File #2805: "2020_Book_PoliceResponseToRiots.pdf"
Testo
1|Introduction to Case Studies|5
2|The Background and Context of Rioting in the United States of America|5
2|References|9
1|Contents|10
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|15
2|1.1 Introduction|15
2|1.2 The Policing of Public Disorder and Riots|16
2|1.3 A Word in Relation to Previous Research|19
2|1.4 What Constitutes a Riot?|20
3|1.4.1 The Influence of the “Battle in Seattle”|21
3|1.4.2 The Influence of Protests in the UK|22
2|1.5 Changes in the Policing of Violent Protests and Riots|22
2|1.6 The Case Studies|23
3|1.6.1 A Note on the Development of the Case Studies|25
2|1.7 Conclusion|25
2|References|26
1|Chapter 2: What Constitutes a Riot?|29
2|2.1 Introduction|29
2|2.2 The Problem with the Definition of a Riot|30
2|2.3 An Attempt to Understand Riots|32
3|2.3.1 Critical Consensus|36
3|2.3.2 Police Cause Riots|37
3|2.3.3 The Police Perspective as to the Causes of Riots|38
2|2.4 Crowds|39
2|2.5 Police–Crowd Relationship|40
3|2.5.1 Elaborated Social Identity Model|41
3|2.5.2 The Flashpoints Model|43
3|2.5.3 Features of the Flashpoints Model|44
2|2.6 Research and Police Response Tactics|45
3|2.6.1 The Theory of the Police Response|47
3|2.6.2 The Actions Taken by the Police|48
3|2.6.3 The Police Response|49
2|2.7 Conclusion|55
2|References|56
1|Chapter 3: An Analysis of the Current Police Response to Rioting|62
2|3.1 Introduction|62
2|3.2 The Traditional Response to Violent Protest and Riots|64
2|3.3 The Catalysts for Change in the Police Response to Violent Protests and Riots|67
3|3.3.1 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization Conference|69
3|3.3.2 2003 Miami Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Meetings|71
3|3.3.3 2009 London G20 Summit Meeting|72
3|3.3.4 The Effect that Transnational Protests Have Had on the Policing of Violent Protest|73
3|3.3.5 Conclusion|76
2|3.4 The Influence of Social Media on the Police Response to Protests|77
3|3.4.1 Case Study: The 2009 London G20 and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist|78
2|3.5 The Relevancy of Elaborated Social Identity Model and Flashpoints Model in the Police Response to Protests|80
2|3.6 Police Knowledge and the Reaction of the Police to the Occurrence of a Riot|81
2|3.7 Crowd Control Strategies|82
3|3.7.1 The Application of the Police Response Models|86
3|3.7.2 The Police Response to Violent Protest: Change on the Horizon|88
3|3.7.3 The Police Use of Force and Crowd Control Tactics|91
3|3.7.4 Conclusion|93
2|3.8 The Militarization of the Police Response to Protests|94
2|3.9 The Police Organization|95
2|3.10 The Police Response to Industrial Action|96
2|3.11 The Police Response to a Political Rally|96
2|3.12 UK Public Surveys of Police Riot Responses|97
2|3.13 Conclusion|99
2|References|101
1|Chapter 4: The 2005 Riots in France|110
2|4.1 Introduction|110
2|4.2 Background and Context|111
3|4.2.1 Conclusion|114
2|4.3 The 2005 Riots in France|114
3|4.3.1 Introduction|114
2|4.4 The Police Response to the Riots|120
2|4.5 The Critique of the Police Response|126
3|4.5.1 The French Police|127
2|4.6 Discussion|129
2|4.7 Conclusion|130
2|References|131
