File #2348: "2018_Book_LabourStandardsInInternational.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|6
1|Contributors|8
1|Labour Standards in International Economic Law: An Introduction|10
2|References|16
1|Part I: Setting the Scene|18
2|International Economic and Social Dimensions: Divided or Connected?|19
3|1 Introduction|20
3|2 The Interwar Period: The International Labour Organization and Stubborn Nationalism in Economic Affairs|20
3|3 Uniting Economic and Social Dimensions? Early Institution Building After World War II|21
4|3.1 The ILO and the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration as an Early Starter|22
4|3.2 The World Bank Group and Keynesian Thought|23
4|3.3 The United Nations: World Economic and Social Governance|24
4|3.4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Social Rights and Human Rights|25
4|3.5 The 1948 Havana Charter: A World Economic and Social Order Under the Auspices of the UN|26
4|3.6 An Early Divide: The GATT Agreement|27
4|3.7 In Sum: Important Achievements and Pragmatic Promotion of Economic Cooperation|27
3|4 Development as a `Social´ Concern and the New International Economic Order|28
4|4.1 International Investments in Focus: CSR and International Investment Law|30
5|4.1.1 From the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations to Corporate Social Responsibility|30
5|4.1.2 The Emergence of International Investment Law|31
4|4.2 The Development of the Global Human Rights System|32
4|4.3 In Sum: Ideologic Battles and Some Progress|33
3|5 The `Era of Globalization´|33
4|5.1 Sustainable Development: The 1992 Rio Conference|33
4|5.2 The Establishment of the World Trade Organization|34
4|5.3 Social Development and Decent Work: UN and ILO Activities|35
4|5.4 Labour Clauses in GSPs|37
4|5.5 Labour Clauses in Free Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment Agreements|37
4|5.6 Corporate Social Responsibility|38
4|5.7 Summary: Diversity of Approaches and Bilateralism|39
3|6 Analysis|39
3|References|41
2|The ILO´s Mandate and Capacity: Creating, Proliferating and Supervising Labour Standards for a Globalized Economy|44
3|1 Introduction|45
3|2 Tripartism in the ILO: What Impact on ILS?|46
4|2.1 The Institution of Tripartism|47
4|2.2 ILS and Their Supervision|49
3|3 Current Difficulties in the Operationalization of Tripartism and the 2012 Crisis|51
4|3.1 The Crisis of 2012 and Its Consequences|52
4|3.2 Underlying Challenges for Tripartism|56
3|4 Conclusion|59
3|References|60
2|Why the Shift from International to Transnational Law Is Important for Labour Standards|63
3|1 Transnational Labour Law Brings in Actors Other than States|64
3|2 Transnational Labour Law Grapples with Accountability in Global Value Chains|65
3|3 Transnational Labour Law Features Hybrid Arrangements in Search of Remedies|66
3|4 Transnational Law Reinforces the Need for Interdisciplinary Analysis and Monitoring|68
3|5 Final Comments|69
3|References|70
1|Part II: Labour Regulation of Trade, Investment and Finance|72
2|The Implications of EC - Seal Products for the Protection of Core Labour Standards in WTO Law|73
3|1 International Trade Regulation and Labour Standards|74
4|1.1 Introduction|74
4|1.2 Negotiations|75
4|1.3 Unilateral Linkages|77
4|1.4 WTO Dispute Settlement|78
3|2 EC - Seal Products|78
4|2.1 Facts and Results|78
4|2.2 Public Morals|80
4|2.3 Necessity and Alternative Measures|81
4|2.4 Discriminatory Treatment Under the Chapeau of Art XX GATT|84
3|3 Assessment|86
4|3.1 Deferential Standards of Public Morals and Evidence|87
4|3.2 The Issue of Extraterritorial Effects|87
4|3.3 Production and Process Methods (PPMs)?|88
3|4 The Prospects of Enforcing Labour Standards|89
4|4.1 Recourse to Public Morals|89
4|4.2 Extraterritorial Effects|91
4|4.3 Necessity|92
4|4.4 Abuse of Rights and the Duty to Negotiate|94
3|5 Conclusions|95
3|References|96
2|The WTO and Child Labour: Implications for the Debate on International Constitutionalism|97
3|1 Introduction|98
