File #2557: "2019_Book_NewFinancingForDistressedBusin.pdf"
Testo
1|Dedication|5
1|Acknowledgments|6
1|Abbreviations|9
1|Contents|8
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|10
2|1.1 The Aim of the Book: New Financing as Component of Restructuring Regimes, Lender Capture and the Distress Debt Market|12
2|1.2 About the Literature: Approaches to Incentivizing New Financing, Lender Capture and the Role of the Distressed Debt Market|14
3|1.2.1 Approaches to Incentivizing New Lending|14
3|1.2.2 Lender Capture Through New Financing|18
3|1.2.3 On the Role of the Distressed Debt Market in Financing and Restructuring|20
2|1.3 Choice of Jurisdictions: Rationale|23
2|1.4 Methodology: Choices and Limitations|27
2|1.5 Terminology Issues|29
3|1.5.1 Financial Distress and Restructuring|29
3|1.5.2 Choice of Restructuring Among Similar Terms|31
3|1.5.3 Connotation of “New Financing”|33
2|1.6 Delimitation of This Book: Focus on “New Money” and Non-bank Distressed Borrowers|34
2|1.7 Roadmap of the Book|35
2|References|37
1|Chapter 2: New Money for Distressed Businesses: Sources, Options and the Changing Financing Landscape|41
2|2.1 Overview|41
2|2.2 Financing the Distressed Debtor Through Debt: Identifying Lenders and Motivation|43
3|2.2.1 Prior Lenders Versus New Lender|44
3|2.2.2 Secured Versus Unsecured Lenders|46
2|2.3 Equity Financing for Distressed Businesses|48
2|2.4 The Shareholder as Lender: To Lend or Not to Lend?|50
3|2.4.1 The Problem with Shareholder Loans|51
3|2.4.2 Subordination of Shareholder Loans: US and Germany|53
4|2.4.2.1 United States|53
4|2.4.2.2 Grounds for Equitable Subordination|54
4|2.4.2.3 Inequitable Conduct: A Predictable Yardstick for Shareholder Lending|56
4|2.4.2.4 From Shareholder Equitable Subordination to Recharacterization|57
4|2.4.2.5 Court Developed Tests for Recharacterization: A Doctrinal Bedlam|58
3|2.4.3 Between Equitable Subordination and Recharacterization: Impact on Distress Financing|59
3|2.4.4 Germany|60
4|2.4.4.1 Equity Substitution Law (Eigenkapitalersatzrecht)|60
4|2.4.4.2 Statutory Codification of the Equity Substitution Rules|61
4|2.4.4.3 A New Regime Under Insolvency Law: Changes to German Equity Substitution Rule|62
4|2.4.4.4 Safe Harbors for Shareholder/Insider Loans|64
3|2.4.5 Shareholder Loans: A Case for Disclosure in Place of a “No-Fault” Rule|65
2|2.5 New Financing Through Asset Sales/Divestiture|66
2|2.6 The Changing Landscape for Distressed Financing: From Commercial Banks to Niche Markets|67
3|2.6.1 Commercial Bank and Private Lending|68
3|2.6.2 Banks as Distressed Lenders: The Decline and Emergence of Non-bank Lenders|70
4|2.6.2.1 Effect of Bank Regulation on Distressed Lending|71
4|2.6.2.2 Availability of Risk-Shifting|72
4|2.6.2.3 Disintermediation: Bespoke Distress Lending Options?|74
2|2.7 Conclusion: Making Distressed Financing Available in Frontier Markets Like Nigeria: What Lessons Can Be Learnt?|77
2|References|79
1|Chapter 3: Restructuring: Key Elements and the Financing Component|83
2|3.1 Overview|83
2|3.2 Between Formal and Informal Restructuring Regimes|84
3|3.2.1 Informal Restructuring: Typical First Choice|84
2|3.3 Specific Formal Restructuring Regimes in the Jurisdictions: A Typology|86
3|3.3.1 Collective Regimes|87
4|3.3.1.1 Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code|87
4|3.3.1.2 The UK Administration Procedure|88
4|3.3.1.3 The German Insolvency Statute and the ESUG|89
3|3.3.2 Targeted Regimes|92
4|3.3.2.1 The Schemes of Arrangement|92
4|3.3.2.2 Administrative Receivership|93
4|3.3.2.3 The German Bond Act|95
2|3.4 Key Requirements for an Effective Debt Restructuring Regime|96
3|3.4.1 The Stay of Creditors’ Action and Enforcement|96
