File #2745: "2019_Book_TheArtOfJudicialReasoning.pdf"
Testo
1|Foreword|6
1|Preface|8
1|Contents|10
1|About the Authors|12
1|Part I: Art and Method|18
2|E gudde Noper – A Good Neighbour|19
2|The Law|27
3|1 Fundamental Rules and Human Rights in the EU|27
4|1.1 The European Court of Justice Takes Charge|27
4|1.2 The Political Institutions Become Active|28
3|2 The EFTA Court and Fundamental Rights|31
4|2.1 The Historical Background|31
4|2.2 The EFTA Court Finds Its Feet|32
4|2.3 The EFTA Court Squares the Circle|33
4|2.4 The EFTA Court Applies Fundamental Rules in Social Policy and Labour Law|35
4|2.5 The Relationship with National Courts|36
3|3 The Legacy|37
3|Reference|37
2|European Courts and the Protection of Fundamental Rights|38
3|1 Introduction|38
3|2 Nature of the Dialogue|39
3|3 The Relationship Between the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights|40
3|4 Benefits of a “Cooperative” Approach|42
3|5 An Interactive Rather Than Hierarchical Relationship|44
3|6 Benefits of an Institutionalised “Dialogue”|45
3|7 Conclusions|46
3|References|47
2|Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Law: The 2014 Revision of the Norwegian Constitution|48
3|1 Introduction|48
3|2 Human Rights and the Constitution Prior to the 2014 Revision|49
3|3 Enforcement and Control of Human Rights|51
3|4 The Lønning Commission’s Report and Adoption of New Human Rights Provisions|53
4|4.1 The Need for More Human Rights Provisions in the Constitution|53
4|4.2 Selection of Rights|55
4|4.3 Civil and Political Rights|55
4|4.4 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights|56
3|5 The Supreme Court’s Application of the New Provisions|58
3|6 EEA Law and Fundamental Rights: A Multi-Level Problem|61
3|7 Concluding Remarks|65
3|References|65
2|A Different Level, a Different Purpose? Reflections on International Criminal Law from the Perspective of Penal Theory|66
3|1 Prolegomenon|66
3|2 The Foundations of Penal Theory|68
4|2.1 Relative Penal Theories: Primacy of Utility|68
4|2.2 Absolute Penal Theories: Primacy of Justice|69
3|3 The Different Level|70
4|3.1 The Development of International Criminal Law|70
4|3.2 Problems with Imputing Individual Criminal Responsibility in Macro-Criminality|71
4|3.3 “Transitional Justice”|71
3|4 What Remains of the Purposes of Punishment|72
4|4.1 Absolute Penal Theories with Regard to International Core Crimes|72
5|4.1.1 The Question of Measurement of Guilt|72
5|4.1.2 Benefit/Burden Approaches|73
4|4.2 Preventive Penal Theories with Regard to International Core Crimes|73
5|4.2.1 Positive and Negative General Prevention|73
5|4.2.2 Positive and Negative Special Prevention|74
3|5 Punishment and Communication|75
4|5.1 The Case of Slobodan Praljak|75
4|5.2 Punishment as a Communicative Act|75
4|5.3 In Whose Name?|76
3|6 Conclusion|77
3|References|78
2|The Enforcement of the EEA Agreement by the EFTA Surveillance Authority: Enhancing Welfare and Prosperity|80
3|1 Introduction|80
3|2 Enforcement of the EEA Agreement: ESA’s Hybrid Role|81
4|2.1 Introduction|81
4|2.2 Case E-4/17: ESA v Norway (Parking Facility in Kristiansand)|82
4|2.3 Case E-16/16: Fosen-Linjen AS v AtB AS|84
4|2.4 Case E-10/17: Nye Kystlink AS v Color Group AS and Color Line AS|89
3|3 Concluding Remarks|91
3|Reference|92
1|Part II: Justice and Judiciary|93
2|Judges: Servants of the Law – But Also Servants of Justice?|94
3|1 Introduction|94
3|2 Self-Image of Judges|95
