File #2582: "2019_Book_JudicialIndependence.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|6
1|Prologue|8
2|The EEA|8
2|The Definition of Independence—Being off Leash|9
2|The Independence of the European Judiciary|10
2|This Book’s Content|11
1|Contents|14
1|Abbreviations|27
1|List of Cases|31
2|EFTA Court|31
2|Icelandic Courts|34
2|Liechtenstein Courts|34
2|Norwegian Courts|35
2|Swiss Courts|35
2|European Union Courts|35
2|Austrian Courts|38
2|German Courts|38
2|Swedish Courts|38
2|UK Courts|38
2|ECTHR|39
2|US Courts|39
2|ILO Administrative Tribunal|39
1|1 My Pre-court Life|40
2|1 General|40
2|2 My Socialisation as a Lawyer|41
3|2.1 Studies and First Work Experiences|41
3|2.2 My German Journeyman Travels|42
2|3 University of St. Gallen|44
2|4 University of Texas|46
2|5 EEA Negotiations|46
1|2 EFTA Court Judge by Chance|47
2|1 Liechtenstein’s Choice of a Judge|47
2|2 Between Austin and Geneva|50
2|3 Flashback: EEA Negotiations|50
3|3.1 Start in Hotel Löwen in Vaduz|50
3|3.2 Advisor to the Princely Government|51
3|3.3 The “Shoals” of the EEA|52
3|3.4 The First Liechtenstein EEA Referendum|52
3|3.5 The Second Liechtenstein EEA Referendum|53
3|3.6 Afterword on the “Shoals”|53
1|3 The EEA—One Area with Two Courts|54
2|1 Introduction|54
2|2 The EFTA Court’s Difficult Birth|57
3|2.1 The ECJ’s First EEA Opinion|57
3|2.2 The ECJ’s Second EEA Opinion|58
2|3 The EEA Judiciary|58
3|3.1 ECJ|58
3|3.2 General Court|61
3|3.3 EFTA Court|61
2|4 Judges’ Background and Independence|63
3|4.1 General|63
3|4.2 Official Commitment to Independence and Impartiality|64
3|4.3 Threat to Independence and Impartiality in Practice|64
3|4.4 The EFTA Court’s Record|67
2|5 The Backbone of the EEA Agreement|68
3|5.1 Introduction|68
3|5.2 Reciprocity|68
3|5.3 Homogeneity|69
4|5.3.1 Legislative Level|69
4|5.3.2 Judicial Level|72
1|4 The Legacy of the Five-Member Court|76
2|1 General|76
2|2 Important Precedents|77
3|2.1 Access to Justice|77
3|2.2 Legal Nature of “Advisory Opinions”|78
3|2.3 Free Movement of Goods|78
3|2.4 Limits of the Transmitting State Principle|78
3|2.5 Effect|79
2|3 Cooperation Between National Courts and Governments|80
2|4 The Policy of the Three-Member Court|80
1|5 Resurrection from the Dead|82
2|1 What to Do if You Have no Cases?|82
2|2 Succession of Contracts: Part One|83
2|3 Settling in Luxembourg|83
2|4 Succession of Contracts: Part Two|85
2|5 The Beginning of the Dialogue with the EU Courts|86
1|6 The Member States—An Unholy Alliance|88
2|1 Introduction|88
2|2 Iceland|90
3|2.1 Mixed Economy|90
3|2.2 National Character|91
3|2.3 Judiciary|92
3|2.4 Failed Attempt to Join the EU|93
2|3 Liechtenstein|94
3|3.1 Mixed Economy|94
3|3.2 Customs and Currency Union with Switzerland and EEA Membership|95
3|3.3 National Character|95
3|3.4 Judiciary|96
2|4 Norway|96
3|4.1 Mixed Economy with High Public Ownership|96
3|4.2 National Character|98
4|4.2.1 General Remarks|98
4|4.2.2 Egalitarianism|99
4|4.2.3 Recent Oil and Gas Wealth|100
4|4.2.4 Complacency and a Sense of Mission|102
4|4.2.5 Everything Is Political|104
4|4.2.6 Result: Norwegian Exceptionalism|105
3|4.3 Judiciary|106
1|7 ESA—The Great Negotiator|108
2|1 General|108
2|2 ESA as a Prosecutor—A Promising Start|109
2|3 After 2002: High Fluctuation and Low Action|111
3|3.1 The Course of Things|111
3|3.2 Musical Chairs|117
3|3.3 Oda’s Double U-Turn|117
3|3.4 Competition Law in Particular|120
3|3.5 National Supreme Courts Disregarding EEA Law|121
2|4 Persistent Norwegian Dominance|122
3|4.1 The Facts|122
3|4.2 An Odd Attempt to Justify|122
3|4.3 New Rhetoric|123
2|5 Input in Preliminary Reference Proceedings|124
2|6 Contribution to ECJ Case Law|125
1|8 Preliminary References: All Options Open?|126
2|1 Starting Point: The EU Model|126
2|2 Complex Situation in the EFTA Pillar|127
3|2.1 History|127
3|2.2 Written Law|128
2|3 To Refer or Not to Refer|129
3|3.1 The Early Years|129
3|3.2 Gradual Progress in Iceland and Liechtenstein|130
3|3.3 Reluctance in Norway|132
2|4 Legal Nature of the Court’s Rulings|133
2|5 The Role of the Governments|134
3|5.1 Iceland|134
3|5.2 Liechtenstein|135
3|5.3 Norway|135
2|6 Irish Bank and Jonsson|142
3|6.1 Restriction of the Freedom to Refer|142
3|6.2 Lack of Clarity|143
3|6.3 Limiting the Effects of the Icelandic Appeal System|143
3|6.4 Background: 2011 Spring Conference|144
2|7 Conclusions|145
1|9 A Matter of Interpretation|146
2|1 Introduction|146
2|2 Relevant EU Case Law Available|147
3|2.1 ECJ Judgments|147
3|2.2 AGs Opinions|148
3|2.3 GC Judgments|148
2|3 Extra-Legal Considerations|148
3|3.1 General|148
3|3.2 Preunderstanding or Attitude|149
3|3.3 Strategic Considerations|152
3|3.4 Institutional Loyalty|153
2|4 Legal Considerations|153
3|4.1 General|153