1|Chapter 5: The 2011 Riots in London|135
2|5.1 Introduction|135
2|5.2 Background and Context|136
2|5.3 The 2011 London Riot (The Riot and Chronology)|140
2|5.4 The Police Response to the Riots|143
2|5.5 The Critique of the Police Response|151
3|5.5.1 Service Mobilization Plan|153
3|5.5.2 Command|155
3|5.5.3 Tactics|156
3|5.5.4 Community Engagement|157
3|5.5.5 Intelligence|160
3|5.5.6 Gangs|161
3|5.5.7 Final Comments|161
2|5.6 Discussion|162
2|5.7 Conclusion|168
2|References|169
1|Chapter 6: The 2014 Riots in Ferguson|173
2|6.1 Introduction|173
2|6.2 Riots and Chronology|175
2|6.3 The Police Response|178
2|6.4 Critique of the Police Response|186
3|6.4.1 Police–Community Relationship|188
3|6.4.2 Police Leadership and Command|188
3|6.4.3 Police Tactics and the Use of Force|192
3|6.4.4 The Need for Police Agency Preparation|193
3|6.4.5 Social Media|194
3|6.4.6 Final Comments|195
2|6.5 Discussion|197
3|6.5.1 Police Preparation for the Grand Jury Decision of Accused Officer|200
2|6.6 Conclusion|202
2|References|204
1|Chapter 7: The 2015 Riots in Baltimore|207
2|7.1 Introduction|207
2|7.2 Riot Chronology|209
2|7.3 The Police Response|212
2|7.4 Critique of the Police Response|216
3|7.4.1 Operational Planning|216
3|7.4.2 National Incident Management System|220
3|7.4.3 Intelligence|222
3|7.4.4 Command and Coordination|223
3|7.4.5 Arrest Policies Were Unclear|224
3|7.4.6 Confusion About Definitions of Orders|225
3|7.4.7 Equipment Was Lacking|226
3|7.4.8 Officers Reported That Their Training Was Inadequate|227
3|7.4.9 Uncertainty About Mutual Aid|228
3|7.4.10 Media|232
3|7.4.11 Community Engagement|233
3|7.4.12 Concluding Comments|234
2|7.5 Discussion|234
3|7.5.1 Exercising|238
3|7.5.2 Mutual Aid|239
3|7.5.3 Mutual Aid Agreements|240
3|7.5.4 Media|241
3|7.5.5 Community|241
3|7.5.6 Concluding Comments|242
2|7.6 Conclusion|242
2|References|243
1|Chapter 8: The Police Response to Riots: An Analysis of the Case Studies|247
2|8.1 Introduction|247
2|8.2 The Definition of Riot Participants|248
2|8.3 France|249
2|8.4 London|250
2|8.5 A Comparison of the Riots in Ferguson and Baltimore with Those That Occurred in the UK|252
2|8.6 The Theoretical Causes of the Riots Discussed in the Case Studies|254
2|8.7 The Policing of Riots|256
2|8.8 The Difficulty in Policing Riots|257
2|8.9 Conclusion|259
2|References|260
1|Chapter 9: Can Improvements Be Made to the Police Response?|265
2|9.1 Introduction|265
2|9.2 Public Acceptance and Confidence in the Police|266
2|9.3 An Overview of Crowd Psychology|267
2|9.4 A Review of Response Tactics Currently Used by the Police|268
3|9.4.1 Containment|270
3|9.4.2 Dispersal|270
3|9.4.3 Negotiation with the Crowd|270
3|9.4.4 The New York Police Department Approach to Negotiated Protest|271
2|9.5 Moving Forward|272
3|9.5.1 Making Contact—Negotiation|273
3|9.5.2 The Issue of the Situational Approach|274
3|9.5.3 Previous Police–Protester Interaction|274
3|9.5.4 Police Knowledge|274
3|9.5.5 Doctrine of Minimum Force|275
3|9.5.6 The Influence of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks|276
2|9.6 Conclusion|277
2|References|279
1|Chapter 10: Conclusion: History’s Patterns and Response Obstacles|283