3|3.4.2 Informal Restructuring: Standstill and Waiver Default Agreements|99
3|3.4.3 Stay in Formal Restructuring|100
4|3.4.3.1 The US: Comprehensive Automatic Stay and Liquidity Facilitation|100
4|3.4.3.2 UK: Multiple Restructuring Regimes But Limited Moratorium?|102
4|3.4.3.3 German “Moratorium”: A Case of a Functional Equivalent?|106
2|3.5 Restructuring Plan Approval Mechanism|108
3|3.5.1 Informal Restructuring|109
4|3.5.1.1 Achieving Binding Resolutions: The “London Approach” Model|109
4|3.5.1.2 Achieving a Binding Resolution: The Contractual Model|111
2|3.6 Formal Restructuring Regimes|113
3|3.6.1 US Chapter 11: A “Cram Down” of Dissenting Creditors|113
3|3.6.2 UK Restructuring Regimes: Binding Dissenting Stakeholders to the Plan|115
3|3.6.3 Approving the German Restructuring Plan|117
2|3.7 Managing the Distressed Business|118
3|3.7.1 Retained Management|118
3|3.7.2 Displacing Pre-distress Management|120
3|3.7.3 A Supervised Management|123
2|3.8 Restructuring Regimes in Nigeria: The Present and the Future|125
3|3.8.1 Restructuring Regimes in Nigeria: The Companies Act Regime and Its Deficiencies|125
3|3.8.2 The AMCON Receivership: A Regulatory Approach to Corporate Restructuring|127
3|3.8.3 The Draft Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act|130
3|3.8.4 Proposed Restructuring Framework in CAMA|132
3|3.8.5 Ongoing Law Reform Efforts and Implication for Corporate Restructuring|132
2|3.9 Conclusion: What Has Been Learnt and What Is Unaccounted For?|133
2|References|135
1|Chapter 4: Financing the Restructuring Process: Incentivizing Through Law|140
2|4.1 Overview|140
2|4.2 Incentivizing Through Law: Why Extrinsic Motivation Matters for New Financing|141
2|4.3 Incentivizing New Financing Through Negative Protection: The Insufficiency of the EU Recommendation Regime|144
2|4.4 Distressed Debtor Financing: A History of Priority as Incentive|146
2|4.5 Claim Ranking as Incentivizing Tool and Superpriority Position|149
3|4.5.1 Administrative Expense Priority|152
4|4.5.1.1 US: Prescriptive Approach to Administrative Expense Priority|153
4|4.5.1.2 The Implied Approach: English Administration and German Restructuring as Examples|154
2|4.6 Security Interest for New Lender: A Technique in Contest|157
3|4.6.1 Why Security Interests for New Financer or Why Might Administrative Expense Priority Not Suffice?|157
3|4.6.2 Incentivizing New Financing: Market-Based Approach Versus Prescriptive Approach|161
4|4.6.2.1 The UK Approach as Market-Based|161
4|4.6.2.2 Justification for the Market-Based Approach|163
5|4.6.2.2.1 A Financing Facilitative Regime|163
5|4.6.2.2.2 Policy Considerations|165
3|4.6.3 The Prescriptive Approach: The US as Paradigm|167
3|4.6.4 Between a Prescriptive and Market-Based Approach: SMEs in View|170
4|4.6.4.1 A Restructuring Facilitative Regime Without a Financing Component|170
4|4.6.4.2 A Market-Based Approach and Pre-distress Lender Induced Strategic Illiquidity|170
2|4.7 New Financing in the Nigerian Landscape: What Lessons Can Nigeria Learn?|173
3|4.7.1 The Approach to New Financing Within a Defective Restructuring Regime|174
3|4.7.2 Is the Situation Any Different with the Secured Transaction Law Regime?|176
3|4.7.3 A Case for Prescriptive Approach for New Financing in the Restructuring Framework|178
2|4.8 Conclusion: Market-Based Approach as Default Approach|180
2|References|181
1|Chapter 5: New Financing and Lender Capture|184
2|5.1 Overview|184
2|5.2 Financing Agreements: Unravelling the Devil in the Detail|185
3|5.2.1 Roll-Up and Cross-Collateralization Clauses|187
4|5.2.1.1 The Problem with Roll-Ups and Cross-Collateralization|188
4|5.2.1.2 Judicial Treatment of Cross-Collateralization Clauses|191