3|2 WTO Law and Child Labour: Key Legal Issues|99
4|2.1 The Non-discrimination Obligations of GATT Art. I and III|100
4|2.2 The General Exceptions Clause of GATT Art. XX|105
4|2.3 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade|109
4|2.4 Concluding Remarks on the WTO Law Compatibility|110
3|3 A Constitutional Approach to International Law?|111
3|4 Recommending an ILO-WTO Regime on Child Labour|113
3|References|114
2|Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between `Human Rights´ and `Sustainable Development´?|116
3|1 Introduction|116
3|2 The Ambitions of Human Rights and Sustainable Development|117
4|2.1 Human Rights Conditionality|117
4|2.2 Sustainable Development|120
5|2.2.1 The Idea of `Sustainability´|122
5|2.2.2 The Link Between Labour Rights and Environmental Concerns: To What Extent Can They Stand Alone?|124
5|2.2.3 Does Sustainable Development Lead Us Beyond Labour `Rights´ into a Broader Decent Work Agenda or Just `Soft(er)´ Law?|125
3|3 The Practice of Human Rights Protection and Sustainable Development|128
4|3.1 EU GSP Before and After|129
4|3.2 Dialogue and Capability in SD Chapters|130
4|3.3 Chapters and Mainstreaming: CETA and TTIP|131
3|4 Conclusion|134
3|References|134
2|Civil Society Meetings in EU Free Trade Agreements: The Purposes Unravelled|138
3|1 Introduction|139
3|2 Civil Society and EU Free Trade Agreements|141
3|3 Purposes of Civil Society Meetings|144
4|3.1 Instrumental Purpose: Supporting the Free Trade Agreement|144
4|3.2 Functional Purpose: Monitoring and Information|147
4|3.3 Deliberative Purpose: Dialogue and Deliberation|148
4|3.4 Policy Influence: Advising the Governments|150
3|4 Conclusions|151
3|References|153
2|Comparative Conclusions on Arbitral Dispute Settlement in Trade-Labour Matters Under US FTAs|156
3|1 Reasons for Labour Standard Protection in FTAs Through Arbitration|159
3|2 Access to Arbitration|161
4|2.1 The Requirement to Negotiate|162
5|2.1.1 Obligation to Negotiate as a Condition for Adjudication in International Law|162
5|2.1.2 NAALC in 1994: Multi-Step Negotiation Procedures|164
5|2.1.3 More Recent US FTAs: Simpler Negotiation Procedures|166
4|2.2 The Gateway to Initiate Proceedings: Petitions by Individuals to National Contact Points|167
5|2.2.1 Unions and NGOs as De Facto Initiators of Trade-Labour Dispute Settlement|167
5|2.2.2 Aligned Interests of Non-State Petitioners and States of Nationality in the WTO and in Diplomatic Protection|168
5|2.2.3 Unaligned Direct Legal Interests of Petitioners and Addressed States in US FTA Trade-Labour Dispute Settlement|169
4|2.3 Conclusion|171
3|3 The Requirements to Prove Patterns of Violations and an Impact on Trade|172
4|3.1 Proof of Patterns of Violations and Impact on Trade as Requirements Shared by US FTAs´ Labour Chapters|172
4|3.2 Requirements to Prove Patterns and an Impact on Trade as an Obstacle to Arbitral Procedures|173
4|3.3 Patterns of Violations in Comparison to Regional Human Rights Adjudication|175
4|3.4 Conclusion|177
3|4 Legal Consequences of an Arbitral Award Against a State: Monetary Assessments|177
3|5 Arbitration and Individuals|179
4|5.1 Inter-State and Mixed Judicial Dispute Settlement Modes|179
4|5.2 Missed Opportunities in Comparison|181
5|5.2.1 NAEEC as a Dispute Settlement Realm That Connects a Societal Good with Trade|181
5|5.2.2 European Union and Canada as Systems with a More Prominent Procedural Role for Individuals|182
4|5.3 Conclusion|183
3|6 Conclusion|184
3|References|185
2|An Individual Labour Complaint Procedure for Workers, Trade Unions, Employers and NGOs in Future Free Trade Agreements|188
3|1 Introduction|189
3|2 Three Shortcomings of Contemporary FTA Labour DSMs|191
4|2.1 Over-Politicization|191
4|2.2 Marginalization of Individuals and the `Disappointment Trap´|192
4|2.3 Lack of Accountability|194
3|3 Conceptualizing an Individual Complaint Procedure|194
4|3.1 Two Overarching Objectives for Reform|194
4|3.2 Key Elements|195
