File #2274: "2018_Book_ComplicationsAndQuandariesInTh.pdf"
Text
1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|Editors and Contributors|9
1|Introduction|17
1|1 National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for India|23
2|1 Introduction|23
2|2 Standards and the International Standard-Setting Landscape|24
2|3 Firm-Level Participation in Standard-Setting|26
2|4 Patents and Standards|27
3|4.1 Patenting Standards|27
3|4.2 SSO Patent Policies|28
2|5 Impact of Patents on International Participation in Standard-Setting|29
3|5.1 Patenting by SSO Participants|29
3|5.2 Patent Licensing Dynamics|30
2|6 Potential Responses|31
3|6.1 Embrace the Status Quo|31
3|6.2 Adopt Protectionist Measures|32
3|6.3 Increase Patenting by Local Firms|33
3|6.4 Benefits of Increased SSO Participation by Local Firms|34
3|6.5 Incentivizing Increased SSO Participation|35
3|6.6 Applications in India|37
2|7 Conclusion|38
1|2 FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents|40
2|1 Introduction|40
2|2 Industry Standards|41
2|3 Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patent Licensing|43
2|4 SSO Licensing Policies and FRAND Commitments|45
2|5 FRAND Terms Determination and Recent U.S. Court Decisions|47
3|5.1 FRAND Commitments Are Binding|48
3|5.2 Additional Requirements for FRAND Analysis|50
2|6 Impact of FRAND on Patent Royalties|55
2|7 Federal Circuit Ruling on CSIRO and the Relevance of FRAND Commitments|56
2|8 Conclusion|56
1|3 The Policy Implications of Licensing Standard Essential FRAND-Committed Patents in Bundles|58
2|1 Introduction|58
2|2 Important Economic Principles|60
3|2.1 The Single Rent Theorem|61
3|2.2 The Economic Literature on Bundling|65
2|3 Tying and Bundling with FRAND-Committed Patents|74
3|3.1 Patent Holders with Licensing Options Outside of the Standard—An Alternative Interpretation of B and S|77
3|3.2 Licensing FRAND-Committed and Non-FRAND-Committed Patents Together|78
2|4 Policy Implications|80
1|4 Calculating FRAND Licensing Fees: A Proposal of Basic Pro-competitive Criteria|83
2|1 Introduction|83
2|2 First Step: Precise Identification of, and Fees’ Strictly Proportional to, the Technology to Be Effectively Adopted by the Willing Licensees|85
2|3 Second Step: Royalties Determination Ex ante, i.e., Taking into Account the Value of the Patent Prior to the Standard Setting|89
2|4 Third Step: Looking at the Overall Licensing Scenario and Royalty Stacking Issues|93
2|5 Fourth Step: Dynamic Approach to FRAND Royalties’ Determination|95
2|6 Conclusion|97
1|5 Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust Perspective|98
2|1 Introduction|98
2|2 The Standardization Process, Its Benefits and the Risks for Competition|99
2|3 The FRAND Commitment|100
2|4 Portfolio Licensing|102
3|4.1 Patent Law Issues|103
3|4.2 EU Competition Law Issues|104
3|4.3 Component-Level Licensing|105
2|5 SEP Transfers and PAEs|110
3|5.1 Potential Issues|112
1|6 Competition, Intellectual Property Rights and Collaboratively Set Standards: Federal Trade Commission Advocacy and Enforcement|117
2|1 Introduction|117
3|1.1 The FTC’s Tools to Promote Innovation and Competition|118
3|1.2 The Intersection of Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law|120
2|2 FTC Policy Reports Discuss Economic Issues Raised by Collaborative Standard Setting|121
2|3 The FTC’s Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding Standardization in the 1980s|125
3|3.1 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation|127
3|3.2 In re American Society of Sanitary Engineering|129
3|3.3 Allied Tube & Conduit Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc.|130
2|4 The FTC’s Enforcement Regarding Standard Setting Conduct Involving Patented Technologies|132
3|4.1 In re Dell Computer Corporation|133
3|4.2 In re Union Oil Company of California|135
3|4.3 In re Rambus, Incorporated|137
3|4.4 In re Negotiated Data Solutions|139
2|5 The FTC’s Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding the Voluntary FRAND Commitment|141
