File #2642: "2019_Book_DeferenceToTheAdministrationIn.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|6
1|Preface|8
1|Acknowledgements|10
1|Contents|12
1|Editors and Contributors|14
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review: Comparative Perspectives|15
2|1 Introduction|16
2|2 The Role of the Courts: Setting the Scene for Discussion|17
2|3 Defining the Concept of ``Deference´´|19
2|4 Deferential Judicial Review in Operation|21
3|4.1 Deference rationae personae or rationae materiae|21
3|4.2 Deference and the Separation of Powers|22
3|4.3 Political Issues and Deference to the Political Branches of the Government|23
3|4.4 Deference to the Executive|24
3|4.5 Deference Due to the Nature of the Courts|25
3|4.6 Technical Deference|25
3|4.7 How Deference Is Manifested|26
2|5 Deference and the Rule of Law|27
2|6 Concluding Remarks|29
2|Annex: Questionnaire on ``Deferene to the Administration in Judicial Review´´|30
3|Introduction: Concept and Definition|31
3|Objectives of the Project|32
3|Proposed Structure|32
3|Main Questions/Issues|33
4|Introduction to National System|33
4|Questions Concerning Judicial Deference|33
4|Comparison and Lessons to Learn|34
2|References|34
2|Books|34
2|Articles|34
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Argentina|36
2|1 Judicial Review in Argentinean Law|36
3|1.1 Brief Introduction to the Argentinean Legal System|36
3|1.2 Judicial Control of Acts of the Administration|38
4|1.2.1 First Stage: Restricted Review|39
4|1.2.2 Second Stage: Broad Review|40
3|1.3 Judicial Review of Administrative Actions|41
3|1.4 Control of Decisions Made by Regulatory Bodies|42
2|2 Questions Concerning Judicial Deference|43
3|2.1 When, Why, and How Much Should Reviewing Courts Defer to Administrative Agency Decisions?|43
3|2.2 Should It Matter What Type of Agency Action Is Being Reviewed?|43
3|2.3 What Standard/Approach/Grounds Should Courts Adopt When Reviewing an Administrative Decision? How Are These Grounds/Standa...|45
3|2.4 In Relation to the Above, Reporters Are Invited to, if Applicable: (a) Probe the Treatment of Fact Finding, Especially Tha...|46
3|2.5 Why in This Jurisdiction, the Courts Tend to Be Active and More Engaging (Judicial Activism), While in Others the Courts P...|47
2|3 Conclusion|49
2|References|49
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Australia|51
2|1 Introduction|52
3|1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Paper: Judicial Deference|52
3|1.2 The Federal Legal and Political System|52
3|1.3 The Australian Constitution and the Separation of Powers|54
2|2 The System of Administrative Law in Australia|56
3|2.1 Introduction|56
3|2.2 Judicial Review Under the Commonwealth Constitution: Section 75(v)|57
3|2.3 Statutory Judicial Review|58
3|2.4 Statutory Merits Review|60
2|3 Introduction to Judicial Deference in Australia|63
2|4 The Identity of the Decision-Maker and the Nature of the Decision|65
3|4.1 Justiciability and Political Questions|65
3|4.2 Decisions by Cabinet|68
3|4.3 Actions of the Governor and Governor-General|69
3|4.4 Exercise of the Privileges and Powers of the Parliament|71
3|4.5 Prisoners and Prosecutions|71
3|4.6 Specialist Expertise|73
3|4.7 Government Policy|74
2|5 Privative Clauses and Deference|80
2|6 Deference to the Process: Procedural Fairness and Jurisdictional Error|84
2|7 Fact Finding and Jurisdictional Error|86
2|8 Non-jurisdictional Fact Finding: What Test Applies?|88
3|8.1 Wednesbury Unreasonableness|88
3|8.2 Irrationality and Illogicality|91
3|8.3 Proportionality|93
2|9 Conclusion|93
2|References|95
1|Comparer la déférence judiciaire : regards canadiens vers l´extérieur|100
2|1 Introduction|101
2|2 ARRIÈRE-PLAN CONCEPTUEL DE LA DÉFÉRENCE|102
3|2.1 Immunité de la Couronne|102
3|2.2 Justiciabilité du litige|104
3|2.3 Révision judiciaire et appel|106
2|3 LA DÉFÉRENCE JUDICIAIRE : UNE ŒUVRE SYSYPHÉENNE|107
3|3.1 Compétence « préliminaire »|108
3|3.2 Normes de contrôle|110
3|3.3 Valeurs de la Charte|112
2|4 Conclusion|114
2|Références|115
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in China|116
2|1 Introduction|116
3|1.1 Constitutional Structure and Judicial Power|116
4|1.1.1 Separation of Powers in China and a Weak Judiciary|116
4|1.1.2 Recent Reforms About Administrative Litigation|117
3|1.2 China´s Courts´ System and the Administrative Division|119
3|1.3 Administrative Litigation and Other Relevant Mechanisms|120
4|1.3.1 Letter-and-Visit Complaint and Administrative Litigation|120
4|1.3.2 Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation|121
3|1.4 Literature on Judicial Deference in Chinese Scholarship|122
