File #2547: "2019_Book_ClaimsForSecessionAndFederalis.pdf"
Text
1|Contents|5
1|When Federalism Faces Secession: Presentation of a Theoretical-Practical Analysis of the Spanish Experience in the Light of Co...|9
1|Part I: Claims for Secession in Western Democracies. A Comparative Overview|12
2|Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist Society|13
3|1 Introduction: Autonomy and Interdependence in Pluralist Society|14
3|2 Secession in the United States|17
4|2.1 Subnational Secession: Then and Now|18
4|2.2 The American Revolution|21
4|2.3 The American Civil War|27
3|3 Federalism in the United States|34
4|3.1 The Structure and Function of American Federalism|35
4|3.2 Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance|37
4|3.3 Constitutional Indeterminacy and Federalism Theory|41
3|4 Nationhood Amid Forces of Political Entropy and Gravity|44
4|4.1 The U.S. Model and the Alternatives|44
4|4.2 The Forces of Fragmentation and Centralization|46
5|4.2.1 Political Entropy: Toward Disassociation|47
5|4.2.2 Political Gravity: Toward Interconnection|48
4|4.3 Suspended Between Autonomy and Interdependence|50
5|4.3.1 Regional Marginalization in Québec and Kurdistan|50
5|4.3.2 Devolution in the United Kingdom and Spain|52
4|4.4 Secession and the Morality of Inclusion|55
3|5 Conclusion: Federalism as a Sword and a Shield|56
3|References|60
2|Legality, Legitimacy, Decisionism and Federalism: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada´s Reasoning in Reference re Seces...|68
3|1 The Mobilization of Monistic Identities in the Context of a Secession Attempt|70
3|2 The Court´s Measured Depiction of the Internally Plural Political Communities Making Up the Canadian Federation|74
3|3 The Court´s Non Positivist Constitutional Theory|78
4|3.1 The Court´s Theory of Sources|80
4|3.2 The Court´s Theory of Interpretive Responsibility|83
4|3.3 The Court´s Interpretive Style|84
3|4 Conclusion|87
3|References|88
2|Competing Claims for Federalism in Complex Political Settings. A Canadian Exploration|90
3|1 Competing Forms of Federal Arrangements|91
3|2 The Québec Case and the Secessionist Track|92
3|3 Options for a New Canada|97
3|4 Concluding Remarks|99
3|References|101
2|Is the Québec Secession Movement Dead? Perspectives After Canada´s 2015 Federal Election|102
3|1 Introduction|103
3|2 Québec as a Nation|104
3|3 Sovereigntist Parties and the Federal Government: The Interplay of Strategies|105
3|4 The Liberals (1995-2005): Changing the Sovereignty Game with Tough Love|106
3|5 The Conservatives (2006-2015): From French Kiss to Indifference|108
3|6 Support for Sovereigntist Parties: Some Quantitative Evidence|110
3|7 Explaining the 2011 NDP Success in Québec|112
3|8 Support for Sovereignty and Independence: Some Quantitative Evidence|113
3|9 Conclusions: The Possibility of a Future Referendum|115
3|References|115
2|Provincial Integration Through the Senate: Trudeau´s (Not Quite) New Era|117
3|1 Introduction|118
3|2 The Starting Point: Harper´s Failed Reform Attempt and the Supreme Court|119
3|3 Trudeau´s New Approach: A Closer Relation with the Provinces|120
4|3.1 The Electoral Proposals|120
4|3.2 Constitutional and Political Implications of the Proposed Reforms|121
5|3.2.1 Government Leader and Speaker|121
5|3.2.2 The Selection of Senators|124
4|3.3 Towards a New Conception of Cooperative Federalism|126
3|4 Concluding Remarks and Lessons for the Future|127
3|References|129
2|`Scotland in the United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement´?|131
3|1 Introduction|131
3|2 Devolution Not Federalism|132
3|3 The Devolution Settlement|133
4|3.1 Parliamentary Sovereignty|133
4|3.2 The Division of Competences|134
4|3.3 Financial Arrangements|134
4|3.4 Scotland´s `Voice at the Centre´|136
4|3.5 The Role of the Courts|136
3|4 The Scotland Act Changes|136
4|4.1 The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government|137
4|4.2 The Sewel Convention|138
4|4.3 Elections, Composition and Functioning|138
4|4.4 Welfare and Taxation|139
4|4.5 The Fiscal Framework|139
4|4.6 Intergovernmental Relations|140
3|5 An Enduring Settlement?|140
3|References|141
2|The Future of the United Kingdom´s Territorial Constitution: Can the Union Survive?|143
3|1 Introduction|144
3|2 Understanding the UK´s Territorial Constitution|146
3|3 Why Is Reform of the Territorial Constitution Required?|149
3|4 What Is Wrong with the Territorial Constitution?|153