3|4.2 Teleological Interpretation in Particular|154
3|4.3 Functional Interpretation in Particular|155
3|4.4 National Case Law and Academic Literature|156
2|5 The Accusation of Judicial Activism|157
3|5.1 General|157
3|5.2 Bridging the Widening Gap|159
2|6 Balanced Realism|161
2|7 My Approach|162
1|10 War Over Constitutional Principles|164
2|1 Starting Point: A Dilatory Formula Compromise|164
2|2 Effect: Deference to State Sovereignty|166
2|3 State Liability: Making or Breaking the EEA Agreement|166
3|3.1 Reference of the Sveinbjörnsdóttir Case|166
3|3.2 Proceedings and Judgment|167
3|3.3 A Salute from the ECJ|169
3|3.4 An Extrajudicial Dissent|170
3|3.5 A Failed Attempt to Turn the Clock Back|171
3|3.6 Acceptance by National Courts and Governments|172
2|4 Primacy: Deference to State Sovereignty|173
2|5 Conform Interpretation|174
1|11 Two Early Landmark Cases: Veronika’s Struggle and Enriched Cereals|175
2|1 Moonshine and the Consequences|175
2|2 Veronika’s First Arrow|176
3|2.1 EFTA Court: Norway Is in Breach|176
3|2.2 Supreme Court: Norway Is in Breach, but Veronika Is Left Out in the Rain|177
3|2.3 Political Implications|178
2|3 Veronika’s Second Arrow|179
2|4 Cornflakes Fortified with Vitamins and Iron|180
3|4.1 A New President|180
3|4.2 De gustibus non est disputandum—There’s no Accounting for Taste|181
3|4.3 The Kellogg’s Ruling|182
2|5 Other Prior Authorisation Cases|183
1|12 Fundamental Rights—The EFTA Court Amends the Law|185
2|1 Norway and Iceland Are Fundamental Rights Societies|185
2|2 Academic Controversy at the Beginning|186
2|3 Recognition of EEA Fundamental Rights|187
2|4 Interim Result|189
2|5 The EU Charter in Particular|189
1|13 Putting the EFTA Court on the Map|192
2|1 My Election as President|192
2|2 Taking Stock|193
2|3 Extrajudicial Activities of the Court|194
3|3.1 General|194
3|3.2 Regular Activities|195
3|3.3 Anniversaries|201
3|3.4 Annual Spring Conference|204
3|3.5 Publications|205
3|3.6 Media|206
2|4 Personal Extrajudicial Activities|208
3|4.1 Building Networks with EU Protagonists|208
3|4.2 Positioning the EFTA Court in Luxembourg|210
3|4.3 Social Life|210
3|4.4 Teaching|212
3|4.5 Speaking|212
3|4.6 The International Competition Law Forum (ICF) in Particular|214
3|4.7 Publishing|215
3|4.8 Media|218
1|14 The Economics of EEA Single Market Law|219
2|1 The EEA Agreement Has Created a Market|219
2|2 Competition Economics|220
2|3 State Aid Economics|222
2|4 Economics Beyond the Realm of Competition Law|223
3|4.1 General|223
3|4.2 Relevance for the EFTA Court|224
1|15 Fundamental Freedoms and the Cursed Proportionality Test|227
2|1 Are All Four Freedoms Indispensable?|227
2|2 The EFTA Court’s Approach to Proportionality|228
3|2.1 Origin and Key Features|228
3|2.2 Areas of Application|230
2|3 Some Landmark Cases|230
3|3.1 Free Movement of Goods|230
3|3.2 Free Movement of Goods and Freedom to Provide Services|233
3|3.3 Freedom to Provide Services and Right of Establishment|233
3|3.4 Right of Establishment and Free Movement of Capital|237
3|3.5 Free Movement of Capital|239
3|3.6 General Prohibition to Discriminate|240
2|4 Does Proportionality Mean Proportionality?|241
3|4.1 Liechtenstein Courts|241
3|4.2 Icelandic Courts|241
3|4.3 Norwegian Courts|242
2|5 ESA’s Position|245
1|16 Competition Law—A Rare Pleasure|246
2|1 General|246
2|2 Limits of Collective Bargaining and Industrial Action|247
3|2.1 Occupational Pension Insurance Schemes|247
3|2.2 Dockers’ Monopoly|250
2|3 Judicial Review|252
3|3.1 Scope|252
3|3.2 Review of Fines|253
2|4 Private Plaintiff as Private Attorney General|254
2|5 Right of Audience for In-House Counsel|255
2|6 Restriction of Competition by Object|256
2|7 Other Notable Cases|257
3|7.1 Protecting Competition Between Airlines|257
3|7.2 Application of EEA Competition Law to Public Bodies|259
2|8 Conclusions|261
1|17 State Aid Control—A More Frequent Pleasure|267
2|1 EU Law as a Starting Point|267
2|2 ESA’s Approach|268
2|3 Judicial Review|269
3|3.1 General|269
3|3.2 Locus Standi|270
3|3.3 Substance|276
2|4 The Court as a Ground Breaker|279
2|5 Aid to Agriculture and Fisheries|281
1|18 Secondary EEA Law—A Wide Sphere|282
2|1 General|282
2|2 Image of Man in the Internet Age|283
2|3 Contractual Model|284
3|3.1 Freedom of Contract and Consumer Protection|284
3|3.2 Sanctity of Contracts|285
2|4 Principle of Liability|287
3|4.1 Liability of a State in a Systemic Crisis|287
3|4.2 Award of a Public Contract to the Wrong Bidder|287
2|5 Adjustment of Price for a Mandatory Takeover Bid|287
2|6 Re-use of Public Sector Information|288
2|7 Information About Convictions of Legal Persons|289
2|8 Re-monopolisation of Works That Have Fallen into the Public Domain|289
1|19 Free Movement of Persons and Social Policy|292