3|3 Selection Process and Career Progression|97
3|4 The Judiciary as the Third State Power|100
3|5 Concluding Remarks|103
2|The EU Judiciary in a New Era of Accountability|104
3|1 Introduction|104
3|2 Context: On a New Management Approach in National and EU Judiciaries|105
3|3 Specific Features of the EU Judiciary: What Impact on Accountability Mechanisms?|109
3|4 Reference Values: What Should EU Courts Account For?|111
3|5 Actors: Towards Whom Should EU Courts Be Accountable?|113
3|6 Conclusion|116
3|References|116
2|The Acceptability of the Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights|118
3|1 Foreword|118
3|2 Introduction: Other Judicial Notions Swimming in the Same Waters as Acceptability of Judicial Rulings|119
4|2.1 The Basics of Judicial Duty|119
4|2.2 The Judicial Power and Judicial Accountability of the Strasbourg Court|120
4|2.3 Judicial Legitimacy|121
3|3 Acceptability of the Strasbourg Court’s Rulings|123
4|3.1 The Mission and Legal Environment of the Strasbourg Court as Factors Going to Acceptability|123
4|3.2 Manifestations of “Acceptability” in the Case-Law and Practice of the Strasbourg Court|127
3|4 Any Conclusions of General Application?|135
3|References|135
2|Some Reflections on the Legitimacy of the Strasbourg Judge|138
3|1 The Individual Aspect: The Judge|142
4|1.1 Legitimacy Issues at the Moment of the Judge’s Appointment|142
5|1.1.1 Election|143
5|1.1.2 Qualifications|145
4|1.2 Legitimacy Issues During the Exercise of Office|146
5|1.2.1 Independence and Impartiality|146
5|1.2.2 Professionalism|148
3|2 The Collective Aspect: The Court|150
4|2.1 A Far-Reaching Mission|150
5|2.1.1 Developing the Human Rights|150
5|2.1.2 The Scope of the Court’s Judgments|153
4|2.2 Specific Duties|156
5|2.2.1 Efficiency|156
5|2.2.2 Subsidiarity|157
6|2.2.2.1 Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality|158
6|2.2.2.2 Changing the Majority Rule for Giving a Judgment?|162
3|3 Conclusion|163
3|References|165
2|On Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and Transnational Justice|167
3|1 Introduction|167
3|2 Judicial Independence and the Effective Protection of EU Rights|169
4|2.1 Judicial Independence and the Notion of ‘Court or Tribunal’ Within the Meaning of Article 267 TFEU|169
4|2.2 Article 19 TEU and the Protection of Judicial Independence|172
5|2.2.1 National Judges as Individuals|173
5|2.2.2 National Judges as the Arm of EU Law|174
3|3 The Integrity of the Judicial Dialogue Between the ECJ and National Courts|176
3|4 Judicial Independence and Mutual Trust in the AFSJ|178
4|4.1 Judicial Independence and the Notion of “Court” in the AFSJ|179
4|4.2 Judicial Independence and the Notion of ‘Judicial Authority’ in the Context of the European Arrest Warrant|182
3|5 Concluding Remarks|185
3|References|186
2|Joint Dispute Settlement and Judicial Interpretation – A Precondition for Participation in the EU Internal Market?|187
3|1 Introduction|187
3|2 The Road Leading to the European Economic Area|188
4|2.1 EFTA and FINEFTA|188
4|2.2 The EFTA-EC Free Trade Agreements|189
3|3 The EEA Agreement|190
4|3.1 Substance: The Four Freedoms of the Internal Market|190
4|3.2 Institutions: The Two-Pillar Structure|190
4|3.3 A Dynamic and Homogeneous EEA|191
5|3.3.1 The Homogeneity Objective|191
5|3.3.2 Relevance of CJEU Case Law|193
5|3.3.3 Legal Effects of EU Acts Taken Over in the Agreement|194
3|4 Negotiating EEA: Main Challenges|195
4|4.1 Substance|195