3|5.1 The Interpretation of the FRAND Commitment|141
3|5.2 Competition Advocacy Regarding Remedies for Infringement of a FRAND-Encumbered Patent|145
3|5.3 Enforcement Actions Regarding Seeking Injunctive Relief on FRAND-Encumbered Patents|154
4|5.3.1 In re Robert Bosch GmbH|154
4|5.3.2 In re Google, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc.|156
2|6 Conclusion|157
1|7 Standard Setting Organizations and Competition Laws: Lessons and Suggestions from the United States|159
2|1 Introduction|159
2|2 The Holdup Problem|162
3|2.1 Disclosure of Standard-Essential Patents|162
3|2.2 RAND Commitments|164
2|3 Do U.S. Antitrust Laws Require Vague Royalty Commitments?|170
3|3.1 Relevant Antitrust Principles|171
3|3.2 The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act|172
3|3.3 Statements of Antitrust Enforcers|173
3|3.4 Required Disclosure of License Demands|176
2|4 Recommendations|180
3|4.1 Mandatory Disclosures|180
3|4.2 Precautions|181
2|5 Conclusion|181
1|8 FRAND in India|183
2|1 Introduction|183
2|2 Hold-Up and Hold-Out|185
2|3 U.S. and EU Law on Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Assured SEPs|189
2|4 The Case Against Special Legislation or Amendments to Regulate FRAND Licensing|190
2|5 The Dangers of Adopting a One-Size-Fits-All Template for SDOs|192
2|6 Problems with Regulating Royalty Rates or Prohibiting “Excessive Pricing”|192
2|7 Non-disclosure Agreements and Transparency|199
2|8 Settlement and Remedies for Disputes Involving FRAND-Assured SEPs|201
2|9 Conclusion|201
1|9 CCI’s Investigation of Abuse of Dominance: Adjudicatory Traits in Prima Facie Opinion|203
2|1 Introduction|203
2|2 CCI v Ericsson: The Jurisdiction of CCI Upheld by Delhi High Court|204
2|3 Initial Investigation Orders by CCI|206
3|3.1 Abuse of Dominance Investigation Under the Competition Act|206
3|3.2 Prima Facie Order of Investigation: Guidelines from Non-ICT Cases|209
2|4 The Practice Followed by CCI in Prima Facie Orders and the ICT Sector|213
2|5 Information Considered at the Prima Facie Stage in ICT Sector|215
2|6 Conclusion|218
1|Contents|7
1|Editors and Contributors|9
1|Introduction|17
1|1 National Disparities and Standards Essential Patents: Considerations for India|23
2|1 Introduction|23
2|2 Standards and the International Standard-Setting Landscape|24
2|3 Firm-Level Participation in Standard-Setting|26
2|4 Patents and Standards|27
3|4.1 Patenting Standards|27
3|4.2 SSO Patent Policies|28
2|5 Impact of Patents on International Participation in Standard-Setting|29
3|5.1 Patenting by SSO Participants|29
3|5.2 Patent Licensing Dynamics|30
2|6 Potential Responses|31
3|6.1 Embrace the Status Quo|31
3|6.2 Adopt Protectionist Measures|32
3|6.3 Increase Patenting by Local Firms|33
3|6.4 Benefits of Increased SSO Participation by Local Firms|34
3|6.5 Incentivizing Increased SSO Participation|35
3|6.6 Applications in India|37
2|7 Conclusion|38
1|2 FRAND Commitments and Royalties for Standard Essential Patents|40
2|1 Introduction|40
2|2 Industry Standards|41
2|3 Standard Setting Organizations and Standard Essential Patent Licensing|43
2|4 SSO Licensing Policies and FRAND Commitments|45
2|5 FRAND Terms Determination and Recent U.S. Court Decisions|47
3|5.1 FRAND Commitments Are Binding|48
3|5.2 Additional Requirements for FRAND Analysis|50
2|6 Impact of FRAND on Patent Royalties|55
2|7 Federal Circuit Ruling on CSIRO and the Relevance of FRAND Commitments|56
2|8 Conclusion|56
1|3 The Policy Implications of Licensing Standard Essential FRAND-Committed Patents in Bundles|58
2|1 Introduction|58
2|2 Important Economic Principles|60
3|2.1 The Single Rent Theorem|61
3|2.2 The Economic Literature on Bundling|65
2|3 Tying and Bundling with FRAND-Committed Patents|74
3|3.1 Patent Holders with Licensing Options Outside of the Standard—An Alternative Interpretation of B and S|77
3|3.2 Licensing FRAND-Committed and Non-FRAND-Committed Patents Together|78
2|4 Policy Implications|80