2|2 Judicial Deference in China|123
3|2.1 Institutional Design of Judicial Review|123
4|2.1.1 The Scope of Judicial Review|123
4|2.1.2 The Principles of Judicial Review|126
3|2.2 Deference in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions|127
4|2.2.1 Deference in the Review of the Factual Issues|127
4|2.2.2 Deference in the Review of Legal Issues|130
4|2.2.3 The Review of the Administrative Action Within the Discretion|133
3|2.3 The Remedies of Judicial Review|135
3|2.4 Theoretical Discussion Over the Relevant Cases|136
4|2.4.1 What Influenced the Deference of the Courts?|136
4|2.4.2 The Degrees of Judicial Deference|138
2|3 Conclusion|138
3|3.1 The Features of Chinese-Style Judicial Deference|138
3|3.2 The Future of Judicial Deference in China|139
2|References|140
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in the Czech Republic|143
2|1 Introduction|143
2|2 Judicial Review and Deference to the Administration: Institutional Settings|144
2|3 Judicial Deference to the Administration: Leading Concepts|149
3|3.1 The Court Cannot Go Beyond the Plaintiff´s Arguments|149
3|3.2 The Decline of Judicial Deference to the Administrative Interpretation of Law?|149
3|3.3 Administrative Discretion: The Bastion of Judicial Deference?|151
3|3.4 Judicial Deference and Administrative Penal Law|153
3|3.5 The Treatment of Fact Finding Based on Science and Technology|156
3|3.6 The Use of Proportionality Review|157
3|3.7 Zone Planning and Self-Administration|158
3|3.8 Deference and Courts´ Interim Measures|160
3|3.9 Cassation Principle|161
3|3.10 Period of Prescription (Statutes of Limitation) and the Protection of Good Faith|162
2|4 Conclusions|163
2|References|164
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Denmark|166
2|1 The Development of Judicial Review in Denmark|166
2|2 The General Approach to Judicial Review|167
2|3 The Principle of Manifestly Wrong Decision Making (in Danish ``Åbenbar Urimelighed´´)|168
2|4 An Interpretation of the Words and Meaning of the Section of the Act Defines the Scope of the Investigation|169
3|4.1 Areas Where the Courts Conduct a Full Review|170
3|4.2 Areas Where the Courts Conduct a Limited Review or no Review at All|170
2|5 Concluding Remarks|171
2|References|171
2|Literature|171
2|Laws|171
2|Danish Supreme Court Cases|172
2|Other Court Cases|172
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review: The European Union|173
2|1 Introduction|173
3|1.1 The Judicial Architecture of the European Union|173
3|1.2 The Grounds of Review of Administrative Action|175
3|1.3 The Concept of `Discretion´ in the EU Legal System|175
2|2 Intensity of Review of `Technical Discretion´ in the EU Legal System: The Evolving Threshold of `Manifest Error´|176
3|2.1 The Early Case Law and the `Light-Touch´ Approach|176
3|2.2 The Tetra Laval Case and the Path Towards a More Intensive Review|177
3|2.3 Probing the Test of `Manifest Error´ Beyond Competition Law|180
4|2.3.1 Public Health and the Environment|180
4|2.3.2 Fundamental Rights|181
2|3 Intensity of Review of Discretion stricto sensu in the EU Legal System: Between `Manifest Error´ and the Principle of Propor...|182
3|3.1 Manifest Error|182
3|3.2 Proportionality Review|183
2|4 Conclusions|185
2|References|186
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Finland|188
2|1 Introduction|188
3|1.1 General Background|188
4|1.1.1 The Legal System and the Role of the Executive|188
4|1.1.2 Sources of Law|189
4|1.1.3 The Judiciary|190
3|1.2 Judicial Procedure|191
2|2 Special Characteristics|191
3|2.1 Procedural Requirements|191
4|2.1.1 Fair Trial in Administrative Cases|191
4|2.1.2 Equality of the Parties: Equality of Arms|192
3|2.2 Definitions and Characterizations|193
4|2.2.1 The Dual Role of the Administrative Courts vis-à-vis the Executive|193
4|2.2.2 A Characterisation of the Concept of ``Deference´´ or ``Judicial Deference´´|194
2|3 Judicial Deference|196
3|3.1 The Scope of Deference|196
4|3.1.1 Judicial Deference and the Intensity of Judicial Review|197
4|3.1.2 Powers of the Court|197
3|3.2 Specific Types of Agency Action|198
4|3.2.1 Administrative Decisions|198
4|3.2.2 Outsourcing|198
4|3.2.3 Administrative Governance Outside Judicial Review|198
2|4 Standards, Approaches and Grounds of Review|199
3|4.1 Standard Grounds of Judicial Review|199
3|4.2 Principles of Administrative Law As Grounds of Review|200
3|4.3 Constitutional Grounds for Review|200
3|4.4 The Effectiveness of Judicial Review|201
2|5 Dimensions of Deference|202
3|5.1 The Role of Information and the Investigation Principle|202
3|5.2 Judicial Construction|203