5|3.2.1 Individuals and Associations as Procedural Subjects|195
5|3.2.2 Immediate Review by an Independent and Impartial Body|196
5|3.2.3 Definite Statement on the (Non-)Violation of Labour Standards|197
3|4 Envisaged Benefits|197
4|4.1 Countering Over-Politicization|197
4|4.2 Enhancing Efficacy by Aligning Interests and Procedural Capacity|198
4|4.3 Complementing Cooperative Mechanisms and Inter-State DSMs in FTAs|198
4|4.4 Maintaining or Restoring `Enforcement Balance´|200
3|5 Scope of Individual Enforcement|200
4|5.1 A Priori Exclusion of Certain Obligations from Enforcement?|201
4|5.2 Rights of Action|202
3|6 Accommodating the `Political Nature´ of Labour Disputes|204
4|6.1 Room for Amicable Settlement|204
4|6.2 Exhaustion of Local Remedies|204
4|6.3 Creating Opportunities to Introduce Perspectives|205
4|6.4 Adapting the Standard of Review|205
4|6.5 Subsequent Policy Space|206
3|7 The Output and Its Effects|206
4|7.1 Monitoring and Follow-Up|207
4|7.2 Coercive Enforcement?|207
3|8 The Issue of Fragmentation|209
3|9 Final Remarks|210
3|References|210
2|Implications of CETA and TTIP on Social Standards|213
3|1 Introduction|213
3|2 General Aspects|215
3|3 Historical Development|215
3|4 Effect of `Non-labour´ Provisions on Labour Standards|216
4|4.1 Economic and Labour Market Political Impact|216
4|4.2 Liberalization Obligations and Investment Protection Rights|217
5|4.2.1 Investment|217
5|4.2.2 Non-discrimination|218
5|4.2.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment|219
5|4.2.4 Direct or Indirect Expropriation|220
5|4.2.5 Exemption Clauses|221
5|4.2.6 Impact on the Services Sector|222
5|4.2.7 Public Procurement|223
4|4.3 Investor-State Dispute Settlement|224
5|4.3.1 General Aspects|224
5|4.3.2 Examples for Lawsuits by Investors Against States|226
3|5 Labour Law Standards in the Sustainability Chapter|228
3|6 Conclusion|230
3|References|230
2|Mainstreaming Investment-Labour Linkage Through `Mega-Regional´ Trade Agreements|234
3|1 Prologue: Towards a `Generalization´ of Investment-Labour Linkages|237
4|1.1 FTAs as `Game Changers´|237
4|1.2 FTAs as Motors of a `Generalization´ of Investment Law|238
4|1.3 FTAs as Trailblazers of Investment-Labour Linkage|238
4|1.4 Interim Conclusion: FTAs `Mainstream´ Investment-Labour Linkage|239
3|2 The Substantive Dimension of the Investment-Labour Linkage in CETA, TTIP and TPP: Potentials in Need of Concretization|240
4|2.1 Sustainable Development as a Common Conceptual Framework|240
4|2.2 General Provisions Intended to Preserve Policy Space|243
5|2.2.1 `Negative Linkage´: Exception Clauses|243
5|2.2.2 Reaffirmations of the `Right to Regulate´|243
4|2.3 Maintaining and Promoting Labour Protection in the Context of Investment|245
5|2.3.1 Non-Lowering of Standards Clauses|245
5|2.3.2 Minimum Standards and the `High Standard of Protection´|248
4|2.4 Labour Concerns in Specific Investment Protection Standards|249
5|2.4.1 Expropriation|249
5|2.4.2 Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)|251
6|2.4.2.1 Defining (Contemporary) FET|251
6|2.4.2.2 Legitimate Expectations and Changes in Labour Legislation and Policy|252
5|2.4.3 Protection and Security (FPS)|254
4|2.5 Provisions Addressing Investor Conduct|255
4|2.6 Interim Conclusion|257
3|3 Institutional Arrangements and Their Potential to Effectuate the Investment-Labour Linkage|257
4|3.1 Administrative (and Political) Fora|258
5|3.1.1 Intergovernmental Committees|258
5|3.1.2 Institutionalized Participatory Mechanisms for Civil Society|260
5|3.1.3 Towards a Re-politicization of Investment Law?|261
4|3.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|261
5|3.2.1 `Strong´ Investment vs. `Weak´ Labour Dispute Settlement|262
5|3.2.2 Effectuating the Investment-Labour Linkage Through Investor-State Dispute Settlement?|263
6|3.2.2.1 `Vicarious´ Effectuation by Investors|263
6|3.2.2.2 Reactive Effectuation by the Respondent State or Other Actors|264
4|3.3 Interim Conclusion|265