2|1 Introduction|292
2|2 Transfer of Undertakings|294
2|3 Exportability of Helplessness Allowance|295
2|4 Citizenship Directive|295
2|5 Working Time Directive|297
2|6 Other Cases|298
3|6.1 Safety at Work|298
3|6.2 Social Security Schemes|299
3|6.3 Healthcare|300
3|6.4 Equal Treatment for Men and Women|302
1|20 Where’s the Beef?|303
2|1 The Origin of the Question|303
2|2 The Diagnosis|304
2|3 Limited Interest in the Beef in EFTA Circles|304
2|4 Remedial Measures|306
1|21 Judicial Dialogue Between the ECJ and the EFTA Court|308
2|1 Introduction|308
2|2 ECJ Going First|310
3|2.1 EFTA Court Follows the ECJ|310
3|2.2 EFTA Court Doesn’t Follow the ECJ|311
2|3 EFTA Court Going First|315
3|3.1 ECJ Follows the EFTA Court Explicitly|315
3|3.2 ECJ Follows the EFTA Court Implicitly|316
3|3.3 No Parallel Case Before the ECJ Yet|317
3|3.4 ECJ Follows the EFTA Court on a Second Attempt|317
3|3.5 EFTA Court Adjusting Its Jurisprudence to ECJ Case Law|320
2|4 Excursus: A Fortress Europe in the Field of Financial Services?|325
2|5 Contradictory ECJ Case Law|326
2|6 Relevance of ECtHR Case Law|328
2|7 Important Judgments on Homogeneity|328
2|8 EFTA Values|330
2|9 Conclusions|330
1|22 The Norwegian Social Model on the Brink of a Downfall?|332
2|1 General|332
2|2 Pedicel: If All Else Fails, Norsk Will Do It|333
2|3 Gaming Machines: “As Long as” Means Nothing|334
3|3.1 The Case|334
3|3.2 Oral Hearing|335
3|3.3 Judgment|335
3|3.4 The Supreme Court’s Judgment|335
2|4 Ladbrokes: Pick and Choose|336
3|4.1 The Case|336
3|4.2 Oral Hearing|336
3|4.3 Judgment|336
3|4.4 The Oslo District Court’s Judgment|337
2|5 Playing the EFTA Court off Against the ECJ|337
2|6 ESA Remains Inactive|338
2|7 The Government’s Happiness|339
2|8 Norwegian Waterfalls - Hjemfall: The Threat to “Us, Our Children and Grandchildren”|340
3|8.1 Pre-litigation Procedure|340
3|8.2 Background|340
3|8.3 Judgment|342
3|8.4 Consequences|342
1|23 The Failed Decapitation of Kong Carl|343
2|1 Conflict with the Court’s Auditors|343
2|2 Journalists Spice Things Up|344
2|3 Reappointment Under Unusual Circumstances|346
2|4 A Not Entirely Unexpected Sequel|349
2|5 Kong Carl av EØS—A Retrospective|350
3|5.1 The Article|350
3|5.2 Össur’s Explanation|352
2|6 Postlude|352
1|24 “Room for manoeuvre” for Norway!|354
2|1 An EEA/EFTA State Against Its Will|354
2|2 The Sejersted Report|356
3|2.1 Bombastic Presentation|356
3|2.2 Positivist Approach and Tunnel Vision|356
3|2.3 The New Mantra|358
3|2.4 Praising ESA and Bashing the Court|359
3|2.5 The Norwegian Social Model Safeguarded|360
3|2.6 Mainly Harmless. The Norwegian Model in Brussels|360
3|2.7 Some Are More Equal Than Others|360
3|2.8 Striking Back|361
2|3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ White Paper|364
2|4 The Norwegian EEA Commentary|364
1|25 The Icesave Saga|367
2|1 The Rise and Downfall of the Icelandic Banks|367
2|2 Precipitous Application for EU Membership|372
2|3 Failed Attempts to Find a Political Solution|372
2|4 Icesave I|375
3|4.1 Pre-litigation Procedure|375
3|4.2 Composition of the Court|376
3|4.3 Oral Hearing|376
3|4.4 Judgment|377
3|4.5 Reactions|379
2|5 Icesave II and Icesave III|382
2|6 Return to the “Courant Normal”|382
3|6.1 Withdrawal of Iceland’s EU Application|382
3|6.2 Brits and Icelanders Put Icesave Behind Them|383
1|26 Gunfight at the Oslo Corral|384
2|1 The Historic Example|384
2|2 Høyesterett’s Reference Boycott|385
3|2.1 The Facts|385
3|2.2 The Academic Whisperers|386
3|2.3 Untenability of the Mechanical Approach|387
2|3 Open Conflict|388
2|4 Frontal Attack on the Supreme Court—“Frontalangrep på Høyesterett”|390
3|4.1 First Skirmish in Tromsø|390
3|4.2 Aftenposten Picks up the Issue|392
3|4.3 The Nordic Labour Journal Follows Suit|392
2|5 Chief Justices’ Teatime|393
2|6 The Oslo Peace Process|394
2|7 ESA’s Caution|395
1|27 Working Methods and Judicial Style|398
2|1 The EFTA Court’s Structure|398
3|1.1 Composition|398
3|1.2 Cabinet System and Manning Table|399
3|1.3 Language Regime|399
2|2 Procedure|399
3|2.1 General|399
3|2.2 Assignment of the Case to a Judge Rapporteur|400
3|2.3 Written Procedure|401
3|2.4 Report for the Hearing|401
3|2.5 Applications for Intervention and for Interim Measures|401
3|2.6 Oral Hearing|402
3|2.7 Resolving the Case and Delivery of the Judgment|402
3|2.8 Peculiarities of a Three-Member Court|403
2|3 Reasoning|403
3|3.1 Early Considerations|403
3|3.2 What Has Been Achieved?|405
3|3.3 Use of dicta|411
2|4 Correlation Between Style and Content|414
2|5 Lack of a Dissenting Opinion System|415
1|28 Attack on the EFTA Court’s Integrity|417
2|1 Introduction|417
2|2 A Second Term for Judge Christiansen?|418
3|2.1 Divided Norwegian Administration|418
