File #2728: "2019_Book_PromotingCompetitionInInnovati.pdf"
Testo
1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|Abbreviations|14
1|EU Treaties and Presidency Conclusions|18
1|Table of Cases|21
1|List of Figures|26
1|List of Table|27
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|28
2|1.1 Background and Purpose of the Book|29
2|1.2 Characteristics of Competition in the ICT Markets|31
2|1.3 Why a Comparative Study?|32
2|1.4 Why an Inter-Disciplinary Study?|33
2|1.5 Who Should Read This Book?|34
2|1.6 Structure of the Book|34
1|Part I: Merger Review|38
2|Chapter 2: (Ir-) Relevant Markets in the High Technology Sector (?)|40
3|2.1 Introduction|40
3|2.2 The SCP Paradigm and the Relevant Market|41
4|2.2.1 Relevant Product Market|42
5|2.2.1.1 Structural Conduct Performance (SCP) Paradigm|42
5|2.2.1.2 Implications of the SSNIP Test and the SCP Paradigm for Market Definition|44
4|2.2.2 Relevant Geographic Market|45
3|2.3 Relevance of the Current Approach for the ICT Sector|46
4|2.3.1 Is Market Definition (Essentially) a Means to an End?|46
4|2.3.2 Does the Current Approach Facilitate Effective Identification of the (Anti-) Competitive Effects of Mergers?|49
4|2.3.3 Market Definition and Multi-Sided Platforms|51
3|2.4 Conclusion|55
2|Chapter 3: Salient Features of the ICT Sector|57
3|3.1 Introduction|57
3|3.2 Network Effects|58
4|3.2.1 Direct and Indirect Network Effects|58
4|3.2.2 Negative Network Effects|59
4|3.2.3 Network Effects and Economies of Scale|60
4|3.2.4 Network Effects and Two-Sided Platforms|61
4|3.2.5 Network Effects, Tipping and Second-Mover Advantage|61
5|3.2.5.1 Second Mover Advantage|63
5|3.2.5.2 Market Envelopment|63
4|3.2.6 Network Effects and Barriers to Entry|64
3|3.3 Qwertynomics, Customer Lock-in and Path Dependency|66
3|3.4 Technological Convergence|67
3|3.5 Consumerisation|68
4|3.5.1 Consumer and Enterprise Product Markets|69
4|3.5.2 Consumerisation and Market Definition|69
3|3.6 Conclusion|71
2|Chapter 4: Theory of Harm: Unilateral Effects in ICT Mergers|72
3|4.1 Introduction|72
3|4.2 Types of Mergers and Theories of Harm|75
3|4.3 Unilateral or Non-coordinated Effects|77
4|4.3.1 Unilateral Effects, Localised Competition and Innovation|77
4|4.3.2 Unilateral Effects and the EU, the UK and the US Merger Guidelines|80
4|4.3.3 Case Law|83
5|4.3.3.1 Oracle/PeopleSoft|83
5|4.3.3.2 Telefónica/E-Plus|85
5|4.3.3.3 NXP Semiconductors/Freescale|90
5|4.3.3.4 ARM/Giesecke and Devrient/Gemalto/JV|93
3|4.4 Co-ordinated Effects|94
2|Chapter 5: Theories of Harm: Vertical Effects in ICT Mergers|97
3|5.1 Introduction|97
4|5.1.1 Vertical Mergers and Efficiencies|98
4|5.1.2 Input and Customer Foreclosure|99
3|5.2 Case Laws|100
4|5.2.1 TomTom/Tele Atlas|101
4|5.2.2 Google/ITA|102
4|5.2.3 ARM/Giesecke and Devrient/Gemalto|104
4|5.2.4 Comcast/NBCU/JV|106
4|5.2.5 Liberty Global/Corelio/WandW/De Vijver Media|109
4|5.2.6 Google/Motorola|112
5|5.2.6.1 Google/Motorola: The EU Decision|113
5|5.2.6.2 Google/Motorola: The US DOJ´s Decision|117
5|5.2.6.3 Google/Motorola: The Chinese MOFCOM´s Decision|118