3|4 Potential Circumventions of Investment-Labour Linkage: Labour in Investment Contracts|266
4|4.1 Common Features of Investment Contracts|266
4|4.2 Potential Circumvention through Investment Contracts|267
4|4.3 Limitations to Investment Contracts by NLS Clauses in CETA, TTIP and TPP?|268
3|5 Conclusion: To the Future in Blind Flight|269
3|References|270
2|Labour Standards and the World Bank. Analysing the Potential of Safeguard Policies for Protecting Workers|273
3|1 Introduction|274
3|2 Contextualising the World Bank and Labour Standards|276
4|2.1 The World Bank´s Key Instruments in a Nutshell|276
4|2.2 The World Bank´s Approach Towards Labour Standards|277
4|2.3 The Precursor of the World Bank´s Safeguard Policies on Labour Standards: IFC´s and MIGA´s Sustainability Policies|279
3|3 The Labour Standards Dimension of the World Bank´s Safeguard Policies|281
4|3.1 General Issues|281
4|3.2 The Safeguard Policies´ Labour Standards Component|284
5|3.2.1 Substantive Labour Standards Requirements|284
5|3.2.2 Coverage of Workers|285
4|3.3 Implementation Procedures|288
3|4 What to Expect from the Bank´s Labour Standards-Related Safeguard Policies in Practice?|290
4|4.1 Insights from Labour-Related Cases Under the IFC´s Performance Standards|290
4|4.2 Insights from the Experience with the World Bank´s Inspection Panel|294
4|4.3 General Limitations of the Safeguard Policies|297
3|5 Conclusion|299
3|References|301
1|Part III: Business Conduct and Labour Standards|305
2|Soft Standards and Hard Consequences: Why Transnational Companies Commit to Respect International Labour and Social Standards,...|306
3|1 Introduction|307
3|2 The Drivers|309
3|3 Sustainability Management: Minimizing Risks and Creating Value|310
3|4 Management Processes to Respect International Labour and Social Standards|311
4|4.1 Which Standards?|311
4|4.2 Which Management Process?|313
3|5 Conclusion|314
3|References|315
2|The Promotion of Labour Standards Through International Framework Agreements|317
3|1 Introduction|317
3|2 Development of International Framework Agreements|320
3|3 Motivation of Unions and Management|322
3|4 Implementation and Monitoring Mechanism|325
3|5 International Framework Agreements as Part of an Emerging Global Labour Governance Regime|327
3|6 Real Impact of International Framework Agreements|331
3|7 Conclusion|332
3|References|333
2|Transnational Labour Litigation: The Ups and Downs Under the Alien Tort Statute|338
3|1 Introduction|339
3|2 Alien Tort Statute|340
3|3 Causes of Action|341
3|4 Corporate Liability|344
3|5 Extraterritoriality|345
3|6 Conclusion|348
3|References|349
2|Promoting Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains Through Consumers´ Choice: Is Social Labelling Effective?|352
3|1 Introduction|353
3|2 The Idea of Minimizing Asymmetric Information in the Market|355
3|3 The Limitations of Social Labelling Schemes|357
4|3.1 GoodWeave|358
5|3.1.1 Aims and Approach|358
5|3.1.2 Constraints Within the Monitoring System|359
5|3.1.3 Implications for Its Effectiveness|360
4|3.2 Fairtrade|360
5|3.2.1 Aims and Approach|360
5|3.2.2 Constraints Within the System of Distribution of Benefits|361
5|3.2.3 Implications for Its Effectiveness|364
4|3.3 Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)|364
5|3.3.1 Aims and Approach|364
5|3.3.2 Constraints Within the Certification System|365
5|3.3.3 Implication for Its Effectiveness|366
4|3.4 Interim Conclusions|366
3|4 A Possible Solution|367
4|4.1 Transparency with Respect to the NGOs´ Capacity to Minimize the Information Asymmetry|367
4|4.2 Regulation of the Information Provided by Social Labels|368
4|4.3 Support from the ILO with Necessary Resources|370
3|5 Conclusion|371
3|References|373
1|Part IV: Labour Standards in International Economic Law: A Proposal for Practice|376
2|A Model Labour Chapter for Future EU Trade Agreements|377
3|1 Introduction|377
3|2 Textual Proposal with Comments|380
3|3 Labour-Relevant Model Provisions for Other FTA Chapters|423