3|5 Obstacles to Reform|156
4|5.1 Problem 1: The Persistence of the ``Political Constitution´´|157
4|5.2 Problem 2: The Problem of Territorial Asymmetry|157
4|5.3 Problem 3: The Dangers of ``Crystallising´´ the Territorial Constitution|159
4|5.4 Problem 4: The Complexity of Constitutional Change|160
4|5.5 Problem 5: Lack of Political Appetite for Comprehensive Constitutional Reform|161
3|6 Conclusion|162
3|References|162
2|Fiscal Federalism and Fiscal Responsibility: The Case of Scotland|166
3|1 The Referendum: How and Why the Losers Won and the Winners Lost|166
4|1.1 `It´s Scotland´s Oil´ and the History of the Scottish National Party|167
3|2 Second Time Lucky: The Creation and Development of the Scottish Parliament|173
3|3 Good Reasons for Voting for Independence|174
3|4 The Bad Reason: Fiscal Fantasy|175
3|5 Reducing Fiscal Fantasy: The Marginal Principle|176
3|6 Lessons for and from Spain and Canada|179
3|7 What Would Spanish and Canadian Constitutionalists Say About the Scottish Referendum?|182
3|References|183
2|The Scottish Independence Referendum: Lessons Learned for the Future|185
3|1 Introduction|185
3|2 Independence Referendums in Federal or Regional Plurinational States: The Problem of Constitutional Silence|186
3|3 Positive Aspects of the Scottish Referendum Process|188
4|3.1 An Example of Political Negotiation and Agreement Between the Scottish and UK Governments|188
4|3.2 Provision of a Clear Legal Framework or the Referendum|190
4|3.3 A Clear Question|192
4|3.4 An Extensive Informed and Deliberative Process Focused on the Central Issue to Be Decided: `Independence for Scotland´|193
3|4 Factors of Unnecessary Uncertainty in the Debate|194
4|4.1 Scotland´s Future in the EU|194
4|4.2 The Framing of the Issue|196
3|5 A Decisive Outcome?|198
3|6 Conclusions|200
3|References|201
2|The End of Belgium As We Know It: From Consociational Democracy to Partitocratic Deadlock?|205
3|1 Political Compromise and Federal Balance|207
4|1.1 By Default Federalism|207
4|1.2 Dual Federalism|208
4|1.3 Consociational Federalism|209
4|1.4 Bipolar Federalism|211
4|1.5 Asymmetrical Federalism|212
3|2 The (Non-)Actors of Belgian Federalism|213
4|2.1 The Federal Entities|214
4|2.2 Political Parties|215
4|2.3 The Social Partners|217
3|3 Conclusion|218
3|References|220
2|Secessionist Claims in a Federal System: The Belgian Case|222
3|References|232
2|The Relations Between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. A Model with Future to Challenge Secessionism?|234
3|1 Introduction|235
3|2 Reasons for the Special Relations|235
3|3 The Danish State and Its Unclear Identity. Challenge and Possibility|239
3|4 Has the Danish State As a Whole a Future or Will Full Independence Triumph?|239
3|5 Conclusions|244
3|References|244
2|The Italian Regional State: A Counter-Reformation After the Failure of the 2001 Constitutional Reform?|247
3|1 A New Stage in the Rough Path of Italian Regionalism|248
3|2 Background: The Reform of 2001 and the Failure of Its Implementation|249
3|3 Context and Objectives of the New Reform|253
3|4 Contents: The New Senate|255
3|5 Contents: The New Distribution of Legislative Competences|259
3|6 Conclusions: Wasted Opportunity or Threat to Democracy?|261
3|References|262
1|Part II: Referendums and Constitutional Clauses on Secession|263
2|Constitutionalizing Secession in Order to Harmonize Constitutionality and Democracy in Territorial Decentralized States Like S...|264
3|1 Why Constitutionalizing Secession?|265
4|1.1 The Blocking of the Territorial Debate in Spain|265
4|1.2 Constitutionalizing Secession in Order to Strengthen the Binding Force of the Constitution|267
3|2 How to Constitutionalize Secession in Spain|270
4|2.1 Through Constitutional Amendment Notwithstanding the National Unity Clause|270
4|2.2 The Need to Follow the Ultra-Aggravated Amendment Procedure|273
3|3 The Content of a Future Secession Clause|275
4|3.1 Adequacy to the Fundamental Principles of the Constitutional System|275
4|3.2 The Secession Clause|276
4|3.3 The Secession Procedure|277
3|4 Imposing Material Conditions Upon Secession?|281
3|References|282
2|Territorial Referendums from a Constitutionalist Perspective: Functions, Justifications and Legal Design|285
3|1 Introduction|285
3|2 Functions: Territorial Referendums and Secession|288
3|3 Justifications: A Legal Framework for Secession and Territorial Referendums?|290
