File #2676: "2019_Book_ConceptionsAndMisconceptionsOf.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|6
2|Acknowledgments|11
1|Contents|14
1|Editor and Contributors|16
1|Part I: Ways and Models of Legislation|18
2|Chapter 1: Language and Rule of Law in Classical Athens|19
3|1.1 The Discovery of Written Law|20
3|1.2 Volatility and Inconsistency in the Written Laws|21
3|1.3 Logographs and Rhetors|23
3|1.4 Things That Rhetors and Logographs Needed to Consider|24
4|1.4.1 Respect for the Rules of Procedure|25
4|1.4.2 The Language of Laws|25
4|1.4.3 The Generality of Laws|27
4|1.4.4 Consistency of the System|28
4|1.4.5 The Non-retroactivity of Laws|30
4|1.4.6 Display of Purposes|30
4|1.4.7 The Stability of Laws|31
4|1.4.8 Publication of Laws|33
3|1.5 Legislating in Athens: A Hazardous Task|33
3|1.6 Ideas That Resist the Passage of Time|35
3|References|35
2|Chapter 2: Misconceptions in Legislative Quality: An Enlightened Approach to the Drafting of Legislation|39
3|2.1 Introduction|39
3|2.2 A Traditional Concept of Legislative Quality|40
3|2.3 An Enlightened Approach to Legislative Quality|46
4|2.3.1 And Here Lies Misconception Number 1: Legislative Quality Comes Via the Application of a Specific Legislative Convention|47
4|2.3.2 Here Lies Misconception Number 2: Legislative Quality Rests in a Vacuum|48
4|2.3.3 Here Lies Misconception Number 3: Legislative Quality Is Not Definable|49
4|2.3.4 Here Lies Misconception Number 4: Effectiveness Always Leads to Quality|50
5|2.3.4.1 Legislation as a Tool for Regulation|51
5|2.3.4.2 Legislation as Written Communication|53
5|2.3.4.3 The Intrinsic Aversion of Users to Legislative Texts|54
4|2.3.5 Here Lies Misconception Number 5: There Is Nothing More to Be Done for Legislative Quality|55
5|2.3.5.1 Alternatives: Delimit the Limits|57
6|The Layered Approach to Structure|57
6|Legislative Image: Presentation, Layout, Pictures|60
6|The Statute Book as a Whole|61
3|2.4 Conclusions|63
3|References|64
2|Chapter 3: Rationality in Criminal Law Making. Rational Decision Making in a Complex Socio-Legislative Process|66
3|3.1 Introduction|67
3|3.2 The Dynamics of the Criminal Law-Making Process|68
4|3.2.1 The Pre-legislative Phase|69
4|3.2.2 The Parliamentarian Phase|70
4|3.2.3 The Evaluation Phase|71
3|3.3 A Pattern of Rational Criminal Law Making|72
4|3.3.1 Five Standards of Legislative Rationality|73
5|3.3.1.1 Ethical Rationality|73
5|3.3.1.2 Teleological Rationality|73
5|3.3.1.3 Pragmatic Rationality|74
5|3.3.1.4 Systematic Rationality|74
5|3.3.1.5 Linguistic Rationality|75
5|3.3.1.6 About the wholeness of the five standards of legislative rationality|75
4|3.3.2 Efficiency as a Transversal Dimension|76
4|3.3.3 Standards of Legislative Rationality and Canons of Legal Interpretation|76
3|3.4 Transfer of the Contents of Rational Criminal Law Making to the Legislative Process|77
3|3.5 Some Additional Insights Into Ethical Rationality|78
4|3.5.1 Principles Building Ethical Rationality|78
5|3.5.1.1 Principles on protected legal interests|78
5|3.5.1.2 Principles on responsibility|79
5|3.5.1.3 Sanctioning principles|80
4|3.5.2 The Democratic Criterion|82
3|3.6 The Constitutional Review of Criminal Statutes|85
4|3.6.1 Control of the Parliamentary Procedure|86
4|3.6.2 Control of the Content of the Law|88
3|References|91
2|Chapter 4: Legislation, Communication, and Authority. How to Account for the Bindingness of Law?|96
3|4.1 Normative Power|97
3|4.2 Two Models of Legislation|99
4|4.2.1 The Law as Symbol Model (LAS)|99
4|4.2.2 The Law as Instrument Model (LAI)|102
3|4.3 Law and Authority|105
3|4.4 Law and Ideology|111
3|4.5 The Culture of Justification|116
3|References|119
2|Chapter 5: Legislation and Nudging. Towards a Suitable Definition|122
3|5.1 Nudging: A Smart or an Unacceptable Tool for Legislators?|123