2|Chapter 6: Theories of Harm: Conglomerate Effects and Types of Evidence|120
3|6.1 Introduction|120
3|6.2 Conglomerate Effects and GE/Honeywell|121
3|6.3 The NHM Guidelines on the Assessment of Conglomerate Effects|123
3|6.4 Case Laws|123
4|6.4.1 Cisco/Tandberg|124
4|6.4.2 Microsoft/Skype|125
4|6.4.3 Intel/McAfee|126
5|6.4.3.1 Foreclosure Effects and the Degradation of Interoperability|127
5|6.4.3.2 Foreclosure and Technical Tying|128
5|6.4.3.3 Foreclosure and Commercial Bundling|129
5|6.4.3.4 Foreclosure Strategy|130
3|6.5 Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis|130
2|Chapter 7: Merger Control in the EU and the UK|135
3|7.1 Historical Backdrop: From the ECSC to the Current Approach|135
4|7.1.1 From the ECSC Treaty to the 1989 Merger Regulation|135
4|7.1.2 From the 1989 Merger Regulation to the 2004 Merger Regulation|138
3|7.2 Procedural Aspects of Merger Remedies|142
3|7.3 When Is a Joint Venture Treated as a Concentration?|144
3|7.4 Requests for Referral and Co-operation Between the Commission, the National Regulatory and the National Competition Author...|145
3|7.5 Electronic Communications Sector: From Regulation to Competition|147
3|7.6 Commitments: Balancing Proportionality and Effectiveness|151
3|7.7 Commitments: Conditions and Obligations|151
2|Chapter 8: Merger Control in the US|153
3|8.1 Legislative Framework|153
3|8.2 The DOJ and the FTC: The Disequilibrium of Power|154
3|8.3 Mergers and the FCC|158
3|8.4 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines|158
3|8.5 2011 Merger Remedies Guide|159
3|8.6 Prohibited Mergers|161
1|Part II: Merger Remedies and Merger Remedy-Related Arbitration|163
2|Chapter 9: Mergers, Innovation and Remedies´ Design|165
3|9.1 Mergers, Innovation and Competition|165
3|9.2 Merger Remedies|171
4|9.2.1 Merger Remedies: A Definition|171
4|9.2.2 Why Do We Need Remedies?|173
4|9.2.3 Merger Remedies and the Principle of Proportionality|173
4|9.2.4 Ex-post Studies|175
3|9.3 Factors to Consider in the Design of Remedies in High Tech Mergers|178
4|9.3.1 `Upgrade Treadmill´, Hidden Costs and Consumer Harm|178
4|9.3.2 `Gatekeeper Effects´ and Merger Remedies|180
4|9.3.3 Additional Factors to Be Considered in the Design of Remedies|181
2|Chapter 10: Merger Remedies|182
2|Chapter 11: Structural Remedies|186
3|11.1 Preference for Structural Remedies|186
3|11.2 Divestitures in Oligopolistic Markets|188
3|11.3 What Is a Divestiture?|190
4|11.3.1 Crown Jewel|191
4|11.3.2 Upfront Buyer|192
4|11.3.3 Carve-Outs and the Nature of Divested Business|193
4|11.3.4 Access Remedies: Structural or Non-Structural?|196
3|11.4 Factors to be Considered in the Design of Structural Remedies|198
4|11.4.1 Identity and Qualifications of the Buyer|199
4|11.4.2 Removal of Links with Competitors|200
4|11.4.3 Managing a Successful Divestiture|201
4|11.4.4 Period for Divestiture|202
4|11.4.5 Interim Period and Preservation of Assets|202
4|11.4.6 Hold-Separate Obligations and Hold-Separate Manager|203
3|11.5 Conclusion|204
2|Chapter 12: Non-structural Remedies|205
3|12.1 Introduction|205
3|12.2 When Non-structural Remedies Are More Preferable|207
