File #2383: "2018_Book_OnStateSecessionFromInternatio.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|6
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|9
2|1.1 Secession as a Multi-Dimensional International Legal Problem|9
2|1.2 Methodologies|12
3|1.2.1 General Methodologies|12
4|1.2.1.1 Dialectics|12
4|1.2.1.2 Unity of Deontology and Consequentialism|16
3|1.2.2 Concrete Methods|19
4|1.2.2.1 Legal Positivism and Natural Law|19
4|1.2.2.2 Historical Review Regarding Secession|22
4|1.2.2.3 The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction|24
4|1.2.2.4 Abstract Legality and Practical Legality|27
4|1.2.2.5 Responding to Incentives and Facing Trade-Offs|30
4|1.2.2.6 A Preventive Idea of a Different Type|32
2|1.3 Structure of the Research|35
2|References|38
1|Chapter 2: Exploring the Legal Color of Secession|40
2|2.1 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of International Conventions|42
3|2.1.1 General Introduction to International Conventions|42
3|2.1.2 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between Sudan and South Sudan|45
3|2.1.3 Edinburgh Agreement Between the UK and Scotland|48
3|2.1.4 Conclusions and Reflections|53
2|2.2 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of International Custom|54
3|2.2.1 Composition of International Custom Regarding Secession|54
3|2.2.2 Practice Corresponding to Opinio Juris|56
3|2.2.3 Conclusions and Reflections|57
2|2.3 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of the General Principles of Law|59
3|2.3.1 General Introduction to the General Principles of Law|59
3|2.3.2 Different Interpretations of the Social Contract Theory Regarding Secession|61
4|2.3.2.1 Thomas Hobbes|61
4|2.3.2.2 Hugo Grotius|62
4|2.3.2.3 Emmerich de Vattel|64
4|2.3.2.4 Samuel Pufendorf|65
4|2.3.2.5 John Locke|66
4|2.3.2.6 Thomas Jefferson|67
3|2.3.3 Conclusions and Reflections|68
2|2.4 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of Subsidiary Means for the Determination of Rules of Law|72
3|2.4.1 General Introduction to Subsidiary Means for the Determination of Rules of Law|72
3|2.4.2 Reference re Secession of Quebec|74
3|2.4.3 Kosovo Advisory Opinion|78
3|2.4.4 Conclusions and Reflections|82
2|2.5 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession and State Recognition|85
3|2.5.1 General Introduction to State Recognition|85
3|2.5.2 No Direct Influence of Recognition on the Legal Color of Secession|86
3|2.5.3 The Influence of Recognition on the Settlement of Secessionist Disputes|88
3|2.5.4 Making Recognition More Rational|89
2|2.6 Replacing a Remedial Right to Secession with a Right to a Remedy|91
3|2.6.1 Moderating Disagreement on Remedial Ways|91
3|2.6.2 Theoretical Advantages of a Right to a Remedy|92
3|2.6.3 Practical Advantages of a Right to a Remedy|95
2|2.7 Conclusions|98
2|References|99
1|Chapter 3: Secession and Self-Determination Conflicts|102
2|3.1 The Historical Evolution of Self-Determination|103
3|3.1.1 Self-Determination in the Eighteenth Century|103
3|3.1.2 Self-Determination in the Nineteenth Century|105
3|3.1.3 Self-Determination in the First Half of the Twentieth Century|109
3|3.1.4 Self-Determination in the De-Colonial Era|117
3|3.1.5 Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era|124
2|3.2 Actively Avoiding or Effectively Settling Secessionist Self-Determination Conflicts|130
3|3.2.1 Reasonably Defining the Holder and the Content of a Right to Self-Determination|130
4|3.2.1.1 Neither Self-Defined Nor Other-Defined|130
4|3.2.1.2 Distinguishing the Territorial Perspective and the Human Rights Perspective of Self-Determination|136
