File #2306: "2018_Book_YearbookOfInternationalHumanit.pdf"
Text
1|Editorial BoardGeneral EditorsProf. Terry D. Gill (Editor-in-Chief), University of Amsterdam/Netherlands Defence AcademyProf. Tim McCormack (Editor, Correspondents’ Reports), University of MelbourneProf. Robin Geiß (Editor), University of GlasgowProf. Heike Krieger (Editor), Free University of BerlinManaging EditorDr. Christophe Paulussen, T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The HagueEditorial AssistantGeneviève Girard, LL.M., T.M.C. Asser Instituut, The HagueBoard of Advisors to the Editorial BoardDr. Louise Arimatsu, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, LondonDr. William Boothby, Geneva Centre for Security PolicyProf. Geoffrey Corn, South Texas College of LawProf. Robert Cryer, University of BirminghamDr. Cordula Droege, International Committee of the Red CrossBGen. Prof. Paul Ducheine, Netherlands Defence Academy/University of AmsterdamProf. Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Europa Universität Viadrina, Frankfurt (Oder)Prof. Dr. Jann K. Kleffner LL.M., Swedish Defence UniversityDr. iur. Nils Melzer, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign AffairsProf. Héctor Olásolo, University of El Rosario, Colombia/The Hague University of Applied SciencesJelena Pejic, International Committee of the Red CrossDr. Kinga Tibori-Szabó, Kosovo Specialist ChambersBGen. Kenneth W. Watkin (Ret’d)/Former Judge Advocate General, CanadaDr. Gentian Zyberi, Norwegian Centre for Human RightsBoard of RecommendationHRH Princess Margriet of the Netherlands, Honorary President of the Netherlands Red CrossProf. em. George Aldrich, University of LeidenProf. Horst Fischer, University of LeidenDr. Dieter Fleck, Honorary President of the International Society for Military Law and the Law of WarH.E. Judge Christopher Greenwood, International Court of JusticeH.E. Judge Theodor Meron, International Criminal Tribunal for the former YugoslaviaH.E. Judge Fausto Pocar, International Criminal Tribunal for the former YugoslaviaProf. Michael N. Schmitt, United States Naval War College|6
2|Board of Advisors to the Editorial Board|6
2|Board of Recommendation|6
1|In Memoriam—Frits Kalshoven (1924–2017)|7
1|Contents|8
1|Armed Groups|10
1|1 Armed Groups, Rebel Coalitions, and Transnational Groups: The Degree of Organization Required from Non-State Armed Groups to Become Party to a Non-International Armed Conflict|11
2|Abstract|11
2|1.1 Introduction|12
2|1.2 The Organization Requirement Under Contemporary IHL|15
3|1.2.1 A Glance at the Origins of the Organization Criterion|16
3|1.2.2 A Party to an Armed Conflict Not of an International Character|18
4|1.2.2.1 A Collective Entity|19
4|1.2.2.2 The Ability to Engage in Sufficiently Intense Armed Violence|21
4|1.2.2.3 Ability to Ensure Respect for Basic Humanitarian Norms|22
2|1.3 Uniting Multiple Armed Groups into One Party to a NIAC|25
3|1.3.1 The “Belonging Test”|27
3|1.3.2 The “Control Test”|28
2|1.4 Transnational Armed Groups|31
3|1.4.1 Transnational Armed Groups with Hierarchical Command and Control Structures|34
3|1.4.2 Transnational Armed Groups Without Traditional Command and Control Structures|35
2|1.5 Conclusion|37
2|References|39
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|39
2|Case Law|43
2|Treaties|43
1|2 Welcome on Board: Improving Respect for International Humanitarian Law Through the Engagement of Armed Non-State Actors|44
2|Abstract|44
2|2.1 Introduction|45
2|2.2 Engaging ANSAs|46
3|2.2.1 Mapping IHL Violations Committed by ANSAs|46
3|2.2.2 Understanding the Causes of the Violations|50
3|2.2.3 Identifying the Incentives|54
3|2.2.4 Existing Practice|55
2|2.3 Challenges and Risks|58