4|5.2.1.3 Judicial Treatment of Roll-Up Clauses|195
3|5.2.2 The Use of Waivers and “Immunization” Clauses in New Financing Agreements|197
4|5.2.2.1 Waiver of Debtor’s Pre-Petition Claims|197
4|5.2.2.2 Automatic Stay Waiver (Relief from Automatic Stay)|198
4|5.2.2.3 Waiver of Junior Lender Financing|199
4|5.2.2.4 The Problem with Waivers|199
4|5.2.2.5 Judicial Treatment of Waiver Clauses|201
2|5.3 New Financing as Control Lever Over Distressed Borrower|202
3|5.3.1 The Financing Agreement as Control Lever|203
3|5.3.2 Lender Control and Its Complication|205
2|5.4 Lender Overreach Through New Financing Agreement: Critiquing the Theoretical Justifications for Special Clauses|206
3|5.4.1 The “Rehabilitation Goal” Facilitation Theory|207
3|5.4.2 Incentivizing Policy Theory|209
3|5.4.3 The “Consideration” Theory|213
3|5.4.4 The “Whole Package” Theory|217
2|5.5 Distress Financing and Lender Control: A Case of Practical Convergence Between the US and Europe?|219
2|5.6 Secured Lender Control: A Case for Carve-Outs and Fiduciary Duties|220
2|5.7 Treatment of Distressed Lender in the German Law Context|224
2|5.8 UK Law and New Financing Agreements: Reflecting on New Financing Problematic Clauses|227
2|5.9 Conclusion: Reflections for Frontier Markets and on the Future of New Financing|229
3|5.9.1 The Quest for Control Through Financing Agreement: Is There a Problem with the DIP Construct?|229
2|References|230
1|Chapter 6: The Role of Distressed Debt Investors in Financing Distressed Debtor Restructuring|234
2|6.1 Overview|234
2|6.2 The Distressed Debt Market as Alternative to Traditional Lenders|238
3|6.2.1 Buyers of Distressed Portfolio|238
3|6.2.2 Potential Exit Route and Liquidity Providers|239
2|6.3 The Players in the Distressed Debt Market and Their Capacity to Add Value|242
3|6.3.1 Hedge Funds|242
3|6.3.2 Private Equity Firms|244
3|6.3.3 Other Institutional Investors|245
2|6.4 Financing Strategies of Distressed Debt Investors|247
2|6.5 Distressed Debt Investors: Driving Value Through Self-Interest?|248
3|6.5.1 Distressed Investors as Self-Interested Participants|249
3|6.5.2 Distressed Debt Investor as a “Residual Claimant”: Value Creation or Re-allocation?|250
3|6.5.3 Junior Creditors: The Role of Distressed Debt Investors as Residual Claimants|252
2|6.6 Value Creation and the Goals of Corporate Restructuring Law|254
3|6.6.1 Self-Interested Participants: How Distressed Investors are Positioned to Add Value|256
3|6.6.2 Distress Investor Activism|257
4|6.6.2.1 Distressed Investors as Sophisticated Financial Actors|258
4|6.6.2.2 Overcoming Senior Creditor Liquidation Bias|259
4|6.6.2.3 Driving Management Accountability, Discipline and Efficiency|260
2|6.7 When Distressed Investor Self Interest Becomes Value Destructive|262
3|6.7.1 Strategic Hold-Up of Restructuring|262
3|6.7.2 Multiple Positions in Capital Structure and Consequent Perverse Incentive|263
2|6.8 Fear of Value Destruction and Investor Exclusion: “Throwing Away the Baby with the Bathwater”?|264
2|6.9 The “Collateral Purpose and Effect” Rule|266
2|6.10 Managing Distressed Debt in Frontier Markets: The Nigerian Example|272
3|6.10.1 Nigeria’s Distressed Debt: Post-2008|272
3|6.10.2 AMCON as Sole Trader in Nigeria’s Secondary Loan Market|273
3|6.10.3 How Will Distressed Debt Investors Intervention Help?|275
3|6.10.4 Should Policymakers be Worried About Asset Stripping?|276
3|6.10.5 Promoting Wider Participation: A Case for the Liberalization of Nigeria’s Distressed Debt Market|277
3|6.10.6 PAMC: Limiting the Role of Investors as Distress Financers|279
2|6.11 Conclusion|280
2|References|282
1|Chapter 7: Conclusion and Final Remarks|287
2|7.1 Rethinking Approach to Law Reform in Nigeria: A Case for an Organic Restructuring Law|289
