File #2553: "2019_Book_LegalInterpretationAndScientif.pdf"
Testo
1|Introduction|5
1|Contents|9
1|The Limited Function of Hermeneutics in Law|10
2|1 Introduction and Overview|11
2|2 Two Views of Law|12
2|3 Law as a Practical Reason|14
2|4 Law Tout Court Is Not a Social Phenomenon|16
2|5 Legal Certainty|17
2|6 Democracy|18
2|7 Conclusion|19
2|References|20
1|An Analytical Foundation of Rule Scepticism|21
2|1 The Manifold Ambiguity of `Interpretation´|21
2|2 Two Kinds of Legal Indeterminacy|26
2|3 The Grounds of Indeterminacy|27
2|4 Normative Sentences and Rules|29
2|5 The Main Sources of Legal Indeterminacy|29
2|6 A Final Note on the (Conceptual) Limits of Interpretation|31
2|References|33
1|The Politics of Legal Interpretation|36
2|1 Understanding the Question|37
2|2 Why (Some) Lawyers Claim That Legal Interpretation Is a Science|38
2|3 Why Legal Interpretation Is No Science (I): `Scientific´ Interpretation?|40
2|4 Why Legal Interpretation Is No Science (II): Legal Scholarship|45
2|5 Conclusions: The Politics of Legal Interpretation|49
2|References|50
1|Naturalizing Interpretation: A First Approach on ``Hardware´´ and ``Software´´ Determinants of Legal Interpretation|53
2|1 Introduction|54
2|2 Legal Interpretation and Noncognitivism|55
2|3 Legal Interpretation and Human Behavior: Mind and Context|61
2|4 Anankastic or Legal Ought Implies Can: ``Hardware´´ and ``Software´´|66
2|5 ``Hardware´´ Constraints and the Philosophical Shift|68
2|6 ``Hardware´´ Constraints and the Evolutionary Approach|70
2|7 ``Hardware´´ Constraints and ``Sticky Behavior´´ in Legal Interpretation|72
2|8 ``Software´´ Constraints: Context in Legal Interpretation|76
2|9 Conclusion: ``What You Want to Do Is to Open That Black Box´´|80
2|References|81
1|An Almost Pure Theory of Legal Interpretation within Legal Science|86
2|1 Preliminary Aspects|86
2|2 Conceptual and Methodological Premises: A Soft Normativist Model of Legal Science|88
2|3 What Do we Mean when we Talk about Legal Interpretation? Sketching a General Theory of Legal Interpretation|98
3|3.1 The Concept of Legal Interpretation: An Approximation|98
3|3.2 The Object of Legal Interpretation: A Linguistic Conception|103
3|3.3 The Nature of Legal Interpretation: The Partial or Local Indeterminacy of Law|106
3|3.4 Legal Interpreters and the Moments of Interpretation|113
3|3.5 How to Interpret. Legal Interpretation as a Norm-Guided Operation|117
2|4 Can Legal Knowledge be Qualified as Scientific?|128
3|4.1 How Can One Obtain Legal Knowledge?|128
3|4.2 Can Legal Interpretation be a Scientific Operation? The Importance of Distinguishing Between Clear and Hard Cases|133
2|References|139
1|Constraining Adjudication: An Inquiry into the Nature of W. Baude´s and S. Sachs´ Law of Interpretation|145
2|1 Introduction|145
2|2 Distinguishing Between a Theory of the Law and a Theory of the Methodology of Applying the Law|146
2|3 A Closer Look at Some Examples of Unwritten Rules of the Law of Interpretation|151
3|3.1 The Background|151
3|3.2 Pragmatic Maxims (the Dueling Canons)|153
3|3.3 Consistency and Coherence|156
3|3.4 Practical Reasoning|158
2|4 Is the Law of Interpretation a Law?|159
2|5 Conclusion|160
2|References|162
1|When It Is Vague What Is Vague: Identifying Vagueness|164
2|1 Introduction|165
2|2 The Vagueness of Vague Terms|166
3|2.1 Abstractness of Vague Terms|167
3|2.2 Borderline Definition|170
2|3 Vagueness and Meaning|172
2|4 Minimal Meaning Verification|176
2|5 Vagueness and Indeterminacy|178
3|5.1 Vagueness and Open Texture|178
3|5.2 Vagueness and Generality|180
3|5.3 Vagueness and Genericity|181
2|6 Vagueness and Legal Discretion|183
2|References|188
1|Institutional Turn(s) in Theories of Legal Interpretation|190
2|1 Introduction|190
2|2 Legislation and Interpretation|191
2|3 Legislative Bodies and Legal Interpretation|192
2|4 Legislative History from an Institutional Perspective|195
2|5 Decision Theory and Legal Interpretation|197
2|6 Competences and Systemic Effects|198
2|7 Judging Under Uncertainty|200
2|8 Interpretation of Planners|204
2|9 Novelty of the Institutional Turn?|210
2|References|211
1|Legal Science: The Demarcation Problem and the Perimeter of ``Good Science´´|213
2|1 Understanding Legal Science and Its Flaws|213
2|2 Science by Degrees|219
2|3 What Is Law as an Object of Inquiry?|227
2|4 Mapping Legal Science|231
2|5 Propositions of Legal Science|234
2|6 Paradigm Shift in Legal Science|243