4|4.2 Institutional|196
5|4.2.1 Legal Imbalance between the EC and EFTA Unacceptable|196
5|4.2.2 Securing the Maintenance of the Dynamic and Homogeneous EEA|196
3|5 What About the EU-Swiss Arrangements?|198
4|5.1 Substance|198
4|5.2 Institutional Aspects|199
3|6 Conclusion|200
3|References|201
2|Patience and Perseverance in Administering Justice – The Role of a Judge at the Andean Tribunal of Justice|202
3|1 Introduction|202
3|2 Disseminating the Andean Legal System|204
3|3 Improving the Quality of Rulings|206
3|4 Transparency|207
3|5 Greater Accountability|208
3|6 Final Thoughts|211
2|Adjudication in Maritime Disputes|212
2|Independence of the Luxembourg Judiciary Through a Council for the Judiciary – A Never-Ending Story|221
1|Part III: Reasoning and Language(s)|231
2|For Whom Are Judgments Written?|232
3|1 Introduction|232
3|2 An Icelandic Perspective|233
3|3 Judgments of the EFTA Court|236
3|4 The Hells Angels Case|237
3|5 Final Words|239
2|On Understanding and Being Understood – The Judicial System, Communication and the Public|241
3|1 Public Information Work by the Courts as a Statutory Duty|242
4|1.1 “In the Name of the People”: The Obligation to Publish Court Rulings|242
4|1.2 The Form in Which Court Rulings Are Published|244
4|1.3 Obligation to Engage in More Extensive Public Information Work|245
3|2 Substantive Reasons for the Active Pursuit of Public Information Work|246
4|2.1 Correct Reporting|246
4|2.2 Confidence in the Rule of Law|247
4|2.3 Taking Responsibility|248
3|3 An Exceptional Criminal Case: The Loveparade Proceedings|249
4|3.1 Review of the Events|249
4|3.2 Press Work in Detail|250
4|3.3 Reactions|252
3|4 Limits on the Active Pursuit of Public Information Work|252
3|5 Conclusion|253
3|References|254
2|Law and Language(s)|255
3|1 Introduction: Why Multilingualism?|255
3|2 Reasons Militating in Favour of Multilingualism|256
3|3 Legal Bases for the Protection of Multilingualism|257
3|4 Risks and Challenges Related to Multilingualism|258
3|5 Managing Multilingualism in the Functioning of EU Institutions|259
3|6 Managing Multilingualism in EU Law Production and Application|260
3|7 Problems of Semantic Divergence|261
3|8 Why Not Reduce Multilingualism in the EU?|261
3|9 Methods for Minimising Semantic Divergence|262
3|10 Conclusion: Why Multilingualism?|264
3|References|265
2|Judicial Reasoning in a Multinational Court|266
3|1 Introduction|266
3|2 Composition of Chambers: Ensuring Diversity of Nationality and Legal Tradition|266
3|3 Language Issues: The Working Language of the Courts|267
3|4 Multinational Composition of the Courts: “How Is it?”|268
3|5 Judicial Reasoning: Reconciling Different Styles of Reasoning Traditions and Ensuring a Clear Framework of Reasoning|269
3|6 The General Court’s Style of Reasoning|270
3|7 Insufficient Reasoning or Errors in the Reasoning: Different Perceptions|271
3|8 The Deliberations Amongst the Judges: Differences Between the General Court and the Court of Justice – Risk of Inconsistency Amongst Chambers and Policy Questions|273
3|9 Ensuring Coherence of the Case Law|275
3|10 Courts Enriched by Judges from a Diverse Professional Background|276
3|11 Concluding Remarks: The Court’s Unlimited Jurisdiction|277
3|References|278
2|Is There an Art of Judicial Reasoning at the General Court? Some Modest Comments|279
3|1 Introduction|279
3|2 The Nature of Judicial Review at the General Court|280
3|3 The Structure of the General Court|281