3|5.3 Proportionality and Other Legal Principles|203
2|6 Activism or Restraint|204
2|7 Limits of Judicial Review|204
3|7.1 Policy Issues|204
3|7.2 Separation of Powers|205
3|7.3 Constitutional Review|205
3|7.4 Administrative Inaction|206
3|7.5 Local Self-government|206
2|8 Concluding Remarks|206
2|References|207
1|A Principled Approach to Judicial Deference for Hong Kong|209
2|1 The Constitutional and Political Context of Hong Kong|211
2|2 Deference: Definition, Underlying Factors and Means of Exhibition|213
2|3 Current Approach: Doctrine and Practice|214
3|3.1 General Principles Where Rights Are Involved|215
3|3.2 Equality and the Socioeconomic Context|217
3|3.3 Immigration Decisions|219
3|3.4 ``Political´´ Judgments|220
3|3.5 National Security Assessments|221
3|3.6 Moral Judgments|222
2|4 Critiques and Suggestions for a General Approach|223
2|5 Application of Suggested Approach to Hong Kong|228
3|5.1 Standard of Review|229
3|5.2 Giving Weight to the Government´s Views: Constitutional and Institutional Competence|230
2|6 Conclusion|232
2|References|234
1|Judicial Deference to the Administration in Israel|236
2|1 Introduction|236
2|2 ``Deference´´: The Concept|238
3|2.1 ``Deference´´ and ``Restraint´´|238
3|2.2 ``Deference´´ in Hebrew|241
2|3 Israel´s Political and Legal System: An Overview|242
3|3.1 History and Political Structure|242
3|3.2 Legal Structure|245
4|3.2.1 General|245
4|3.2.2 Types of Rules|246
5|Constitutional-Type Legislation|246
5|Primary Legislation|247
5|Secondary Legislation|248
5|Emergency Law and Regulations|249
5|Tertiary Rules|249
3|3.3 Judicial Review of Administrative Action|249
3|3.4 A Tale of Judicial Expansion|252
2|4 Israel´s ``Activist´´ Supreme Court and the Demise of Deference and Restraint: A Myth?|254
3|4.1 Deference ``stricto sensu´´ in Israel´s Supreme Court|254
4|4.1.1 Introduction and Methodology|254
4|4.1.2 ``Deference´´: Explicit References|255
4|4.1.3 Extraction of Three Theoretical Rationales for Deference/Restraint|258
2|5 Judicial Restraint in Israel´s Supreme Court Review of the Administration: A Context-Based Overview|260
3|5.1 Introduction|260
3|5.2 Restraint in the Review of Secondary Legislation|261
3|5.3 Human Rights|262
3|5.4 Public Ethics: Appointments, Removal and the Criminal Process|264
3|5.5 Government Policy|266
2|6 The Future of Deference as a Main Version of Restraint: Two Conflicting Recent Decisions|268
3|6.1 Deri (2016)|268
3|6.2 Seligman (2018)|270
2|7 Conclusion|271
2|References|273
1|Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Italy: Beyond Deference?|275
2|1 An Intriguing Case|275
2|2 A Constitutional Overview: An Asystematic Administrative Justice?|277
2|3 Judicial Review of Administration: Dynamics of Change|279
3|3.1 The Age of Blind Deference (1865-1890)|279
3|3.2 Deference by Other Names (1890-1999)|280
3|3.3 A Diminishing Deference (1999-2018)|281
2|4 Judicial Review by Administrative Courts|282
3|4.1 Deference: Anti-terrorism Measures and Antitrust|282
3|4.2 Toward a Full Jurisdiction Standard|284
3|4.3 Standards and Evidence|287
3|4.4 Summary|289
2|5 A Quick Look at the `Other´ Judges of the Administration|289
3|5.1 Judicial Review by Ordinary Courts|289
3|5.2 The Liability of Civil Servants|291
2|6 Contrasting Views|293
3|6.1 Inadequacies of Judicial Review from the Viewpoint of the ECHR|293
3|6.2 Political Reactions to (Perceived) Judicial Activism|294
2|7 Conclusion|295
2|References|296
2|Books|296
2|Journal Articles and Book Chapters|296
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Japan|298
2|1 Introduction|299
3|1.1 The General Legal Framework of Administrative Activities|299
3|1.2 Judicial Review Over the Administration in General|302
2|2 The Framework of Discussion on Administrative Discretion and Judicial Review|303
3|2.1 A Historical Overview|303
3|2.2 The Functional Approach|305
3|2.3 The Contemporary Baseline of Discussion|307
2|3 Modes of Judicial Review Over Administrative Actions|308
2|4 Standards the Court May Adopt When It Reviews Administrative Actions|312
3|4.1 Errors in Finding Facts|313
3|4.2 Purpose Violation or Injustice of Motive|313
3|4.3 Contravention of the General Principle of Law|313
4|4.3.1 Contravention of the Equality Principle|313
4|4.3.2 Contravention of the Proportionality Principle|314
4|4.3.3 Contravention of the Good Faith Principle|314
2|5 Review of the Administrative Decision-Making Process|314
2|6 The Areas in Which Administrative Discretion Is Often Recognized and Judicial Review|316
3|6.1 Education|316
3|6.2 Matters Related to Public Officials|317
3|6.3 Areas of Immigration Control and Diplomacy|318