4|3.2.1.3 Correctly Understanding the Interrelation Between Territorial Sovereignty and Self-Determination|142
3|3.2.2 Preventing Abuse of a Right to Self-Determination|147
4|3.2.2.1 Remedial but Not Secessionist Self-Determination|148
4|3.2.2.2 Specifying Obligations on Holders of the Right to Secessionist Self-Determination|153
4|3.2.2.3 Making External Involvement Constructive in Secessionist Self-Determination Conflicts|158
2|References|163
1|Chapter 4: Secession and the Use of Force|166
2|4.1 Internal Use of Force and External Use of Force in Secessionist Conflicts|167
3|4.1.1 Force Used by Conflicting Parties|167
3|4.1.2 Force Used by External Actors|173
4|4.1.2.1 General Introduction to Legal Regulations Governing the External Use of Force|174
5|a. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: Necessary Condition and Sufficient Condition|175
5|b. Exceptions to the General Prohibition: Abstract Legality and Practical Legality|176
4|4.1.2.2 An Analysis of the Responsibility to Protect|184
5|a. Intervention but Not Humanitarian|184
5|b. Humanitarian Pursuit Without the Use of Force: Responsibility to Refrain|191
4|4.1.2.3 The Legal Judgment by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo|197
5|a. Legality or Legitimacy|197
5|b. The Pursuit of Consistency Between Legality and Legitimacy|201
3|4.1.3 Escaping the Vicious Circle of the Use of Force|205
2|4.2 Cases Regarding the Use of Force in Secessionist Conflicts|211
3|4.2.1 Katanga|211
3|4.2.2 Bangladesh|217
3|4.2.3 Kosovo|223
3|4.2.4 Crimea|229
2|References|235
1|Chapter 5: Improving External Involvement in the Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts|237
2|5.1 Adopting a Comprehensive Approach in Dealing with Secessionist Conflicts|237
2|5.2 Standardizing External Involvement in Secessionist Conflicts|239
3|5.2.1 Balancing Conflicting Interests with the Help of External Involvement|239
3|5.2.2 Improving the Functioning of the UN in Conflict Settlement|243
4|5.2.2.1 More Rational Exercise of Power by the Security Council|244
5|a. More Rationality in Making Decisions|246
5|b. More Rationality in Enforcing Decisions|250
4|5.2.2.2 More Rational Exercise of Power by Other UN Organs|254
5|a. More Rational Exercise of Power to Issue Legally Non-Binding Instruments|254
5|b. Improving Cooperation Between the Security Council and Other UN Organs|256
2|5.3 More Rational Exercise of Mediating Power in Conflict Settlement|259
3|5.3.1 Exercise of Mediating Power by External Actors|259
3|5.3.2 Standardization for Increasing Rationality|261
4|5.3.2.1 Following Legally Non-Binding UN Instruments|261
4|5.3.2.2 Replacing Unsuitable Mediators|263
3|5.3.3 Eschewing Artificial Deadlines|267
4|5.3.3.1 Setting Deadlines or Not|267
4|5.3.3.2 Understanding the Importance of Eschewing Artificial Deadlines from Various Perspectives|269
5|a. Intricacy, Competency and Entitlement|269
5|b. An Analysis of the Deadline Set in the Ahtisaari Plan|272
2|5.4 Reconsidering External Recognition Regarding Secessionist Conflicts|276
3|5.4.1 Recognizing the Significance of Non-Recognition|276
3|5.4.2 Recognizing a Right Instead of a Wish|281
3|5.4.3 Recognizing Detrimental Effects Caused by Unilateral Secession|283
2|5.5 Pursuing a More Reasonable Response to De Facto Secession|286
3|5.5.1 Nullus Commodum Capere Potest De Injuria Sua Propria|286
3|5.5.2 Considering a Fair Distribution of Territorial Interests|289
2|5.6 Considering the Influence of the Mass Media in Conflict Settlement|291
3|5.6.1 The Distorted Media Coverage and the Ill-Informed Public|291
3|5.6.2 Rendering the Public Well-Informed in Conflict Settlement|297