3|12.3 Access Remedies|209
4|12.3.1 Intel/McAfee: Interoperability Remedies in a Conglomerate Merger|211
4|12.3.2 Google/ITA: Non-structural Remedies in Potential Vertical Mergers|212
5|12.3.2.1 Licensing of QPX|213
5|12.3.2.2 Licensing of InstaSearch|213
4|12.3.3 Interoperability Remedies for Vertical Concerns in ARM/GandD/Gemalto/JV|214
4|12.3.4 Comcast/NBCU/JV: FRANDly Access to the OVDs|215
4|12.3.5 Axalto/Gemplus: FRANDly Access to the OTA SIM Platforms|217
3|12.4 Other Non-structural Remedies|218
4|12.4.1 Exclusive Long-Term Clauses|218
4|12.4.2 Restrictive Licensing Practices, Non-discrimination Clauses and Anti-retaliation Provisions|219
4|12.4.3 Firewall Provisions|221
3|12.5 Impediments to Effective Implementation of Remedies|223
2|Chapter 13: Remedies in the Telecommunications Sector|226
3|13.1 Introduction|226
3|13.2 T-Mobile/Orange UK|228
4|13.2.1 Remedies in T-Mobile/Orange|229
5|13.2.1.1 T-Mobile/3UK´s RAN Sharing Agreement|229
5|13.2.1.2 Spectrum|229
3|13.3 Telefónica/E-Plus Deutschland|231
4|13.3.1 The MNO Remedy|232
4|13.3.2 The MBA Remedy|232
4|13.3.3 The Non-MNO Remedy|234
3|13.4 Remedies in H3G Austria/Orange and H3G Ireland/Telefónica Ireland|234
4|13.4.1 Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange|234
4|13.4.2 Hutchison 3G Ireland/Telefónica Ireland|236
4|13.4.3 H3G Italy/Wind/JV|237
3|13.5 Conclusion|238
2|Chapter 14: Merger Remedy-Related Arbitration: une innovation suprenante|240
3|14.1 Introduction|240
3|14.2 Arbitration Clause in Merger Commitments|242
3|14.3 Arbitration: An erga omnes Offer to Arbitrate|243
3|14.4 Interpretation of Commitments|245
3|14.5 Subject Matter of Arbitration Clauses|247
4|14.5.1 Type of Arbitration: Institutional or Ad Hoc?|248
4|14.5.2 Appointment of Arbitrators|249
4|14.5.3 Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings|250
4|14.5.4 Burden of Proof|251
4|14.5.5 Powers of the Commission|251
4|14.5.6 Pre-arbitration Dispute Settlement|253
4|14.5.7 Scope of Arbitration Clause: What Is Arbitrable and Who Can Initiate Arbitration?|255
4|14.5.8 Substantive Law|256
4|14.5.9 Interim Awards and Preliminary Rulings|257
4|14.5.10 Place and Language of Arbitration|257
2|Chapter 15: RTI v. Sky: The First Reported Case of Merger Remedy Related Arbitration|259
3|15.1 Introduction|259
4|15.1.1 Background and Facts of the Case|259
4|15.1.2 Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal|260
4|15.1.3 The Interpretation of the Commitments|261
4|15.1.4 Can the Tribunal Amend the Scope of the Commitments?|262
3|15.2 Resolution of Ambiguities in the Arbitration Agreement|262
3|15.3 Baseball Arbitration|265
3|15.4 Conclusion|265
2|Chapter 16: Monitoring Trustee|268
3|16.1 Monitoring Trustee: The `Eyes and Ears´ of the Commission|268
3|16.2 Appointment, Conflict of Interest and the Independence of Trustee|269
3|16.3 Qualifications and Skill Set of the Trustee|271
3|16.4 Monitoring Trustee and Confidential Information|272
3|16.5 Monitoring Trustee or a Divestiture Trustee?|273
3|16.6 The Role and Responsibility of the Trustee|274
3|16.7 Monitoring Trustee or a `Managing´ Trustee?|276