2|Reference|291
1|Acknowledgments|6
1|Abbreviations|9
1|Contents|8
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|10
2|1.1 The Aim of the Book: New Financing as Component of Restructuring Regimes, Lender Capture and the Distress Debt Market|12
2|1.2 About the Literature: Approaches to Incentivizing New Financing, Lender Capture and the Role of the Distressed Debt Market|14
3|1.2.1 Approaches to Incentivizing New Lending|14
3|1.2.2 Lender Capture Through New Financing|18
3|1.2.3 On the Role of the Distressed Debt Market in Financing and Restructuring|20
2|1.3 Choice of Jurisdictions: Rationale|23
2|1.4 Methodology: Choices and Limitations|27
2|1.5 Terminology Issues|29
3|1.5.1 Financial Distress and Restructuring|29
3|1.5.2 Choice of Restructuring Among Similar Terms|31
3|1.5.3 Connotation of “New Financing”|33
2|1.6 Delimitation of This Book: Focus on “New Money” and Non-bank Distressed Borrowers|34
2|1.7 Roadmap of the Book|35
2|References|37
1|Chapter 2: New Money for Distressed Businesses: Sources, Options and the Changing Financing Landscape|41
2|2.1 Overview|41
2|2.2 Financing the Distressed Debtor Through Debt: Identifying Lenders and Motivation|43
3|2.2.1 Prior Lenders Versus New Lender|44
3|2.2.2 Secured Versus Unsecured Lenders|46
2|2.3 Equity Financing for Distressed Businesses|48
2|2.4 The Shareholder as Lender: To Lend or Not to Lend?|50
3|2.4.1 The Problem with Shareholder Loans|51
3|2.4.2 Subordination of Shareholder Loans: US and Germany|53
4|2.4.2.1 United States|53
4|2.4.2.2 Grounds for Equitable Subordination|54
4|2.4.2.3 Inequitable Conduct: A Predictable Yardstick for Shareholder Lending|56
4|2.4.2.4 From Shareholder Equitable Subordination to Recharacterization|57
4|2.4.2.5 Court Developed Tests for Recharacterization: A Doctrinal Bedlam|58
3|2.4.3 Between Equitable Subordination and Recharacterization: Impact on Distress Financing|59
3|2.4.4 Germany|60
4|2.4.4.1 Equity Substitution Law (Eigenkapitalersatzrecht)|60
4|2.4.4.2 Statutory Codification of the Equity Substitution Rules|61
4|2.4.4.3 A New Regime Under Insolvency Law: Changes to German Equity Substitution Rule|62
4|2.4.4.4 Safe Harbors for Shareholder/Insider Loans|64
3|2.4.5 Shareholder Loans: A Case for Disclosure in Place of a “No-Fault” Rule|65
2|2.5 New Financing Through Asset Sales/Divestiture|66
2|2.6 The Changing Landscape for Distressed Financing: From Commercial Banks to Niche Markets|67
3|2.6.1 Commercial Bank and Private Lending|68
3|2.6.2 Banks as Distressed Lenders: The Decline and Emergence of Non-bank Lenders|70
4|2.6.2.1 Effect of Bank Regulation on Distressed Lending|71
4|2.6.2.2 Availability of Risk-Shifting|72
4|2.6.2.3 Disintermediation: Bespoke Distress Lending Options?|74
2|2.7 Conclusion: Making Distressed Financing Available in Frontier Markets Like Nigeria: What Lessons Can Be Learnt?|77
2|References|79
1|Chapter 3: Restructuring: Key Elements and the Financing Component|83
2|3.1 Overview|83
2|3.2 Between Formal and Informal Restructuring Regimes|84
3|3.2.1 Informal Restructuring: Typical First Choice|84
2|3.3 Specific Formal Restructuring Regimes in the Jurisdictions: A Typology|86
3|3.3.1 Collective Regimes|87
4|3.3.1.1 Chapter 11 of the US Bankruptcy Code|87
4|3.3.1.2 The UK Administration Procedure|88
4|3.3.1.3 The German Insolvency Statute and the ESUG|89
3|3.3.2 Targeted Regimes|92
4|3.3.2.1 The Schemes of Arrangement|92
4|3.3.2.2 Administrative Receivership|93
4|3.3.2.3 The German Bond Act|95
2|3.4 Key Requirements for an Effective Debt Restructuring Regime|96
3|3.4.1 The Stay of Creditors’ Action and Enforcement|96
3|3.4.2 Informal Restructuring: Standstill and Waiver Default Agreements|99
