File #2632: "2019_Book_NewDevelopmentsInCompetitionLa.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|6
1|Introduction|7
1|Contents|12
1|Contributors|14
1|Part I: Foundations of Competition Law|16
2|Justifying Competition Law in the Face of Consumers’ Bounded Rationality|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 Competitive Outcomes with Biased Consumer Beliefs|19
3|3 Biased Consumers and Distorted Demand|20
4|3.1 Competitive Effects|23
3|4 Consumer Welfare with Malleable Preferences|27
3|5 The Uneasy Behavioural Economic Case for Competition Law|31
4|5.1 Competition Still Tends to Advance Efficiency and Welfare|32
4|5.2 A Policy Favoring Competition Still Offers a Superior Baseline Approach|34
3|6 Conclusion|36
3|References|37
2|Two Contexts for Economics in Competition Law|40
3|1 Introduction|40
3|2 The Big Picture|42
3|3 Deterrence Effects|43
4|3.1 Expected Sanction|43
5|3.1.1 Loss if Convicted|44
5|3.1.2 Probability of Detection|44
5|3.1.3 Probability of Error|45
4|3.2 Predictability of Enforcement|46
4|3.3 Conclusion: Economic Analysis of Law|47
3|4 Competitive Effects|48
4|4.1 Market Power as a Necessary Condition|48
4|4.2 Effects Exerted by Whom?|50
4|4.3 Effects on Whom?|50
5|4.3.1 Effects on Customers and Suppliers|50
5|4.3.2 Effects on Competitors|51
4|4.4 Conclusion: Industrial Organization|52
3|5 The Two Contexts Compared|53
4|5.1 Field of Study|53
4|5.2 Relationship to Law|55
4|5.3 Attention in the Discourse|56
4|5.4 The Close Link Between Economics and Competition Law|57
3|6 Conclusion|58
3|References|58
2|Pleading for a “Multiple Goal Approach” in European Competition Law|63
3|1 Introduction|63
3|2 The “More Economic Approach”|64
4|2.1 A Brief Introduction|64
4|2.2 The US Roots: Chicago School of Antitrust|65
4|2.3 The Pragmatic European Adaptation|67
4|2.4 The Lacking Influence: Indicators and Reasons|68
3|3 The FTCA and Its Criticism of the MEA|69
4|3.1 “Freedom to Compete Approach”|69
5|3.1.1 A Short Introduction|69
5|3.1.2 Criticisms Against the MEA|70
4|3.2 Critical Aspects of the FTCA|72
3|4 Between the MEA and the FTCA: A “Multiple Goal Approach” to Competition Law|73
3|5 Concluding Remarks|75
3|References|76
1|Part II: Applications of Competition Law|79
2|The Impact on Competition by Deregulation of Professions (Reducing Occupational Licenses): The Case of Three Professions in Poland from 1989 to 2018|80
3|1 Introduction|80
3|2 Economic Theories of ‘Professional Regulation’|81
4|2.1 Public Interest Theory of ‘Professional Regulation’|82
4|2.2 Private Interest Theories of ‘Professional Regulation’|84
3|3 The Evolution of Regulations in Selected Professions in Poland|85
4|3.1 Civil Notaries|87
4|3.2 Tourist Guides|91
4|3.3 Taxi Drivers|94
3|4 Conclusion|97
3|References|98
2|Taking the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial Practices Seriously|102
3|1 Introduction|102
3|2 The Case of Foreign-Currency Indexed Mortgage Loans|103
3|3 Foreign Currency Mortgage Loans and the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union|105
4|3.1 Kásler Judgment|105
4|3.2 The Notion of Transparency in Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union|106
4|3.3 The Limits of ex ante Perspective|107
3|4 The Concept of the Average Consumer in Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union|108
3|5 Adjudicating Under the Shadow of Hindsight Bias Judicial Governance in Financial Markets from the Perspective of Behavioural Law and Economics|110
3|6 Conclusion|114
3|References|116
2|De minimis Exceptions for Hard-Core Restrictions in Swiss Competition Law|118