3|4 The Working Methods at the General Court|282
3|5 The Value of Precedents at the General Court|283
3|6 Final Observations|284
3|References|285
2|Comparative Law as an Element of Reasoning|286
3|1 Trends in Comparative Law|286
3|2 Comparative Law in Liechtenstein as a Country of Reception|288
4|2.1 Comparative Law: A Practised Method of Interpretation|288
4|2.2 The Princely Supreme Court and Comparative Law as an Element of Reasoning|289
5|2.2.1 In the Application of Adapted Law|289
5|2.2.2 The Application of Non-received Law|293
5|2.2.3 In Matters of European Law|294
3|3 Conclusion|295
3|References|295
2|“Fiat Justitia ruat caelum”. Is This a Good Guide to the Role of a Specialist Appeal Court Judge?|297
3|1 Introduction: R v Wilkes|297
4|1.1 The Need to do Justice|298
4|1.2 Some Examples|298
3|2 Should Competition Appeals Be Heard in the General Courts?|300
4|2.1 What Are the Benefits of a Specialist Appeal Court?|301
4|2.2 Further Appeal Processes|303
4|2.3 The Adversarial System|304
3|3 The CAT and Full Merits Appeals|306
3|4 Conclusions|308
3|References|309
2|Antitrust Courts and Economic Findings in Germany|310
3|1 Introduction|310
3|2 Sources and Subjects of Economic Findings|311
4|2.1 Theoretical Economics|312
4|2.2 Empirical Economics|313
3|3 Scope of the Judicial Review in Germany|314
4|3.1 Fine Proceedings|314
4|3.2 Administrative Proceedings|315
4|3.3 Civil Law Proceedings|315
3|4 Economic Findings in the Case Law of German Antitrust Courts|315
4|4.1 General Economic Judgments (“ökonomische Erfahrungssätze”)|316
4|4.2 Expert Opinions Commissioned by the Parties|318
4|4.3 Expert Opinions Commissioned by the Court|319
4|4.4 Consultation of amici curiae|321
3|5 Conclusion and Outlook|322
3|References|322
1|Preface|8
1|Contents|10
1|About the Authors|12
1|Part I: Art and Method|18
2|E gudde Noper – A Good Neighbour|19
2|The Law|27
3|1 Fundamental Rules and Human Rights in the EU|27
4|1.1 The European Court of Justice Takes Charge|27
4|1.2 The Political Institutions Become Active|28
3|2 The EFTA Court and Fundamental Rights|31
4|2.1 The Historical Background|31
4|2.2 The EFTA Court Finds Its Feet|32
4|2.3 The EFTA Court Squares the Circle|33
4|2.4 The EFTA Court Applies Fundamental Rules in Social Policy and Labour Law|35
4|2.5 The Relationship with National Courts|36
3|3 The Legacy|37
3|Reference|37
2|European Courts and the Protection of Fundamental Rights|38
3|1 Introduction|38
3|2 Nature of the Dialogue|39
3|3 The Relationship Between the Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights|40
3|4 Benefits of a “Cooperative” Approach|42
3|5 An Interactive Rather Than Hierarchical Relationship|44
3|6 Benefits of an Institutionalised “Dialogue”|45
3|7 Conclusions|46
3|References|47
2|Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Law: The 2014 Revision of the Norwegian Constitution|48
3|1 Introduction|48
3|2 Human Rights and the Constitution Prior to the 2014 Revision|49
3|3 Enforcement and Control of Human Rights|51
3|4 The Lønning Commission’s Report and Adoption of New Human Rights Provisions|53
4|4.1 The Need for More Human Rights Provisions in the Constitution|53
4|4.2 Selection of Rights|55
4|4.3 Civil and Political Rights|55
4|4.4 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights|56
3|5 The Supreme Court’s Application of the New Provisions|58
3|6 EEA Law and Fundamental Rights: A Multi-Level Problem|61