2|10.1 Introduction|283
2|References|287
1|Index|288
2|The Background and Context of Rioting in the United States of America|5
2|References|9
1|Contents|10
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|15
2|1.1 Introduction|15
2|1.2 The Policing of Public Disorder and Riots|16
2|1.3 A Word in Relation to Previous Research|19
2|1.4 What Constitutes a Riot?|20
3|1.4.1 The Influence of the “Battle in Seattle”|21
3|1.4.2 The Influence of Protests in the UK|22
2|1.5 Changes in the Policing of Violent Protests and Riots|22
2|1.6 The Case Studies|23
3|1.6.1 A Note on the Development of the Case Studies|25
2|1.7 Conclusion|25
2|References|26
1|Chapter 2: What Constitutes a Riot?|29
2|2.1 Introduction|29
2|2.2 The Problem with the Definition of a Riot|30
2|2.3 An Attempt to Understand Riots|32
3|2.3.1 Critical Consensus|36
3|2.3.2 Police Cause Riots|37
3|2.3.3 The Police Perspective as to the Causes of Riots|38
2|2.4 Crowds|39
2|2.5 Police–Crowd Relationship|40
3|2.5.1 Elaborated Social Identity Model|41
3|2.5.2 The Flashpoints Model|43
3|2.5.3 Features of the Flashpoints Model|44
2|2.6 Research and Police Response Tactics|45
3|2.6.1 The Theory of the Police Response|47
3|2.6.2 The Actions Taken by the Police|48
3|2.6.3 The Police Response|49
2|2.7 Conclusion|55
2|References|56
1|Chapter 3: An Analysis of the Current Police Response to Rioting|62
2|3.1 Introduction|62
2|3.2 The Traditional Response to Violent Protest and Riots|64
2|3.3 The Catalysts for Change in the Police Response to Violent Protests and Riots|67
3|3.3.1 1999 Seattle World Trade Organization Conference|69
3|3.3.2 2003 Miami Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) Meetings|71
3|3.3.3 2009 London G20 Summit Meeting|72
3|3.3.4 The Effect that Transnational Protests Have Had on the Policing of Violent Protest|73
3|3.3.5 Conclusion|76
2|3.4 The Influence of Social Media on the Police Response to Protests|77
3|3.4.1 Case Study: The 2009 London G20 and the Rise of the Citizen Journalist|78
2|3.5 The Relevancy of Elaborated Social Identity Model and Flashpoints Model in the Police Response to Protests|80
2|3.6 Police Knowledge and the Reaction of the Police to the Occurrence of a Riot|81
2|3.7 Crowd Control Strategies|82
3|3.7.1 The Application of the Police Response Models|86
3|3.7.2 The Police Response to Violent Protest: Change on the Horizon|88
3|3.7.3 The Police Use of Force and Crowd Control Tactics|91
3|3.7.4 Conclusion|93
2|3.8 The Militarization of the Police Response to Protests|94
2|3.9 The Police Organization|95
2|3.10 The Police Response to Industrial Action|96
2|3.11 The Police Response to a Political Rally|96
2|3.12 UK Public Surveys of Police Riot Responses|97
2|3.13 Conclusion|99
2|References|101
1|Chapter 4: The 2005 Riots in France|110
2|4.1 Introduction|110
2|4.2 Background and Context|111
3|4.2.1 Conclusion|114
2|4.3 The 2005 Riots in France|114
3|4.3.1 Introduction|114
2|4.4 The Police Response to the Riots|120
2|4.5 The Critique of the Police Response|126
3|4.5.1 The French Police|127
2|4.6 Discussion|129
2|4.7 Conclusion|130
2|References|131
1|Chapter 5: The 2011 Riots in London|135
2|5.1 Introduction|135