2|5.7 Conclusions|299
2|References|301
1|Contents|6
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|9
2|1.1 Secession as a Multi-Dimensional International Legal Problem|9
2|1.2 Methodologies|12
3|1.2.1 General Methodologies|12
4|1.2.1.1 Dialectics|12
4|1.2.1.2 Unity of Deontology and Consequentialism|16
3|1.2.2 Concrete Methods|19
4|1.2.2.1 Legal Positivism and Natural Law|19
4|1.2.2.2 Historical Review Regarding Secession|22
4|1.2.2.3 The Principal Contradiction and the Principal Aspect of a Contradiction|24
4|1.2.2.4 Abstract Legality and Practical Legality|27
4|1.2.2.5 Responding to Incentives and Facing Trade-Offs|30
4|1.2.2.6 A Preventive Idea of a Different Type|32
2|1.3 Structure of the Research|35
2|References|38
1|Chapter 2: Exploring the Legal Color of Secession|40
2|2.1 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of International Conventions|42
3|2.1.1 General Introduction to International Conventions|42
3|2.1.2 Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between Sudan and South Sudan|45
3|2.1.3 Edinburgh Agreement Between the UK and Scotland|48
3|2.1.4 Conclusions and Reflections|53
2|2.2 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of International Custom|54
3|2.2.1 Composition of International Custom Regarding Secession|54
3|2.2.2 Practice Corresponding to Opinio Juris|56
3|2.2.3 Conclusions and Reflections|57
2|2.3 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of the General Principles of Law|59
3|2.3.1 General Introduction to the General Principles of Law|59
3|2.3.2 Different Interpretations of the Social Contract Theory Regarding Secession|61
4|2.3.2.1 Thomas Hobbes|61
4|2.3.2.2 Hugo Grotius|62
4|2.3.2.3 Emmerich de Vattel|64
4|2.3.2.4 Samuel Pufendorf|65
4|2.3.2.5 John Locke|66
4|2.3.2.6 Thomas Jefferson|67
3|2.3.3 Conclusions and Reflections|68
2|2.4 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession in Terms of Subsidiary Means for the Determination of Rules of Law|72
3|2.4.1 General Introduction to Subsidiary Means for the Determination of Rules of Law|72
3|2.4.2 Reference re Secession of Quebec|74
3|2.4.3 Kosovo Advisory Opinion|78
3|2.4.4 Conclusions and Reflections|82
2|2.5 Exploring the Legal Color of Secession and State Recognition|85
3|2.5.1 General Introduction to State Recognition|85
3|2.5.2 No Direct Influence of Recognition on the Legal Color of Secession|86
3|2.5.3 The Influence of Recognition on the Settlement of Secessionist Disputes|88
3|2.5.4 Making Recognition More Rational|89
2|2.6 Replacing a Remedial Right to Secession with a Right to a Remedy|91
3|2.6.1 Moderating Disagreement on Remedial Ways|91
3|2.6.2 Theoretical Advantages of a Right to a Remedy|92
3|2.6.3 Practical Advantages of a Right to a Remedy|95
2|2.7 Conclusions|98
2|References|99
1|Chapter 3: Secession and Self-Determination Conflicts|102
2|3.1 The Historical Evolution of Self-Determination|103
3|3.1.1 Self-Determination in the Eighteenth Century|103
3|3.1.2 Self-Determination in the Nineteenth Century|105
3|3.1.3 Self-Determination in the First Half of the Twentieth Century|109
3|3.1.4 Self-Determination in the De-Colonial Era|117
3|3.1.5 Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era|124
2|3.2 Actively Avoiding or Effectively Settling Secessionist Self-Determination Conflicts|130
3|3.2.1 Reasonably Defining the Holder and the Content of a Right to Self-Determination|130
4|3.2.1.1 Neither Self-Defined Nor Other-Defined|130
4|3.2.1.2 Distinguishing the Territorial Perspective and the Human Rights Perspective of Self-Determination|136