4|3.1 Exceptions Chapter|423
4|3.2 Public Procurement Chapter|425
4|3.3 Investment Chapter|425
1|Contents|6
1|Contributors|8
1|Labour Standards in International Economic Law: An Introduction|10
2|References|16
1|Part I: Setting the Scene|18
2|International Economic and Social Dimensions: Divided or Connected?|19
3|1 Introduction|20
3|2 The Interwar Period: The International Labour Organization and Stubborn Nationalism in Economic Affairs|20
3|3 Uniting Economic and Social Dimensions? Early Institution Building After World War II|21
4|3.1 The ILO and the 1944 Philadelphia Declaration as an Early Starter|22
4|3.2 The World Bank Group and Keynesian Thought|23
4|3.3 The United Nations: World Economic and Social Governance|24
4|3.4 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Social Rights and Human Rights|25
4|3.5 The 1948 Havana Charter: A World Economic and Social Order Under the Auspices of the UN|26
4|3.6 An Early Divide: The GATT Agreement|27
4|3.7 In Sum: Important Achievements and Pragmatic Promotion of Economic Cooperation|27
3|4 Development as a `Social´ Concern and the New International Economic Order|28
4|4.1 International Investments in Focus: CSR and International Investment Law|30
5|4.1.1 From the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational Corporations to Corporate Social Responsibility|30
5|4.1.2 The Emergence of International Investment Law|31
4|4.2 The Development of the Global Human Rights System|32
4|4.3 In Sum: Ideologic Battles and Some Progress|33
3|5 The `Era of Globalization´|33
4|5.1 Sustainable Development: The 1992 Rio Conference|33
4|5.2 The Establishment of the World Trade Organization|34
4|5.3 Social Development and Decent Work: UN and ILO Activities|35
4|5.4 Labour Clauses in GSPs|37
4|5.5 Labour Clauses in Free Trade Agreements and Bilateral Investment Agreements|37
4|5.6 Corporate Social Responsibility|38
4|5.7 Summary: Diversity of Approaches and Bilateralism|39
3|6 Analysis|39
3|References|41
2|The ILO´s Mandate and Capacity: Creating, Proliferating and Supervising Labour Standards for a Globalized Economy|44
3|1 Introduction|45
3|2 Tripartism in the ILO: What Impact on ILS?|46
4|2.1 The Institution of Tripartism|47
4|2.2 ILS and Their Supervision|49
3|3 Current Difficulties in the Operationalization of Tripartism and the 2012 Crisis|51
4|3.1 The Crisis of 2012 and Its Consequences|52
4|3.2 Underlying Challenges for Tripartism|56
3|4 Conclusion|59
3|References|60
2|Why the Shift from International to Transnational Law Is Important for Labour Standards|63
3|1 Transnational Labour Law Brings in Actors Other than States|64
3|2 Transnational Labour Law Grapples with Accountability in Global Value Chains|65
3|3 Transnational Labour Law Features Hybrid Arrangements in Search of Remedies|66
3|4 Transnational Law Reinforces the Need for Interdisciplinary Analysis and Monitoring|68
3|5 Final Comments|69
3|References|70
1|Part II: Labour Regulation of Trade, Investment and Finance|72
2|The Implications of EC - Seal Products for the Protection of Core Labour Standards in WTO Law|73
3|1 International Trade Regulation and Labour Standards|74
4|1.1 Introduction|74
4|1.2 Negotiations|75
4|1.3 Unilateral Linkages|77
4|1.4 WTO Dispute Settlement|78
3|2 EC - Seal Products|78
4|2.1 Facts and Results|78
4|2.2 Public Morals|80
4|2.3 Necessity and Alternative Measures|81
4|2.4 Discriminatory Treatment Under the Chapeau of Art XX GATT|84
3|3 Assessment|86
4|3.1 Deferential Standards of Public Morals and Evidence|87
4|3.2 The Issue of Extraterritorial Effects|87
4|3.3 Production and Process Methods (PPMs)?|88
3|4 The Prospects of Enforcing Labour Standards|89
4|4.1 Recourse to Public Morals|89
4|4.2 Extraterritorial Effects|91
4|4.3 Necessity|92
4|4.4 Abuse of Rights and the Duty to Negotiate|94
3|5 Conclusions|95
3|References|96
2|The WTO and Child Labour: Implications for the Debate on International Constitutionalism|97
3|1 Introduction|98
3|2 WTO Law and Child Labour: Key Legal Issues|99