3|5.2 The Received View: Econs vs. Humans|125
3|5.3 Nudges All Around the World|130
3|5.4 Nudging: Context Relevance and Open Purposes|137
3|5.5 Conclusion. A Proposal of Definition|140
3|References|141
1|Part II: Legislation in a Culture of Justification|145
2|Chapter 6: Legislation as Balancing|146
3|6.1 Introduction|146
3|6.2 The Model of Balancing|147
4|6.2.1 The Criterion of Pareto-Optimality|149
4|6.2.2 Indifference Curves|150
4|6.2.3 Optimality|150
4|6.2.4 Rules of Balancing|150
3|6.3 Complex Balancing: Interests, Arguments, and Principles|152
4|6.3.1 Utilitarian Balancing|152
5|6.3.1.1 The Increase of Utility|153
5|6.3.1.2 The Aggregation of Interests|153
4|6.3.2 Some Difficulties|154
4|6.3.3 An Example: The Prohibition to Smoke in Bars or Restaurants|156
5|6.3.3.1 Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Non-smokers, Counting Agents|156
5|6.3.3.2 Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Non-smokers, Moderate Impact of the Number of Agents|158
5|6.3.3.3 Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Smokers, Moderate Impact of the Number of Agents|158
5|6.3.3.4 Alternatives to Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Non-smokers, Moderate Impact of the Number of Agents|159
3|6.4 Rights Balancing|160
4|6.4.1 Universalisability as the Criterion of Rights Balancing|160
4|6.4.2 Rights as Prohibitions of Balancing|162
3|6.5 Conclusion|163
3|References|164
2|Chapter 7: Proportionality in Lawmaking|166
3|7.1 From the Principle of Proportionality in Legal Reasoning to a General Culture of Justification in Public Decision-Making|167
3|7.2 Misconceptions Related to Legislation Studies|171
4|7.2.1 First Misconception: Legal Science Unduly Marginalises the Study of the Quality of Laws ( for Which There Is No Basis)|171
4|7.2.2 Second Misconception: Considering That Legal Scientists Have Not Reflected on the Legislative Task|173
4|7.2.3 Third Misconception: Approaching Lawmaking from Just One Concept of Law|174
4|7.2.4 Fourth Misconception: The Darkest Side of Politics Is an Obstacle for Legislation Studies|176
3|7.3 The Principle of Proportionality as a Way to Make Progress in Legislative Reasoning|177
4|7.3.1 Lawmaking and Adjudication Are Not Essentially Different Ways of Legal Reasoning|177
4|7.3.2 Distinguishing Legal Reasoning in Lawmaking from Adjudicative Legal Reasoning|180
5|7.3.2.1 The Institutional Role of Judges and Legislators|180
5|7.3.2.2 The Legislator’s and the Judge’s Priorities|181
5|7.3.2.3 The Objects, Forms, and Places of Both Judicial and Legislative Legal Reasoning|181
3|7.4 Conclusion|182
3|References|184
2|Chapter 8: Legislation and Argumentation: Towards a Model for the Analysis of Legislative Reasoning|187
3|8.1 Introduction|188
3|8.2 Argumentation on Underage Girls’ Access to Abortion|190
3|8.3 Argumentation on the Citizen Security Act|200
4|8.3.1 Linguistic Reasons|201
4|8.3.2 Systematic Reasons|202
4|8.3.3 Pragmatic Reasons|203
4|8.3.4 Teleological Reasons|203
4|8.3.5 Axiological Reasons|204
3|8.4 Conclusions|210
3|References|217
2|Chapter 9: Legislative Deliberation and Judicial Review: Between Respect and Disrespect for Elected Lawmakers|219
3|9.1 More than Anecdotal Remarks|221
3|9.2 Debate Review as a Constitutional Pathology|226
3|9.3 Sketching a Case for Judicial Review of Legislative Debate Quality|229
4|9.3.1 A Democratic Culture of Justification|229
4|9.3.2 Due Deference as Reasoned Deference|231
4|9.3.3 Constitutional Benefits|233
4|9.3.4 Institutional Neutrality and the Variable Weight of Democracy as a Formal Principle|235
4|9.3.5 Judicial Candor|236
3|9.4 Making Sense of Debate Review|238
3|9.5 Developing Debate Review Further|243
3|9.6 Concluding Remarks|249
3|References|250
2|Chapter 10: Special Interest Legislation and Legislative Capture|254
3|10.1 Introduction|255