3|1 Introduction|118
3|2 Analytical Structure for Hard-Core Restrictions in Swiss Competition Law|119
3|3 Significance Test in the Practice of the Swiss Competition Commission|120
4|3.1 Qualitative Criteria: Subject Matter of the Agreement|121
4|3.2 Quantitative Criteria: Effect of the Agreement on Competition|121
5|3.2.1 Horizontal Agreements|122
5|3.2.2 Vertical Agreements|123
4|3.3 Quantitative Criteria: Effect of the Agreement on the Market|125
4|3.4 Significance Test as Weighing and Balancing of All Qualitative and Quantitative Criteria|126
3|4 Significance Test in the Jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal|127
3|5 De minimis Exception for Hard-Core Restrictions on Competition|129
3|6 Conclusion|131
3|References|131
4|Swiss Competition Commission: Horizontal Agreements|132
4|Swiss Competition Commission: Vertical Agreements|132
4|Swiss Federal Administrative Court|133
4|Swiss Federal Supreme Court|133
4|European Court of Justice|133
2|Whole Foods, Fresh Concerns?|134
3|1 Introduction|134
3|2 Predatory Pricing as an Antitrust Problem in the United States|136
4|2.1 Definition of Predatory Pricing|136
4|2.2 An Overview of Predatory Pricing Law in the United States|137
5|2.2.1 Matsushita Electric Industry Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.|138
5|2.2.2 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms|139
5|2.2.3 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.|140
4|2.3 The Chicago School “Consensus” on Predatory Pricing: Rarely Tried, Rarely Successful|142
4|2.4 Justifications for the Recoupment Requirement|143
5|2.4.1 The Recoupment Requirement Minimizes the Risk of False Positives|143
5|2.4.2 The Recoupment Requirement Serves as an Efficient Screen for Predatory Conduct|143
3|3 Amazon: The Everything|144
4|3.1 Amazon’s Origins|144
4|3.2 Amazon’s Pricing Strategy|145
4|3.3 Amazon’s Integration in the E-book Market|146
5|3.3.1 The Arrangement|146
5|3.3.2 The Lawsuit|147
5|3.3.3 The Trial|147
4|3.4 The Recoupment Requirement Misses the Mark on Amazon’s Anticompetitive Practices|148
5|3.4.1 Recoupment Can Occur Outside the Market Where the Predator Sustained Its Losses|149
5|3.4.2 Amazon’s Pricing Strategy Has Exclusionary Effects on Rivals|150
5|3.4.3 Antitrust Implications of Amazon’s Acquisition of Whole Foods|151
5|3.4.4 Whole Foods, Fresh Concerns?|151
3|4 Recalibrating the Recoupment Requirement|152
4|4.1 The Predatory Pricing Analysis Should Be Expanded to Consider a Firm’s Reputation for Predation|153
3|5 Conclusion|154
3|References|155
4|Statutes and Case Law|156
1|Part III: Intellectual Property Rights and Patents|157
2|Blocking Patents and the Process of Innovation|158
3|1 Starting Point|158
3|2 Fraud on the Patent Office|160
4|2.1 Patent Granting and Review Procedures|160
4|2.2 US Law|161
4|2.3 EU Law|162
4|2.4 Conclusions|164
3|3 Boehringer|165
3|4 Servier|166
4|4.1 The European Commission’s Decision|166
4|4.2 Blocking Patents|167
4|4.3 Conclusions|168
3|5 The Economics of Intellectual Property Protection and the Limits of Exclusive Rights|168
4|5.1 The Patent Rationale|168
4|5.2 Categories of Unused Patents|170
4|5.3 Function in the Competitive Process|170
3|6 Proposal of a Test|172
4|6.1 The Test for Abusive Blocking|172
4|6.2 Explanations|172
4|6.3 Legal Consequences|174
3|7 Outlook|175
3|References|176
2|Why an Absent International Regulatory Framework for Competition and Strong Copyright Protection Harms Diversity of Expressions and What to Do About It|178
3|1 Introduction|179
3|2 Harm for Diversity of Expressions|179
4|2.1 Competition Law and Diversity of Expressions|179