4|2.1 The Non-discrimination Obligations of GATT Art. I and III|100
4|2.2 The General Exceptions Clause of GATT Art. XX|105
4|2.3 The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade|109
4|2.4 Concluding Remarks on the WTO Law Compatibility|110
3|3 A Constitutional Approach to International Law?|111
3|4 Recommending an ILO-WTO Regime on Child Labour|113
3|References|114
2|Labour Standards and Trade: Need We Choose Between `Human Rights´ and `Sustainable Development´?|116
3|1 Introduction|116
3|2 The Ambitions of Human Rights and Sustainable Development|117
4|2.1 Human Rights Conditionality|117
4|2.2 Sustainable Development|120
5|2.2.1 The Idea of `Sustainability´|122
5|2.2.2 The Link Between Labour Rights and Environmental Concerns: To What Extent Can They Stand Alone?|124
5|2.2.3 Does Sustainable Development Lead Us Beyond Labour `Rights´ into a Broader Decent Work Agenda or Just `Soft(er)´ Law?|125
3|3 The Practice of Human Rights Protection and Sustainable Development|128
4|3.1 EU GSP Before and After|129
4|3.2 Dialogue and Capability in SD Chapters|130
4|3.3 Chapters and Mainstreaming: CETA and TTIP|131
3|4 Conclusion|134
3|References|134
2|Civil Society Meetings in EU Free Trade Agreements: The Purposes Unravelled|138
3|1 Introduction|139
3|2 Civil Society and EU Free Trade Agreements|141
3|3 Purposes of Civil Society Meetings|144
4|3.1 Instrumental Purpose: Supporting the Free Trade Agreement|144
4|3.2 Functional Purpose: Monitoring and Information|147
4|3.3 Deliberative Purpose: Dialogue and Deliberation|148
4|3.4 Policy Influence: Advising the Governments|150
3|4 Conclusions|151
3|References|153
2|Comparative Conclusions on Arbitral Dispute Settlement in Trade-Labour Matters Under US FTAs|156
3|1 Reasons for Labour Standard Protection in FTAs Through Arbitration|159
3|2 Access to Arbitration|161
4|2.1 The Requirement to Negotiate|162
5|2.1.1 Obligation to Negotiate as a Condition for Adjudication in International Law|162
5|2.1.2 NAALC in 1994: Multi-Step Negotiation Procedures|164
5|2.1.3 More Recent US FTAs: Simpler Negotiation Procedures|166
4|2.2 The Gateway to Initiate Proceedings: Petitions by Individuals to National Contact Points|167
5|2.2.1 Unions and NGOs as De Facto Initiators of Trade-Labour Dispute Settlement|167
5|2.2.2 Aligned Interests of Non-State Petitioners and States of Nationality in the WTO and in Diplomatic Protection|168
5|2.2.3 Unaligned Direct Legal Interests of Petitioners and Addressed States in US FTA Trade-Labour Dispute Settlement|169
4|2.3 Conclusion|171
3|3 The Requirements to Prove Patterns of Violations and an Impact on Trade|172
4|3.1 Proof of Patterns of Violations and Impact on Trade as Requirements Shared by US FTAs´ Labour Chapters|172
4|3.2 Requirements to Prove Patterns and an Impact on Trade as an Obstacle to Arbitral Procedures|173
4|3.3 Patterns of Violations in Comparison to Regional Human Rights Adjudication|175
4|3.4 Conclusion|177
3|4 Legal Consequences of an Arbitral Award Against a State: Monetary Assessments|177
3|5 Arbitration and Individuals|179
4|5.1 Inter-State and Mixed Judicial Dispute Settlement Modes|179
4|5.2 Missed Opportunities in Comparison|181
5|5.2.1 NAEEC as a Dispute Settlement Realm That Connects a Societal Good with Trade|181
5|5.2.2 European Union and Canada as Systems with a More Prominent Procedural Role for Individuals|182
4|5.3 Conclusion|183
3|6 Conclusion|184
3|References|185
2|An Individual Labour Complaint Procedure for Workers, Trade Unions, Employers and NGOs in Future Free Trade Agreements|188
3|1 Introduction|189
3|2 Three Shortcomings of Contemporary FTA Labour DSMs|191
4|2.1 Over-Politicization|191
4|2.2 Marginalization of Individuals and the `Disappointment Trap´|192
4|2.3 Lack of Accountability|194
3|3 Conceptualizing an Individual Complaint Procedure|194
4|3.1 Two Overarching Objectives for Reform|194
4|3.2 Key Elements|195
5|3.2.1 Individuals and Associations as Procedural Subjects|195