3|16.8 The Practice in the US|277
1|Part III: Big Data Mergers: Merger Review and Remedies|280
2|Chapter 17: Big Data and Merger Control|281
3|17.1 Introduction|281
3|17.2 Data, Big Data, Personal Data and Merger Control|283
4|17.2.1 Data: The New Currency of the Digital Economy|284
4|17.2.2 Value of Big Data|285
4|17.2.3 Zero Price Effect and User Dynamism as Non-Price Parameter of Competition and Innovation in the MSPs|286
4|17.2.4 Personal Data: Privacy Concerns and Law|288
3|17.3 Competition, Consumer Protection and Privacy Laws|290
3|17.4 Jurisdiction and Filing Threshold|293
3|17.5 Case Laws|296
4|17.5.1 Google/Double Click|296
5|17.5.1.1 Decision of the Competition Authorities|296
5|17.5.1.2 Comment|298
4|17.5.2 Facebook/Whatsapp|299
5|17.5.2.1 Decision of the Competition Authorities|299
5|17.5.2.2 Comment|300
5|17.5.2.3 Ex-post Developments: Commission Fines Facebook|301
4|17.5.3 Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere|302
4|17.5.4 Microsoft/Yahoo!|303
4|17.5.5 Sanofi/Google/DMI JV|304
3|17.6 Microsoft/LinkedIn|306
4|17.6.1 Horizontal Effects|307
4|17.6.2 Vertical Effects|307
4|17.6.3 Conglomerate Effects|308
4|17.6.4 Commitments|310
3|17.7 Remedies for Big Data Mergers|311
4|17.7.1 The 2018 EU General Data Protection Regulation and Potential Remedies|312
4|17.7.2 Thomson/Reuters|314
5|17.7.2.1 Competitive Assessment|314
5|17.7.2.2 Remedies|316
3|17.8 Summary and Recommendations|317
1|Part IV: Summary, Conclusions and the Road Ahead|320
2|Chapter 18: Summary, Conclusions and Further Research|321
1|Bibliography|326
2|Books|326
2|Chapters in a Book|328
2|Articles|329
1|Contents|7
1|Abbreviations|14
1|EU Treaties and Presidency Conclusions|18
1|Table of Cases|21
1|List of Figures|26
1|List of Table|27
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|28
2|1.1 Background and Purpose of the Book|29
2|1.2 Characteristics of Competition in the ICT Markets|31
2|1.3 Why a Comparative Study?|32
2|1.4 Why an Inter-Disciplinary Study?|33
2|1.5 Who Should Read This Book?|34
2|1.6 Structure of the Book|34
1|Part I: Merger Review|38
2|Chapter 2: (Ir-) Relevant Markets in the High Technology Sector (?)|40
3|2.1 Introduction|40
3|2.2 The SCP Paradigm and the Relevant Market|41
4|2.2.1 Relevant Product Market|42
5|2.2.1.1 Structural Conduct Performance (SCP) Paradigm|42
5|2.2.1.2 Implications of the SSNIP Test and the SCP Paradigm for Market Definition|44
4|2.2.2 Relevant Geographic Market|45
3|2.3 Relevance of the Current Approach for the ICT Sector|46
4|2.3.1 Is Market Definition (Essentially) a Means to an End?|46
4|2.3.2 Does the Current Approach Facilitate Effective Identification of the (Anti-) Competitive Effects of Mergers?|49
4|2.3.3 Market Definition and Multi-Sided Platforms|51
3|2.4 Conclusion|55
2|Chapter 3: Salient Features of the ICT Sector|57
3|3.1 Introduction|57
3|3.2 Network Effects|58
4|3.2.1 Direct and Indirect Network Effects|58
4|3.2.2 Negative Network Effects|59
4|3.2.3 Network Effects and Economies of Scale|60
4|3.2.4 Network Effects and Two-Sided Platforms|61
4|3.2.5 Network Effects, Tipping and Second-Mover Advantage|61