3|2.2 A Norwegian Panel Dominated by Bureaucrats|419
3|2.3 The Norwegian Public Becomes Aware of the Matter|421
2|3 Abridging a Judge’s Term at All Costs|422
3|3.1 A Cheap Compromise|422
3|3.2 The Two Other Governments Have Reservations|422
3|3.3 The Two Other Governments Cave In|422
3|3.4 The Unlawful Decision|423
2|4 Courageous Lawyers Stand Up|424
3|4.1 Complaints by Norwegian Academics|424
3|4.2 ESA Reacts|426
3|4.3 The Liechtenstein Court of Appeal Steps In|427
3|4.4 The Norwegian Judges Association Protests|427
3|4.5 POLITICO Accuses Norway of Meddling with Judicial Independence|428
2|5 The Court’s Answers|429
3|5.1 An Absurd Notion of Bias|429
3|5.2 The Court’s Valentine’s Day Decision|429
3|5.3 The President’s Washington’s Birthday Order|430
2|6 The Governments Show Little Discernment|430
3|6.1 The Unheard Call for the Establishment of a Supranational Panel|430
3|6.2 2017 EFTA Ministerial Meeting in Svalbard|432
3|6.3 2017 Conference “Norway in Europe”|433
3|6.4 My Last Speech Before the ESA/Court Committee|433
1|29 The Commission—The EFTA Court’s Patron Saint?|435
2|1 The Commission’s Role|435
2|2 EFTA Court Following the Commission|436
2|3 Commission Using the EFTA Court as a Testing Ground|437
2|4 EFTA Court Not Following the Commission|439
2|5 Nullity Actions Against ESA Decisions|440
2|6 Result|440
1|30 Switzerland—From EU-phobia to EU-philia?|441
2|1 The Start: Defensive Attitude vis-à-vis Supranationalism|441
2|2 The Failed EEA Attempt and Its Consequences|442
3|2.1 The Federal Council’s Blunder|442
3|2.2 Sectoral Institution-Free Bilateralism as an Intermediate Step on the Road to the EU|444
2|3 Towards Institutionalisation?|448
3|3.1 2008 Onwards: The EU Pushes for Institutions|448
3|3.2 2010: A Cautious Opening Towards the EEA?|449
3|3.3 2011: Piano Piano|451
3|3.4 2012: The Futile Attempt to Establish a Swiss Pillar|452
2|4 From 2013 on: Acquiring Passive EU Membership?|454
3|4.1 General|454
3|4.2 The ECJ’s Rulings: Not Binding—Or Binding, but Not Final?|457
3|4.3 Cabinet Politics: The “Non-paper”|458
3|4.4 The Six Untenable Contentions About the EFTA Institutions|460
3|4.5 An Irresponsible Use of the “Foreign Judges” Formula|464
3|4.6 Going Down the Drain Step by Step|465
2|5 2014: Mass Immigration Initiative|469
2|6 2015 Onwards: Treading Water|470
3|6.1 Negotiation for the Sake of Negotiation|470
3|6.2 Mr. Burkhalter’s Replacement by Mr. Cassis|472
3|6.3 The EU Playing Hardball|472
3|6.4 A Sham Arbitration Mechanism?|473
3|6.5 Lessons to Be Learned|474
3|6.6 The Berne Gracious Lords|476
3|6.7 The Crisis of the Swiss Governance System|477
1|31 Brexit—No to an ‘Ever Closer Union’|479
2|1 The Inconceivable Happens|480
3|1.1 A Logical Step?|480
3|1.2 The Vote of 23 June 2016|481
3|1.3 Hard Brexit—HM Government’s First Choice|483
2|2 A Role for the EFTA Court President?|484
3|2.1 Perplexity After the British Leave Vote|484
3|2.2 What Is the EEA?|485
3|2.3 My Credo|485
2|3 My First Brexit Activities|488
3|3.1 Immediate Reaction|488
3|3.2 Keidanren|488
3|3.3 October 2016 in London|488
3|3.4 German-Speaking Countries|489
3|3.5 Scotland and Wales on Crutches|490
2|4 Things Heat Up|491
3|4.1 Summer 2017|491
3|4.2 My September 2017 Trip to London|492
3|4.3 An Unexpected, Yet Easily Comprehensible Attack|493
3|4.4 My November and December 2017 Trips to London|495
3|4.5 The Joint Report of 8 December 2017|496
3|4.6 Early 2018: Giving Evidence to Both Houses of Parliament|497
3|4.7 March 2018: Cross Party Event and Lecture at Queen Mary University|498
2|5 A Largely Domestic Problem?|498
3|5.1 The Start: PM May in the Hands of the Brexiteers|498
3|5.2 The Failed Snap Election|499
3|5.3 Labour’s Dilemma|499
3|5.4 The Usual Mantras|499
3|5.5 Parliament Speaks up|500
2|6 The Position of the 27|501
2|7 A Unique Chance for EFTA|502
3|7.1 General|502
3|7.2 Norway|503
3|7.3 Iceland|504
3|7.4 Liechtenstein|505
3|7.5 Switzerland|505
3|7.6 Conclusions|506
1|32 “Two Souls in Europe’s Breast”|507
2|1 Jacques Delors’ Desire|507
2|2 Political Integration Versus Economic Integration|508
3|2.1 Status quo|508
3|2.2 A Look Back into History|509
2|3 Common Law and Civil Law|510
3|3.1 General|510
3|3.2 Legal Origins Theory|510
3|3.3 Stare decisis: The Most Important Common Law Doctrine|511
3|3.4 Von Hayek’s Spontaneous Order Theory Applied to the Law|512
2|4 Commonalities of the Five Non-EU States|512
3|4.1 Belief in Free Trade and Open Markets|512
3|4.2 Notion of the State|513
3|4.3 Religious Foundations of Capitalism|513
3|4.4 Legal Systems|514
3|4.5 Image of Man|516
2|5 Conclusions|516
3|5.1 The Five EU Outsiders Ought to Join Forces|516
3|5.2 What About the Orphaned Insiders?|517
1|Epilogue|518
1|1. Announcement of My Resignation|518