2|5.2 Background and Context|136
2|5.3 The 2011 London Riot (The Riot and Chronology)|140
2|5.4 The Police Response to the Riots|143
2|5.5 The Critique of the Police Response|151
3|5.5.1 Service Mobilization Plan|153
3|5.5.2 Command|155
3|5.5.3 Tactics|156
3|5.5.4 Community Engagement|157
3|5.5.5 Intelligence|160
3|5.5.6 Gangs|161
3|5.5.7 Final Comments|161
2|5.6 Discussion|162
2|5.7 Conclusion|168
2|References|169
1|Chapter 6: The 2014 Riots in Ferguson|173
2|6.1 Introduction|173
2|6.2 Riots and Chronology|175
2|6.3 The Police Response|178
2|6.4 Critique of the Police Response|186
3|6.4.1 Police–Community Relationship|188
3|6.4.2 Police Leadership and Command|188
3|6.4.3 Police Tactics and the Use of Force|192
3|6.4.4 The Need for Police Agency Preparation|193
3|6.4.5 Social Media|194
3|6.4.6 Final Comments|195
2|6.5 Discussion|197
3|6.5.1 Police Preparation for the Grand Jury Decision of Accused Officer|200
2|6.6 Conclusion|202
2|References|204
1|Chapter 7: The 2015 Riots in Baltimore|207
2|7.1 Introduction|207
2|7.2 Riot Chronology|209
2|7.3 The Police Response|212
2|7.4 Critique of the Police Response|216
3|7.4.1 Operational Planning|216
3|7.4.2 National Incident Management System|220
3|7.4.3 Intelligence|222
3|7.4.4 Command and Coordination|223
3|7.4.5 Arrest Policies Were Unclear|224
3|7.4.6 Confusion About Definitions of Orders|225
3|7.4.7 Equipment Was Lacking|226
3|7.4.8 Officers Reported That Their Training Was Inadequate|227
3|7.4.9 Uncertainty About Mutual Aid|228
3|7.4.10 Media|232
3|7.4.11 Community Engagement|233
3|7.4.12 Concluding Comments|234
2|7.5 Discussion|234
3|7.5.1 Exercising|238
3|7.5.2 Mutual Aid|239
3|7.5.3 Mutual Aid Agreements|240
3|7.5.4 Media|241
3|7.5.5 Community|241
3|7.5.6 Concluding Comments|242
2|7.6 Conclusion|242
2|References|243
1|Chapter 8: The Police Response to Riots: An Analysis of the Case Studies|247
2|8.1 Introduction|247
2|8.2 The Definition of Riot Participants|248
2|8.3 France|249
2|8.4 London|250
2|8.5 A Comparison of the Riots in Ferguson and Baltimore with Those That Occurred in the UK|252
2|8.6 The Theoretical Causes of the Riots Discussed in the Case Studies|254
2|8.7 The Policing of Riots|256
2|8.8 The Difficulty in Policing Riots|257
2|8.9 Conclusion|259
2|References|260
1|Chapter 9: Can Improvements Be Made to the Police Response?|265
2|9.1 Introduction|265
2|9.2 Public Acceptance and Confidence in the Police|266
2|9.3 An Overview of Crowd Psychology|267
2|9.4 A Review of Response Tactics Currently Used by the Police|268
3|9.4.1 Containment|270
3|9.4.2 Dispersal|270
3|9.4.3 Negotiation with the Crowd|270
3|9.4.4 The New York Police Department Approach to Negotiated Protest|271
2|9.5 Moving Forward|272
3|9.5.1 Making Contact—Negotiation|273
3|9.5.2 The Issue of the Situational Approach|274
3|9.5.3 Previous Police–Protester Interaction|274
3|9.5.4 Police Knowledge|274
3|9.5.5 Doctrine of Minimum Force|275
3|9.5.6 The Influence of the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks|276
2|9.6 Conclusion|277
2|References|279
1|Chapter 10: Conclusion: History’s Patterns and Response Obstacles|283
2|10.1 Introduction|283
2|References|287
1|Index|288