5|3.2.2 Immediate Review by an Independent and Impartial Body|196
5|3.2.3 Definite Statement on the (Non-)Violation of Labour Standards|197
3|4 Envisaged Benefits|197
4|4.1 Countering Over-Politicization|197
4|4.2 Enhancing Efficacy by Aligning Interests and Procedural Capacity|198
4|4.3 Complementing Cooperative Mechanisms and Inter-State DSMs in FTAs|198
4|4.4 Maintaining or Restoring `Enforcement Balance´|200
3|5 Scope of Individual Enforcement|200
4|5.1 A Priori Exclusion of Certain Obligations from Enforcement?|201
4|5.2 Rights of Action|202
3|6 Accommodating the `Political Nature´ of Labour Disputes|204
4|6.1 Room for Amicable Settlement|204
4|6.2 Exhaustion of Local Remedies|204
4|6.3 Creating Opportunities to Introduce Perspectives|205
4|6.4 Adapting the Standard of Review|205
4|6.5 Subsequent Policy Space|206
3|7 The Output and Its Effects|206
4|7.1 Monitoring and Follow-Up|207
4|7.2 Coercive Enforcement?|207
3|8 The Issue of Fragmentation|209
3|9 Final Remarks|210
3|References|210
2|Implications of CETA and TTIP on Social Standards|213
3|1 Introduction|213
3|2 General Aspects|215
3|3 Historical Development|215
3|4 Effect of `Non-labour´ Provisions on Labour Standards|216
4|4.1 Economic and Labour Market Political Impact|216
4|4.2 Liberalization Obligations and Investment Protection Rights|217
5|4.2.1 Investment|217
5|4.2.2 Non-discrimination|218
5|4.2.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment|219
5|4.2.4 Direct or Indirect Expropriation|220
5|4.2.5 Exemption Clauses|221
5|4.2.6 Impact on the Services Sector|222
5|4.2.7 Public Procurement|223
4|4.3 Investor-State Dispute Settlement|224
5|4.3.1 General Aspects|224
5|4.3.2 Examples for Lawsuits by Investors Against States|226
3|5 Labour Law Standards in the Sustainability Chapter|228
3|6 Conclusion|230
3|References|230
2|Mainstreaming Investment-Labour Linkage Through `Mega-Regional´ Trade Agreements|234
3|1 Prologue: Towards a `Generalization´ of Investment-Labour Linkages|237
4|1.1 FTAs as `Game Changers´|237
4|1.2 FTAs as Motors of a `Generalization´ of Investment Law|238
4|1.3 FTAs as Trailblazers of Investment-Labour Linkage|238
4|1.4 Interim Conclusion: FTAs `Mainstream´ Investment-Labour Linkage|239
3|2 The Substantive Dimension of the Investment-Labour Linkage in CETA, TTIP and TPP: Potentials in Need of Concretization|240
4|2.1 Sustainable Development as a Common Conceptual Framework|240
4|2.2 General Provisions Intended to Preserve Policy Space|243
5|2.2.1 `Negative Linkage´: Exception Clauses|243
5|2.2.2 Reaffirmations of the `Right to Regulate´|243
4|2.3 Maintaining and Promoting Labour Protection in the Context of Investment|245
5|2.3.1 Non-Lowering of Standards Clauses|245
5|2.3.2 Minimum Standards and the `High Standard of Protection´|248
4|2.4 Labour Concerns in Specific Investment Protection Standards|249
5|2.4.1 Expropriation|249
5|2.4.2 Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET)|251
6|2.4.2.1 Defining (Contemporary) FET|251
6|2.4.2.2 Legitimate Expectations and Changes in Labour Legislation and Policy|252
5|2.4.3 Protection and Security (FPS)|254
4|2.5 Provisions Addressing Investor Conduct|255
4|2.6 Interim Conclusion|257
3|3 Institutional Arrangements and Their Potential to Effectuate the Investment-Labour Linkage|257
4|3.1 Administrative (and Political) Fora|258
5|3.1.1 Intergovernmental Committees|258
5|3.1.2 Institutionalized Participatory Mechanisms for Civil Society|260
5|3.1.3 Towards a Re-politicization of Investment Law?|261
4|3.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|261
5|3.2.1 `Strong´ Investment vs. `Weak´ Labour Dispute Settlement|262
5|3.2.2 Effectuating the Investment-Labour Linkage Through Investor-State Dispute Settlement?|263
6|3.2.2.1 `Vicarious´ Effectuation by Investors|263
6|3.2.2.2 Reactive Effectuation by the Respondent State or Other Actors|264
4|3.3 Interim Conclusion|265
3|4 Potential Circumventions of Investment-Labour Linkage: Labour in Investment Contracts|266
