File #2667: "2019_Book_EuropeanYearbookOfInternationa.pdf"
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1|Editorial EYIEL 9 (2018)|6
1|Contents|11
1|Editors and Contributors|14
1|Part I: Natural Resources Law|17
2|The Role of Sustainable Development in Natural Resources Law|18
3|1 Introduction|18
3|2 What Is Natural Resources Law?|20
3|3 SD as a Political Objective|22
3|4 SD as a Concept of International Law|24
4|4.1 The Conceptual Content of SD|24
4|4.2 The Legal Effects of SD|29
4|4.3 The Legal Status of SD|30
5|4.3.1 The General Debate|31
5|4.3.2 SD as a Principle of International Law?|32
4|4.4 SD as Regulatory Objective|37
5|4.4.1 The Typical Evolution from Political to Regulatory Objective|38
5|4.4.2 Law as an Instrument Fostering the Development of Society|40
5|4.4.3 SD as Regulatory Objective in Treaty Regimes|44
5|4.4.4 SD as Regulatory Objective Outside Treaty Regimes|46
4|4.5 SD as the Overall Object and Purpose of NRL|48
3|5 Conclusions|50
3|References|51
2|Chinese Natural Resources Disputes: A Never-Ending Story?|54
3|1 Introduction|54
3|2 Driving Factors Behind Chinese Natural Resources Disputes|57
4|2.1 Pervasiveness of China´s Regime on Export Restrictions|57
4|2.2 Criticality of Targeted Raw Materials|59
4|2.3 Magnitude of the Economic Effects of China´s Export Restrictions|61
3|3 China-Specific WTO Obligations on the Export Side|63
4|3.1 China´s WTO Obligations on the Use of Export Duties|63
4|3.2 China´s WTO Obligations on the Use of Export Quantitative Restrictions|65
3|4 Assessing China´s Regulatory Autonomy to Impose (Mineral) Export Restraints|67
4|4.1 Regulatory Autonomy to Impose Export Duties|67
4|4.2 Regulatory Autonomy to Impose Export Quotas|70
3|5 Conclusion|73
3|References|74
2|Energy and Fossil Fuels as a Topic of WTO Accession Protocols|76
3|1 Introduction|76
3|2 Accession to the GATT and the WTO|77
3|3 Energy and Fossil Fuels in WTO Accession Protocols|79
4|3.1 Status of Raw Materials in Trade Law|79
4|3.2 WTO Accession Protocols|80
3|4 Energy in Accession Protocols 1996-2015|81
4|4.1 Ecuador (1996)|82
4|4.2 Oman (2000)|82
4|4.3 China (2001)|83
4|4.4 Saudi Arabia (2005)|84
4|4.5 Ukraine (2008)|86
4|4.6 Russia (2012)|88
4|4.7 Kazakhstan (2015)|92
3|5 Concluding Remarks on WTO Accession Protocols and Energy|93
3|References|94
2|All that Glitters: Conflict Diamonds, Dirty Gold and the WTO Legal Framework on Trade and Human Rights|96
3|1 Introduction|97
3|2 Conflict Minerals or Minerals from Conflict-Affected Areas: From Regulating Products to Regulating Supply Chains|99
3|3 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme|101
4|3.1 The Kimberley Process|101
4|3.2 The Kimberley System|102
4|3.3 The Weaknesses|103
4|3.4 Regulation of Conflict Gold|105
4|3.5 US Law on Trade in Conflict Minerals|105
4|3.6 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas|106
4|3.7 European Union Regulation on Trade in Minerals and Metals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas|107
3|4 Regulation of Supply Chains and WTO Law|108
4|4.1 WTO Principles|110
4|4.2 Market Access Restrictions|111
5|4.2.1 The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions|111
5|4.2.2 Non-discrimination|111
5|4.2.3 Technical Barriers to Trade|111
4|4.3 The WTO Conformity of Regulation of Supply Chains|112
5|4.3.1 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme|112
5|4.3.2 Potential Solutions to WTO Violations|113
4|4.4 The Path Taken|115
3|5 Regulating Dirty Gold: International Attempts to Rid the Gold Supply Chains of Human Rights Abuses|118
4|5.1 Other Standards|122
3|6 Conclusion|124
3|References|125
2|Beyond Antagonism: Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Natural Resources Sector|127
3|1 Introduction|127
3|2 Definition of Natural Resources|128
3|3 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources|130
3|4 Sustainable Development|134
3|5 Regulatory Powers|137
3|6 Protection of the Environment|140
3|7 Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility|146
3|8 Good Governance|150
3|9 Conclusion|152
3|References|153
2|Reconsidering Sovereignty, Ownership and Consent in Natural Resource Contracts: From Concepts to Practice|157
3|1 Introduction|157
3|2 The Foundations of Natural Resource Contracts|160
4|2.1 Sovereignty|160
4|2.2 Ownership|165
4|2.3 Consent|169
3|3 From Concepts to Practice: Illustrative Issues|173
4|3.1 Investor-State Contracts|173
4|3.2 Community-Investor and Multi-Actor Contracts|179
3|4 Conclusion|184
3|References|185