4|3.1 Skepticism in Constitutional Theory and Practice|290
4|3.2 Arguments for and Against a Legal Framework|292
3|4 Legal Design: The Territorial Referendum as Central Concern|295
4|4.1 Minimalistic Proclamations|296
4|4.2 Extensive Procedural Regulations|297
5|4.2.1 Pre-referendum Stage|298
5|4.2.2 Referendum Stage|299
5|4.2.3 Post-referendum Stage|302
3|5 Conclusions|303
3|References|306
2|The Sovereign State and the Right to Secede. Historical Examples and Theoretical Reasons Concerning the Benefits of Political ...|309
3|1 Introduction|309
3|2 Brief History of Secessionist Referendums (1905-2015)|311
3|3 The Benefits of Regulating the Right to Secede|316
3|References|320
2|Federative Tools: A New Perspective for Secession|323
3|1 Definition and Advantages of Federative Tools|325
4|1.1 Understanding of the Concept of Federative Tools|325
4|1.2 Two Categories of Federative Tools|327
3|2 The Use of Federative Tools to Allow Secession|328
4|2.1 Interest of Federative Tools|328
4|2.2 Use of Federative Tools for Secession|330
3|References|331
2|Reasons for and Limits of the Referendum as a Mechanism to Declare the Secession of Part of a State|333
3|1 The Referendum as an Insufficient Mechanism to Declare the Secession of Part of a State|333
3|2 The Referendum as a Necessary Mechanism to Declare the Secession of Part of a Territory: The Case of the Spanish Constitutio...|335
4|2.1 Two Theses About Secession|336
4|2.2 Two Antitheses with Regard to Secession|337
4|2.3 A Synthesis|339
3|3 Right to Secession and Amendment of the Spanish Constitution of 1978|340
4|3.1 Excursus: Concerning the Procedure of Constitutional Amendment|340
4|3.2 Secession as a Consequence of the Exercise of the Power of Review|342
3|References|343
2|The Myth of Ontological Foundations and the Secession Clause as Federal Answers to National Claims of External Self-Determinat...|345
3|1 The Fall of Old Monopolies and Democratic Legitimacy|346
3|2 From Unilateral Foundation to Plural Citizenship|349
3|3 Federal Means Under the Rule of Law: Supremacy Clause, Constitutional Revision and Secession|356
3|References|359
1|Part III: Claims for Secession and Federalism in Spain|360
2|Claims for Secession in Catalonia. Rule of Law, Democratic Principle and Federal Alternative|361
3|1 Claims for Sovereignty in Spain: From the Basque Country to Catalonia|361
3|2 A Bad Starting Point: The Right to Self-Determination As the Basis of the Secessionist Demand|365
3|3 A Bad Response to the Secessionist Demand: Rule of Law and Nothing More Than Rule of Law|370
3|4 A Dangerous Confrontation: Democratic Principle Versus Principle of Legality|373
3|5 A Weak Base for Independence: The Absence of a Majority|376
3|6 A Dead End: Is There an Alternative to Constitutional Reform of Territorial Autonomy?|380
3|References|382
2|Secession and Federalism. The Spanish Case|385
3|1 Introduction|385
3|2 The Crisis of the National State|387
3|3 Referendum and Right to Secession|390
4|3.1 Independence Referendum|390
5|3.1.1 The Referendum Should Be Held Within the Framework of the Constitution|391
5|3.1.2 The Referendum Should Be Held Following These Guidelines|391
5|3.1.3 Who Should Be Able to Vote?|392
5|3.1.4 What to Ask?|392
5|3.1.5 What Majority?|393
4|3.2 Self-Determination, Right to Decide, Secession|393
3|4 Plurinational Federalism as an Answer. The Spanish Case|396
3|References|399
2|Constitution and Referendum on Secession in Catalonia|401
3|1 Facts: Five Years of the Secessionist ``Process´´ (2012-2017)|401
3|2 Referendum on Secession and Spanish Constitutional Law|405
3|3 Referendum on Secession and European Standards|411
3|4 Conclusion|416
3|References|417
2|Federalism and Democratic Quality: The Contribution of Territorial Pluralism to Constitutional Democracy|419
3|1 Territorial Pluralism and Political Pluralism. An Intricate Relationship|420
3|2 Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism at Supranational Level|421
3|3 Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism at Infra-State Level|423
3|4 The Integration of Infra-State Territorial Pluralism in the European Sphere|424
3|5 Federalism and Democratic Quality|426
3|References|427
2|Political Pluralism and Independence in Catalonia: Lessons Learned from Federalism|428
3|1 Introduction|428
3|2 The Idea of Nation and Social Pluralism|429
3|3 Elections, Pluralism and Plebiscite|431
3|4 Pluralism, Parliaments and Predominance of the Executive Power|433
