Chapter 6: Rethinking the Alternative Benchmark Regime in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|196
2|6.1 Substantive Issues of Reform|196
3|6.1.1 The Problematic Issues of the Present Alternative Benchmark Approach|197
4|6.1.1.1 Problematic Issues in the Determination of Market Distortion|197
4|6.1.1.2 Problematic Issues in the Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|198
3|6.1.2 The Objectives of the Reform Proposal|199
3|6.1.3 Test Criteria for Legal Reform|200
3|6.1.4 Substantive Legal Reform Proposals|200
4|6.1.4.1 Reforming the Determination of Market Distortion|200
5|6.1.4.1.1 The Conception of Market Underlying WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|200
6|6.1.4.1.1.1 Indications from the Systemic Regulatory Concept of the ASCM|201
6|6.1.4.1.1.2 Indications from the Regulation of Actionable Subsidies|202
5|6.1.4.1.2 Suitability of the Present Indicators for the Determination of Market Distortion|203
6|6.1.4.1.2.1 The Rationale Behind the Selection of the Indicators|203
6|6.1.4.1.2.2 Assessment of the Indicator of Market Shares|203
6|6.1.4.1.2.3 Assessment of the Indicator of Market Power|205
5|6.1.4.1.3 Redefining the Indicator of Market Power|206
6|6.1.4.1.3.1 Potential New Parameters for the Determination of Market Power|207
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.1 Number-of-Firms Criterion|207
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.2 Concentration Ratio|208
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.3 Hirschman-Herfindahl Index|209
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.4 Excess Profitability Criterion|210
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.5 Lerner Index|211
7|6.1.4.1.3.1.6 Criterion of Cross-Price Elasticity by Triffin|211
6|6.1.4.1.3.2 Adaption of the Potential Parameters for the Determination of Market Power|212
7|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 Centralisation of the Exercise of Discretion|212
8|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 Existing Structures for Centralised Reasoning in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|213
8|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 Suitability of the Existing Structures for Legal Reform|213
8|6.1.4.1.3.2.1 The New Expert Group for the Determination of Market Distortion|214
7|6.1.4.1.3.2.2 Introduction of a Preliminary Distinction Analysis|214
7|6.1.4.1.3.2.3 Introduction of the Criterion of Non-profitability|215
5|6.1.4.1.4 Conclusion|215
4|6.1.4.2 Reforming the Selection of the Alternative Benchmark|216
5|6.1.4.2.1 Potential Alternative Benchmark Methodologies for Legal Reform|216
6|6.1.4.2.1.1 Price Construction|216
6|6.1.4.2.1.2 Out-of-Country Methodologies|217
7|6.1.4.2.1.2.1 Third-Country Methodology|217
7|6.1.4.2.1.2.2 World Market Price|218
6|6.1.4.2.1.3 Adjustment of Existing Distorted In-Country Prices|218
6|6.1.4.2.1.4 Artificial Pricing|219
6|6.1.4.2.1.5 Injury-Based Determination|220
5|6.1.4.2.2 Assessment|221
5|6.1.4.2.3 The Default Alternative Benchmark Methodology|223
5|6.1.4.2.4 Further Necessary Adaptions|224
6|6.1.4.2.4.1 Cap at the Injury Margin|224
6|6.1.4.2.4.2 Centralisation of the Process of Reasoning|224
5|6.1.4.2.5 Conclusion|225
2|6.2 Implementation of the Reform Proposal at WTO Level|225
3|6.2.1 Necessity of Amendment as Suitable Means of Implementation|225
3|6.2.2 Risks of an Amendment|226
3|6.2.3 Realisability of an Amendment|227
4|6.2.3.1 The Status Quo of the Current Doha Development Agenda|227
4|6.2.3.2 The Doha Round´s Reform Proposals on the Use of Alternative Benchmark Methodologies (2008)|228
5|6.2.3.2.1 The Article 1 ASCM Reform Proposals|229
5|6.2.3.2.2 The Article 14 Reform Proposals|229
4|6.2.3.3 Substantive Overlap of the 2008 Draft Proposals and the Study´s Reform Proposals|230
5|6.2.3.3.1 Overlap in the Definition of Benefit in Draft Article 14.1 ASCM|230
5|6.2.3.3.2 Overlap in the Addition of Long-Term Loss-Incurring Financing as Type of Subsidy to Draft Articles 14(b) and (c) ASCM|231
5|6.2.3.3.3 Overlap in the Alternative Benchmark Regime of Draft Article 14.1(d) ASCM|231
4|6.2.3.4 Realisability of the Study´s Reform Proposals|232
3|6.2.4 Conclusion|232
2|6.3 Draft Reform Proposal for an Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|233
2|6.4 Chapter Summary|235
1|Chapter 7: Summary|236
2|7.1 Major Findings of the Study|236
3|7.1.1 China´s Applicable WTO Anti-Subsidy Law|236
3|7.1.2 WTO Law Compatibility As Such and As Applied of Current EU Anti-Subsidy Law and Practice|237
3|7.1.3 Legality and Legitimacy of the Introduction of Country-Specific Accession Commitments in Anti-Subsidy Law|238
3|7.1.4 Legality and Legitimacy of the Introduction of an Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in General WTO Anti-Subsidy Law ...|239
2|7.2 A Reform Proposal Concerning the Alternative Benchmark Regime for NMES in Anti-Subsidy Law|239
2|7.3 Future Prospects and Developments|240
1|Table of Treaties and Legal Instruments (as of 1 January 2018)|242
1|Tables of Cases (as of 1 January 2018)|245
2|WTO Cases|245
2|EU Cases|249
2|ICJ Cases|249
2|US Cases|249
1|Tables of Investigations (as of 1 January 2018)|250
2|EU Investigations|250
2|US Investigations|252
1|Bibliography|253
1|Index|263