File #2593: "2019_Book_TransitionalJusticeAndAStateSR.pdf"
Testo
1|Foreword by William Schabas|7
1|Foreword by Augusto Antonio Barbera|10
1|Acknowledgements|13
1|Contents|15
1|About the Author|18
1|Abbreviations|19
1|List of Figures|21
1|List of Cases|22
1|List of Treaties, Peace Agreements, and National Legislation|33
1|1 Introduction|37
2|References|47
1|2 The Content of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute International Humanitarian Law Violations—The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols|49
2|Abstract|49
2|2.1 The “Respect and Ensure Respect” Provision|52
3|2.1.1 The Purpose of Common Article 1|52
3|2.1.2 A Dynamic Interpretation? Between Internal and External Compliance Dimensions|55
3|2.1.3 The Travaux Préparatoires|57
3|2.1.4 The ICRC Commentaries|58
3|2.1.5 The Interpretation of the “Respect” Provision in Light of Other International Treaties|60
3|2.1.6 The Interpretation of the “Ensure Respect” Provision in Light of Other International Treaties and State Practice|61
3|2.1.7 The Interpretation of the “In All Circumstances” Term|65
2|2.2 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|66
3|2.2.1 The Obligation to Criminalize|68
3|2.2.2 The Obligation to Search|68
3|2.2.3 The Obligation to Bring Those Responsible Before Domestic Courts|71
3|2.2.4 The Question of Amnesty|72
3|2.2.5 The Obligation to Extradite|74
3|2.2.6 The Obligation to “Suppress” “Other” Serious Violations|77
3|2.2.7 Other Residuary Mechanisms to Ensure Compliance|78
3|2.2.8 The Nature of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|78
2|References|80
1|3 The Content of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute International Human Rights Law Violations|85
2|Abstract|85
2|3.1 Crimes Defined in International Human Rights Conventions as Explicitly Requiring Investigation and Prosecution|86
3|3.1.1 The Genocide Convention|87
3|3.1.2 The Torture Convention|89
3|3.1.3 The Enforced Disappearance Convention|94
3|3.1.4 Comparative Analysis|96
2|3.2 Investigating and Prosecuting Under Comprehensive Universal and Regional Human Rights Conventions|97
3|3.2.1 Investigating and Prosecuting Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights|98
4|3.2.1.1 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|100
4|3.2.1.2 Different Rationales Behind the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|104
3|3.2.2 Investigating and Prosecuting Under the European Convention on Human Rights|107
4|3.2.2.1 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|109
4|3.2.2.2 Different Rationales Behind the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|113
3|3.2.3 Investigating and Prosecuting Under the American Convention on Human Rights|117
4|3.2.3.1 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|119
4|3.2.3.2 Different Rationales Behind the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|124
3|3.2.4 Investigating and Prosecuting Under Customary International Law—Crimes Against Humanity|126
4|3.2.4.1 Treaty Provisions as the Basis of a Customary Norm|127
4|3.2.4.2 Crimes Against Humanity|129
4|3.2.4.3 The Jus Cogens Nature of Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes|130
2|References|132
1|4 International Law and Transitional Justice: The Difficulties of Abiding by the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute in Countries Facing a Transition|136
2|Abstract|136
2|4.1 Defining Transition and Transitional Justice|137
2|4.2 The Dilemmas and Challenges Faced by Successor Governments When Dealing with a Legacy of Massive Atrocities: The Inherent Risks of Confronting an Undefeated and Still Powerful Military|146
2|4.3 Common Measures to Counter These Dilemmas Short of Prosecution: Amnesty and Pardon|154
2|4.4 Amnesty, Pardon, International Law, and the Fight Against Impunity|162
3|4.4.1 The Recent Jurisprudence of International Treaty Bodies on Amnesty|167
4|4.4.1.1 The Recent Jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee: An Absolute Ban|170
4|4.4.1.2 The Recent Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Treaty Bodies: An Absolute Ban|172
4|4.4.1.3 The Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: A Certain Margin of Discretion?|175
3|4.4.2 Amnesty and Customary International Law: An Emerging Norm Against Amnesty for International Crimes?|178
2|4.5 Amnesty, Peace Agreements, and the International Criminal Court|181
3|4.5.1 The International Criminal Court Stance in Uganda: No Deference to National Measures of Reconciliation|188
3|4.5.2 The International Criminal Court and the 2016 Colombian Final Peace Agreement: At Long Last a Case for Positive Complementarity?|190
2|4.6 The Applicability of International Law to Transitions|196
2|References|199
1|5 State’s International Responsibility for Failing to Investigate and Prosecute Mass Atrocities: Are There Techniques Within International Law to Solve the Dilemmas Raised by Transitions?|208
2|Abstract|208
2|5.1 Denunciation, Suspension, and Limitation Clauses in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties|212
3|5.1.1 Denunciation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocols|213
3|5.1.2 Suspension of Rights and Guarantees Under Exceptional Circumstances in Universal and Regional Human Rights Treaties|216
4|5.1.2.1 Analysis of the Provisions|216
4|5.1.2.2 State Practice|226
4|5.1.2.3 Resorting to the Suspension of Rights and Guarantees in Transitions|228
2|5.2 Article 23 on Force Majeure of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts|232
3|5.2.1 Analysis of the Provision|232
3|5.2.2 State Practice|239
3|5.2.3 Resorting to Force Majeure in Transitions|243
2|5.3 Article 25 on Necessity of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts|246
3|5.3.1 Analysis of the Provision|246
3|5.3.2 State Practice|254
3|5.3.3 Resorting to Necessity in Transitions|257
2|References|262
1|6 Conclusions|266