5|2.1.1 Regulatory Gap|179
5|2.1.2 The Effect for Diversity|182
5|2.1.3 The Example of the Culture and Media Industry|184
4|2.2 Copyright Law and Diversity|184
5|2.2.1 Focus on TRIPS|185
5|2.2.2 Incentives, Exclusive Rights and the Need for a Proper Balance of Interests|186
5|2.2.3 The Effect of the Current Balance of Interests Within TRIPS for Diversity of Expressions|188
5|2.2.4 Examples for Improper and to Be Reviewed Balance of Interests|191
6|Period of Protection|191
6|Exceptions and Limitations|192
6|Digitisation|193
4|2.3 Reciprocal Effect for Diversity of Expressions|195
4|2.4 Conclusion|198
3|3 What to Do About It?|198
3|References|200
4|Case Law|203
2|Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices as an Anticompetitive Practice in TRIPS and European Competition Law|205
3|1 The Issue of Excessive Prices in the Field of Pharmaceutical Products: Background|206
4|1.1 Patents, Right to Health & TRIPS|208
4|1.2 Compulsory Licensing & TRIPS|209
4|1.3 The Flawed Paragraph 6 System|211
4|1.4 Legal-Economic Considerations Regarding Compulsory Licensing Enforcement|212
4|1.5 The Case for Excessive Prices as an Anti-Competetive Practice in TRIPS|216
4|1.6 The Case for Excessive Prices as an Anti-Competetive Practice in European Competition Law|219
3|2 Conclusion: Justice, Efficiency and Excessive Prices|225
3|References|227
4|Case Law|228
1|Part IV: Impact of Information Technology|229
2|Disruptive Technologies and Competition Law|230
3|1 Introduction|230
3|2 Phase 1: New Phenomena of Online Markets|231
4|2.1 Two-Sided Markets and Network Effects|231
4|2.2 ‘Winner-Takes-it-all’ or Concentration Effects|232
4|2.3 Switching Costs and Multi-Homing|233
4|2.4 Gratuity Issue|233
4|2.5 Entry and Exit Barriers|234
4|2.6 Phase 1 in a Nutshell|235
3|3 Phase 2: Data Ownership and Privacy as New Values|235
4|3.1 Ownership Phenomenon|235
4|3.2 Privacy Phenomenon|236
4|3.3 Phase 2 in a Nutshell|238
3|4 Phase 3: Uncoupling of Transactional Mechanics from Persons|238
4|4.1 New Infrastructures|238
4|4.2 Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence|239
5|4.2.1 Notion of Collusion and Characteristics of Markets|239
5|4.2.2 Examples of Collusive Algorithmic Situations|240
5|4.2.3 Technical Measures Combatting Collusion|242
5|4.2.4 Challenges in the Legal Environment|243
5|4.2.5 Phase 3 in a Nutshell|244
3|5 Outlook|245
3|References|246
2|Understanding the Implications of Big Data and Big Data Analytics for Competition Law|248
3|1 Introduction|248
3|2 What Is Big Data? How Valuable Is It?|249
4|2.1 The Five Vs|249
4|2.2 What Is in the Data?|252
3|3 Understanding the Implications of Big Data for Competition Law and Policy: “Business as Usual” Versus Disruptive Change|254
4|3.1 Some Distinct Characteristics of Data-Driven Competition|254
4|3.2 Big Data Is “Business as Usual”|257
4|3.3 Big Data as a Challenge to Competition and to Competition Law|260
3|4 Concluding Remarks|267
3|References|268
2|Regulating Data Giants: Between Competition Law and Data Protection Law|271
3|1 Introduction|271
3|2 Recent Competition Law Cases|274
4|2.1 Merger Cases|274
4|2.2 Abuse of Dominance|277
3|3 Sources of Market Power in Data-Fuelled Platform Markets|278
4|3.1 Network Effects in Multi-Sided Markets|278
4|3.2 Market Power in Datasets|279
3|4 Economics of Privacy|282
4|4.1 Defining Privacy|282
5|4.1.1 The Meaning of Privacy|282
5|4.1.2 Gains and Losses to Firms|283
5|4.1.3 Gains and Losses to Individuals|284
4|4.2 A Market for Privacy?|286
4|4.3 Market Failures in the Market for Personal Data|287
5|4.3.1 Information Asymmetries|287