3|5 The Needed Reform of a State with Scarce Capacity of Integration|435
3|Reference|437
2|Federal Reform of Spain vs Secession in Catalonia. Could Constitutional Reform Provide a Response to the Demands Upon Which th...|438
3|1 The Unconstitutionality of the Secessionist Declaration and the Weakness of the Pro-Independence Process in Catalonia|439
3|2 Internal Self-Determination Via Constitutional Reform That Would Involve the Holding of a Referendum|443
3|3 The Federal Answer to the Reality of Catalonia and Its Demands|445
3|4 Conclusions|452
3|5 Summary|453
3|References|454
2|Which Federalism for Spain?|455
3|1 Introduction|455
3|2 ``Political´´ and ``Federal´´ Proposals|458
3|3 Light Federalism|460
3|4 Serious Federalism|464
3|5 Multinational Federalism|467
3|6 Conclusion|470
3|References|470
2|Constitutional Reform Within the Context of the Debate on the Independence of Catalonia|472
3|1 Constitutional Reform Versus Referendum on Independence|472
3|2 Reasons for Constitutional Reform|476
3|3 Reforms Linked to the Functioning of the Autonomous State: The Senate as a Territorial Council|478
3|4 Constitutional Reform as a Response to the Current Territorial Crisis|481
3|References|483
2|The Constitutional Answer to the Crisis of the Model of Territorial Organization|484
3|1 A Framework for a Constitutional Reform|485
3|2 The Federal Requirement|487
4|2.1 The Normative Perspective of the Federal Reform|487
4|2.2 The Requirements and Values of Federalism. Federalism and the National Coexistence|489
3|3 The Possibilities of Asymmetry|492
3|4 The Constitutional Answer to Secessionist Movements. The Non Acceptance of the Right of Self-Determination|497
3|References|499
2|Constitutional Reform and Federalism in Spain. A Modest Proposal|501
3|References|508
2|Constitutional Reform and Global Market Federalism|510
3|1 Federal Proposal and Economic Substrata|510
3|2 Global Market Federalism|515
4|2.1 Federalism and Form of State|515
4|2.2 Global Market Federalism as Transnational Federalism|516
4|2.3 Global Federalism as Market Federalism|517
3|3 Global Market Federalism in the Recent Evolution of European Territorial Autonomies|519
4|3.1 Brief Comments with Regard to the German Reform|519
4|3.2 Thoughts Regarding the Failed Italian Constitutional Reform: The Significance of Economic Control|520
3|4 Some Pressing Problems with Regard to the Spanish Territorial Question|524
4|4.1 Financing of the Autonomous Regions|524
4|4.2 The Distribution of Competences in the Spanish Federal Debate|527
3|5 A Final Reflection|528
3|References|529
2|Territorial Secession and Federal Loyalty in the 1978 Spanish Constitution|533
3|1 Federal Loyalty, Principle of Unity and Secession in the Federal State|533
4|1.1 The Principle of Unity of the Legal System as a Premise for Federal Loyalty|534
4|1.2 Federal Loyalty, Principle of Material Unity and Secession|535
3|2 Federal Loyalty, Principle of Unity and Secession in the SC|536
4|2.1 Federal Loyalty, Formal Unity of the Body of Laws and Secession|537
4|2.2 The Constitutional Foundations of Federal Loyalty in Spain´s State of Autonomies|538
3|3 The Preventive Effect of Federal Loyalty Over Secession in the SC|539
4|3.1 Federal Loyalty as an Interpretative Principle: The Duty of Consideration in the Exercise of Competences by All Territoria...|539
4|3.2 Incidental Content of Federal Loyalty: Solidarity, Coordination, Cooperation and Mutual Aid|541
3|4 Reactive Effects of Federal Loyalty Against Secession in the SC|543
4|4.1 Formal Understanding of the State´s Unity and Violation of Federal Loyalty|543
4|4.2 Reactive Safeguarding of Federal Loyalty Through Constitutional Review and Federal Coercion|544
4|4.3 The Reactive Function of Federal Loyalty Through ``Negative Legislation´´ and ``Positive Legislation´´|547
3|5 Conclusions|549
3|References|550
2|State Integration and Disintegration Within the European Union. Regarding the Purported Secession of Catalonia and Its Hypothe...|552
3|1 Approach|552
3|2 Final Thoughts Regarding Purported Integration (European) Via Disintegration (State)|559
3|References|562
2|The Catalan Independence Movement in the Political and Constitutional Debate in the European Union|563
3|1 Introduction|563
3|2 The European Union and Territorial Diversity|566
3|3 The European Union and Territorial Secessionism|567
3|4 The European Union and the Self-Declaration of Independence of Catalonia|570