3|7 Concluding Remarks|65
3|References|65
2|A Different Level, a Different Purpose? Reflections on International Criminal Law from the Perspective of Penal Theory|66
3|1 Prolegomenon|66
3|2 The Foundations of Penal Theory|68
4|2.1 Relative Penal Theories: Primacy of Utility|68
4|2.2 Absolute Penal Theories: Primacy of Justice|69
3|3 The Different Level|70
4|3.1 The Development of International Criminal Law|70
4|3.2 Problems with Imputing Individual Criminal Responsibility in Macro-Criminality|71
4|3.3 “Transitional Justice”|71
3|4 What Remains of the Purposes of Punishment|72
4|4.1 Absolute Penal Theories with Regard to International Core Crimes|72
5|4.1.1 The Question of Measurement of Guilt|72
5|4.1.2 Benefit/Burden Approaches|73
4|4.2 Preventive Penal Theories with Regard to International Core Crimes|73
5|4.2.1 Positive and Negative General Prevention|73
5|4.2.2 Positive and Negative Special Prevention|74
3|5 Punishment and Communication|75
4|5.1 The Case of Slobodan Praljak|75
4|5.2 Punishment as a Communicative Act|75
4|5.3 In Whose Name?|76
3|6 Conclusion|77
3|References|78
2|The Enforcement of the EEA Agreement by the EFTA Surveillance Authority: Enhancing Welfare and Prosperity|80
3|1 Introduction|80
3|2 Enforcement of the EEA Agreement: ESA’s Hybrid Role|81
4|2.1 Introduction|81
4|2.2 Case E-4/17: ESA v Norway (Parking Facility in Kristiansand)|82
4|2.3 Case E-16/16: Fosen-Linjen AS v AtB AS|84
4|2.4 Case E-10/17: Nye Kystlink AS v Color Group AS and Color Line AS|89
3|3 Concluding Remarks|91
3|Reference|92
1|Part II: Justice and Judiciary|93
2|Judges: Servants of the Law – But Also Servants of Justice?|94
3|1 Introduction|94
3|2 Self-Image of Judges|95
3|3 Selection Process and Career Progression|97
3|4 The Judiciary as the Third State Power|100
3|5 Concluding Remarks|103
2|The EU Judiciary in a New Era of Accountability|104
3|1 Introduction|104
3|2 Context: On a New Management Approach in National and EU Judiciaries|105
3|3 Specific Features of the EU Judiciary: What Impact on Accountability Mechanisms?|109
3|4 Reference Values: What Should EU Courts Account For?|111
3|5 Actors: Towards Whom Should EU Courts Be Accountable?|113
3|6 Conclusion|116
3|References|116
2|The Acceptability of the Rulings of the European Court of Human Rights|118
3|1 Foreword|118
3|2 Introduction: Other Judicial Notions Swimming in the Same Waters as Acceptability of Judicial Rulings|119
4|2.1 The Basics of Judicial Duty|119
4|2.2 The Judicial Power and Judicial Accountability of the Strasbourg Court|120
4|2.3 Judicial Legitimacy|121
3|3 Acceptability of the Strasbourg Court’s Rulings|123
4|3.1 The Mission and Legal Environment of the Strasbourg Court as Factors Going to Acceptability|123
4|3.2 Manifestations of “Acceptability” in the Case-Law and Practice of the Strasbourg Court|127
3|4 Any Conclusions of General Application?|135
3|References|135
2|Some Reflections on the Legitimacy of the Strasbourg Judge|138
3|1 The Individual Aspect: The Judge|142
4|1.1 Legitimacy Issues at the Moment of the Judge’s Appointment|142
5|1.1.1 Election|143
5|1.1.2 Qualifications|145
4|1.2 Legitimacy Issues During the Exercise of Office|146
5|1.2.1 Independence and Impartiality|146
5|1.2.2 Professionalism|148
3|2 The Collective Aspect: The Court|150
4|2.1 A Far-Reaching Mission|150
5|2.1.1 Developing the Human Rights|150
5|2.1.2 The Scope of the Court’s Judgments|153
4|2.2 Specific Duties|156
