File #2545: "2019_Book_LegalConventionalism.pdf"
Testo
1|Contents|6
1|Introduction|8
1|Part I: The Notion of Convention|13
2|Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background|14
3|1 Introduction|14
3|2 The Word “Convention”: Some Meanings|15
3|3 Convention: A Family of Concepts|16
3|4 Pre-conventions: Some Examples|18
3|5 Arguments (I): Induction, Salience and Projection|24
3|6 Arguments (II): To Follow a Rule|28
3|7 Arguments (III): The Background of Intentionality|30
3|8 Conclusion: Nature and Convention|33
3|References|34
2|Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency|36
3|1 Introduction|37
3|2 Intentional Action Is Primarily Forward-Looking|38
3|3 A Criticism of Deep Conventions: Deep Conventions Are Always Forward-Looking and Therefore Presuppose Practical Reason|40
3|4 An Alternative Diagnosis|45
3|5 Conclusion: Forward-Looking and Primary Reasons for Actions|47
3|References|47
1|Part II: Conventions and the Rule of Recognition|49
2|Conventions, Reasons and the Law|50
3|1 Introduction|50
3|2 The Emergence of Legal Conventionalism|51
3|3 Constitutive Conventions|58
3|References|66
2|The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention|67
3|1 Introduction|67
3|2 Conventions and Reasons|69
3|3 Constitutive Conventions?|74
3|4 The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention|77
3|5 Saving the Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Rule|83
3|References|87
2|Social Facts and Law: Why the Rule of Recognition is a Convention|90
3|1 Introduction|90
3|2 The Conventionality of the Rule of Recognition|91
4|2.1 Convention|92
5|2.1.1 A Finite Return|93
5|2.1.2 A Virtuous Circle|94
4|2.2 The Constitutive Dimension of Conventions|97
3|3 Responses to Possible Objections|99
4|3.1 The Normativity of the Rule of Recognition|99
4|3.2 Conventions and Principles|101
4|3.3 Convention and Disagreement|102
4|3.4 The Arbitrary Character of a Conventional Rule of Recognition|104
4|3.5 The Supposed Banality of the Conventionalist Thesis|106
3|References|107
2|Cooperative Conventions, Rules of Recognition and Institutional Practices|109
3|1 Introduction|109
3|2 Coordinative-Conventions and the Initial Strategy of Legal Conventionalism|111
3|3 Postema’s Sophisticated Version and Cooperative-Conventions|113
3|4 Cooperative-Conventions and the Rule of Recognition|117
3|5 Objections and Replies|118
4|5.1 The Idea of Obligation|118
4|5.2 Unconditional Obligations|119
3|6 New Objections|121
4|6.1 The Binding Character of the Rule of Recognition|121
4|6.2 Modifying Postema’s Model|122
4|6.3 The Problem|122
3|7 Conclusions|125
3|References|126
2|On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach|127
3|1 Foreword|127
3|2 Some Elementary Notions of Set Theory|128
4|2.1 The Concept of Set|128
4|2.2 The Identification of Sets|129
4|2.3 Logical Operations on Sets|130
3|3 The Identification of Law in the Light of Set Theory|131
4|3.1 Discussion of Case (a)|132
4|3.2 Discussion of Case (b)|133
4|3.3 Discussion of Case (c)|135
3|4 The Rule of Recognition in the Light of Set Theory|137
3|5 Concluding Remarks|142
3|References|143
1|Part III: Conventions and Legal Interpretation|145
2|Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin’s Criticisms|146
3|1 Premise|146
3|2 Caging Conventionalism. Dworkin’s Argument|148
3|3 Captivity. Kinds of Conventionalism|153
4|3.1 Hartian Conventionalism|154
4|3.2 Constructive Conventionalism|158
3|4 Breaking the Chain|166
4|4.1 Sceptical Conventionalism|166
4|4.2 The Route to Freedom|168
4|4.3 Dworkin’s Last Link: Disagreements|170
3|5 Conclusion|174
3|References|175
2|Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference|178
3|1 The Causal Theory of Reference and Semantic Conventionalism|178
3|2 The Causal Theory of Reference and Legal Conventionalism|185
3|References|188
2|The Interpretation of Plans|190
3|1 Introduction|190
3|2 Accounting for Theoretical Disagreements|191
4|2.1 Looking for Social Facts|191
4|2.2 Settling on an Ideology|192
3|3 The Future of the Hart-Dworkin Debate|196