5|4.3.2 Privacy as a Public Good|288
5|4.3.3 Externalities|289
5|4.3.4 Behavioural Biases|289
3|5 Regulatory Approach|290
4|5.1 Data Protection Regulation|291
4|5.2 Competition Law|292
4|5.3 Guiding Principles for Choosing a Regulatory Instrument|294
5|5.3.1 Type of Harm|294
5|5.3.2 Interaction Between the Instruments|296
3|6 Conclusion|296
3|References|297
2|Competition Law and Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Online Markets|301
3|1 Introduction|302
3|2 Competitive Concerns and Pro-Competitive Justifications of MFNs in Traditional and Online Settings|303
3|3 Internet Intermediaries and Digital Comparison Tools|306
3|4 The European Experience|309
4|4.1 Investigations into Online Hotel Booking Sector|310
5|4.1.1 Platform MFNs Within the Scope of Article 101|313
5|4.1.2 Platform MFNs and RPM|313
5|4.1.3 The Free Riding Defence|314
5|4.1.4 Platform MFNs and Best Price Guarantees|316
3|5 The Ongoing Debate in the US: An Overview|318
3|6 Concluding Remarks|320
3|References|321
1|Part V: Energy Markets and Competition Law|324
2|Energy Competition: From Commodity to Boutique and Back|325
3|1 The Fall of Energy Commodities & the Rise of Boutique Energy|326
3|2 How Companies Exploit Boutique Energy Markets|327
3|3 Making Energy a Commodity Again|331
3|4 Conclusion|332
3|References|332
2|EU Competition Law, Renewable Energies and the Tendering Model: Quantity Control Versus Price Control in Climate Politics|334
3|1 EU Competition Law and Energy Politics|334
3|2 The Tendering Model: Basic Idea, Costs, Competitiveness, and International Climate Law|336
3|3 Tendering Model and State Aid Law|339
3|4 Inconsistent Neglect of Other State Aid Constellations: Subsidies by Sparing|346
3|5 Tendering Model, Quantity Control and Price Control: Toward a Meaningful Energy Transition from the Perspective of Law and Economics|349
3|6 Conclusion|352
3|References|353
1|Index|356
1|Introduction|7
1|Contents|12
1|Contributors|14
1|Part I: Foundations of Competition Law|16
2|Justifying Competition Law in the Face of Consumers’ Bounded Rationality|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 Competitive Outcomes with Biased Consumer Beliefs|19
3|3 Biased Consumers and Distorted Demand|20
4|3.1 Competitive Effects|23
3|4 Consumer Welfare with Malleable Preferences|27
3|5 The Uneasy Behavioural Economic Case for Competition Law|31
4|5.1 Competition Still Tends to Advance Efficiency and Welfare|32
4|5.2 A Policy Favoring Competition Still Offers a Superior Baseline Approach|34
3|6 Conclusion|36
3|References|37
2|Two Contexts for Economics in Competition Law|40
3|1 Introduction|40
3|2 The Big Picture|42
3|3 Deterrence Effects|43
4|3.1 Expected Sanction|43
5|3.1.1 Loss if Convicted|44
5|3.1.2 Probability of Detection|44
5|3.1.3 Probability of Error|45
4|3.2 Predictability of Enforcement|46
4|3.3 Conclusion: Economic Analysis of Law|47
3|4 Competitive Effects|48
4|4.1 Market Power as a Necessary Condition|48
4|4.2 Effects Exerted by Whom?|50
4|4.3 Effects on Whom?|50
5|4.3.1 Effects on Customers and Suppliers|50
5|4.3.2 Effects on Competitors|51
4|4.4 Conclusion: Industrial Organization|52
3|5 The Two Contexts Compared|53
4|5.1 Field of Study|53
4|5.2 Relationship to Law|55
4|5.3 Attention in the Discourse|56
4|5.4 The Close Link Between Economics and Competition Law|57
3|6 Conclusion|58
3|References|58
2|Pleading for a “Multiple Goal Approach” in European Competition Law|63
3|1 Introduction|63
3|2 The “More Economic Approach”|64
4|2.1 A Brief Introduction|64
4|2.2 The US Roots: Chicago School of Antitrust|65
4|2.3 The Pragmatic European Adaptation|67