4|4.1 Common Features of Investment Contracts|266
4|4.2 Potential Circumvention through Investment Contracts|267
4|4.3 Limitations to Investment Contracts by NLS Clauses in CETA, TTIP and TPP?|268
3|5 Conclusion: To the Future in Blind Flight|269
3|References|270
2|Labour Standards and the World Bank. Analysing the Potential of Safeguard Policies for Protecting Workers|273
3|1 Introduction|274
3|2 Contextualising the World Bank and Labour Standards|276
4|2.1 The World Bank´s Key Instruments in a Nutshell|276
4|2.2 The World Bank´s Approach Towards Labour Standards|277
4|2.3 The Precursor of the World Bank´s Safeguard Policies on Labour Standards: IFC´s and MIGA´s Sustainability Policies|279
3|3 The Labour Standards Dimension of the World Bank´s Safeguard Policies|281
4|3.1 General Issues|281
4|3.2 The Safeguard Policies´ Labour Standards Component|284
5|3.2.1 Substantive Labour Standards Requirements|284
5|3.2.2 Coverage of Workers|285
4|3.3 Implementation Procedures|288
3|4 What to Expect from the Bank´s Labour Standards-Related Safeguard Policies in Practice?|290
4|4.1 Insights from Labour-Related Cases Under the IFC´s Performance Standards|290
4|4.2 Insights from the Experience with the World Bank´s Inspection Panel|294
4|4.3 General Limitations of the Safeguard Policies|297
3|5 Conclusion|299
3|References|301
1|Part III: Business Conduct and Labour Standards|305
2|Soft Standards and Hard Consequences: Why Transnational Companies Commit to Respect International Labour and Social Standards,...|306
3|1 Introduction|307
3|2 The Drivers|309
3|3 Sustainability Management: Minimizing Risks and Creating Value|310
3|4 Management Processes to Respect International Labour and Social Standards|311
4|4.1 Which Standards?|311
4|4.2 Which Management Process?|313
3|5 Conclusion|314
3|References|315
2|The Promotion of Labour Standards Through International Framework Agreements|317
3|1 Introduction|317
3|2 Development of International Framework Agreements|320
3|3 Motivation of Unions and Management|322
3|4 Implementation and Monitoring Mechanism|325
3|5 International Framework Agreements as Part of an Emerging Global Labour Governance Regime|327
3|6 Real Impact of International Framework Agreements|331
3|7 Conclusion|332
3|References|333
2|Transnational Labour Litigation: The Ups and Downs Under the Alien Tort Statute|338
3|1 Introduction|339
3|2 Alien Tort Statute|340
3|3 Causes of Action|341
3|4 Corporate Liability|344
3|5 Extraterritoriality|345
3|6 Conclusion|348
3|References|349
2|Promoting Labour Standards in Global Supply Chains Through Consumers´ Choice: Is Social Labelling Effective?|352
3|1 Introduction|353
3|2 The Idea of Minimizing Asymmetric Information in the Market|355
3|3 The Limitations of Social Labelling Schemes|357
4|3.1 GoodWeave|358
5|3.1.1 Aims and Approach|358
5|3.1.2 Constraints Within the Monitoring System|359
5|3.1.3 Implications for Its Effectiveness|360
4|3.2 Fairtrade|360
5|3.2.1 Aims and Approach|360
5|3.2.2 Constraints Within the System of Distribution of Benefits|361
5|3.2.3 Implications for Its Effectiveness|364
4|3.3 Forest Stewardship Council (FSC)|364
5|3.3.1 Aims and Approach|364
5|3.3.2 Constraints Within the Certification System|365
5|3.3.3 Implication for Its Effectiveness|366
4|3.4 Interim Conclusions|366
3|4 A Possible Solution|367
4|4.1 Transparency with Respect to the NGOs´ Capacity to Minimize the Information Asymmetry|367
4|4.2 Regulation of the Information Provided by Social Labels|368
4|4.3 Support from the ILO with Necessary Resources|370
3|5 Conclusion|371
3|References|373
1|Part IV: Labour Standards in International Economic Law: A Proposal for Practice|376
2|A Model Labour Chapter for Future EU Trade Agreements|377
3|1 Introduction|377
3|2 Textual Proposal with Comments|380
3|3 Labour-Relevant Model Provisions for Other FTA Chapters|423
4|3.1 Exceptions Chapter|423
4|3.2 Public Procurement Chapter|425
4|3.3 Investment Chapter|425