5|2.2.1 Efficiency|156
5|2.2.2 Subsidiarity|157
6|2.2.2.1 Margin of Appreciation and Proportionality|158
6|2.2.2.2 Changing the Majority Rule for Giving a Judgment?|162
3|3 Conclusion|163
3|References|165
2|On Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and Transnational Justice|167
3|1 Introduction|167
3|2 Judicial Independence and the Effective Protection of EU Rights|169
4|2.1 Judicial Independence and the Notion of ‘Court or Tribunal’ Within the Meaning of Article 267 TFEU|169
4|2.2 Article 19 TEU and the Protection of Judicial Independence|172
5|2.2.1 National Judges as Individuals|173
5|2.2.2 National Judges as the Arm of EU Law|174
3|3 The Integrity of the Judicial Dialogue Between the ECJ and National Courts|176
3|4 Judicial Independence and Mutual Trust in the AFSJ|178
4|4.1 Judicial Independence and the Notion of “Court” in the AFSJ|179
4|4.2 Judicial Independence and the Notion of ‘Judicial Authority’ in the Context of the European Arrest Warrant|182
3|5 Concluding Remarks|185
3|References|186
2|Joint Dispute Settlement and Judicial Interpretation – A Precondition for Participation in the EU Internal Market?|187
3|1 Introduction|187
3|2 The Road Leading to the European Economic Area|188
4|2.1 EFTA and FINEFTA|188
4|2.2 The EFTA-EC Free Trade Agreements|189
3|3 The EEA Agreement|190
4|3.1 Substance: The Four Freedoms of the Internal Market|190
4|3.2 Institutions: The Two-Pillar Structure|190
4|3.3 A Dynamic and Homogeneous EEA|191
5|3.3.1 The Homogeneity Objective|191
5|3.3.2 Relevance of CJEU Case Law|193
5|3.3.3 Legal Effects of EU Acts Taken Over in the Agreement|194
3|4 Negotiating EEA: Main Challenges|195
4|4.1 Substance|195
4|4.2 Institutional|196
5|4.2.1 Legal Imbalance between the EC and EFTA Unacceptable|196
5|4.2.2 Securing the Maintenance of the Dynamic and Homogeneous EEA|196
3|5 What About the EU-Swiss Arrangements?|198
4|5.1 Substance|198
4|5.2 Institutional Aspects|199
3|6 Conclusion|200
3|References|201
2|Patience and Perseverance in Administering Justice – The Role of a Judge at the Andean Tribunal of Justice|202
3|1 Introduction|202
3|2 Disseminating the Andean Legal System|204
3|3 Improving the Quality of Rulings|206
3|4 Transparency|207
3|5 Greater Accountability|208
3|6 Final Thoughts|211
2|Adjudication in Maritime Disputes|212
2|Independence of the Luxembourg Judiciary Through a Council for the Judiciary – A Never-Ending Story|221
1|Part III: Reasoning and Language(s)|231
2|For Whom Are Judgments Written?|232
3|1 Introduction|232
3|2 An Icelandic Perspective|233
3|3 Judgments of the EFTA Court|236
3|4 The Hells Angels Case|237
3|5 Final Words|239
2|On Understanding and Being Understood – The Judicial System, Communication and the Public|241
3|1 Public Information Work by the Courts as a Statutory Duty|242
4|1.1 “In the Name of the People”: The Obligation to Publish Court Rulings|242
4|1.2 The Form in Which Court Rulings Are Published|244
4|1.3 Obligation to Engage in More Extensive Public Information Work|245
3|2 Substantive Reasons for the Active Pursuit of Public Information Work|246
4|2.1 Correct Reporting|246
4|2.2 Confidence in the Rule of Law|247
4|2.3 Taking Responsibility|248
3|3 An Exceptional Criminal Case: The Loveparade Proceedings|249
4|3.1 Review of the Events|249
4|3.2 Press Work in Detail|250
4|3.3 Reactions|252
3|4 Limits on the Active Pursuit of Public Information Work|252
3|5 Conclusion|253
3|References|254