3|3.4.3 Stay in Formal Restructuring|100
4|3.4.3.1 The US: Comprehensive Automatic Stay and Liquidity Facilitation|100
4|3.4.3.2 UK: Multiple Restructuring Regimes But Limited Moratorium?|102
4|3.4.3.3 German “Moratorium”: A Case of a Functional Equivalent?|106
2|3.5 Restructuring Plan Approval Mechanism|108
3|3.5.1 Informal Restructuring|109
4|3.5.1.1 Achieving Binding Resolutions: The “London Approach” Model|109
4|3.5.1.2 Achieving a Binding Resolution: The Contractual Model|111
2|3.6 Formal Restructuring Regimes|113
3|3.6.1 US Chapter 11: A “Cram Down” of Dissenting Creditors|113
3|3.6.2 UK Restructuring Regimes: Binding Dissenting Stakeholders to the Plan|115
3|3.6.3 Approving the German Restructuring Plan|117
2|3.7 Managing the Distressed Business|118
3|3.7.1 Retained Management|118
3|3.7.2 Displacing Pre-distress Management|120
3|3.7.3 A Supervised Management|123
2|3.8 Restructuring Regimes in Nigeria: The Present and the Future|125
3|3.8.1 Restructuring Regimes in Nigeria: The Companies Act Regime and Its Deficiencies|125
3|3.8.2 The AMCON Receivership: A Regulatory Approach to Corporate Restructuring|127
3|3.8.3 The Draft Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act|130
3|3.8.4 Proposed Restructuring Framework in CAMA|132
3|3.8.5 Ongoing Law Reform Efforts and Implication for Corporate Restructuring|132
2|3.9 Conclusion: What Has Been Learnt and What Is Unaccounted For?|133
2|References|135
1|Chapter 4: Financing the Restructuring Process: Incentivizing Through Law|140
2|4.1 Overview|140
2|4.2 Incentivizing Through Law: Why Extrinsic Motivation Matters for New Financing|141
2|4.3 Incentivizing New Financing Through Negative Protection: The Insufficiency of the EU Recommendation Regime|144
2|4.4 Distressed Debtor Financing: A History of Priority as Incentive|146
2|4.5 Claim Ranking as Incentivizing Tool and Superpriority Position|149
3|4.5.1 Administrative Expense Priority|152
4|4.5.1.1 US: Prescriptive Approach to Administrative Expense Priority|153
4|4.5.1.2 The Implied Approach: English Administration and German Restructuring as Examples|154
2|4.6 Security Interest for New Lender: A Technique in Contest|157
3|4.6.1 Why Security Interests for New Financer or Why Might Administrative Expense Priority Not Suffice?|157
3|4.6.2 Incentivizing New Financing: Market-Based Approach Versus Prescriptive Approach|161
4|4.6.2.1 The UK Approach as Market-Based|161
4|4.6.2.2 Justification for the Market-Based Approach|163
5|4.6.2.2.1 A Financing Facilitative Regime|163
5|4.6.2.2.2 Policy Considerations|165
3|4.6.3 The Prescriptive Approach: The US as Paradigm|167
3|4.6.4 Between a Prescriptive and Market-Based Approach: SMEs in View|170
4|4.6.4.1 A Restructuring Facilitative Regime Without a Financing Component|170
4|4.6.4.2 A Market-Based Approach and Pre-distress Lender Induced Strategic Illiquidity|170
2|4.7 New Financing in the Nigerian Landscape: What Lessons Can Nigeria Learn?|173
3|4.7.1 The Approach to New Financing Within a Defective Restructuring Regime|174
3|4.7.2 Is the Situation Any Different with the Secured Transaction Law Regime?|176
3|4.7.3 A Case for Prescriptive Approach for New Financing in the Restructuring Framework|178
2|4.8 Conclusion: Market-Based Approach as Default Approach|180
2|References|181
1|Chapter 5: New Financing and Lender Capture|184
2|5.1 Overview|184
2|5.2 Financing Agreements: Unravelling the Devil in the Detail|185
3|5.2.1 Roll-Up and Cross-Collateralization Clauses|187
4|5.2.1.1 The Problem with Roll-Ups and Cross-Collateralization|188
4|5.2.1.2 Judicial Treatment of Cross-Collateralization Clauses|191
4|5.2.1.3 Judicial Treatment of Roll-Up Clauses|195