4|10.1.1 Current State of Research|255
4|10.1.2 Aim of the Analysis|260
3|10.2 Factual and Normative Premises|261
4|10.2.1 Premises|262
4|10.2.2 Comments|263
3|10.3 Legal Problems|269
4|10.3.1 Rights to Lobbyism|269
4|10.3.2 Limits of Special Interest Legislation|270
4|10.3.3 EU State Aid Law|273
4|10.3.4 Procedural Approach|274
3|10.4 Outlook|276
3|References|278
1|Part III: Legislation, Lawyers, and Citizens|284
2|Chapter 11: The Global Revival of Legisprudence: A Comparative View on Legislation in Legal Education and Research|285
3|11.1 The Revival of Legislation: The American Perspective|287
4|11.1.1 Legislation as a Long Forgotten Field|287
4|11.1.2 The Revival and Recent Blossoming of Legislation|289
3|11.2 Beyond the American Perspective: Challenging American Exceptionalism|292
4|11.2.1 Legisprudence as a Long Forgotten Field|292
4|11.2.2 The Global Revival and Recent Blossom of Legisprudence|293
3|11.3 A Global Future for Legisprudence|296
3|11.4 Conclusion|299
3|References|299
2|Chapter 12: In the Law We Trust. Some Thoughts on the ‘Legislative Gap’ in Legal Studies|305
3|12.1 The Importance of Legislative Knowledge|305
3|12.2 Judge-Centred Academic Curricula in Law Schools|307
3|12.3 What Is the Origin of This Judge-Centred Culture?|308
3|12.4 Raised to Distrust the Legislature?|310
3|12.5 Towards a New Academic Curriculum in Legal Studies?|312
3|12.6 Learning from Experience as We Go Along?|314
3|References|316
2|Chapter 13: Taking Modern Legislation Seriously: Agency Rights as a Special Challenge|318
3|13.1 Legislation on Obligations and Prohibitions|320
3|13.2 Legislation Recognizing Agency Rights|321
4|13.2.1 Agency Rights as a Specific Type of Subjective Right|322
4|13.2.2 Agency Rights and Modernity|326
4|13.2.3 Agency Rights and Non-Legal Norms|331
4|13.2.4 The Role of Jurists in the Exercise of Agency Rights|333
4|13.2.5 Legisprudential Implications|335
3|13.3 Conclusion|338
3|References|339
1|Index|342
2|Acknowledgments|11
1|Contents|14
1|Editor and Contributors|16
1|Part I: Ways and Models of Legislation|18
2|Chapter 1: Language and Rule of Law in Classical Athens|19
3|1.1 The Discovery of Written Law|20
3|1.2 Volatility and Inconsistency in the Written Laws|21
3|1.3 Logographs and Rhetors|23
3|1.4 Things That Rhetors and Logographs Needed to Consider|24
4|1.4.1 Respect for the Rules of Procedure|25
4|1.4.2 The Language of Laws|25
4|1.4.3 The Generality of Laws|27
4|1.4.4 Consistency of the System|28
4|1.4.5 The Non-retroactivity of Laws|30
4|1.4.6 Display of Purposes|30
4|1.4.7 The Stability of Laws|31
4|1.4.8 Publication of Laws|33
3|1.5 Legislating in Athens: A Hazardous Task|33
3|1.6 Ideas That Resist the Passage of Time|35
3|References|35
2|Chapter 2: Misconceptions in Legislative Quality: An Enlightened Approach to the Drafting of Legislation|39
3|2.1 Introduction|39
3|2.2 A Traditional Concept of Legislative Quality|40
3|2.3 An Enlightened Approach to Legislative Quality|46
4|2.3.1 And Here Lies Misconception Number 1: Legislative Quality Comes Via the Application of a Specific Legislative Convention|47
4|2.3.2 Here Lies Misconception Number 2: Legislative Quality Rests in a Vacuum|48
4|2.3.3 Here Lies Misconception Number 3: Legislative Quality Is Not Definable|49
4|2.3.4 Here Lies Misconception Number 4: Effectiveness Always Leads to Quality|50
5|2.3.4.1 Legislation as a Tool for Regulation|51
5|2.3.4.2 Legislation as Written Communication|53
5|2.3.4.3 The Intrinsic Aversion of Users to Legislative Texts|54
4|2.3.5 Here Lies Misconception Number 5: There Is Nothing More to Be Done for Legislative Quality|55
5|2.3.5.1 Alternatives: Delimit the Limits|57
6|The Layered Approach to Structure|57
6|Legislative Image: Presentation, Layout, Pictures|60
6|The Statute Book as a Whole|61
3|2.4 Conclusions|63