1|Bibliography|523
1|Newspaper Articles and Interviews|538
1|Prologue|8
2|The EEA|8
2|The Definition of Independence—Being off Leash|9
2|The Independence of the European Judiciary|10
2|This Book’s Content|11
1|Contents|14
1|Abbreviations|27
1|List of Cases|31
2|EFTA Court|31
2|Icelandic Courts|34
2|Liechtenstein Courts|34
2|Norwegian Courts|35
2|Swiss Courts|35
2|European Union Courts|35
2|Austrian Courts|38
2|German Courts|38
2|Swedish Courts|38
2|UK Courts|38
2|ECTHR|39
2|US Courts|39
2|ILO Administrative Tribunal|39
1|1 My Pre-court Life|40
2|1 General|40
2|2 My Socialisation as a Lawyer|41
3|2.1 Studies and First Work Experiences|41
3|2.2 My German Journeyman Travels|42
2|3 University of St. Gallen|44
2|4 University of Texas|46
2|5 EEA Negotiations|46
1|2 EFTA Court Judge by Chance|47
2|1 Liechtenstein’s Choice of a Judge|47
2|2 Between Austin and Geneva|50
2|3 Flashback: EEA Negotiations|50
3|3.1 Start in Hotel Löwen in Vaduz|50
3|3.2 Advisor to the Princely Government|51
3|3.3 The “Shoals” of the EEA|52
3|3.4 The First Liechtenstein EEA Referendum|52
3|3.5 The Second Liechtenstein EEA Referendum|53
3|3.6 Afterword on the “Shoals”|53
1|3 The EEA—One Area with Two Courts|54
2|1 Introduction|54
2|2 The EFTA Court’s Difficult Birth|57
3|2.1 The ECJ’s First EEA Opinion|57
3|2.2 The ECJ’s Second EEA Opinion|58
2|3 The EEA Judiciary|58
3|3.1 ECJ|58
3|3.2 General Court|61
3|3.3 EFTA Court|61
2|4 Judges’ Background and Independence|63
3|4.1 General|63
3|4.2 Official Commitment to Independence and Impartiality|64
3|4.3 Threat to Independence and Impartiality in Practice|64
3|4.4 The EFTA Court’s Record|67
2|5 The Backbone of the EEA Agreement|68
3|5.1 Introduction|68
3|5.2 Reciprocity|68
3|5.3 Homogeneity|69
4|5.3.1 Legislative Level|69
4|5.3.2 Judicial Level|72
1|4 The Legacy of the Five-Member Court|76
2|1 General|76
2|2 Important Precedents|77
3|2.1 Access to Justice|77
3|2.2 Legal Nature of “Advisory Opinions”|78
3|2.3 Free Movement of Goods|78
3|2.4 Limits of the Transmitting State Principle|78
3|2.5 Effect|79
2|3 Cooperation Between National Courts and Governments|80
2|4 The Policy of the Three-Member Court|80
1|5 Resurrection from the Dead|82
2|1 What to Do if You Have no Cases?|82
2|2 Succession of Contracts: Part One|83
2|3 Settling in Luxembourg|83
2|4 Succession of Contracts: Part Two|85
2|5 The Beginning of the Dialogue with the EU Courts|86
1|6 The Member States—An Unholy Alliance|88
2|1 Introduction|88
2|2 Iceland|90
3|2.1 Mixed Economy|90
3|2.2 National Character|91
3|2.3 Judiciary|92
3|2.4 Failed Attempt to Join the EU|93
2|3 Liechtenstein|94
3|3.1 Mixed Economy|94
3|3.2 Customs and Currency Union with Switzerland and EEA Membership|95
3|3.3 National Character|95
3|3.4 Judiciary|96
2|4 Norway|96
3|4.1 Mixed Economy with High Public Ownership|96
3|4.2 National Character|98
4|4.2.1 General Remarks|98
4|4.2.2 Egalitarianism|99
4|4.2.3 Recent Oil and Gas Wealth|100
4|4.2.4 Complacency and a Sense of Mission|102
4|4.2.5 Everything Is Political|104
4|4.2.6 Result: Norwegian Exceptionalism|105
3|4.3 Judiciary|106
1|7 ESA—The Great Negotiator|108
2|1 General|108
2|2 ESA as a Prosecutor—A Promising Start|109
2|3 After 2002: High Fluctuation and Low Action|111
3|3.1 The Course of Things|111
3|3.2 Musical Chairs|117
3|3.3 Oda’s Double U-Turn|117
3|3.4 Competition Law in Particular|120
3|3.5 National Supreme Courts Disregarding EEA Law|121
2|4 Persistent Norwegian Dominance|122
3|4.1 The Facts|122
3|4.2 An Odd Attempt to Justify|122
3|4.3 New Rhetoric|123
2|5 Input in Preliminary Reference Proceedings|124
2|6 Contribution to ECJ Case Law|125
1|8 Preliminary References: All Options Open?|126
2|1 Starting Point: The EU Model|126
2|2 Complex Situation in the EFTA Pillar|127
3|2.1 History|127
3|2.2 Written Law|128
2|3 To Refer or Not to Refer|129
3|3.1 The Early Years|129
3|3.2 Gradual Progress in Iceland and Liechtenstein|130
3|3.3 Reluctance in Norway|132
2|4 Legal Nature of the Court’s Rulings|133
2|5 The Role of the Governments|134
3|5.1 Iceland|134
3|5.2 Liechtenstein|135
3|5.3 Norway|135
2|6 Irish Bank and Jonsson|142
3|6.1 Restriction of the Freedom to Refer|142
3|6.2 Lack of Clarity|143
3|6.3 Limiting the Effects of the Icelandic Appeal System|143
3|6.4 Background: 2011 Spring Conference|144
2|7 Conclusions|145
1|9 A Matter of Interpretation|146
2|1 Introduction|146
2|2 Relevant EU Case Law Available|147
3|2.1 ECJ Judgments|147
3|2.2 AGs Opinions|148
3|2.3 GC Judgments|148
2|3 Extra-Legal Considerations|148
3|3.1 General|148
3|3.2 Preunderstanding or Attitude|149
3|3.3 Strategic Considerations|152
3|3.4 Institutional Loyalty|153
2|4 Legal Considerations|153
3|4.1 General|153
3|4.2 Teleological Interpretation in Particular|154