4|2.4 The Lacking Influence: Indicators and Reasons|68
3|3 The FTCA and Its Criticism of the MEA|69
4|3.1 “Freedom to Compete Approach”|69
5|3.1.1 A Short Introduction|69
5|3.1.2 Criticisms Against the MEA|70
4|3.2 Critical Aspects of the FTCA|72
3|4 Between the MEA and the FTCA: A “Multiple Goal Approach” to Competition Law|73
3|5 Concluding Remarks|75
3|References|76
1|Part II: Applications of Competition Law|79
2|The Impact on Competition by Deregulation of Professions (Reducing Occupational Licenses): The Case of Three Professions in Poland from 1989 to 2018|80
3|1 Introduction|80
3|2 Economic Theories of ‘Professional Regulation’|81
4|2.1 Public Interest Theory of ‘Professional Regulation’|82
4|2.2 Private Interest Theories of ‘Professional Regulation’|84
3|3 The Evolution of Regulations in Selected Professions in Poland|85
4|3.1 Civil Notaries|87
4|3.2 Tourist Guides|91
4|3.3 Taxi Drivers|94
3|4 Conclusion|97
3|References|98
2|Taking the Prohibition of Unfair Commercial Practices Seriously|102
3|1 Introduction|102
3|2 The Case of Foreign-Currency Indexed Mortgage Loans|103
3|3 Foreign Currency Mortgage Loans and the Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union|105
4|3.1 Kásler Judgment|105
4|3.2 The Notion of Transparency in Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union|106
4|3.3 The Limits of ex ante Perspective|107
3|4 The Concept of the Average Consumer in Jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union|108
3|5 Adjudicating Under the Shadow of Hindsight Bias Judicial Governance in Financial Markets from the Perspective of Behavioural Law and Economics|110
3|6 Conclusion|114
3|References|116
2|De minimis Exceptions for Hard-Core Restrictions in Swiss Competition Law|118
3|1 Introduction|118
3|2 Analytical Structure for Hard-Core Restrictions in Swiss Competition Law|119
3|3 Significance Test in the Practice of the Swiss Competition Commission|120
4|3.1 Qualitative Criteria: Subject Matter of the Agreement|121
4|3.2 Quantitative Criteria: Effect of the Agreement on Competition|121
5|3.2.1 Horizontal Agreements|122
5|3.2.2 Vertical Agreements|123
4|3.3 Quantitative Criteria: Effect of the Agreement on the Market|125
4|3.4 Significance Test as Weighing and Balancing of All Qualitative and Quantitative Criteria|126
3|4 Significance Test in the Jurisprudence of the Swiss Federal Tribunal|127
3|5 De minimis Exception for Hard-Core Restrictions on Competition|129
3|6 Conclusion|131
3|References|131
4|Swiss Competition Commission: Horizontal Agreements|132
4|Swiss Competition Commission: Vertical Agreements|132
4|Swiss Federal Administrative Court|133
4|Swiss Federal Supreme Court|133
4|European Court of Justice|133
2|Whole Foods, Fresh Concerns?|134
3|1 Introduction|134
3|2 Predatory Pricing as an Antitrust Problem in the United States|136
4|2.1 Definition of Predatory Pricing|136
4|2.2 An Overview of Predatory Pricing Law in the United States|137
5|2.2.1 Matsushita Electric Industry Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.|138
5|2.2.2 A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms|139
5|2.2.3 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.|140
4|2.3 The Chicago School “Consensus” on Predatory Pricing: Rarely Tried, Rarely Successful|142
4|2.4 Justifications for the Recoupment Requirement|143
5|2.4.1 The Recoupment Requirement Minimizes the Risk of False Positives|143
5|2.4.2 The Recoupment Requirement Serves as an Efficient Screen for Predatory Conduct|143
3|3 Amazon: The Everything|144
4|3.1 Amazon’s Origins|144
4|3.2 Amazon’s Pricing Strategy|145