3|6.4 Area of Treatment of Inmates and Detainees|319
3|6.5 Areas Where Reference to Specialist Knowledge and Skills Is Especially Required|320
3|6.6 Administrative Inaction: The Failure to Exert Administrative Discretionary Power|322
3|6.7 Administrative Legislation|323
2|7 Conclusion|324
2|References|326
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review: The Case of the Netherlands|329
2|1 Introduction|329
2|2 The Dutch Context: The System of Legal Protection Against the Government|331
2|3 The Development of the Doctrine on the Basis of the Supreme Court Judgment in Doetinchem|334
2|4 Intermezzo: The European Court of Human Rights Demands Judicial Legal Protection Against Government Decisions in Benthem|335
2|5 The General Administrative Law Act As the Green Light for Further Development of the Doctrine with Harmonising Effect on Var...|336
2|6 Conclusion, with an Outlook for the Future: After Harmonisation, Moving Towards Differentiation and a Greater Focus on Propo...|338
3|6.1 Moving Towards Differentiation and a Focus on Proportionality|338
3|6.2 But with Limits, Due to the Necessary Expertise|341
2|References|343
1|The ``Dreadful Truth´´ and Transparent Fictions: Deference in New Zealand Administrative Law|347
2|1 Introduction|347
2|2 The Constitutional Context|349
2|3 The New Zealand ``System´´ of Judicial Review|351
2|4 The Difficulty of Deference: Justification for Judicial Review in New Zealand|352
2|5 Statutory Deference|354
2|6 Deference and the Traditional Heads of Review|355
2|7 Variable Intensity Review and Reasonableness|357
2|8 Providing Structure to Deference in NZ: Taggart´s Rainbow|360
2|9 Conclusion|362
2|References|363
1|Deference to the Public Administration in Judicial Review: A Polish Perspective|365
2|1 Introduction: A Historical Review|365
2|2 Concept and Its Adoption|370
3|2.1 Polish Context|371
3|2.2 Recent Development of Administrative Justice|371
3|2.3 Constitutional Ground|373
3|2.4 In the Context of the European Union|374
2|3 The Practice of Judicial Review and the Power of the Courts|375
3|3.1 The Difficulty of Application of Deference Doctrine|376
3|3.2 Deference and the Balance of Powers|376
2|4 Conclusion|378
2|References|379
1|`The Notion of a Subjective or Unfettered Discretion is Contrary to the Rule of Law´: Judicial Review of Administrative Action...|380
2|1 Introduction|380
2|2 Overview of Deference and the Green-Light Approach to Judicial Review|384
2|3 Justiciability|387
2|4 Judicial Scrutiny and Varying Intensities of Review|394
2|5 Judicial Deference on Interpretations of Law: A New Standard of Review?|397
2|6 Conclusion|401
2|References|404
1|Full Judicial Review or Administrative Discretion? A Swedish Perspective on Deference to the Administration|406
2|1 Introduction|406
2|2 Background|407
2|3 Administrative-Judicial Appeal|410
2|4 Municipal Appeal|412
2|5 Legal Review of Governmental Decisions|413
2|6 Conclusion|414
2|References|415
1|Judicial Deference to the Administration in the United States|417
2|1 Introduction to the Legal and Administrative Structure of the United States and the Subject of Judicial Deference|418
3|1.1 Structure of the U.S. Legal and Administrative System|418
3|1.2 Introduction to the Concepts of Deference and Discretion|420
3|1.3 De Jure Deference in the APA Standards for Judicial Review|421
3|1.4 The Concept of Discretion|423
3|1.5 The Connection Between de Jure Deference and de Jure Discretion|424
2|2 The Practice of Judicial Deference in the United States|425
3|2.1 De Jure Deference Part I: Basic Rationality Review of Agency Action Within the Agency´s Zone of Discretion|425
4|2.1.1 ``Substantial Evidence´´: A Standard of Medium Deference for Fact-Finding in Formal Processes|425
4|2.1.2 ``Arbitrary and Capricious´´ Review: The Most Generally Applicable Standard of Medium Deference|427
4|2.1.3 The Specially Deferential Standard for Review of Agency Rejections of Petitions to Engage in Rulemaking|429
3|2.2 De Jure Deference Part II: The Special Problem of Deference to Agency Interpretation of Vague or Ambiguous Language in Sta...|430
4|2.2.1 Chevron Deference|430
4|2.2.2 The Meaning of Chevron|432
4|2.2.3 The Puzzles of Chevron|433
4|2.2.4 The Triumph and Genius of Chevron|433
4|2.2.5 The Search for Chevron Step Zero|435
4|2.2.6 Chevron´s Possible Fall|437
4|2.2.7 Auer or Seminole Rock Deference: Deference to an Agency´s Interpretation of Its Own Regulations|437
3|2.3 De Facto Deference and Skidmore Deference|438
3|2.4 The Puzzle of Military, Security, and Foreign Affairs Issues|440
3|2.5 The Puzzle of Science and Technology|441