3|4.3 Functional Interpretation in Particular|155
3|4.4 National Case Law and Academic Literature|156
2|5 The Accusation of Judicial Activism|157
3|5.1 General|157
3|5.2 Bridging the Widening Gap|159
2|6 Balanced Realism|161
2|7 My Approach|162
1|10 War Over Constitutional Principles|164
2|1 Starting Point: A Dilatory Formula Compromise|164
2|2 Effect: Deference to State Sovereignty|166
2|3 State Liability: Making or Breaking the EEA Agreement|166
3|3.1 Reference of the Sveinbjörnsdóttir Case|166
3|3.2 Proceedings and Judgment|167
3|3.3 A Salute from the ECJ|169
3|3.4 An Extrajudicial Dissent|170
3|3.5 A Failed Attempt to Turn the Clock Back|171
3|3.6 Acceptance by National Courts and Governments|172
2|4 Primacy: Deference to State Sovereignty|173
2|5 Conform Interpretation|174
1|11 Two Early Landmark Cases: Veronika’s Struggle and Enriched Cereals|175
2|1 Moonshine and the Consequences|175
2|2 Veronika’s First Arrow|176
3|2.1 EFTA Court: Norway Is in Breach|176
3|2.2 Supreme Court: Norway Is in Breach, but Veronika Is Left Out in the Rain|177
3|2.3 Political Implications|178
2|3 Veronika’s Second Arrow|179
2|4 Cornflakes Fortified with Vitamins and Iron|180
3|4.1 A New President|180
3|4.2 De gustibus non est disputandum—There’s no Accounting for Taste|181
3|4.3 The Kellogg’s Ruling|182
2|5 Other Prior Authorisation Cases|183
1|12 Fundamental Rights—The EFTA Court Amends the Law|185
2|1 Norway and Iceland Are Fundamental Rights Societies|185
2|2 Academic Controversy at the Beginning|186
2|3 Recognition of EEA Fundamental Rights|187
2|4 Interim Result|189
2|5 The EU Charter in Particular|189
1|13 Putting the EFTA Court on the Map|192
2|1 My Election as President|192
2|2 Taking Stock|193
2|3 Extrajudicial Activities of the Court|194
3|3.1 General|194
3|3.2 Regular Activities|195
3|3.3 Anniversaries|201
3|3.4 Annual Spring Conference|204
3|3.5 Publications|205
3|3.6 Media|206
2|4 Personal Extrajudicial Activities|208
3|4.1 Building Networks with EU Protagonists|208
3|4.2 Positioning the EFTA Court in Luxembourg|210
3|4.3 Social Life|210
3|4.4 Teaching|212
3|4.5 Speaking|212
3|4.6 The International Competition Law Forum (ICF) in Particular|214
3|4.7 Publishing|215
3|4.8 Media|218
1|14 The Economics of EEA Single Market Law|219
2|1 The EEA Agreement Has Created a Market|219
2|2 Competition Economics|220
2|3 State Aid Economics|222
2|4 Economics Beyond the Realm of Competition Law|223
3|4.1 General|223
3|4.2 Relevance for the EFTA Court|224
1|15 Fundamental Freedoms and the Cursed Proportionality Test|227
2|1 Are All Four Freedoms Indispensable?|227
2|2 The EFTA Court’s Approach to Proportionality|228
3|2.1 Origin and Key Features|228
3|2.2 Areas of Application|230
2|3 Some Landmark Cases|230
3|3.1 Free Movement of Goods|230
3|3.2 Free Movement of Goods and Freedom to Provide Services|233
3|3.3 Freedom to Provide Services and Right of Establishment|233
3|3.4 Right of Establishment and Free Movement of Capital|237
3|3.5 Free Movement of Capital|239
3|3.6 General Prohibition to Discriminate|240
2|4 Does Proportionality Mean Proportionality?|241
3|4.1 Liechtenstein Courts|241
3|4.2 Icelandic Courts|241
3|4.3 Norwegian Courts|242
2|5 ESA’s Position|245
1|16 Competition Law—A Rare Pleasure|246
2|1 General|246
2|2 Limits of Collective Bargaining and Industrial Action|247
3|2.1 Occupational Pension Insurance Schemes|247
3|2.2 Dockers’ Monopoly|250
2|3 Judicial Review|252
3|3.1 Scope|252
3|3.2 Review of Fines|253
2|4 Private Plaintiff as Private Attorney General|254
2|5 Right of Audience for In-House Counsel|255
2|6 Restriction of Competition by Object|256
2|7 Other Notable Cases|257
3|7.1 Protecting Competition Between Airlines|257
3|7.2 Application of EEA Competition Law to Public Bodies|259
2|8 Conclusions|261
1|17 State Aid Control—A More Frequent Pleasure|267
2|1 EU Law as a Starting Point|267
2|2 ESA’s Approach|268
2|3 Judicial Review|269
3|3.1 General|269
3|3.2 Locus Standi|270
3|3.3 Substance|276
2|4 The Court as a Ground Breaker|279
2|5 Aid to Agriculture and Fisheries|281
1|18 Secondary EEA Law—A Wide Sphere|282
2|1 General|282
2|2 Image of Man in the Internet Age|283
2|3 Contractual Model|284
3|3.1 Freedom of Contract and Consumer Protection|284
3|3.2 Sanctity of Contracts|285
2|4 Principle of Liability|287
3|4.1 Liability of a State in a Systemic Crisis|287
3|4.2 Award of a Public Contract to the Wrong Bidder|287
2|5 Adjustment of Price for a Mandatory Takeover Bid|287
2|6 Re-use of Public Sector Information|288
2|7 Information About Convictions of Legal Persons|289
2|8 Re-monopolisation of Works That Have Fallen into the Public Domain|289
1|19 Free Movement of Persons and Social Policy|292
2|1 Introduction|292