4|3.3 Amazon’s Integration in the E-book Market|146
5|3.3.1 The Arrangement|146
5|3.3.2 The Lawsuit|147
5|3.3.3 The Trial|147
4|3.4 The Recoupment Requirement Misses the Mark on Amazon’s Anticompetitive Practices|148
5|3.4.1 Recoupment Can Occur Outside the Market Where the Predator Sustained Its Losses|149
5|3.4.2 Amazon’s Pricing Strategy Has Exclusionary Effects on Rivals|150
5|3.4.3 Antitrust Implications of Amazon’s Acquisition of Whole Foods|151
5|3.4.4 Whole Foods, Fresh Concerns?|151
3|4 Recalibrating the Recoupment Requirement|152
4|4.1 The Predatory Pricing Analysis Should Be Expanded to Consider a Firm’s Reputation for Predation|153
3|5 Conclusion|154
3|References|155
4|Statutes and Case Law|156
1|Part III: Intellectual Property Rights and Patents|157
2|Blocking Patents and the Process of Innovation|158
3|1 Starting Point|158
3|2 Fraud on the Patent Office|160
4|2.1 Patent Granting and Review Procedures|160
4|2.2 US Law|161
4|2.3 EU Law|162
4|2.4 Conclusions|164
3|3 Boehringer|165
3|4 Servier|166
4|4.1 The European Commission’s Decision|166
4|4.2 Blocking Patents|167
4|4.3 Conclusions|168
3|5 The Economics of Intellectual Property Protection and the Limits of Exclusive Rights|168
4|5.1 The Patent Rationale|168
4|5.2 Categories of Unused Patents|170
4|5.3 Function in the Competitive Process|170
3|6 Proposal of a Test|172
4|6.1 The Test for Abusive Blocking|172
4|6.2 Explanations|172
4|6.3 Legal Consequences|174
3|7 Outlook|175
3|References|176
2|Why an Absent International Regulatory Framework for Competition and Strong Copyright Protection Harms Diversity of Expressions and What to Do About It|178
3|1 Introduction|179
3|2 Harm for Diversity of Expressions|179
4|2.1 Competition Law and Diversity of Expressions|179
5|2.1.1 Regulatory Gap|179
5|2.1.2 The Effect for Diversity|182
5|2.1.3 The Example of the Culture and Media Industry|184
4|2.2 Copyright Law and Diversity|184
5|2.2.1 Focus on TRIPS|185
5|2.2.2 Incentives, Exclusive Rights and the Need for a Proper Balance of Interests|186
5|2.2.3 The Effect of the Current Balance of Interests Within TRIPS for Diversity of Expressions|188
5|2.2.4 Examples for Improper and to Be Reviewed Balance of Interests|191
6|Period of Protection|191
6|Exceptions and Limitations|192
6|Digitisation|193
4|2.3 Reciprocal Effect for Diversity of Expressions|195
4|2.4 Conclusion|198
3|3 What to Do About It?|198
3|References|200
4|Case Law|203
2|Excessive Pharmaceutical Prices as an Anticompetitive Practice in TRIPS and European Competition Law|205
3|1 The Issue of Excessive Prices in the Field of Pharmaceutical Products: Background|206
4|1.1 Patents, Right to Health & TRIPS|208
4|1.2 Compulsory Licensing & TRIPS|209
4|1.3 The Flawed Paragraph 6 System|211
4|1.4 Legal-Economic Considerations Regarding Compulsory Licensing Enforcement|212
4|1.5 The Case for Excessive Prices as an Anti-Competetive Practice in TRIPS|216
4|1.6 The Case for Excessive Prices as an Anti-Competetive Practice in European Competition Law|219
3|2 Conclusion: Justice, Efficiency and Excessive Prices|225
3|References|227
4|Case Law|228
1|Part IV: Impact of Information Technology|229
2|Disruptive Technologies and Competition Law|230
3|1 Introduction|230
3|2 Phase 1: New Phenomena of Online Markets|231
4|2.1 Two-Sided Markets and Network Effects|231
4|2.2 ‘Winner-Takes-it-all’ or Concentration Effects|232
4|2.3 Switching Costs and Multi-Homing|233
4|2.4 Gratuity Issue|233
4|2.5 Entry and Exit Barriers|234
4|2.6 Phase 1 in a Nutshell|235
3|3 Phase 2: Data Ownership and Privacy as New Values|235
4|3.1 Ownership Phenomenon|235