3|2.3.1 The Changing Nature of Armed Conflicts and the Structural Diversity of ANSAs|58
3|2.3.2 The Lack of Clarity of the Applicable Legal Framework|59
3|2.3.3 The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures|61
2|2.4 Conclusion|64
2|References|65
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|65
2|Case Law|68
2|Treaties|68
1|3 Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?|69
2|Abstract|69
2|3.1 Introduction|70
2|3.2 Definitions|71
3|3.2.1 Defining Compliance|71
3|3.2.2 Defining International Humanitarian Law|72
3|3.2.3 Defining Non-State Armed Groups|73
2|3.3 Problem Assessment|75
3|3.3.1 Patterns of Non-Compliance|75
3|3.3.2 Why Non-Compliance Occurs|76
4|3.3.2.1 The Law Is Not Clear|77
4|3.3.2.2 The Law Is Not Legitimate|77
4|3.3.2.3 The Law Does Not Match with Local Norms|77
4|3.3.2.4 Armed Groups Have Overriding Military Imperatives|78
4|3.3.2.5 Armed Groups Lack Capacity to Comply|78
2|3.4 Compliance Mechanisms as Solutions|79
3|3.4.1 Soft Measures|81
4|3.4.1.1 Legal Developments|81
4|3.4.1.2 Humanitarian Engagement|82
4|3.4.1.3 Naming and Shaming|83
3|3.4.2 Hard Measures|84
4|3.4.2.1 Sanctions|84
4|3.4.2.2 Prosecutions|84
4|3.4.2.3 Military Actions|85
3|3.4.3 Other Measures|85
4|3.4.3.1 Encouraging Compliance by States|85
4|3.4.3.2 Engaging Communities|86
2|3.5 Toward a Synthesis|86
3|3.5.1 Considerations|87
3|3.5.2 Conjectures|88
3|3.5.3 Conclusion|90
2|Acknowledgements|90
2|References|90
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|90
2|Case Law|94
2|Treaties|94
1|4 Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Promoting Respect for International Humanitarian Law by the Security Council|95
2|Abstract|95
2|4.1 Introduction|96
2|4.2 Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Competence and First Practice|98
3|4.2.1 The Competence of the Security Council to Impose Sanctions Against Those Violating IHL|99
3|4.2.2 The Security Council’s Use of the Competence to Impose Crime-Based Sanctions|101
3|4.2.3 Evaluation|103
2|4.3 The Imposition of Targeted Sanctions Against Armed Groups: Two Case Studies|104
3|4.3.1 Case 1: The Democratic Republic of the Congo|105
4|4.3.1.1 The Goals|108
4|4.3.1.2 Implementation|109
3|4.3.2 Case 2: The Central African Republic|110
4|4.3.2.1 The Goals|111
4|4.3.2.2 Implementation|113
3|4.3.3 Evaluation|113
2|4.4 An Evaluation of Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions as a Tool to Ensure Respect for IHL|114
3|4.4.1 The Security Council and Ensuring Respect for IHL|115
3|4.4.2 Targeted Sanctions as a Tool to Ensure Respect for IHL|117
3|4.4.3 Evaluation|118
2|4.5 Conclusion|120
2|References|120
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|120
2|Treaties|123
1|5 Engaging Armed Groups Through the Development of Human Rights Obligations: Incorporating Practice, Motivation and Ideology to Promote Compliance with International Law|124
2|Abstract|124
2|5.1 Introduction|125
2|5.2 A Framework for the Application of Human Rights Law Obligations to Armed Groups|130
2|5.3 Armed Group Governance in Practice|133
3|5.3.1 Stability, Security and the Administration of Justice|134
3|5.3.2 Service Provision|137
2|5.4 Affected Individuals’ Interest in Armed Group Governance|138
2|5.5 Why Do Armed Groups Engage in Governance Activities?|140
3|5.5.1 Armed Group Governance and Compliance with International Law|144
2|5.6 What Can International Human Rights Law Offer Armed Groups and Affected Populations?|144
3|5.6.1 Stability, Security and the Administration of Justice|146
3|5.6.2 Service Provision|149
4|5.6.2.1 How Armed Groups Engage in Service Provision|150
4|5.6.2.2 Ensuring Resource Provision in Armed Group Controlled Areas|154