1|4 Calculating FRAND Licensing Fees: A Proposal of Basic Pro-competitive Criteria|83
2|1 Introduction|83
2|2 First Step: Precise Identification of, and Fees’ Strictly Proportional to, the Technology to Be Effectively Adopted by the Willing Licensees|85
2|3 Second Step: Royalties Determination Ex ante, i.e., Taking into Account the Value of the Patent Prior to the Standard Setting|89
2|4 Third Step: Looking at the Overall Licensing Scenario and Royalty Stacking Issues|93
2|5 Fourth Step: Dynamic Approach to FRAND Royalties’ Determination|95
2|6 Conclusion|97
1|5 Selected Issues in SEP Licensing in Europe: The Antitrust Perspective|98
2|1 Introduction|98
2|2 The Standardization Process, Its Benefits and the Risks for Competition|99
2|3 The FRAND Commitment|100
2|4 Portfolio Licensing|102
3|4.1 Patent Law Issues|103
3|4.2 EU Competition Law Issues|104
3|4.3 Component-Level Licensing|105
2|5 SEP Transfers and PAEs|110
3|5.1 Potential Issues|112
1|6 Competition, Intellectual Property Rights and Collaboratively Set Standards: Federal Trade Commission Advocacy and Enforcement|117
2|1 Introduction|117
3|1.1 The FTC’s Tools to Promote Innovation and Competition|118
3|1.2 The Intersection of Intellectual Property Law and Antitrust Law|120
2|2 FTC Policy Reports Discuss Economic Issues Raised by Collaborative Standard Setting|121
2|3 The FTC’s Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding Standardization in the 1980s|125
3|3.1 American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corporation|127
3|3.2 In re American Society of Sanitary Engineering|129
3|3.3 Allied Tube & Conduit Corporation v. Indian Head, Inc.|130
2|4 The FTC’s Enforcement Regarding Standard Setting Conduct Involving Patented Technologies|132
3|4.1 In re Dell Computer Corporation|133
3|4.2 In re Union Oil Company of California|135
3|4.3 In re Rambus, Incorporated|137
3|4.4 In re Negotiated Data Solutions|139
2|5 The FTC’s Enforcement and Advocacy Regarding the Voluntary FRAND Commitment|141
3|5.1 The Interpretation of the FRAND Commitment|141
3|5.2 Competition Advocacy Regarding Remedies for Infringement of a FRAND-Encumbered Patent|145
3|5.3 Enforcement Actions Regarding Seeking Injunctive Relief on FRAND-Encumbered Patents|154
4|5.3.1 In re Robert Bosch GmbH|154
4|5.3.2 In re Google, Inc. and Motorola Mobility, Inc.|156
2|6 Conclusion|157
1|7 Standard Setting Organizations and Competition Laws: Lessons and Suggestions from the United States|159
2|1 Introduction|159
2|2 The Holdup Problem|162
3|2.1 Disclosure of Standard-Essential Patents|162
3|2.2 RAND Commitments|164
2|3 Do U.S. Antitrust Laws Require Vague Royalty Commitments?|170
3|3.1 Relevant Antitrust Principles|171
3|3.2 The Standards Development Organization Advancement Act|172
3|3.3 Statements of Antitrust Enforcers|173
3|3.4 Required Disclosure of License Demands|176
2|4 Recommendations|180
3|4.1 Mandatory Disclosures|180
3|4.2 Precautions|181
2|5 Conclusion|181
1|8 FRAND in India|183
2|1 Introduction|183
2|2 Hold-Up and Hold-Out|185
2|3 U.S. and EU Law on Injunctive Relief for FRAND-Assured SEPs|189
2|4 The Case Against Special Legislation or Amendments to Regulate FRAND Licensing|190
2|5 The Dangers of Adopting a One-Size-Fits-All Template for SDOs|192
2|6 Problems with Regulating Royalty Rates or Prohibiting “Excessive Pricing”|192
2|7 Non-disclosure Agreements and Transparency|199
2|8 Settlement and Remedies for Disputes Involving FRAND-Assured SEPs|201
2|9 Conclusion|201
1|9 CCI’s Investigation of Abuse of Dominance: Adjudicatory Traits in Prima Facie Opinion|203
2|1 Introduction|203
2|2 CCI v Ericsson: The Jurisdiction of CCI Upheld by Delhi High Court|204
2|3 Initial Investigation Orders by CCI|206
3|3.1 Abuse of Dominance Investigation Under the Competition Act|206
3|3.2 Prima Facie Order of Investigation: Guidelines from Non-ICT Cases|209
2|4 The Practice Followed by CCI in Prima Facie Orders and the ICT Sector|213
2|5 Information Considered at the Prima Facie Stage in ICT Sector|215
2|6 Conclusion|218