3|References|64
2|Chapter 3: Rationality in Criminal Law Making. Rational Decision Making in a Complex Socio-Legislative Process|66
3|3.1 Introduction|67
3|3.2 The Dynamics of the Criminal Law-Making Process|68
4|3.2.1 The Pre-legislative Phase|69
4|3.2.2 The Parliamentarian Phase|70
4|3.2.3 The Evaluation Phase|71
3|3.3 A Pattern of Rational Criminal Law Making|72
4|3.3.1 Five Standards of Legislative Rationality|73
5|3.3.1.1 Ethical Rationality|73
5|3.3.1.2 Teleological Rationality|73
5|3.3.1.3 Pragmatic Rationality|74
5|3.3.1.4 Systematic Rationality|74
5|3.3.1.5 Linguistic Rationality|75
5|3.3.1.6 About the wholeness of the five standards of legislative rationality|75
4|3.3.2 Efficiency as a Transversal Dimension|76
4|3.3.3 Standards of Legislative Rationality and Canons of Legal Interpretation|76
3|3.4 Transfer of the Contents of Rational Criminal Law Making to the Legislative Process|77
3|3.5 Some Additional Insights Into Ethical Rationality|78
4|3.5.1 Principles Building Ethical Rationality|78
5|3.5.1.1 Principles on protected legal interests|78
5|3.5.1.2 Principles on responsibility|79
5|3.5.1.3 Sanctioning principles|80
4|3.5.2 The Democratic Criterion|82
3|3.6 The Constitutional Review of Criminal Statutes|85
4|3.6.1 Control of the Parliamentary Procedure|86
4|3.6.2 Control of the Content of the Law|88
3|References|91
2|Chapter 4: Legislation, Communication, and Authority. How to Account for the Bindingness of Law?|96
3|4.1 Normative Power|97
3|4.2 Two Models of Legislation|99
4|4.2.1 The Law as Symbol Model (LAS)|99
4|4.2.2 The Law as Instrument Model (LAI)|102
3|4.3 Law and Authority|105
3|4.4 Law and Ideology|111
3|4.5 The Culture of Justification|116
3|References|119
2|Chapter 5: Legislation and Nudging. Towards a Suitable Definition|122
3|5.1 Nudging: A Smart or an Unacceptable Tool for Legislators?|123
3|5.2 The Received View: Econs vs. Humans|125
3|5.3 Nudges All Around the World|130
3|5.4 Nudging: Context Relevance and Open Purposes|137
3|5.5 Conclusion. A Proposal of Definition|140
3|References|141
1|Part II: Legislation in a Culture of Justification|145
2|Chapter 6: Legislation as Balancing|146
3|6.1 Introduction|146
3|6.2 The Model of Balancing|147
4|6.2.1 The Criterion of Pareto-Optimality|149
4|6.2.2 Indifference Curves|150
4|6.2.3 Optimality|150
4|6.2.4 Rules of Balancing|150
3|6.3 Complex Balancing: Interests, Arguments, and Principles|152
4|6.3.1 Utilitarian Balancing|152
5|6.3.1.1 The Increase of Utility|153
5|6.3.1.2 The Aggregation of Interests|153
4|6.3.2 Some Difficulties|154
4|6.3.3 An Example: The Prohibition to Smoke in Bars or Restaurants|156
5|6.3.3.1 Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Non-smokers, Counting Agents|156
5|6.3.3.2 Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Non-smokers, Moderate Impact of the Number of Agents|158
5|6.3.3.3 Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Smokers, Moderate Impact of the Number of Agents|158
5|6.3.3.4 Alternatives to Prohibition/No Prohibition, Evaluation Favourable to Non-smokers, Moderate Impact of the Number of Agents|159
3|6.4 Rights Balancing|160
4|6.4.1 Universalisability as the Criterion of Rights Balancing|160
4|6.4.2 Rights as Prohibitions of Balancing|162
3|6.5 Conclusion|163
3|References|164
2|Chapter 7: Proportionality in Lawmaking|166
3|7.1 From the Principle of Proportionality in Legal Reasoning to a General Culture of Justification in Public Decision-Making|167
3|7.2 Misconceptions Related to Legislation Studies|171
4|7.2.1 First Misconception: Legal Science Unduly Marginalises the Study of the Quality of Laws ( for Which There Is No Basis)|171
4|7.2.2 Second Misconception: Considering That Legal Scientists Have Not Reflected on the Legislative Task|173
4|7.2.3 Third Misconception: Approaching Lawmaking from Just One Concept of Law|174