2|5.7 Conclusion|156
2|References|157
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|157
2|Case Law|160
1|6 Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought|161
2|Abstract|161
2|6.1 Introduction|162
2|6.2 Accountability Context|162
2|6.3 Definitions of Accountability|165
2|6.4 Towards an Accountability of Armed Groups?|169
3|6.4.1 UNAMA|175
3|6.4.2 Geneva Call|178
2|6.5 Conclusions|179
2|References|180
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|180
2|Case Law|184
2|Treaties|184
1|Other Articles|185
1|7 Knock on the Roof: Legitimate Warning or Method of Warfare?|186
2|Abstract|186
2|7.1 Introduction|187
2|7.2 Warnings Under IHL|189
2|7.3 Knock on the Roof as a Warning|194
3|7.3.1 Understanding the Knock as a Warning|195
3|7.3.2 The Prohibition of Acts the Primary Purpose of Which Is to Spread Terror Among the Civilian Population|196
3|7.3.3 Warning or Attack on Civilians?|197
2|7.4 Knock on the Roof as a Method of Warfare|200
3|7.4.1 Interpreting IHL Norms to Solve the Norm Collision|204
3|7.4.2 Prioritising the Protection of Civilian Life|207
2|7.5 Conclusion|209
2|References|210
2|Books, Articles and Other Documents|210
2|Case Law|212
2|Treaties|212
1|8 Year in Review 2016|213
2|Abstract|213
2|8.1 Ongoing Conflicts and Other Developments|214
3|8.1.1 Afghanistan|214
3|8.1.2 Central African Republic|216
3|8.1.3 Colombia|219
3|8.1.4 Egypt|221
3|8.1.5 Iraq|222
3|8.1.6 Israel/Palestine|225
3|8.1.7 Libya|226
3|8.1.8 Mali|228
3|8.1.9 Myanmar|230
3|8.1.10 Pakistan|232
3|8.1.11 South Sudan|233
3|8.1.12 Sudan|235
3|8.1.13 Syria|237
3|8.1.14 Ukraine|240
3|8.1.15 Yemen|242
2|8.2 Tribunals and Courts|245
3|8.2.1 International Tribunals|245
4|8.2.1.1 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia|245
4|8.2.1.2 Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals|250
4|8.2.1.3 International Criminal Court|253
3|8.2.2 Hybrid Tribunals|261
4|8.2.2.1 Republic of Kosovo|261
4|8.2.2.2 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia|262
4|8.2.2.3 Special Tribunal for Lebanon|264
4|8.2.2.4 Extraordinary African Chambers|266
3|8.2.3 National Courts|268
4|8.2.3.1 Bangladesh|268
4|8.2.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina|270
4|8.2.3.3 Croatia|271
4|8.2.3.4 El Salvador|271
4|8.2.3.5 France|272
4|8.2.3.6 Germany|272
4|8.2.3.7 Guatemala|273
4|8.2.3.8 Rwanda|275
4|8.2.3.9 Sri Lanka|276
4|8.2.3.10 Sweden|277
2|8.3 Arms Control and Disarmament|277
3|8.3.1 Conventional Weapons|277
3|8.3.2 Non-Conventional Weapons|279
4|8.3.2.1 Chemical Weapons|279
4|8.3.2.2 Biological Weapons|281
4|8.3.2.3 Nuclear Weapons|282
2|8.4 Miscellaneous|284
3|8.4.1 New ICRC Commentary on the First Geneva Convention|284
2|References|285
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|285
2|Case Law|287
1|Final Report ILA Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities|289
1|Table of Cases|339
2|INTERNATIONAL|339
2|NATIONAL|342
1|Index|344
2|Board of Advisors to the Editorial Board|6
2|Board of Recommendation|6
1|In Memoriam—Frits Kalshoven (1924–2017)|7
1|Contents|8
1|Armed Groups|10
1|1 Armed Groups, Rebel Coalitions, and Transnational Groups: The Degree of Organization Required from Non-State Armed Groups to Become Party to a Non-International Armed Conflict|11
2|Abstract|11
2|1.1 Introduction|12
2|1.2 The Organization Requirement Under Contemporary IHL|15
3|1.2.1 A Glance at the Origins of the Organization Criterion|16
3|1.2.2 A Party to an Armed Conflict Not of an International Character|18
4|1.2.2.1 A Collective Entity|19
4|1.2.2.2 The Ability to Engage in Sufficiently Intense Armed Violence|21
4|1.2.2.3 Ability to Ensure Respect for Basic Humanitarian Norms|22
2|1.3 Uniting Multiple Armed Groups into One Party to a NIAC|25