2|3 Summary and Comparative Remarks|443
2|References|444
1|Preface|8
1|Acknowledgements|10
1|Contents|12
1|Editors and Contributors|14
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review: Comparative Perspectives|15
2|1 Introduction|16
2|2 The Role of the Courts: Setting the Scene for Discussion|17
2|3 Defining the Concept of ``Deference´´|19
2|4 Deferential Judicial Review in Operation|21
3|4.1 Deference rationae personae or rationae materiae|21
3|4.2 Deference and the Separation of Powers|22
3|4.3 Political Issues and Deference to the Political Branches of the Government|23
3|4.4 Deference to the Executive|24
3|4.5 Deference Due to the Nature of the Courts|25
3|4.6 Technical Deference|25
3|4.7 How Deference Is Manifested|26
2|5 Deference and the Rule of Law|27
2|6 Concluding Remarks|29
2|Annex: Questionnaire on ``Deferene to the Administration in Judicial Review´´|30
3|Introduction: Concept and Definition|31
3|Objectives of the Project|32
3|Proposed Structure|32
3|Main Questions/Issues|33
4|Introduction to National System|33
4|Questions Concerning Judicial Deference|33
4|Comparison and Lessons to Learn|34
2|References|34
2|Books|34
2|Articles|34
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Argentina|36
2|1 Judicial Review in Argentinean Law|36
3|1.1 Brief Introduction to the Argentinean Legal System|36
3|1.2 Judicial Control of Acts of the Administration|38
4|1.2.1 First Stage: Restricted Review|39
4|1.2.2 Second Stage: Broad Review|40
3|1.3 Judicial Review of Administrative Actions|41
3|1.4 Control of Decisions Made by Regulatory Bodies|42
2|2 Questions Concerning Judicial Deference|43
3|2.1 When, Why, and How Much Should Reviewing Courts Defer to Administrative Agency Decisions?|43
3|2.2 Should It Matter What Type of Agency Action Is Being Reviewed?|43
3|2.3 What Standard/Approach/Grounds Should Courts Adopt When Reviewing an Administrative Decision? How Are These Grounds/Standa...|45
3|2.4 In Relation to the Above, Reporters Are Invited to, if Applicable: (a) Probe the Treatment of Fact Finding, Especially Tha...|46
3|2.5 Why in This Jurisdiction, the Courts Tend to Be Active and More Engaging (Judicial Activism), While in Others the Courts P...|47
2|3 Conclusion|49
2|References|49
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Australia|51
2|1 Introduction|52
3|1.1 Purpose and Scope of the Paper: Judicial Deference|52
3|1.2 The Federal Legal and Political System|52
3|1.3 The Australian Constitution and the Separation of Powers|54
2|2 The System of Administrative Law in Australia|56
3|2.1 Introduction|56
3|2.2 Judicial Review Under the Commonwealth Constitution: Section 75(v)|57
3|2.3 Statutory Judicial Review|58
3|2.4 Statutory Merits Review|60
2|3 Introduction to Judicial Deference in Australia|63
2|4 The Identity of the Decision-Maker and the Nature of the Decision|65
3|4.1 Justiciability and Political Questions|65
3|4.2 Decisions by Cabinet|68
3|4.3 Actions of the Governor and Governor-General|69
3|4.4 Exercise of the Privileges and Powers of the Parliament|71
3|4.5 Prisoners and Prosecutions|71
3|4.6 Specialist Expertise|73
3|4.7 Government Policy|74
2|5 Privative Clauses and Deference|80
2|6 Deference to the Process: Procedural Fairness and Jurisdictional Error|84
2|7 Fact Finding and Jurisdictional Error|86
2|8 Non-jurisdictional Fact Finding: What Test Applies?|88
3|8.1 Wednesbury Unreasonableness|88
3|8.2 Irrationality and Illogicality|91
3|8.3 Proportionality|93
2|9 Conclusion|93
2|References|95
1|Comparer la déférence judiciaire : regards canadiens vers l´extérieur|100
2|1 Introduction|101
2|2 ARRIÈRE-PLAN CONCEPTUEL DE LA DÉFÉRENCE|102
3|2.1 Immunité de la Couronne|102
3|2.2 Justiciabilité du litige|104
3|2.3 Révision judiciaire et appel|106
2|3 LA DÉFÉRENCE JUDICIAIRE : UNE ŒUVRE SYSYPHÉENNE|107
3|3.1 Compétence « préliminaire »|108
3|3.2 Normes de contrôle|110
3|3.3 Valeurs de la Charte|112
2|4 Conclusion|114
2|Références|115
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in China|116
2|1 Introduction|116
3|1.1 Constitutional Structure and Judicial Power|116
4|1.1.1 Separation of Powers in China and a Weak Judiciary|116
4|1.1.2 Recent Reforms About Administrative Litigation|117
3|1.2 China´s Courts´ System and the Administrative Division|119
3|1.3 Administrative Litigation and Other Relevant Mechanisms|120
4|1.3.1 Letter-and-Visit Complaint and Administrative Litigation|120
4|1.3.2 Administrative Reconsideration and Administrative Litigation|121
3|1.4 Literature on Judicial Deference in Chinese Scholarship|122
2|2 Judicial Deference in China|123