2|Law and Language(s)|255
3|1 Introduction: Why Multilingualism?|255
3|2 Reasons Militating in Favour of Multilingualism|256
3|3 Legal Bases for the Protection of Multilingualism|257
3|4 Risks and Challenges Related to Multilingualism|258
3|5 Managing Multilingualism in the Functioning of EU Institutions|259
3|6 Managing Multilingualism in EU Law Production and Application|260
3|7 Problems of Semantic Divergence|261
3|8 Why Not Reduce Multilingualism in the EU?|261
3|9 Methods for Minimising Semantic Divergence|262
3|10 Conclusion: Why Multilingualism?|264
3|References|265
2|Judicial Reasoning in a Multinational Court|266
3|1 Introduction|266
3|2 Composition of Chambers: Ensuring Diversity of Nationality and Legal Tradition|266
3|3 Language Issues: The Working Language of the Courts|267
3|4 Multinational Composition of the Courts: “How Is it?”|268
3|5 Judicial Reasoning: Reconciling Different Styles of Reasoning Traditions and Ensuring a Clear Framework of Reasoning|269
3|6 The General Court’s Style of Reasoning|270
3|7 Insufficient Reasoning or Errors in the Reasoning: Different Perceptions|271
3|8 The Deliberations Amongst the Judges: Differences Between the General Court and the Court of Justice – Risk of Inconsistency Amongst Chambers and Policy Questions|273
3|9 Ensuring Coherence of the Case Law|275
3|10 Courts Enriched by Judges from a Diverse Professional Background|276
3|11 Concluding Remarks: The Court’s Unlimited Jurisdiction|277
3|References|278
2|Is There an Art of Judicial Reasoning at the General Court? Some Modest Comments|279
3|1 Introduction|279
3|2 The Nature of Judicial Review at the General Court|280
3|3 The Structure of the General Court|281
3|4 The Working Methods at the General Court|282
3|5 The Value of Precedents at the General Court|283
3|6 Final Observations|284
3|References|285
2|Comparative Law as an Element of Reasoning|286
3|1 Trends in Comparative Law|286
3|2 Comparative Law in Liechtenstein as a Country of Reception|288
4|2.1 Comparative Law: A Practised Method of Interpretation|288
4|2.2 The Princely Supreme Court and Comparative Law as an Element of Reasoning|289
5|2.2.1 In the Application of Adapted Law|289
5|2.2.2 The Application of Non-received Law|293
5|2.2.3 In Matters of European Law|294
3|3 Conclusion|295
3|References|295
2|“Fiat Justitia ruat caelum”. Is This a Good Guide to the Role of a Specialist Appeal Court Judge?|297
3|1 Introduction: R v Wilkes|297
4|1.1 The Need to do Justice|298
4|1.2 Some Examples|298
3|2 Should Competition Appeals Be Heard in the General Courts?|300
4|2.1 What Are the Benefits of a Specialist Appeal Court?|301
4|2.2 Further Appeal Processes|303
4|2.3 The Adversarial System|304
3|3 The CAT and Full Merits Appeals|306
3|4 Conclusions|308
3|References|309
2|Antitrust Courts and Economic Findings in Germany|310
3|1 Introduction|310
3|2 Sources and Subjects of Economic Findings|311
4|2.1 Theoretical Economics|312
4|2.2 Empirical Economics|313
3|3 Scope of the Judicial Review in Germany|314
4|3.1 Fine Proceedings|314
4|3.2 Administrative Proceedings|315
4|3.3 Civil Law Proceedings|315
3|4 Economic Findings in the Case Law of German Antitrust Courts|315
4|4.1 General Economic Judgments (“ökonomische Erfahrungssätze”)|316
4|4.2 Expert Opinions Commissioned by the Parties|318
4|4.3 Expert Opinions Commissioned by the Court|319
4|4.4 Consultation of amici curiae|321
3|5 Conclusion and Outlook|322
3|References|322