3|References|575
1|When Federalism Faces Secession: Presentation of a Theoretical-Practical Analysis of the Spanish Experience in the Light of Co...|9
1|Part I: Claims for Secession in Western Democracies. A Comparative Overview|12
2|Secession and Federalism in the United States: Tools for Managing Regional Conflict in a Pluralist Society|13
3|1 Introduction: Autonomy and Interdependence in Pluralist Society|14
3|2 Secession in the United States|17
4|2.1 Subnational Secession: Then and Now|18
4|2.2 The American Revolution|21
4|2.3 The American Civil War|27
3|3 Federalism in the United States|34
4|3.1 The Structure and Function of American Federalism|35
4|3.2 Federalism as a Strategy for Good Governance|37
4|3.3 Constitutional Indeterminacy and Federalism Theory|41
3|4 Nationhood Amid Forces of Political Entropy and Gravity|44
4|4.1 The U.S. Model and the Alternatives|44
4|4.2 The Forces of Fragmentation and Centralization|46
5|4.2.1 Political Entropy: Toward Disassociation|47
5|4.2.2 Political Gravity: Toward Interconnection|48
4|4.3 Suspended Between Autonomy and Interdependence|50
5|4.3.1 Regional Marginalization in Québec and Kurdistan|50
5|4.3.2 Devolution in the United Kingdom and Spain|52
4|4.4 Secession and the Morality of Inclusion|55
3|5 Conclusion: Federalism as a Sword and a Shield|56
3|References|60
2|Legality, Legitimacy, Decisionism and Federalism: An Analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada´s Reasoning in Reference re Seces...|68
3|1 The Mobilization of Monistic Identities in the Context of a Secession Attempt|70
3|2 The Court´s Measured Depiction of the Internally Plural Political Communities Making Up the Canadian Federation|74
3|3 The Court´s Non Positivist Constitutional Theory|78
4|3.1 The Court´s Theory of Sources|80
4|3.2 The Court´s Theory of Interpretive Responsibility|83
4|3.3 The Court´s Interpretive Style|84
3|4 Conclusion|87
3|References|88
2|Competing Claims for Federalism in Complex Political Settings. A Canadian Exploration|90
3|1 Competing Forms of Federal Arrangements|91
3|2 The Québec Case and the Secessionist Track|92
3|3 Options for a New Canada|97
3|4 Concluding Remarks|99
3|References|101
2|Is the Québec Secession Movement Dead? Perspectives After Canada´s 2015 Federal Election|102
3|1 Introduction|103
3|2 Québec as a Nation|104
3|3 Sovereigntist Parties and the Federal Government: The Interplay of Strategies|105
3|4 The Liberals (1995-2005): Changing the Sovereignty Game with Tough Love|106
3|5 The Conservatives (2006-2015): From French Kiss to Indifference|108
3|6 Support for Sovereigntist Parties: Some Quantitative Evidence|110
3|7 Explaining the 2011 NDP Success in Québec|112
3|8 Support for Sovereignty and Independence: Some Quantitative Evidence|113
3|9 Conclusions: The Possibility of a Future Referendum|115
3|References|115
2|Provincial Integration Through the Senate: Trudeau´s (Not Quite) New Era|117
3|1 Introduction|118
3|2 The Starting Point: Harper´s Failed Reform Attempt and the Supreme Court|119
3|3 Trudeau´s New Approach: A Closer Relation with the Provinces|120
4|3.1 The Electoral Proposals|120
4|3.2 Constitutional and Political Implications of the Proposed Reforms|121
5|3.2.1 Government Leader and Speaker|121
5|3.2.2 The Selection of Senators|124
4|3.3 Towards a New Conception of Cooperative Federalism|126
3|4 Concluding Remarks and Lessons for the Future|127
3|References|129
2|`Scotland in the United Kingdom: An Enduring Settlement´?|131
3|1 Introduction|131
3|2 Devolution Not Federalism|132
3|3 The Devolution Settlement|133
4|3.1 Parliamentary Sovereignty|133
4|3.2 The Division of Competences|134
4|3.3 Financial Arrangements|134
4|3.4 Scotland´s `Voice at the Centre´|136
4|3.5 The Role of the Courts|136
3|4 The Scotland Act Changes|136
4|4.1 The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government|137
4|4.2 The Sewel Convention|138
4|4.3 Elections, Composition and Functioning|138
4|4.4 Welfare and Taxation|139
4|4.5 The Fiscal Framework|139
4|4.6 Intergovernmental Relations|140
3|5 An Enduring Settlement?|140
3|References|141
2|The Future of the United Kingdom´s Territorial Constitution: Can the Union Survive?|143
3|1 Introduction|144
3|2 Understanding the UK´s Territorial Constitution|146
3|3 Why Is Reform of the Territorial Constitution Required?|149
3|4 What Is Wrong with the Territorial Constitution?|153