5|3.2.5.1 Second Mover Advantage|63
5|3.2.5.2 Market Envelopment|63
4|3.2.6 Network Effects and Barriers to Entry|64
3|3.3 Qwertynomics, Customer Lock-in and Path Dependency|66
3|3.4 Technological Convergence|67
3|3.5 Consumerisation|68
4|3.5.1 Consumer and Enterprise Product Markets|69
4|3.5.2 Consumerisation and Market Definition|69
3|3.6 Conclusion|71
2|Chapter 4: Theory of Harm: Unilateral Effects in ICT Mergers|72
3|4.1 Introduction|72
3|4.2 Types of Mergers and Theories of Harm|75
3|4.3 Unilateral or Non-coordinated Effects|77
4|4.3.1 Unilateral Effects, Localised Competition and Innovation|77
4|4.3.2 Unilateral Effects and the EU, the UK and the US Merger Guidelines|80
4|4.3.3 Case Law|83
5|4.3.3.1 Oracle/PeopleSoft|83
5|4.3.3.2 Telefónica/E-Plus|85
5|4.3.3.3 NXP Semiconductors/Freescale|90
5|4.3.3.4 ARM/Giesecke and Devrient/Gemalto/JV|93
3|4.4 Co-ordinated Effects|94
2|Chapter 5: Theories of Harm: Vertical Effects in ICT Mergers|97
3|5.1 Introduction|97
4|5.1.1 Vertical Mergers and Efficiencies|98
4|5.1.2 Input and Customer Foreclosure|99
3|5.2 Case Laws|100
4|5.2.1 TomTom/Tele Atlas|101
4|5.2.2 Google/ITA|102
4|5.2.3 ARM/Giesecke and Devrient/Gemalto|104
4|5.2.4 Comcast/NBCU/JV|106
4|5.2.5 Liberty Global/Corelio/WandW/De Vijver Media|109
4|5.2.6 Google/Motorola|112
5|5.2.6.1 Google/Motorola: The EU Decision|113
5|5.2.6.2 Google/Motorola: The US DOJ´s Decision|117
5|5.2.6.3 Google/Motorola: The Chinese MOFCOM´s Decision|118
2|Chapter 6: Theories of Harm: Conglomerate Effects and Types of Evidence|120
3|6.1 Introduction|120
3|6.2 Conglomerate Effects and GE/Honeywell|121
3|6.3 The NHM Guidelines on the Assessment of Conglomerate Effects|123
3|6.4 Case Laws|123
4|6.4.1 Cisco/Tandberg|124
4|6.4.2 Microsoft/Skype|125
4|6.4.3 Intel/McAfee|126
5|6.4.3.1 Foreclosure Effects and the Degradation of Interoperability|127
5|6.4.3.2 Foreclosure and Technical Tying|128
5|6.4.3.3 Foreclosure and Commercial Bundling|129
5|6.4.3.4 Foreclosure Strategy|130
3|6.5 Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis|130
2|Chapter 7: Merger Control in the EU and the UK|135
3|7.1 Historical Backdrop: From the ECSC to the Current Approach|135
4|7.1.1 From the ECSC Treaty to the 1989 Merger Regulation|135
4|7.1.2 From the 1989 Merger Regulation to the 2004 Merger Regulation|138
3|7.2 Procedural Aspects of Merger Remedies|142
3|7.3 When Is a Joint Venture Treated as a Concentration?|144
3|7.4 Requests for Referral and Co-operation Between the Commission, the National Regulatory and the National Competition Author...|145
3|7.5 Electronic Communications Sector: From Regulation to Competition|147
3|7.6 Commitments: Balancing Proportionality and Effectiveness|151
3|7.7 Commitments: Conditions and Obligations|151
2|Chapter 8: Merger Control in the US|153
3|8.1 Legislative Framework|153
3|8.2 The DOJ and the FTC: The Disequilibrium of Power|154
3|8.3 Mergers and the FCC|158
3|8.4 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines|158
3|8.5 2011 Merger Remedies Guide|159
3|8.6 Prohibited Mergers|161