4|7.2.4 Fourth Misconception: The Darkest Side of Politics Is an Obstacle for Legislation Studies|176
3|7.3 The Principle of Proportionality as a Way to Make Progress in Legislative Reasoning|177
4|7.3.1 Lawmaking and Adjudication Are Not Essentially Different Ways of Legal Reasoning|177
4|7.3.2 Distinguishing Legal Reasoning in Lawmaking from Adjudicative Legal Reasoning|180
5|7.3.2.1 The Institutional Role of Judges and Legislators|180
5|7.3.2.2 The Legislator’s and the Judge’s Priorities|181
5|7.3.2.3 The Objects, Forms, and Places of Both Judicial and Legislative Legal Reasoning|181
3|7.4 Conclusion|182
3|References|184
2|Chapter 8: Legislation and Argumentation: Towards a Model for the Analysis of Legislative Reasoning|187
3|8.1 Introduction|188
3|8.2 Argumentation on Underage Girls’ Access to Abortion|190
3|8.3 Argumentation on the Citizen Security Act|200
4|8.3.1 Linguistic Reasons|201
4|8.3.2 Systematic Reasons|202
4|8.3.3 Pragmatic Reasons|203
4|8.3.4 Teleological Reasons|203
4|8.3.5 Axiological Reasons|204
3|8.4 Conclusions|210
3|References|217
2|Chapter 9: Legislative Deliberation and Judicial Review: Between Respect and Disrespect for Elected Lawmakers|219
3|9.1 More than Anecdotal Remarks|221
3|9.2 Debate Review as a Constitutional Pathology|226
3|9.3 Sketching a Case for Judicial Review of Legislative Debate Quality|229
4|9.3.1 A Democratic Culture of Justification|229
4|9.3.2 Due Deference as Reasoned Deference|231
4|9.3.3 Constitutional Benefits|233
4|9.3.4 Institutional Neutrality and the Variable Weight of Democracy as a Formal Principle|235
4|9.3.5 Judicial Candor|236
3|9.4 Making Sense of Debate Review|238
3|9.5 Developing Debate Review Further|243
3|9.6 Concluding Remarks|249
3|References|250
2|Chapter 10: Special Interest Legislation and Legislative Capture|254
3|10.1 Introduction|255
4|10.1.1 Current State of Research|255
4|10.1.2 Aim of the Analysis|260
3|10.2 Factual and Normative Premises|261
4|10.2.1 Premises|262
4|10.2.2 Comments|263
3|10.3 Legal Problems|269
4|10.3.1 Rights to Lobbyism|269
4|10.3.2 Limits of Special Interest Legislation|270
4|10.3.3 EU State Aid Law|273
4|10.3.4 Procedural Approach|274
3|10.4 Outlook|276
3|References|278
1|Part III: Legislation, Lawyers, and Citizens|284
2|Chapter 11: The Global Revival of Legisprudence: A Comparative View on Legislation in Legal Education and Research|285
3|11.1 The Revival of Legislation: The American Perspective|287
4|11.1.1 Legislation as a Long Forgotten Field|287
4|11.1.2 The Revival and Recent Blossoming of Legislation|289
3|11.2 Beyond the American Perspective: Challenging American Exceptionalism|292
4|11.2.1 Legisprudence as a Long Forgotten Field|292
4|11.2.2 The Global Revival and Recent Blossom of Legisprudence|293
3|11.3 A Global Future for Legisprudence|296
3|11.4 Conclusion|299
3|References|299
2|Chapter 12: In the Law We Trust. Some Thoughts on the ‘Legislative Gap’ in Legal Studies|305
3|12.1 The Importance of Legislative Knowledge|305
3|12.2 Judge-Centred Academic Curricula in Law Schools|307
3|12.3 What Is the Origin of This Judge-Centred Culture?|308
3|12.4 Raised to Distrust the Legislature?|310
3|12.5 Towards a New Academic Curriculum in Legal Studies?|312
3|12.6 Learning from Experience as We Go Along?|314
3|References|316
2|Chapter 13: Taking Modern Legislation Seriously: Agency Rights as a Special Challenge|318
3|13.1 Legislation on Obligations and Prohibitions|320
3|13.2 Legislation Recognizing Agency Rights|321
4|13.2.1 Agency Rights as a Specific Type of Subjective Right|322
4|13.2.2 Agency Rights and Modernity|326
4|13.2.3 Agency Rights and Non-Legal Norms|331
4|13.2.4 The Role of Jurists in the Exercise of Agency Rights|333
4|13.2.5 Legisprudential Implications|335
3|13.3 Conclusion|338
3|References|339
1|Index|342