3|1.3.1 The “Belonging Test”|27
3|1.3.2 The “Control Test”|28
2|1.4 Transnational Armed Groups|31
3|1.4.1 Transnational Armed Groups with Hierarchical Command and Control Structures|34
3|1.4.2 Transnational Armed Groups Without Traditional Command and Control Structures|35
2|1.5 Conclusion|37
2|References|39
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|39
2|Case Law|43
2|Treaties|43
1|2 Welcome on Board: Improving Respect for International Humanitarian Law Through the Engagement of Armed Non-State Actors|44
2|Abstract|44
2|2.1 Introduction|45
2|2.2 Engaging ANSAs|46
3|2.2.1 Mapping IHL Violations Committed by ANSAs|46
3|2.2.2 Understanding the Causes of the Violations|50
3|2.2.3 Identifying the Incentives|54
3|2.2.4 Existing Practice|55
2|2.3 Challenges and Risks|58
3|2.3.1 The Changing Nature of Armed Conflicts and the Structural Diversity of ANSAs|58
3|2.3.2 The Lack of Clarity of the Applicable Legal Framework|59
3|2.3.3 The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures|61
2|2.4 Conclusion|64
2|References|65
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|65
2|Case Law|68
2|Treaties|68
1|3 Compliance with International Humanitarian Law by Non-State Armed Groups: How Can It Be Improved?|69
2|Abstract|69
2|3.1 Introduction|70
2|3.2 Definitions|71
3|3.2.1 Defining Compliance|71
3|3.2.2 Defining International Humanitarian Law|72
3|3.2.3 Defining Non-State Armed Groups|73
2|3.3 Problem Assessment|75
3|3.3.1 Patterns of Non-Compliance|75
3|3.3.2 Why Non-Compliance Occurs|76
4|3.3.2.1 The Law Is Not Clear|77
4|3.3.2.2 The Law Is Not Legitimate|77
4|3.3.2.3 The Law Does Not Match with Local Norms|77
4|3.3.2.4 Armed Groups Have Overriding Military Imperatives|78
4|3.3.2.5 Armed Groups Lack Capacity to Comply|78
2|3.4 Compliance Mechanisms as Solutions|79
3|3.4.1 Soft Measures|81
4|3.4.1.1 Legal Developments|81
4|3.4.1.2 Humanitarian Engagement|82
4|3.4.1.3 Naming and Shaming|83
3|3.4.2 Hard Measures|84
4|3.4.2.1 Sanctions|84
4|3.4.2.2 Prosecutions|84
4|3.4.2.3 Military Actions|85
3|3.4.3 Other Measures|85
4|3.4.3.1 Encouraging Compliance by States|85
4|3.4.3.2 Engaging Communities|86
2|3.5 Toward a Synthesis|86
3|3.5.1 Considerations|87
3|3.5.2 Conjectures|88
3|3.5.3 Conclusion|90
2|Acknowledgements|90
2|References|90
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|90
2|Case Law|94
2|Treaties|94
1|4 Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Promoting Respect for International Humanitarian Law by the Security Council|95
2|Abstract|95
2|4.1 Introduction|96
2|4.2 Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions: Competence and First Practice|98
3|4.2.1 The Competence of the Security Council to Impose Sanctions Against Those Violating IHL|99
3|4.2.2 The Security Council’s Use of the Competence to Impose Crime-Based Sanctions|101
3|4.2.3 Evaluation|103
2|4.3 The Imposition of Targeted Sanctions Against Armed Groups: Two Case Studies|104
3|4.3.1 Case 1: The Democratic Republic of the Congo|105
4|4.3.1.1 The Goals|108
4|4.3.1.2 Implementation|109
3|4.3.2 Case 2: The Central African Republic|110
4|4.3.2.1 The Goals|111
4|4.3.2.2 Implementation|113
3|4.3.3 Evaluation|113
2|4.4 An Evaluation of Crime-Based Targeted Sanctions as a Tool to Ensure Respect for IHL|114
3|4.4.1 The Security Council and Ensuring Respect for IHL|115
3|4.4.2 Targeted Sanctions as a Tool to Ensure Respect for IHL|117
3|4.4.3 Evaluation|118
2|4.5 Conclusion|120
2|References|120
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|120
2|Treaties|123
1|5 Engaging Armed Groups Through the Development of Human Rights Obligations: Incorporating Practice, Motivation and Ideology to Promote Compliance with International Law|124