2|2 Transfer of Undertakings|294
2|3 Exportability of Helplessness Allowance|295
2|4 Citizenship Directive|295
2|5 Working Time Directive|297
2|6 Other Cases|298
3|6.1 Safety at Work|298
3|6.2 Social Security Schemes|299
3|6.3 Healthcare|300
3|6.4 Equal Treatment for Men and Women|302
1|20 Where’s the Beef?|303
2|1 The Origin of the Question|303
2|2 The Diagnosis|304
2|3 Limited Interest in the Beef in EFTA Circles|304
2|4 Remedial Measures|306
1|21 Judicial Dialogue Between the ECJ and the EFTA Court|308
2|1 Introduction|308
2|2 ECJ Going First|310
3|2.1 EFTA Court Follows the ECJ|310
3|2.2 EFTA Court Doesn’t Follow the ECJ|311
2|3 EFTA Court Going First|315
3|3.1 ECJ Follows the EFTA Court Explicitly|315
3|3.2 ECJ Follows the EFTA Court Implicitly|316
3|3.3 No Parallel Case Before the ECJ Yet|317
3|3.4 ECJ Follows the EFTA Court on a Second Attempt|317
3|3.5 EFTA Court Adjusting Its Jurisprudence to ECJ Case Law|320
2|4 Excursus: A Fortress Europe in the Field of Financial Services?|325
2|5 Contradictory ECJ Case Law|326
2|6 Relevance of ECtHR Case Law|328
2|7 Important Judgments on Homogeneity|328
2|8 EFTA Values|330
2|9 Conclusions|330
1|22 The Norwegian Social Model on the Brink of a Downfall?|332
2|1 General|332
2|2 Pedicel: If All Else Fails, Norsk Will Do It|333
2|3 Gaming Machines: “As Long as” Means Nothing|334
3|3.1 The Case|334
3|3.2 Oral Hearing|335
3|3.3 Judgment|335
3|3.4 The Supreme Court’s Judgment|335
2|4 Ladbrokes: Pick and Choose|336
3|4.1 The Case|336
3|4.2 Oral Hearing|336
3|4.3 Judgment|336
3|4.4 The Oslo District Court’s Judgment|337
2|5 Playing the EFTA Court off Against the ECJ|337
2|6 ESA Remains Inactive|338
2|7 The Government’s Happiness|339
2|8 Norwegian Waterfalls - Hjemfall: The Threat to “Us, Our Children and Grandchildren”|340
3|8.1 Pre-litigation Procedure|340
3|8.2 Background|340
3|8.3 Judgment|342
3|8.4 Consequences|342
1|23 The Failed Decapitation of Kong Carl|343
2|1 Conflict with the Court’s Auditors|343
2|2 Journalists Spice Things Up|344
2|3 Reappointment Under Unusual Circumstances|346
2|4 A Not Entirely Unexpected Sequel|349
2|5 Kong Carl av EØS—A Retrospective|350
3|5.1 The Article|350
3|5.2 Össur’s Explanation|352
2|6 Postlude|352
1|24 “Room for manoeuvre” for Norway!|354
2|1 An EEA/EFTA State Against Its Will|354
2|2 The Sejersted Report|356
3|2.1 Bombastic Presentation|356
3|2.2 Positivist Approach and Tunnel Vision|356
3|2.3 The New Mantra|358
3|2.4 Praising ESA and Bashing the Court|359
3|2.5 The Norwegian Social Model Safeguarded|360
3|2.6 Mainly Harmless. The Norwegian Model in Brussels|360
3|2.7 Some Are More Equal Than Others|360
3|2.8 Striking Back|361
2|3 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ White Paper|364
2|4 The Norwegian EEA Commentary|364
1|25 The Icesave Saga|367
2|1 The Rise and Downfall of the Icelandic Banks|367
2|2 Precipitous Application for EU Membership|372
2|3 Failed Attempts to Find a Political Solution|372
2|4 Icesave I|375
3|4.1 Pre-litigation Procedure|375
3|4.2 Composition of the Court|376
3|4.3 Oral Hearing|376
3|4.4 Judgment|377
3|4.5 Reactions|379
2|5 Icesave II and Icesave III|382
2|6 Return to the “Courant Normal”|382
3|6.1 Withdrawal of Iceland’s EU Application|382
3|6.2 Brits and Icelanders Put Icesave Behind Them|383
1|26 Gunfight at the Oslo Corral|384
2|1 The Historic Example|384
2|2 Høyesterett’s Reference Boycott|385
3|2.1 The Facts|385
3|2.2 The Academic Whisperers|386
3|2.3 Untenability of the Mechanical Approach|387
2|3 Open Conflict|388
2|4 Frontal Attack on the Supreme Court—“Frontalangrep på Høyesterett”|390
3|4.1 First Skirmish in Tromsø|390
3|4.2 Aftenposten Picks up the Issue|392
3|4.3 The Nordic Labour Journal Follows Suit|392
2|5 Chief Justices’ Teatime|393
2|6 The Oslo Peace Process|394
2|7 ESA’s Caution|395
1|27 Working Methods and Judicial Style|398
2|1 The EFTA Court’s Structure|398
3|1.1 Composition|398
3|1.2 Cabinet System and Manning Table|399
3|1.3 Language Regime|399
2|2 Procedure|399
3|2.1 General|399
3|2.2 Assignment of the Case to a Judge Rapporteur|400
3|2.3 Written Procedure|401
3|2.4 Report for the Hearing|401
3|2.5 Applications for Intervention and for Interim Measures|401
3|2.6 Oral Hearing|402
3|2.7 Resolving the Case and Delivery of the Judgment|402
3|2.8 Peculiarities of a Three-Member Court|403
2|3 Reasoning|403
3|3.1 Early Considerations|403
3|3.2 What Has Been Achieved?|405
3|3.3 Use of dicta|411
2|4 Correlation Between Style and Content|414
2|5 Lack of a Dissenting Opinion System|415
1|28 Attack on the EFTA Court’s Integrity|417
2|1 Introduction|417
2|2 A Second Term for Judge Christiansen?|418
3|2.1 Divided Norwegian Administration|418
3|2.2 A Norwegian Panel Dominated by Bureaucrats|419