2|References|274
1|Index|276
1|Foreword by Augusto Antonio Barbera|10
1|Acknowledgements|13
1|Contents|15
1|About the Author|18
1|Abbreviations|19
1|List of Figures|21
1|List of Cases|22
1|List of Treaties, Peace Agreements, and National Legislation|33
1|1 Introduction|37
2|References|47
1|2 The Content of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute International Humanitarian Law Violations—The 1949 Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols|49
2|Abstract|49
2|2.1 The “Respect and Ensure Respect” Provision|52
3|2.1.1 The Purpose of Common Article 1|52
3|2.1.2 A Dynamic Interpretation? Between Internal and External Compliance Dimensions|55
3|2.1.3 The Travaux Préparatoires|57
3|2.1.4 The ICRC Commentaries|58
3|2.1.5 The Interpretation of the “Respect” Provision in Light of Other International Treaties|60
3|2.1.6 The Interpretation of the “Ensure Respect” Provision in Light of Other International Treaties and State Practice|61
3|2.1.7 The Interpretation of the “In All Circumstances” Term|65
2|2.2 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|66
3|2.2.1 The Obligation to Criminalize|68
3|2.2.2 The Obligation to Search|68
3|2.2.3 The Obligation to Bring Those Responsible Before Domestic Courts|71
3|2.2.4 The Question of Amnesty|72
3|2.2.5 The Obligation to Extradite|74
3|2.2.6 The Obligation to “Suppress” “Other” Serious Violations|77
3|2.2.7 Other Residuary Mechanisms to Ensure Compliance|78
3|2.2.8 The Nature of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|78
2|References|80
1|3 The Content of the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute International Human Rights Law Violations|85
2|Abstract|85
2|3.1 Crimes Defined in International Human Rights Conventions as Explicitly Requiring Investigation and Prosecution|86
3|3.1.1 The Genocide Convention|87
3|3.1.2 The Torture Convention|89
3|3.1.3 The Enforced Disappearance Convention|94
3|3.1.4 Comparative Analysis|96
2|3.2 Investigating and Prosecuting Under Comprehensive Universal and Regional Human Rights Conventions|97
3|3.2.1 Investigating and Prosecuting Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights|98
4|3.2.1.1 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|100
4|3.2.1.2 Different Rationales Behind the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|104
3|3.2.2 Investigating and Prosecuting Under the European Convention on Human Rights|107
4|3.2.2.1 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|109
4|3.2.2.2 Different Rationales Behind the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|113
3|3.2.3 Investigating and Prosecuting Under the American Convention on Human Rights|117
4|3.2.3.1 The Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|119
4|3.2.3.2 Different Rationales Behind the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute|124
3|3.2.4 Investigating and Prosecuting Under Customary International Law—Crimes Against Humanity|126
4|3.2.4.1 Treaty Provisions as the Basis of a Customary Norm|127
4|3.2.4.2 Crimes Against Humanity|129
4|3.2.4.3 The Jus Cogens Nature of Crimes Against Humanity, Genocide, and War Crimes|130
2|References|132
1|4 International Law and Transitional Justice: The Difficulties of Abiding by the Obligations to Investigate and Prosecute in Countries Facing a Transition|136
2|Abstract|136
2|4.1 Defining Transition and Transitional Justice|137
2|4.2 The Dilemmas and Challenges Faced by Successor Governments When Dealing with a Legacy of Massive Atrocities: The Inherent Risks of Confronting an Undefeated and Still Powerful Military|146
2|4.3 Common Measures to Counter These Dilemmas Short of Prosecution: Amnesty and Pardon|154
2|4.4 Amnesty, Pardon, International Law, and the Fight Against Impunity|162
3|4.4.1 The Recent Jurisprudence of International Treaty Bodies on Amnesty|167
4|4.4.1.1 The Recent Jurisprudence of the UN Human Rights Committee: An Absolute Ban|170
4|4.4.1.2 The Recent Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Treaty Bodies: An Absolute Ban|172
4|4.4.1.3 The Recent Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights: A Certain Margin of Discretion?|175
3|4.4.2 Amnesty and Customary International Law: An Emerging Norm Against Amnesty for International Crimes?|178
2|4.5 Amnesty, Peace Agreements, and the International Criminal Court|181
3|4.5.1 The International Criminal Court Stance in Uganda: No Deference to National Measures of Reconciliation|188
3|4.5.2 The International Criminal Court and the 2016 Colombian Final Peace Agreement: At Long Last a Case for Positive Complementarity?|190
2|4.6 The Applicability of International Law to Transitions|196
2|References|199
1|5 State’s International Responsibility for Failing to Investigate and Prosecute Mass Atrocities: Are There Techniques Within International Law to Solve the Dilemmas Raised by Transitions?|208
2|Abstract|208
2|5.1 Denunciation, Suspension, and Limitation Clauses in International Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties|212
3|5.1.1 Denunciation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocols|213
3|5.1.2 Suspension of Rights and Guarantees Under Exceptional Circumstances in Universal and Regional Human Rights Treaties|216
4|5.1.2.1 Analysis of the Provisions|216
4|5.1.2.2 State Practice|226
4|5.1.2.3 Resorting to the Suspension of Rights and Guarantees in Transitions|228
2|5.2 Article 23 on Force Majeure of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts|232
3|5.2.1 Analysis of the Provision|232
3|5.2.2 State Practice|239
3|5.2.3 Resorting to Force Majeure in Transitions|243
2|5.3 Article 25 on Necessity of the 2001 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts|246
3|5.3.1 Analysis of the Provision|246
3|5.3.2 State Practice|254
3|5.3.3 Resorting to Necessity in Transitions|257
2|References|262
1|6 Conclusions|266
2|References|274
1|Index|276