3|2.1 Institutional Design of Judicial Review|123
4|2.1.1 The Scope of Judicial Review|123
4|2.1.2 The Principles of Judicial Review|126
3|2.2 Deference in Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions|127
4|2.2.1 Deference in the Review of the Factual Issues|127
4|2.2.2 Deference in the Review of Legal Issues|130
4|2.2.3 The Review of the Administrative Action Within the Discretion|133
3|2.3 The Remedies of Judicial Review|135
3|2.4 Theoretical Discussion Over the Relevant Cases|136
4|2.4.1 What Influenced the Deference of the Courts?|136
4|2.4.2 The Degrees of Judicial Deference|138
2|3 Conclusion|138
3|3.1 The Features of Chinese-Style Judicial Deference|138
3|3.2 The Future of Judicial Deference in China|139
2|References|140
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in the Czech Republic|143
2|1 Introduction|143
2|2 Judicial Review and Deference to the Administration: Institutional Settings|144
2|3 Judicial Deference to the Administration: Leading Concepts|149
3|3.1 The Court Cannot Go Beyond the Plaintiff´s Arguments|149
3|3.2 The Decline of Judicial Deference to the Administrative Interpretation of Law?|149
3|3.3 Administrative Discretion: The Bastion of Judicial Deference?|151
3|3.4 Judicial Deference and Administrative Penal Law|153
3|3.5 The Treatment of Fact Finding Based on Science and Technology|156
3|3.6 The Use of Proportionality Review|157
3|3.7 Zone Planning and Self-Administration|158
3|3.8 Deference and Courts´ Interim Measures|160
3|3.9 Cassation Principle|161
3|3.10 Period of Prescription (Statutes of Limitation) and the Protection of Good Faith|162
2|4 Conclusions|163
2|References|164
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Denmark|166
2|1 The Development of Judicial Review in Denmark|166
2|2 The General Approach to Judicial Review|167
2|3 The Principle of Manifestly Wrong Decision Making (in Danish ``Åbenbar Urimelighed´´)|168
2|4 An Interpretation of the Words and Meaning of the Section of the Act Defines the Scope of the Investigation|169
3|4.1 Areas Where the Courts Conduct a Full Review|170
3|4.2 Areas Where the Courts Conduct a Limited Review or no Review at All|170
2|5 Concluding Remarks|171
2|References|171
2|Literature|171
2|Laws|171
2|Danish Supreme Court Cases|172
2|Other Court Cases|172
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review: The European Union|173
2|1 Introduction|173
3|1.1 The Judicial Architecture of the European Union|173
3|1.2 The Grounds of Review of Administrative Action|175
3|1.3 The Concept of `Discretion´ in the EU Legal System|175
2|2 Intensity of Review of `Technical Discretion´ in the EU Legal System: The Evolving Threshold of `Manifest Error´|176
3|2.1 The Early Case Law and the `Light-Touch´ Approach|176
3|2.2 The Tetra Laval Case and the Path Towards a More Intensive Review|177
3|2.3 Probing the Test of `Manifest Error´ Beyond Competition Law|180
4|2.3.1 Public Health and the Environment|180
4|2.3.2 Fundamental Rights|181
2|3 Intensity of Review of Discretion stricto sensu in the EU Legal System: Between `Manifest Error´ and the Principle of Propor...|182
3|3.1 Manifest Error|182
3|3.2 Proportionality Review|183
2|4 Conclusions|185
2|References|186
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Finland|188
2|1 Introduction|188
3|1.1 General Background|188
4|1.1.1 The Legal System and the Role of the Executive|188
4|1.1.2 Sources of Law|189
4|1.1.3 The Judiciary|190
3|1.2 Judicial Procedure|191
2|2 Special Characteristics|191
3|2.1 Procedural Requirements|191
4|2.1.1 Fair Trial in Administrative Cases|191
4|2.1.2 Equality of the Parties: Equality of Arms|192
3|2.2 Definitions and Characterizations|193
4|2.2.1 The Dual Role of the Administrative Courts vis-à-vis the Executive|193
4|2.2.2 A Characterisation of the Concept of ``Deference´´ or ``Judicial Deference´´|194
2|3 Judicial Deference|196
3|3.1 The Scope of Deference|196
4|3.1.1 Judicial Deference and the Intensity of Judicial Review|197
4|3.1.2 Powers of the Court|197
3|3.2 Specific Types of Agency Action|198
4|3.2.1 Administrative Decisions|198
4|3.2.2 Outsourcing|198
4|3.2.3 Administrative Governance Outside Judicial Review|198
2|4 Standards, Approaches and Grounds of Review|199
3|4.1 Standard Grounds of Judicial Review|199
3|4.2 Principles of Administrative Law As Grounds of Review|200
3|4.3 Constitutional Grounds for Review|200
3|4.4 The Effectiveness of Judicial Review|201
2|5 Dimensions of Deference|202
3|5.1 The Role of Information and the Investigation Principle|202
3|5.2 Judicial Construction|203
3|5.3 Proportionality and Other Legal Principles|203