2|7 Towards a ``Good´´ Legal Science|247
2|References|249
1|Contents|9
1|The Limited Function of Hermeneutics in Law|10
2|1 Introduction and Overview|11
2|2 Two Views of Law|12
2|3 Law as a Practical Reason|14
2|4 Law Tout Court Is Not a Social Phenomenon|16
2|5 Legal Certainty|17
2|6 Democracy|18
2|7 Conclusion|19
2|References|20
1|An Analytical Foundation of Rule Scepticism|21
2|1 The Manifold Ambiguity of `Interpretation´|21
2|2 Two Kinds of Legal Indeterminacy|26
2|3 The Grounds of Indeterminacy|27
2|4 Normative Sentences and Rules|29
2|5 The Main Sources of Legal Indeterminacy|29
2|6 A Final Note on the (Conceptual) Limits of Interpretation|31
2|References|33
1|The Politics of Legal Interpretation|36
2|1 Understanding the Question|37
2|2 Why (Some) Lawyers Claim That Legal Interpretation Is a Science|38
2|3 Why Legal Interpretation Is No Science (I): `Scientific´ Interpretation?|40
2|4 Why Legal Interpretation Is No Science (II): Legal Scholarship|45
2|5 Conclusions: The Politics of Legal Interpretation|49
2|References|50
1|Naturalizing Interpretation: A First Approach on ``Hardware´´ and ``Software´´ Determinants of Legal Interpretation|53
2|1 Introduction|54
2|2 Legal Interpretation and Noncognitivism|55
2|3 Legal Interpretation and Human Behavior: Mind and Context|61
2|4 Anankastic or Legal Ought Implies Can: ``Hardware´´ and ``Software´´|66
2|5 ``Hardware´´ Constraints and the Philosophical Shift|68
2|6 ``Hardware´´ Constraints and the Evolutionary Approach|70
2|7 ``Hardware´´ Constraints and ``Sticky Behavior´´ in Legal Interpretation|72
2|8 ``Software´´ Constraints: Context in Legal Interpretation|76
2|9 Conclusion: ``What You Want to Do Is to Open That Black Box´´|80
2|References|81
1|An Almost Pure Theory of Legal Interpretation within Legal Science|86
2|1 Preliminary Aspects|86
2|2 Conceptual and Methodological Premises: A Soft Normativist Model of Legal Science|88
2|3 What Do we Mean when we Talk about Legal Interpretation? Sketching a General Theory of Legal Interpretation|98
3|3.1 The Concept of Legal Interpretation: An Approximation|98
3|3.2 The Object of Legal Interpretation: A Linguistic Conception|103
3|3.3 The Nature of Legal Interpretation: The Partial or Local Indeterminacy of Law|106
3|3.4 Legal Interpreters and the Moments of Interpretation|113
3|3.5 How to Interpret. Legal Interpretation as a Norm-Guided Operation|117
2|4 Can Legal Knowledge be Qualified as Scientific?|128
3|4.1 How Can One Obtain Legal Knowledge?|128
3|4.2 Can Legal Interpretation be a Scientific Operation? The Importance of Distinguishing Between Clear and Hard Cases|133
2|References|139
1|Constraining Adjudication: An Inquiry into the Nature of W. Baude´s and S. Sachs´ Law of Interpretation|145
2|1 Introduction|145
2|2 Distinguishing Between a Theory of the Law and a Theory of the Methodology of Applying the Law|146
2|3 A Closer Look at Some Examples of Unwritten Rules of the Law of Interpretation|151
3|3.1 The Background|151
3|3.2 Pragmatic Maxims (the Dueling Canons)|153
3|3.3 Consistency and Coherence|156
3|3.4 Practical Reasoning|158
2|4 Is the Law of Interpretation a Law?|159
2|5 Conclusion|160
2|References|162
1|When It Is Vague What Is Vague: Identifying Vagueness|164
2|1 Introduction|165
2|2 The Vagueness of Vague Terms|166
3|2.1 Abstractness of Vague Terms|167
3|2.2 Borderline Definition|170
2|3 Vagueness and Meaning|172
2|4 Minimal Meaning Verification|176
2|5 Vagueness and Indeterminacy|178
3|5.1 Vagueness and Open Texture|178
3|5.2 Vagueness and Generality|180
3|5.3 Vagueness and Genericity|181
2|6 Vagueness and Legal Discretion|183
2|References|188
1|Institutional Turn(s) in Theories of Legal Interpretation|190
2|1 Introduction|190
2|2 Legislation and Interpretation|191
2|3 Legislative Bodies and Legal Interpretation|192
2|4 Legislative History from an Institutional Perspective|195
2|5 Decision Theory and Legal Interpretation|197
2|6 Competences and Systemic Effects|198
2|7 Judging Under Uncertainty|200
2|8 Interpretation of Planners|204
2|9 Novelty of the Institutional Turn?|210
2|References|211
1|Legal Science: The Demarcation Problem and the Perimeter of ``Good Science´´|213
2|1 Understanding Legal Science and Its Flaws|213
2|2 Science by Degrees|219
2|3 What Is Law as an Object of Inquiry?|227
2|4 Mapping Legal Science|231
2|5 Propositions of Legal Science|234
2|6 Paradigm Shift in Legal Science|243
2|7 Towards a ``Good´´ Legal Science|247
2|References|249