1|Part II: Merger Remedies and Merger Remedy-Related Arbitration|163
2|Chapter 9: Mergers, Innovation and Remedies´ Design|165
3|9.1 Mergers, Innovation and Competition|165
3|9.2 Merger Remedies|171
4|9.2.1 Merger Remedies: A Definition|171
4|9.2.2 Why Do We Need Remedies?|173
4|9.2.3 Merger Remedies and the Principle of Proportionality|173
4|9.2.4 Ex-post Studies|175
3|9.3 Factors to Consider in the Design of Remedies in High Tech Mergers|178
4|9.3.1 `Upgrade Treadmill´, Hidden Costs and Consumer Harm|178
4|9.3.2 `Gatekeeper Effects´ and Merger Remedies|180
4|9.3.3 Additional Factors to Be Considered in the Design of Remedies|181
2|Chapter 10: Merger Remedies|182
2|Chapter 11: Structural Remedies|186
3|11.1 Preference for Structural Remedies|186
3|11.2 Divestitures in Oligopolistic Markets|188
3|11.3 What Is a Divestiture?|190
4|11.3.1 Crown Jewel|191
4|11.3.2 Upfront Buyer|192
4|11.3.3 Carve-Outs and the Nature of Divested Business|193
4|11.3.4 Access Remedies: Structural or Non-Structural?|196
3|11.4 Factors to be Considered in the Design of Structural Remedies|198
4|11.4.1 Identity and Qualifications of the Buyer|199
4|11.4.2 Removal of Links with Competitors|200
4|11.4.3 Managing a Successful Divestiture|201
4|11.4.4 Period for Divestiture|202
4|11.4.5 Interim Period and Preservation of Assets|202
4|11.4.6 Hold-Separate Obligations and Hold-Separate Manager|203
3|11.5 Conclusion|204
2|Chapter 12: Non-structural Remedies|205
3|12.1 Introduction|205
3|12.2 When Non-structural Remedies Are More Preferable|207
3|12.3 Access Remedies|209
4|12.3.1 Intel/McAfee: Interoperability Remedies in a Conglomerate Merger|211
4|12.3.2 Google/ITA: Non-structural Remedies in Potential Vertical Mergers|212
5|12.3.2.1 Licensing of QPX|213
5|12.3.2.2 Licensing of InstaSearch|213
4|12.3.3 Interoperability Remedies for Vertical Concerns in ARM/GandD/Gemalto/JV|214
4|12.3.4 Comcast/NBCU/JV: FRANDly Access to the OVDs|215
4|12.3.5 Axalto/Gemplus: FRANDly Access to the OTA SIM Platforms|217
3|12.4 Other Non-structural Remedies|218
4|12.4.1 Exclusive Long-Term Clauses|218
4|12.4.2 Restrictive Licensing Practices, Non-discrimination Clauses and Anti-retaliation Provisions|219
4|12.4.3 Firewall Provisions|221
3|12.5 Impediments to Effective Implementation of Remedies|223
2|Chapter 13: Remedies in the Telecommunications Sector|226
3|13.1 Introduction|226
3|13.2 T-Mobile/Orange UK|228
4|13.2.1 Remedies in T-Mobile/Orange|229
5|13.2.1.1 T-Mobile/3UK´s RAN Sharing Agreement|229
5|13.2.1.2 Spectrum|229
3|13.3 Telefónica/E-Plus Deutschland|231
4|13.3.1 The MNO Remedy|232
4|13.3.2 The MBA Remedy|232
4|13.3.3 The Non-MNO Remedy|234
3|13.4 Remedies in H3G Austria/Orange and H3G Ireland/Telefónica Ireland|234
4|13.4.1 Hutchison 3G Austria/Orange|234
4|13.4.2 Hutchison 3G Ireland/Telefónica Ireland|236
4|13.4.3 H3G Italy/Wind/JV|237
3|13.5 Conclusion|238
2|Chapter 14: Merger Remedy-Related Arbitration: une innovation suprenante|240
3|14.1 Introduction|240
3|14.2 Arbitration Clause in Merger Commitments|242
3|14.3 Arbitration: An erga omnes Offer to Arbitrate|243
3|14.4 Interpretation of Commitments|245