3|References|197
1|Introduction|8
1|Part I: The Notion of Convention|13
2|Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background|14
3|1 Introduction|14
3|2 The Word “Convention”: Some Meanings|15
3|3 Convention: A Family of Concepts|16
3|4 Pre-conventions: Some Examples|18
3|5 Arguments (I): Induction, Salience and Projection|24
3|6 Arguments (II): To Follow a Rule|28
3|7 Arguments (III): The Background of Intentionality|30
3|8 Conclusion: Nature and Convention|33
3|References|34
2|Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency|36
3|1 Introduction|37
3|2 Intentional Action Is Primarily Forward-Looking|38
3|3 A Criticism of Deep Conventions: Deep Conventions Are Always Forward-Looking and Therefore Presuppose Practical Reason|40
3|4 An Alternative Diagnosis|45
3|5 Conclusion: Forward-Looking and Primary Reasons for Actions|47
3|References|47
1|Part II: Conventions and the Rule of Recognition|49
2|Conventions, Reasons and the Law|50
3|1 Introduction|50
3|2 The Emergence of Legal Conventionalism|51
3|3 Constitutive Conventions|58
3|References|66
2|The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention|67
3|1 Introduction|67
3|2 Conventions and Reasons|69
3|3 Constitutive Conventions?|74
3|4 The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention|77
3|5 Saving the Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Rule|83
3|References|87
2|Social Facts and Law: Why the Rule of Recognition is a Convention|90
3|1 Introduction|90
3|2 The Conventionality of the Rule of Recognition|91
4|2.1 Convention|92
5|2.1.1 A Finite Return|93
5|2.1.2 A Virtuous Circle|94
4|2.2 The Constitutive Dimension of Conventions|97
3|3 Responses to Possible Objections|99
4|3.1 The Normativity of the Rule of Recognition|99
4|3.2 Conventions and Principles|101
4|3.3 Convention and Disagreement|102
4|3.4 The Arbitrary Character of a Conventional Rule of Recognition|104
4|3.5 The Supposed Banality of the Conventionalist Thesis|106
3|References|107
2|Cooperative Conventions, Rules of Recognition and Institutional Practices|109
3|1 Introduction|109
3|2 Coordinative-Conventions and the Initial Strategy of Legal Conventionalism|111
3|3 Postema’s Sophisticated Version and Cooperative-Conventions|113
3|4 Cooperative-Conventions and the Rule of Recognition|117
3|5 Objections and Replies|118
4|5.1 The Idea of Obligation|118
4|5.2 Unconditional Obligations|119
3|6 New Objections|121
4|6.1 The Binding Character of the Rule of Recognition|121
4|6.2 Modifying Postema’s Model|122
4|6.3 The Problem|122
3|7 Conclusions|125
3|References|126
2|On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach|127
3|1 Foreword|127
3|2 Some Elementary Notions of Set Theory|128
4|2.1 The Concept of Set|128
4|2.2 The Identification of Sets|129
4|2.3 Logical Operations on Sets|130
3|3 The Identification of Law in the Light of Set Theory|131
4|3.1 Discussion of Case (a)|132
4|3.2 Discussion of Case (b)|133
4|3.3 Discussion of Case (c)|135
3|4 The Rule of Recognition in the Light of Set Theory|137
3|5 Concluding Remarks|142
3|References|143
1|Part III: Conventions and Legal Interpretation|145
2|Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin’s Criticisms|146
3|1 Premise|146
3|2 Caging Conventionalism. Dworkin’s Argument|148
3|3 Captivity. Kinds of Conventionalism|153
4|3.1 Hartian Conventionalism|154
4|3.2 Constructive Conventionalism|158
3|4 Breaking the Chain|166
4|4.1 Sceptical Conventionalism|166
4|4.2 The Route to Freedom|168
4|4.3 Dworkin’s Last Link: Disagreements|170
3|5 Conclusion|174
3|References|175
2|Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference|178
3|1 The Causal Theory of Reference and Semantic Conventionalism|178
3|2 The Causal Theory of Reference and Legal Conventionalism|185
3|References|188
2|The Interpretation of Plans|190
3|1 Introduction|190
3|2 Accounting for Theoretical Disagreements|191
4|2.1 Looking for Social Facts|191
4|2.2 Settling on an Ideology|192
3|3 The Future of the Hart-Dworkin Debate|196
3|References|197