3|2.3 The Norwegian Public Becomes Aware of the Matter|421
2|3 Abridging a Judge’s Term at All Costs|422
3|3.1 A Cheap Compromise|422
3|3.2 The Two Other Governments Have Reservations|422
3|3.3 The Two Other Governments Cave In|422
3|3.4 The Unlawful Decision|423
2|4 Courageous Lawyers Stand Up|424
3|4.1 Complaints by Norwegian Academics|424
3|4.2 ESA Reacts|426
3|4.3 The Liechtenstein Court of Appeal Steps In|427
3|4.4 The Norwegian Judges Association Protests|427
3|4.5 POLITICO Accuses Norway of Meddling with Judicial Independence|428
2|5 The Court’s Answers|429
3|5.1 An Absurd Notion of Bias|429
3|5.2 The Court’s Valentine’s Day Decision|429
3|5.3 The President’s Washington’s Birthday Order|430
2|6 The Governments Show Little Discernment|430
3|6.1 The Unheard Call for the Establishment of a Supranational Panel|430
3|6.2 2017 EFTA Ministerial Meeting in Svalbard|432
3|6.3 2017 Conference “Norway in Europe”|433
3|6.4 My Last Speech Before the ESA/Court Committee|433
1|29 The Commission—The EFTA Court’s Patron Saint?|435
2|1 The Commission’s Role|435
2|2 EFTA Court Following the Commission|436
2|3 Commission Using the EFTA Court as a Testing Ground|437
2|4 EFTA Court Not Following the Commission|439
2|5 Nullity Actions Against ESA Decisions|440
2|6 Result|440
1|30 Switzerland—From EU-phobia to EU-philia?|441
2|1 The Start: Defensive Attitude vis-à-vis Supranationalism|441
2|2 The Failed EEA Attempt and Its Consequences|442
3|2.1 The Federal Council’s Blunder|442
3|2.2 Sectoral Institution-Free Bilateralism as an Intermediate Step on the Road to the EU|444
2|3 Towards Institutionalisation?|448
3|3.1 2008 Onwards: The EU Pushes for Institutions|448
3|3.2 2010: A Cautious Opening Towards the EEA?|449
3|3.3 2011: Piano Piano|451
3|3.4 2012: The Futile Attempt to Establish a Swiss Pillar|452
2|4 From 2013 on: Acquiring Passive EU Membership?|454
3|4.1 General|454
3|4.2 The ECJ’s Rulings: Not Binding—Or Binding, but Not Final?|457
3|4.3 Cabinet Politics: The “Non-paper”|458
3|4.4 The Six Untenable Contentions About the EFTA Institutions|460
3|4.5 An Irresponsible Use of the “Foreign Judges” Formula|464
3|4.6 Going Down the Drain Step by Step|465
2|5 2014: Mass Immigration Initiative|469
2|6 2015 Onwards: Treading Water|470
3|6.1 Negotiation for the Sake of Negotiation|470
3|6.2 Mr. Burkhalter’s Replacement by Mr. Cassis|472
3|6.3 The EU Playing Hardball|472
3|6.4 A Sham Arbitration Mechanism?|473
3|6.5 Lessons to Be Learned|474
3|6.6 The Berne Gracious Lords|476
3|6.7 The Crisis of the Swiss Governance System|477
1|31 Brexit—No to an ‘Ever Closer Union’|479
2|1 The Inconceivable Happens|480
3|1.1 A Logical Step?|480
3|1.2 The Vote of 23 June 2016|481
3|1.3 Hard Brexit—HM Government’s First Choice|483
2|2 A Role for the EFTA Court President?|484
3|2.1 Perplexity After the British Leave Vote|484
3|2.2 What Is the EEA?|485
3|2.3 My Credo|485
2|3 My First Brexit Activities|488
3|3.1 Immediate Reaction|488
3|3.2 Keidanren|488
3|3.3 October 2016 in London|488
3|3.4 German-Speaking Countries|489
3|3.5 Scotland and Wales on Crutches|490
2|4 Things Heat Up|491
3|4.1 Summer 2017|491
3|4.2 My September 2017 Trip to London|492
3|4.3 An Unexpected, Yet Easily Comprehensible Attack|493
3|4.4 My November and December 2017 Trips to London|495
3|4.5 The Joint Report of 8 December 2017|496
3|4.6 Early 2018: Giving Evidence to Both Houses of Parliament|497
3|4.7 March 2018: Cross Party Event and Lecture at Queen Mary University|498
2|5 A Largely Domestic Problem?|498
3|5.1 The Start: PM May in the Hands of the Brexiteers|498
3|5.2 The Failed Snap Election|499
3|5.3 Labour’s Dilemma|499
3|5.4 The Usual Mantras|499
3|5.5 Parliament Speaks up|500
2|6 The Position of the 27|501
2|7 A Unique Chance for EFTA|502
3|7.1 General|502
3|7.2 Norway|503
3|7.3 Iceland|504
3|7.4 Liechtenstein|505
3|7.5 Switzerland|505
3|7.6 Conclusions|506
1|32 “Two Souls in Europe’s Breast”|507
2|1 Jacques Delors’ Desire|507
2|2 Political Integration Versus Economic Integration|508
3|2.1 Status quo|508
3|2.2 A Look Back into History|509
2|3 Common Law and Civil Law|510
3|3.1 General|510
3|3.2 Legal Origins Theory|510
3|3.3 Stare decisis: The Most Important Common Law Doctrine|511
3|3.4 Von Hayek’s Spontaneous Order Theory Applied to the Law|512
2|4 Commonalities of the Five Non-EU States|512
3|4.1 Belief in Free Trade and Open Markets|512
3|4.2 Notion of the State|513
3|4.3 Religious Foundations of Capitalism|513
3|4.4 Legal Systems|514
3|4.5 Image of Man|516
2|5 Conclusions|516
3|5.1 The Five EU Outsiders Ought to Join Forces|516
3|5.2 What About the Orphaned Insiders?|517
1|Epilogue|518
1|1. Announcement of My Resignation|518
1|Bibliography|523
1|Newspaper Articles and Interviews|538