2|6 Activism or Restraint|204
2|7 Limits of Judicial Review|204
3|7.1 Policy Issues|204
3|7.2 Separation of Powers|205
3|7.3 Constitutional Review|205
3|7.4 Administrative Inaction|206
3|7.5 Local Self-government|206
2|8 Concluding Remarks|206
2|References|207
1|A Principled Approach to Judicial Deference for Hong Kong|209
2|1 The Constitutional and Political Context of Hong Kong|211
2|2 Deference: Definition, Underlying Factors and Means of Exhibition|213
2|3 Current Approach: Doctrine and Practice|214
3|3.1 General Principles Where Rights Are Involved|215
3|3.2 Equality and the Socioeconomic Context|217
3|3.3 Immigration Decisions|219
3|3.4 ``Political´´ Judgments|220
3|3.5 National Security Assessments|221
3|3.6 Moral Judgments|222
2|4 Critiques and Suggestions for a General Approach|223
2|5 Application of Suggested Approach to Hong Kong|228
3|5.1 Standard of Review|229
3|5.2 Giving Weight to the Government´s Views: Constitutional and Institutional Competence|230
2|6 Conclusion|232
2|References|234
1|Judicial Deference to the Administration in Israel|236
2|1 Introduction|236
2|2 ``Deference´´: The Concept|238
3|2.1 ``Deference´´ and ``Restraint´´|238
3|2.2 ``Deference´´ in Hebrew|241
2|3 Israel´s Political and Legal System: An Overview|242
3|3.1 History and Political Structure|242
3|3.2 Legal Structure|245
4|3.2.1 General|245
4|3.2.2 Types of Rules|246
5|Constitutional-Type Legislation|246
5|Primary Legislation|247
5|Secondary Legislation|248
5|Emergency Law and Regulations|249
5|Tertiary Rules|249
3|3.3 Judicial Review of Administrative Action|249
3|3.4 A Tale of Judicial Expansion|252
2|4 Israel´s ``Activist´´ Supreme Court and the Demise of Deference and Restraint: A Myth?|254
3|4.1 Deference ``stricto sensu´´ in Israel´s Supreme Court|254
4|4.1.1 Introduction and Methodology|254
4|4.1.2 ``Deference´´: Explicit References|255
4|4.1.3 Extraction of Three Theoretical Rationales for Deference/Restraint|258
2|5 Judicial Restraint in Israel´s Supreme Court Review of the Administration: A Context-Based Overview|260
3|5.1 Introduction|260
3|5.2 Restraint in the Review of Secondary Legislation|261
3|5.3 Human Rights|262
3|5.4 Public Ethics: Appointments, Removal and the Criminal Process|264
3|5.5 Government Policy|266
2|6 The Future of Deference as a Main Version of Restraint: Two Conflicting Recent Decisions|268
3|6.1 Deri (2016)|268
3|6.2 Seligman (2018)|270
2|7 Conclusion|271
2|References|273
1|Judicial Review of Administrative Action in Italy: Beyond Deference?|275
2|1 An Intriguing Case|275
2|2 A Constitutional Overview: An Asystematic Administrative Justice?|277
2|3 Judicial Review of Administration: Dynamics of Change|279
3|3.1 The Age of Blind Deference (1865-1890)|279
3|3.2 Deference by Other Names (1890-1999)|280
3|3.3 A Diminishing Deference (1999-2018)|281
2|4 Judicial Review by Administrative Courts|282
3|4.1 Deference: Anti-terrorism Measures and Antitrust|282
3|4.2 Toward a Full Jurisdiction Standard|284
3|4.3 Standards and Evidence|287
3|4.4 Summary|289
2|5 A Quick Look at the `Other´ Judges of the Administration|289
3|5.1 Judicial Review by Ordinary Courts|289
3|5.2 The Liability of Civil Servants|291
2|6 Contrasting Views|293
3|6.1 Inadequacies of Judicial Review from the Viewpoint of the ECHR|293
3|6.2 Political Reactions to (Perceived) Judicial Activism|294
2|7 Conclusion|295
2|References|296
2|Books|296
2|Journal Articles and Book Chapters|296
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review in Japan|298
2|1 Introduction|299
3|1.1 The General Legal Framework of Administrative Activities|299
3|1.2 Judicial Review Over the Administration in General|302
2|2 The Framework of Discussion on Administrative Discretion and Judicial Review|303
3|2.1 A Historical Overview|303
3|2.2 The Functional Approach|305
3|2.3 The Contemporary Baseline of Discussion|307
2|3 Modes of Judicial Review Over Administrative Actions|308
2|4 Standards the Court May Adopt When It Reviews Administrative Actions|312
3|4.1 Errors in Finding Facts|313
3|4.2 Purpose Violation or Injustice of Motive|313
3|4.3 Contravention of the General Principle of Law|313
4|4.3.1 Contravention of the Equality Principle|313
4|4.3.2 Contravention of the Proportionality Principle|314
4|4.3.3 Contravention of the Good Faith Principle|314
2|5 Review of the Administrative Decision-Making Process|314
2|6 The Areas in Which Administrative Discretion Is Often Recognized and Judicial Review|316
3|6.1 Education|316
3|6.2 Matters Related to Public Officials|317
3|6.3 Areas of Immigration Control and Diplomacy|318
3|6.4 Area of Treatment of Inmates and Detainees|319