3|5 Obstacles to Reform|156
4|5.1 Problem 1: The Persistence of the ``Political Constitution´´|157
4|5.2 Problem 2: The Problem of Territorial Asymmetry|157
4|5.3 Problem 3: The Dangers of ``Crystallising´´ the Territorial Constitution|159
4|5.4 Problem 4: The Complexity of Constitutional Change|160
4|5.5 Problem 5: Lack of Political Appetite for Comprehensive Constitutional Reform|161
3|6 Conclusion|162
3|References|162
2|Fiscal Federalism and Fiscal Responsibility: The Case of Scotland|166
3|1 The Referendum: How and Why the Losers Won and the Winners Lost|166
4|1.1 `It´s Scotland´s Oil´ and the History of the Scottish National Party|167
3|2 Second Time Lucky: The Creation and Development of the Scottish Parliament|173
3|3 Good Reasons for Voting for Independence|174
3|4 The Bad Reason: Fiscal Fantasy|175
3|5 Reducing Fiscal Fantasy: The Marginal Principle|176
3|6 Lessons for and from Spain and Canada|179
3|7 What Would Spanish and Canadian Constitutionalists Say About the Scottish Referendum?|182
3|References|183
2|The Scottish Independence Referendum: Lessons Learned for the Future|185
3|1 Introduction|185
3|2 Independence Referendums in Federal or Regional Plurinational States: The Problem of Constitutional Silence|186
3|3 Positive Aspects of the Scottish Referendum Process|188
4|3.1 An Example of Political Negotiation and Agreement Between the Scottish and UK Governments|188
4|3.2 Provision of a Clear Legal Framework or the Referendum|190
4|3.3 A Clear Question|192
4|3.4 An Extensive Informed and Deliberative Process Focused on the Central Issue to Be Decided: `Independence for Scotland´|193
3|4 Factors of Unnecessary Uncertainty in the Debate|194
4|4.1 Scotland´s Future in the EU|194
4|4.2 The Framing of the Issue|196
3|5 A Decisive Outcome?|198
3|6 Conclusions|200
3|References|201
2|The End of Belgium As We Know It: From Consociational Democracy to Partitocratic Deadlock?|205
3|1 Political Compromise and Federal Balance|207
4|1.1 By Default Federalism|207
4|1.2 Dual Federalism|208
4|1.3 Consociational Federalism|209
4|1.4 Bipolar Federalism|211
4|1.5 Asymmetrical Federalism|212
3|2 The (Non-)Actors of Belgian Federalism|213
4|2.1 The Federal Entities|214
4|2.2 Political Parties|215
4|2.3 The Social Partners|217
3|3 Conclusion|218
3|References|220
2|Secessionist Claims in a Federal System: The Belgian Case|222
3|References|232
2|The Relations Between Denmark, Greenland and the Faroe Islands. A Model with Future to Challenge Secessionism?|234
3|1 Introduction|235
3|2 Reasons for the Special Relations|235
3|3 The Danish State and Its Unclear Identity. Challenge and Possibility|239
3|4 Has the Danish State As a Whole a Future or Will Full Independence Triumph?|239
3|5 Conclusions|244
3|References|244
2|The Italian Regional State: A Counter-Reformation After the Failure of the 2001 Constitutional Reform?|247
3|1 A New Stage in the Rough Path of Italian Regionalism|248
3|2 Background: The Reform of 2001 and the Failure of Its Implementation|249
3|3 Context and Objectives of the New Reform|253
3|4 Contents: The New Senate|255
3|5 Contents: The New Distribution of Legislative Competences|259
3|6 Conclusions: Wasted Opportunity or Threat to Democracy?|261
3|References|262
1|Part II: Referendums and Constitutional Clauses on Secession|263
2|Constitutionalizing Secession in Order to Harmonize Constitutionality and Democracy in Territorial Decentralized States Like S...|264
3|1 Why Constitutionalizing Secession?|265
4|1.1 The Blocking of the Territorial Debate in Spain|265
4|1.2 Constitutionalizing Secession in Order to Strengthen the Binding Force of the Constitution|267
3|2 How to Constitutionalize Secession in Spain|270
4|2.1 Through Constitutional Amendment Notwithstanding the National Unity Clause|270
4|2.2 The Need to Follow the Ultra-Aggravated Amendment Procedure|273
3|3 The Content of a Future Secession Clause|275
4|3.1 Adequacy to the Fundamental Principles of the Constitutional System|275
4|3.2 The Secession Clause|276
4|3.3 The Secession Procedure|277
3|4 Imposing Material Conditions Upon Secession?|281
3|References|282
2|Territorial Referendums from a Constitutionalist Perspective: Functions, Justifications and Legal Design|285
3|1 Introduction|285
3|2 Functions: Territorial Referendums and Secession|288
3|3 Justifications: A Legal Framework for Secession and Territorial Referendums?|290
4|3.1 Skepticism in Constitutional Theory and Practice|290