3|14.5 Subject Matter of Arbitration Clauses|247
4|14.5.1 Type of Arbitration: Institutional or Ad Hoc?|248
4|14.5.2 Appointment of Arbitrators|249
4|14.5.3 Confidentiality in Arbitration Proceedings|250
4|14.5.4 Burden of Proof|251
4|14.5.5 Powers of the Commission|251
4|14.5.6 Pre-arbitration Dispute Settlement|253
4|14.5.7 Scope of Arbitration Clause: What Is Arbitrable and Who Can Initiate Arbitration?|255
4|14.5.8 Substantive Law|256
4|14.5.9 Interim Awards and Preliminary Rulings|257
4|14.5.10 Place and Language of Arbitration|257
2|Chapter 15: RTI v. Sky: The First Reported Case of Merger Remedy Related Arbitration|259
3|15.1 Introduction|259
4|15.1.1 Background and Facts of the Case|259
4|15.1.2 Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal|260
4|15.1.3 The Interpretation of the Commitments|261
4|15.1.4 Can the Tribunal Amend the Scope of the Commitments?|262
3|15.2 Resolution of Ambiguities in the Arbitration Agreement|262
3|15.3 Baseball Arbitration|265
3|15.4 Conclusion|265
2|Chapter 16: Monitoring Trustee|268
3|16.1 Monitoring Trustee: The `Eyes and Ears´ of the Commission|268
3|16.2 Appointment, Conflict of Interest and the Independence of Trustee|269
3|16.3 Qualifications and Skill Set of the Trustee|271
3|16.4 Monitoring Trustee and Confidential Information|272
3|16.5 Monitoring Trustee or a Divestiture Trustee?|273
3|16.6 The Role and Responsibility of the Trustee|274
3|16.7 Monitoring Trustee or a `Managing´ Trustee?|276
3|16.8 The Practice in the US|277
1|Part III: Big Data Mergers: Merger Review and Remedies|280
2|Chapter 17: Big Data and Merger Control|281
3|17.1 Introduction|281
3|17.2 Data, Big Data, Personal Data and Merger Control|283
4|17.2.1 Data: The New Currency of the Digital Economy|284
4|17.2.2 Value of Big Data|285
4|17.2.3 Zero Price Effect and User Dynamism as Non-Price Parameter of Competition and Innovation in the MSPs|286
4|17.2.4 Personal Data: Privacy Concerns and Law|288
3|17.3 Competition, Consumer Protection and Privacy Laws|290
3|17.4 Jurisdiction and Filing Threshold|293
3|17.5 Case Laws|296
4|17.5.1 Google/Double Click|296
5|17.5.1.1 Decision of the Competition Authorities|296
5|17.5.1.2 Comment|298
4|17.5.2 Facebook/Whatsapp|299
5|17.5.2.1 Decision of the Competition Authorities|299
5|17.5.2.2 Comment|300
5|17.5.2.3 Ex-post Developments: Commission Fines Facebook|301
4|17.5.3 Telefónica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere|302
4|17.5.4 Microsoft/Yahoo!|303
4|17.5.5 Sanofi/Google/DMI JV|304
3|17.6 Microsoft/LinkedIn|306
4|17.6.1 Horizontal Effects|307
4|17.6.2 Vertical Effects|307
4|17.6.3 Conglomerate Effects|308
4|17.6.4 Commitments|310
3|17.7 Remedies for Big Data Mergers|311
4|17.7.1 The 2018 EU General Data Protection Regulation and Potential Remedies|312
4|17.7.2 Thomson/Reuters|314
5|17.7.2.1 Competitive Assessment|314
5|17.7.2.2 Remedies|316
3|17.8 Summary and Recommendations|317
1|Part IV: Summary, Conclusions and the Road Ahead|320
2|Chapter 18: Summary, Conclusions and Further Research|321
1|Bibliography|326
2|Books|326
2|Chapters in a Book|328
2|Articles|329