3|6.5 Areas Where Reference to Specialist Knowledge and Skills Is Especially Required|320
3|6.6 Administrative Inaction: The Failure to Exert Administrative Discretionary Power|322
3|6.7 Administrative Legislation|323
2|7 Conclusion|324
2|References|326
1|Deference to the Administration in Judicial Review: The Case of the Netherlands|329
2|1 Introduction|329
2|2 The Dutch Context: The System of Legal Protection Against the Government|331
2|3 The Development of the Doctrine on the Basis of the Supreme Court Judgment in Doetinchem|334
2|4 Intermezzo: The European Court of Human Rights Demands Judicial Legal Protection Against Government Decisions in Benthem|335
2|5 The General Administrative Law Act As the Green Light for Further Development of the Doctrine with Harmonising Effect on Var...|336
2|6 Conclusion, with an Outlook for the Future: After Harmonisation, Moving Towards Differentiation and a Greater Focus on Propo...|338
3|6.1 Moving Towards Differentiation and a Focus on Proportionality|338
3|6.2 But with Limits, Due to the Necessary Expertise|341
2|References|343
1|The ``Dreadful Truth´´ and Transparent Fictions: Deference in New Zealand Administrative Law|347
2|1 Introduction|347
2|2 The Constitutional Context|349
2|3 The New Zealand ``System´´ of Judicial Review|351
2|4 The Difficulty of Deference: Justification for Judicial Review in New Zealand|352
2|5 Statutory Deference|354
2|6 Deference and the Traditional Heads of Review|355
2|7 Variable Intensity Review and Reasonableness|357
2|8 Providing Structure to Deference in NZ: Taggart´s Rainbow|360
2|9 Conclusion|362
2|References|363
1|Deference to the Public Administration in Judicial Review: A Polish Perspective|365
2|1 Introduction: A Historical Review|365
2|2 Concept and Its Adoption|370
3|2.1 Polish Context|371
3|2.2 Recent Development of Administrative Justice|371
3|2.3 Constitutional Ground|373
3|2.4 In the Context of the European Union|374
2|3 The Practice of Judicial Review and the Power of the Courts|375
3|3.1 The Difficulty of Application of Deference Doctrine|376
3|3.2 Deference and the Balance of Powers|376
2|4 Conclusion|378
2|References|379
1|`The Notion of a Subjective or Unfettered Discretion is Contrary to the Rule of Law´: Judicial Review of Administrative Action...|380
2|1 Introduction|380
2|2 Overview of Deference and the Green-Light Approach to Judicial Review|384
2|3 Justiciability|387
2|4 Judicial Scrutiny and Varying Intensities of Review|394
2|5 Judicial Deference on Interpretations of Law: A New Standard of Review?|397
2|6 Conclusion|401
2|References|404
1|Full Judicial Review or Administrative Discretion? A Swedish Perspective on Deference to the Administration|406
2|1 Introduction|406
2|2 Background|407
2|3 Administrative-Judicial Appeal|410
2|4 Municipal Appeal|412
2|5 Legal Review of Governmental Decisions|413
2|6 Conclusion|414
2|References|415
1|Judicial Deference to the Administration in the United States|417
2|1 Introduction to the Legal and Administrative Structure of the United States and the Subject of Judicial Deference|418
3|1.1 Structure of the U.S. Legal and Administrative System|418
3|1.2 Introduction to the Concepts of Deference and Discretion|420
3|1.3 De Jure Deference in the APA Standards for Judicial Review|421
3|1.4 The Concept of Discretion|423
3|1.5 The Connection Between de Jure Deference and de Jure Discretion|424
2|2 The Practice of Judicial Deference in the United States|425
3|2.1 De Jure Deference Part I: Basic Rationality Review of Agency Action Within the Agency´s Zone of Discretion|425
4|2.1.1 ``Substantial Evidence´´: A Standard of Medium Deference for Fact-Finding in Formal Processes|425
4|2.1.2 ``Arbitrary and Capricious´´ Review: The Most Generally Applicable Standard of Medium Deference|427
4|2.1.3 The Specially Deferential Standard for Review of Agency Rejections of Petitions to Engage in Rulemaking|429
3|2.2 De Jure Deference Part II: The Special Problem of Deference to Agency Interpretation of Vague or Ambiguous Language in Sta...|430
4|2.2.1 Chevron Deference|430
4|2.2.2 The Meaning of Chevron|432
4|2.2.3 The Puzzles of Chevron|433
4|2.2.4 The Triumph and Genius of Chevron|433
4|2.2.5 The Search for Chevron Step Zero|435
4|2.2.6 Chevron´s Possible Fall|437
4|2.2.7 Auer or Seminole Rock Deference: Deference to an Agency´s Interpretation of Its Own Regulations|437
3|2.3 De Facto Deference and Skidmore Deference|438
3|2.4 The Puzzle of Military, Security, and Foreign Affairs Issues|440
3|2.5 The Puzzle of Science and Technology|441
2|3 Summary and Comparative Remarks|443
2|References|444