2|Abstract|124
2|5.1 Introduction|125
2|5.2 A Framework for the Application of Human Rights Law Obligations to Armed Groups|130
2|5.3 Armed Group Governance in Practice|133
3|5.3.1 Stability, Security and the Administration of Justice|134
3|5.3.2 Service Provision|137
2|5.4 Affected Individuals’ Interest in Armed Group Governance|138
2|5.5 Why Do Armed Groups Engage in Governance Activities?|140
3|5.5.1 Armed Group Governance and Compliance with International Law|144
2|5.6 What Can International Human Rights Law Offer Armed Groups and Affected Populations?|144
3|5.6.1 Stability, Security and the Administration of Justice|146
3|5.6.2 Service Provision|149
4|5.6.2.1 How Armed Groups Engage in Service Provision|150
4|5.6.2.2 Ensuring Resource Provision in Armed Group Controlled Areas|154
2|5.7 Conclusion|156
2|References|157
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|157
2|Case Law|160
1|6 Armed Groups and Procedural Accountability: A Roadmap for Further Thought|161
2|Abstract|161
2|6.1 Introduction|162
2|6.2 Accountability Context|162
2|6.3 Definitions of Accountability|165
2|6.4 Towards an Accountability of Armed Groups?|169
3|6.4.1 UNAMA|175
3|6.4.2 Geneva Call|178
2|6.5 Conclusions|179
2|References|180
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|180
2|Case Law|184
2|Treaties|184
1|Other Articles|185
1|7 Knock on the Roof: Legitimate Warning or Method of Warfare?|186
2|Abstract|186
2|7.1 Introduction|187
2|7.2 Warnings Under IHL|189
2|7.3 Knock on the Roof as a Warning|194
3|7.3.1 Understanding the Knock as a Warning|195
3|7.3.2 The Prohibition of Acts the Primary Purpose of Which Is to Spread Terror Among the Civilian Population|196
3|7.3.3 Warning or Attack on Civilians?|197
2|7.4 Knock on the Roof as a Method of Warfare|200
3|7.4.1 Interpreting IHL Norms to Solve the Norm Collision|204
3|7.4.2 Prioritising the Protection of Civilian Life|207
2|7.5 Conclusion|209
2|References|210
2|Books, Articles and Other Documents|210
2|Case Law|212
2|Treaties|212
1|8 Year in Review 2016|213
2|Abstract|213
2|8.1 Ongoing Conflicts and Other Developments|214
3|8.1.1 Afghanistan|214
3|8.1.2 Central African Republic|216
3|8.1.3 Colombia|219
3|8.1.4 Egypt|221
3|8.1.5 Iraq|222
3|8.1.6 Israel/Palestine|225
3|8.1.7 Libya|226
3|8.1.8 Mali|228
3|8.1.9 Myanmar|230
3|8.1.10 Pakistan|232
3|8.1.11 South Sudan|233
3|8.1.12 Sudan|235
3|8.1.13 Syria|237
3|8.1.14 Ukraine|240
3|8.1.15 Yemen|242
2|8.2 Tribunals and Courts|245
3|8.2.1 International Tribunals|245
4|8.2.1.1 International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia|245
4|8.2.1.2 Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals|250
4|8.2.1.3 International Criminal Court|253
3|8.2.2 Hybrid Tribunals|261
4|8.2.2.1 Republic of Kosovo|261
4|8.2.2.2 Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia|262
4|8.2.2.3 Special Tribunal for Lebanon|264
4|8.2.2.4 Extraordinary African Chambers|266
3|8.2.3 National Courts|268
4|8.2.3.1 Bangladesh|268
4|8.2.3.2 Bosnia and Herzegovina|270
4|8.2.3.3 Croatia|271
4|8.2.3.4 El Salvador|271
4|8.2.3.5 France|272
4|8.2.3.6 Germany|272
4|8.2.3.7 Guatemala|273
4|8.2.3.8 Rwanda|275
4|8.2.3.9 Sri Lanka|276
4|8.2.3.10 Sweden|277
2|8.3 Arms Control and Disarmament|277
3|8.3.1 Conventional Weapons|277
3|8.3.2 Non-Conventional Weapons|279
4|8.3.2.1 Chemical Weapons|279
4|8.3.2.2 Biological Weapons|281
4|8.3.2.3 Nuclear Weapons|282
2|8.4 Miscellaneous|284
3|8.4.1 New ICRC Commentary on the First Geneva Convention|284
2|References|285
2|Articles, Books and Other Documents|285
2|Case Law|287
1|Final Report ILA Study Group on the Conduct of Hostilities|289
1|Table of Cases|339
2|INTERNATIONAL|339
2|NATIONAL|342
1|Index|344