4|3.2.1.3 Correctly Understanding the Interrelation Between Territorial Sovereignty and Self-Determination|142
3|3.2.2 Preventing Abuse of a Right to Self-Determination|147
4|3.2.2.1 Remedial but Not Secessionist Self-Determination|148
4|3.2.2.2 Specifying Obligations on Holders of the Right to Secessionist Self-Determination|153
4|3.2.2.3 Making External Involvement Constructive in Secessionist Self-Determination Conflicts|158
2|References|163
1|Chapter 4: Secession and the Use of Force|166
2|4.1 Internal Use of Force and External Use of Force in Secessionist Conflicts|167
3|4.1.1 Force Used by Conflicting Parties|167
3|4.1.2 Force Used by External Actors|173
4|4.1.2.1 General Introduction to Legal Regulations Governing the External Use of Force|174
5|a. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter: Necessary Condition and Sufficient Condition|175
5|b. Exceptions to the General Prohibition: Abstract Legality and Practical Legality|176
4|4.1.2.2 An Analysis of the Responsibility to Protect|184
5|a. Intervention but Not Humanitarian|184
5|b. Humanitarian Pursuit Without the Use of Force: Responsibility to Refrain|191
4|4.1.2.3 The Legal Judgment by the Independent International Commission on Kosovo|197
5|a. Legality or Legitimacy|197
5|b. The Pursuit of Consistency Between Legality and Legitimacy|201
3|4.1.3 Escaping the Vicious Circle of the Use of Force|205
2|4.2 Cases Regarding the Use of Force in Secessionist Conflicts|211
3|4.2.1 Katanga|211
3|4.2.2 Bangladesh|217
3|4.2.3 Kosovo|223
3|4.2.4 Crimea|229
2|References|235
1|Chapter 5: Improving External Involvement in the Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts|237
2|5.1 Adopting a Comprehensive Approach in Dealing with Secessionist Conflicts|237
2|5.2 Standardizing External Involvement in Secessionist Conflicts|239
3|5.2.1 Balancing Conflicting Interests with the Help of External Involvement|239
3|5.2.2 Improving the Functioning of the UN in Conflict Settlement|243
4|5.2.2.1 More Rational Exercise of Power by the Security Council|244
5|a. More Rationality in Making Decisions|246
5|b. More Rationality in Enforcing Decisions|250
4|5.2.2.2 More Rational Exercise of Power by Other UN Organs|254
5|a. More Rational Exercise of Power to Issue Legally Non-Binding Instruments|254
5|b. Improving Cooperation Between the Security Council and Other UN Organs|256
2|5.3 More Rational Exercise of Mediating Power in Conflict Settlement|259
3|5.3.1 Exercise of Mediating Power by External Actors|259
3|5.3.2 Standardization for Increasing Rationality|261
4|5.3.2.1 Following Legally Non-Binding UN Instruments|261
4|5.3.2.2 Replacing Unsuitable Mediators|263
3|5.3.3 Eschewing Artificial Deadlines|267
4|5.3.3.1 Setting Deadlines or Not|267
4|5.3.3.2 Understanding the Importance of Eschewing Artificial Deadlines from Various Perspectives|269
5|a. Intricacy, Competency and Entitlement|269
5|b. An Analysis of the Deadline Set in the Ahtisaari Plan|272
2|5.4 Reconsidering External Recognition Regarding Secessionist Conflicts|276
3|5.4.1 Recognizing the Significance of Non-Recognition|276
3|5.4.2 Recognizing a Right Instead of a Wish|281
3|5.4.3 Recognizing Detrimental Effects Caused by Unilateral Secession|283
2|5.5 Pursuing a More Reasonable Response to De Facto Secession|286
3|5.5.1 Nullus Commodum Capere Potest De Injuria Sua Propria|286
3|5.5.2 Considering a Fair Distribution of Territorial Interests|289
2|5.6 Considering the Influence of the Mass Media in Conflict Settlement|291
3|5.6.1 The Distorted Media Coverage and the Ill-Informed Public|291
3|5.6.2 Rendering the Public Well-Informed in Conflict Settlement|297
2|5.7 Conclusions|299
2|References|301