4|3.2 Arguments for and Against a Legal Framework|292
3|4 Legal Design: The Territorial Referendum as Central Concern|295
4|4.1 Minimalistic Proclamations|296
4|4.2 Extensive Procedural Regulations|297
5|4.2.1 Pre-referendum Stage|298
5|4.2.2 Referendum Stage|299
5|4.2.3 Post-referendum Stage|302
3|5 Conclusions|303
3|References|306
2|The Sovereign State and the Right to Secede. Historical Examples and Theoretical Reasons Concerning the Benefits of Political ...|309
3|1 Introduction|309
3|2 Brief History of Secessionist Referendums (1905-2015)|311
3|3 The Benefits of Regulating the Right to Secede|316
3|References|320
2|Federative Tools: A New Perspective for Secession|323
3|1 Definition and Advantages of Federative Tools|325
4|1.1 Understanding of the Concept of Federative Tools|325
4|1.2 Two Categories of Federative Tools|327
3|2 The Use of Federative Tools to Allow Secession|328
4|2.1 Interest of Federative Tools|328
4|2.2 Use of Federative Tools for Secession|330
3|References|331
2|Reasons for and Limits of the Referendum as a Mechanism to Declare the Secession of Part of a State|333
3|1 The Referendum as an Insufficient Mechanism to Declare the Secession of Part of a State|333
3|2 The Referendum as a Necessary Mechanism to Declare the Secession of Part of a Territory: The Case of the Spanish Constitutio...|335
4|2.1 Two Theses About Secession|336
4|2.2 Two Antitheses with Regard to Secession|337
4|2.3 A Synthesis|339
3|3 Right to Secession and Amendment of the Spanish Constitution of 1978|340
4|3.1 Excursus: Concerning the Procedure of Constitutional Amendment|340
4|3.2 Secession as a Consequence of the Exercise of the Power of Review|342
3|References|343
2|The Myth of Ontological Foundations and the Secession Clause as Federal Answers to National Claims of External Self-Determinat...|345
3|1 The Fall of Old Monopolies and Democratic Legitimacy|346
3|2 From Unilateral Foundation to Plural Citizenship|349
3|3 Federal Means Under the Rule of Law: Supremacy Clause, Constitutional Revision and Secession|356
3|References|359
1|Part III: Claims for Secession and Federalism in Spain|360
2|Claims for Secession in Catalonia. Rule of Law, Democratic Principle and Federal Alternative|361
3|1 Claims for Sovereignty in Spain: From the Basque Country to Catalonia|361
3|2 A Bad Starting Point: The Right to Self-Determination As the Basis of the Secessionist Demand|365
3|3 A Bad Response to the Secessionist Demand: Rule of Law and Nothing More Than Rule of Law|370
3|4 A Dangerous Confrontation: Democratic Principle Versus Principle of Legality|373
3|5 A Weak Base for Independence: The Absence of a Majority|376
3|6 A Dead End: Is There an Alternative to Constitutional Reform of Territorial Autonomy?|380
3|References|382
2|Secession and Federalism. The Spanish Case|385
3|1 Introduction|385
3|2 The Crisis of the National State|387
3|3 Referendum and Right to Secession|390
4|3.1 Independence Referendum|390
5|3.1.1 The Referendum Should Be Held Within the Framework of the Constitution|391
5|3.1.2 The Referendum Should Be Held Following These Guidelines|391
5|3.1.3 Who Should Be Able to Vote?|392
5|3.1.4 What to Ask?|392
5|3.1.5 What Majority?|393
4|3.2 Self-Determination, Right to Decide, Secession|393
3|4 Plurinational Federalism as an Answer. The Spanish Case|396
3|References|399
2|Constitution and Referendum on Secession in Catalonia|401
3|1 Facts: Five Years of the Secessionist ``Process´´ (2012-2017)|401
3|2 Referendum on Secession and Spanish Constitutional Law|405
3|3 Referendum on Secession and European Standards|411
3|4 Conclusion|416
3|References|417
2|Federalism and Democratic Quality: The Contribution of Territorial Pluralism to Constitutional Democracy|419
3|1 Territorial Pluralism and Political Pluralism. An Intricate Relationship|420
3|2 Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism at Supranational Level|421
3|3 Political Pluralism and Territorial Pluralism at Infra-State Level|423
3|4 The Integration of Infra-State Territorial Pluralism in the European Sphere|424
3|5 Federalism and Democratic Quality|426
3|References|427
2|Political Pluralism and Independence in Catalonia: Lessons Learned from Federalism|428
3|1 Introduction|428
3|2 The Idea of Nation and Social Pluralism|429
3|3 Elections, Pluralism and Plebiscite|431
3|4 Pluralism, Parliaments and Predominance of the Executive Power|433