4|3.2 Privacy Phenomenon|236
4|3.3 Phase 2 in a Nutshell|238
3|4 Phase 3: Uncoupling of Transactional Mechanics from Persons|238
4|4.1 New Infrastructures|238
4|4.2 Algorithms and Artificial Intelligence|239
5|4.2.1 Notion of Collusion and Characteristics of Markets|239
5|4.2.2 Examples of Collusive Algorithmic Situations|240
5|4.2.3 Technical Measures Combatting Collusion|242
5|4.2.4 Challenges in the Legal Environment|243
5|4.2.5 Phase 3 in a Nutshell|244
3|5 Outlook|245
3|References|246
2|Understanding the Implications of Big Data and Big Data Analytics for Competition Law|248
3|1 Introduction|248
3|2 What Is Big Data? How Valuable Is It?|249
4|2.1 The Five Vs|249
4|2.2 What Is in the Data?|252
3|3 Understanding the Implications of Big Data for Competition Law and Policy: “Business as Usual” Versus Disruptive Change|254
4|3.1 Some Distinct Characteristics of Data-Driven Competition|254
4|3.2 Big Data Is “Business as Usual”|257
4|3.3 Big Data as a Challenge to Competition and to Competition Law|260
3|4 Concluding Remarks|267
3|References|268
2|Regulating Data Giants: Between Competition Law and Data Protection Law|271
3|1 Introduction|271
3|2 Recent Competition Law Cases|274
4|2.1 Merger Cases|274
4|2.2 Abuse of Dominance|277
3|3 Sources of Market Power in Data-Fuelled Platform Markets|278
4|3.1 Network Effects in Multi-Sided Markets|278
4|3.2 Market Power in Datasets|279
3|4 Economics of Privacy|282
4|4.1 Defining Privacy|282
5|4.1.1 The Meaning of Privacy|282
5|4.1.2 Gains and Losses to Firms|283
5|4.1.3 Gains and Losses to Individuals|284
4|4.2 A Market for Privacy?|286
4|4.3 Market Failures in the Market for Personal Data|287
5|4.3.1 Information Asymmetries|287
5|4.3.2 Privacy as a Public Good|288
5|4.3.3 Externalities|289
5|4.3.4 Behavioural Biases|289
3|5 Regulatory Approach|290
4|5.1 Data Protection Regulation|291
4|5.2 Competition Law|292
4|5.3 Guiding Principles for Choosing a Regulatory Instrument|294
5|5.3.1 Type of Harm|294
5|5.3.2 Interaction Between the Instruments|296
3|6 Conclusion|296
3|References|297
2|Competition Law and Most Favoured Nation Clauses in Online Markets|301
3|1 Introduction|302
3|2 Competitive Concerns and Pro-Competitive Justifications of MFNs in Traditional and Online Settings|303
3|3 Internet Intermediaries and Digital Comparison Tools|306
3|4 The European Experience|309
4|4.1 Investigations into Online Hotel Booking Sector|310
5|4.1.1 Platform MFNs Within the Scope of Article 101|313
5|4.1.2 Platform MFNs and RPM|313
5|4.1.3 The Free Riding Defence|314
5|4.1.4 Platform MFNs and Best Price Guarantees|316
3|5 The Ongoing Debate in the US: An Overview|318
3|6 Concluding Remarks|320
3|References|321
1|Part V: Energy Markets and Competition Law|324
2|Energy Competition: From Commodity to Boutique and Back|325
3|1 The Fall of Energy Commodities & the Rise of Boutique Energy|326
3|2 How Companies Exploit Boutique Energy Markets|327
3|3 Making Energy a Commodity Again|331
3|4 Conclusion|332
3|References|332
2|EU Competition Law, Renewable Energies and the Tendering Model: Quantity Control Versus Price Control in Climate Politics|334
3|1 EU Competition Law and Energy Politics|334
3|2 The Tendering Model: Basic Idea, Costs, Competitiveness, and International Climate Law|336
3|3 Tendering Model and State Aid Law|339
3|4 Inconsistent Neglect of Other State Aid Constellations: Subsidies by Sparing|346
3|5 Tendering Model, Quantity Control and Price Control: Toward a Meaningful Energy Transition from the Perspective of Law and Economics|349
3|6 Conclusion|352
3|References|353
1|Index|356