3|5.2.2 The Use of Waivers and “Immunization” Clauses in New Financing Agreements|197
4|5.2.2.1 Waiver of Debtor’s Pre-Petition Claims|197
4|5.2.2.2 Automatic Stay Waiver (Relief from Automatic Stay)|198
4|5.2.2.3 Waiver of Junior Lender Financing|199
4|5.2.2.4 The Problem with Waivers|199
4|5.2.2.5 Judicial Treatment of Waiver Clauses|201
2|5.3 New Financing as Control Lever Over Distressed Borrower|202
3|5.3.1 The Financing Agreement as Control Lever|203
3|5.3.2 Lender Control and Its Complication|205
2|5.4 Lender Overreach Through New Financing Agreement: Critiquing the Theoretical Justifications for Special Clauses|206
3|5.4.1 The “Rehabilitation Goal” Facilitation Theory|207
3|5.4.2 Incentivizing Policy Theory|209
3|5.4.3 The “Consideration” Theory|213
3|5.4.4 The “Whole Package” Theory|217
2|5.5 Distress Financing and Lender Control: A Case of Practical Convergence Between the US and Europe?|219
2|5.6 Secured Lender Control: A Case for Carve-Outs and Fiduciary Duties|220
2|5.7 Treatment of Distressed Lender in the German Law Context|224
2|5.8 UK Law and New Financing Agreements: Reflecting on New Financing Problematic Clauses|227
2|5.9 Conclusion: Reflections for Frontier Markets and on the Future of New Financing|229
3|5.9.1 The Quest for Control Through Financing Agreement: Is There a Problem with the DIP Construct?|229
2|References|230
1|Chapter 6: The Role of Distressed Debt Investors in Financing Distressed Debtor Restructuring|234
2|6.1 Overview|234
2|6.2 The Distressed Debt Market as Alternative to Traditional Lenders|238
3|6.2.1 Buyers of Distressed Portfolio|238
3|6.2.2 Potential Exit Route and Liquidity Providers|239
2|6.3 The Players in the Distressed Debt Market and Their Capacity to Add Value|242
3|6.3.1 Hedge Funds|242
3|6.3.2 Private Equity Firms|244
3|6.3.3 Other Institutional Investors|245
2|6.4 Financing Strategies of Distressed Debt Investors|247
2|6.5 Distressed Debt Investors: Driving Value Through Self-Interest?|248
3|6.5.1 Distressed Investors as Self-Interested Participants|249
3|6.5.2 Distressed Debt Investor as a “Residual Claimant”: Value Creation or Re-allocation?|250
3|6.5.3 Junior Creditors: The Role of Distressed Debt Investors as Residual Claimants|252
2|6.6 Value Creation and the Goals of Corporate Restructuring Law|254
3|6.6.1 Self-Interested Participants: How Distressed Investors are Positioned to Add Value|256
3|6.6.2 Distress Investor Activism|257
4|6.6.2.1 Distressed Investors as Sophisticated Financial Actors|258
4|6.6.2.2 Overcoming Senior Creditor Liquidation Bias|259
4|6.6.2.3 Driving Management Accountability, Discipline and Efficiency|260
2|6.7 When Distressed Investor Self Interest Becomes Value Destructive|262
3|6.7.1 Strategic Hold-Up of Restructuring|262
3|6.7.2 Multiple Positions in Capital Structure and Consequent Perverse Incentive|263
2|6.8 Fear of Value Destruction and Investor Exclusion: “Throwing Away the Baby with the Bathwater”?|264
2|6.9 The “Collateral Purpose and Effect” Rule|266
2|6.10 Managing Distressed Debt in Frontier Markets: The Nigerian Example|272
3|6.10.1 Nigeria’s Distressed Debt: Post-2008|272
3|6.10.2 AMCON as Sole Trader in Nigeria’s Secondary Loan Market|273
3|6.10.3 How Will Distressed Debt Investors Intervention Help?|275
3|6.10.4 Should Policymakers be Worried About Asset Stripping?|276
3|6.10.5 Promoting Wider Participation: A Case for the Liberalization of Nigeria’s Distressed Debt Market|277
3|6.10.6 PAMC: Limiting the Role of Investors as Distress Financers|279
2|6.11 Conclusion|280
2|References|282
1|Chapter 7: Conclusion and Final Remarks|287
2|7.1 Rethinking Approach to Law Reform in Nigeria: A Case for an Organic Restructuring Law|289
2|Reference|291