3|5 The Needed Reform of a State with Scarce Capacity of Integration|435
3|Reference|437
2|Federal Reform of Spain vs Secession in Catalonia. Could Constitutional Reform Provide a Response to the Demands Upon Which th...|438
3|1 The Unconstitutionality of the Secessionist Declaration and the Weakness of the Pro-Independence Process in Catalonia|439
3|2 Internal Self-Determination Via Constitutional Reform That Would Involve the Holding of a Referendum|443
3|3 The Federal Answer to the Reality of Catalonia and Its Demands|445
3|4 Conclusions|452
3|5 Summary|453
3|References|454
2|Which Federalism for Spain?|455
3|1 Introduction|455
3|2 ``Political´´ and ``Federal´´ Proposals|458
3|3 Light Federalism|460
3|4 Serious Federalism|464
3|5 Multinational Federalism|467
3|6 Conclusion|470
3|References|470
2|Constitutional Reform Within the Context of the Debate on the Independence of Catalonia|472
3|1 Constitutional Reform Versus Referendum on Independence|472
3|2 Reasons for Constitutional Reform|476
3|3 Reforms Linked to the Functioning of the Autonomous State: The Senate as a Territorial Council|478
3|4 Constitutional Reform as a Response to the Current Territorial Crisis|481
3|References|483
2|The Constitutional Answer to the Crisis of the Model of Territorial Organization|484
3|1 A Framework for a Constitutional Reform|485
3|2 The Federal Requirement|487
4|2.1 The Normative Perspective of the Federal Reform|487
4|2.2 The Requirements and Values of Federalism. Federalism and the National Coexistence|489
3|3 The Possibilities of Asymmetry|492
3|4 The Constitutional Answer to Secessionist Movements. The Non Acceptance of the Right of Self-Determination|497
3|References|499
2|Constitutional Reform and Federalism in Spain. A Modest Proposal|501
3|References|508
2|Constitutional Reform and Global Market Federalism|510
3|1 Federal Proposal and Economic Substrata|510
3|2 Global Market Federalism|515
4|2.1 Federalism and Form of State|515
4|2.2 Global Market Federalism as Transnational Federalism|516
4|2.3 Global Federalism as Market Federalism|517
3|3 Global Market Federalism in the Recent Evolution of European Territorial Autonomies|519
4|3.1 Brief Comments with Regard to the German Reform|519
4|3.2 Thoughts Regarding the Failed Italian Constitutional Reform: The Significance of Economic Control|520
3|4 Some Pressing Problems with Regard to the Spanish Territorial Question|524
4|4.1 Financing of the Autonomous Regions|524
4|4.2 The Distribution of Competences in the Spanish Federal Debate|527
3|5 A Final Reflection|528
3|References|529
2|Territorial Secession and Federal Loyalty in the 1978 Spanish Constitution|533
3|1 Federal Loyalty, Principle of Unity and Secession in the Federal State|533
4|1.1 The Principle of Unity of the Legal System as a Premise for Federal Loyalty|534
4|1.2 Federal Loyalty, Principle of Material Unity and Secession|535
3|2 Federal Loyalty, Principle of Unity and Secession in the SC|536
4|2.1 Federal Loyalty, Formal Unity of the Body of Laws and Secession|537
4|2.2 The Constitutional Foundations of Federal Loyalty in Spain´s State of Autonomies|538
3|3 The Preventive Effect of Federal Loyalty Over Secession in the SC|539
4|3.1 Federal Loyalty as an Interpretative Principle: The Duty of Consideration in the Exercise of Competences by All Territoria...|539
4|3.2 Incidental Content of Federal Loyalty: Solidarity, Coordination, Cooperation and Mutual Aid|541
3|4 Reactive Effects of Federal Loyalty Against Secession in the SC|543
4|4.1 Formal Understanding of the State´s Unity and Violation of Federal Loyalty|543
4|4.2 Reactive Safeguarding of Federal Loyalty Through Constitutional Review and Federal Coercion|544
4|4.3 The Reactive Function of Federal Loyalty Through ``Negative Legislation´´ and ``Positive Legislation´´|547
3|5 Conclusions|549
3|References|550
2|State Integration and Disintegration Within the European Union. Regarding the Purported Secession of Catalonia and Its Hypothe...|552
3|1 Approach|552
3|2 Final Thoughts Regarding Purported Integration (European) Via Disintegration (State)|559
3|References|562
2|The Catalan Independence Movement in the Political and Constitutional Debate in the European Union|563
3|1 Introduction|563
3|2 The European Union and Territorial Diversity|566
3|3 The European Union and Territorial Secessionism|567
3|4 The European Union and the Self-Declaration of Independence of Catalonia|570
3|References|575