2|Fracking, Sovereignty over Natural Resources and International Investment Law|189
3|1 Introduction|190
3|2 Shale Gas: Boom, Bust or Here to Stay?|191
4|2.1 Shale Gas Economics: State-of-Play|192
4|2.2 Domestic Regulation of Shale Gas in the US, Canada and the EU (and Its MS)|193
3|3 Natural Resource Exploitation and International Law|196
4|3.1 UN General Assembly Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962)|196
4|3.2 Other Relevant Norms of International Law|199
3|4 Fracking and International Economic Law: More than Just Another Example of the Tension Between Trade/Investment Liberalizati...|200
4|4.1 Lone Pine Resources v Canada|200
5|4.1.1 Can Permits and Licenses Constitute an ``Investment´´|201
5|4.1.2 The Revocation of the River Permit as Expropriation?|203
5|4.1.3 The Scope of the Minimum Standard of Treatment|204
5|4.1.4 Status of the Arbitration|204
4|4.2 The Changing Tide for Investment Arbitration Involving Natural Resources|204
5|4.2.1 Domestic Legislation on Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Tanzania|205
4|4.3 International Developments: The EU´s MIC Proposal and the CPTPP|209
5|4.3.1 The EU´s ICS and MIC|209
5|4.3.2 The CPTPP|210
3|5 Conclusion|211
3|References|212
2|Towards a European Natural Resources Law?|216
3|1 A European Natural Resources Law: Consolidation or Emergence of a (New) Field of Union Law/Policy?|217
3|2 The EU in the Global Competition for Raw Materials|219
4|2.1 Raw Materials and Natural Resources Law|219
4|2.2 The Commodity Dependence of the EU in a Global Context|220
4|2.3 Developments on the Global Commodity Market|221
4|2.4 The Legal Structure of the Global Commodity Market|222
3|3 Requirements of European Union Law|223
4|3.1 Legal Foundations|223
4|3.2 Natural Resources Law as an Independent Field of Law?|224
4|3.3 The Momentum of the Treaty of Lisbon|225
5|3.3.1 The Consolidation of the European Energy Policy|226
5|3.3.2 The Strengthening of the Foreign Policy Profile of the Union|227
5|3.3.3 The Extension of the Competences in the Common Commercial Policy|227
5|3.3.4 The Development of EU Environmental Law|228
3|4 Underlying Structures and Demarcation|229
4|4.1 Natural Resources Law in Between the Internal Market and Environmental Policy|229
4|4.2 The Objectives and Principles of a European Natural Resources Law|230
5|4.2.1 Security of Supply|231
5|4.2.2 Sustainability|231
5|4.2.3 Efficiency|232
5|4.2.4 The General Objectives and Principles of Union Law|232
4|4.3 European Natural Resources Law and National Law|233
4|4.4 European Natural Resources Law and International Law|233
3|5 The Framework of the European Raw Materials Initiative|234
4|5.1 The European Raw Materials Initiative|234
4|5.2 A European Raw Materials Governance|236
4|5.3 The Challenges for European Law|236
3|6 Conclusion|237
3|References|238
2|The EU Legal Framework on Trade in Timber and Timber Products: Recent Developments in the Implementation and Enforcement of th...|242
3|1 Introduction|242
3|2 The EU Regime on Timber (and Timber Products) Trade|245
4|2.1 The First Pillar: The FLEGT Action Plan (2003) and the FLEGT Regulation (2005)|246
4|2.2 The Second Pillar: The EU Timber Regulation (2010)|248
5|2.2.1 The Regulatory Framework of the Timber Regulation|248
5|2.2.2 The Commission´s Delegated and Implementing Regulations (2012)|253
5|2.2.3 The Commission´s Guidance Document for the Timber Regulation (2013, 2016)|254
4|2.3 The Role of the Timber Regulation Within the EU´s and International Anti-Illegal Logging Legislative Framework and Its Pos...|260
3|3 EUTR Implementing Practice 5 Years After Its Entry into Application: Where Do We Are?|263
3|4 Recent National EUTR Case Law: Signals of an Emerging `Due Diligence Jurisprudence´?|264
3|5 Concluding Remarks|270
3|References|271
2|The International Legal Regime Applicable to the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed|273
3|1 Introduction|273
3|2 Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed|276
4|2.1 A Comparison of Natural Resource Rights Within Coastal State Maritime Zones and the Area|276
4|2.2 Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction|279
4|2.3 Deep Seabed Mining for Rare Earth Elements|283
3|3 The UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime|286
4|3.1 Key Aspects of the Deep Seabed Mining Regime|286
4|3.2 The Licensing Process for Deep Seabed Mineral Exploration and Exploitation|290
4|3.3 The Current Extent of Deep Seabed Mining Activities|293
3|4 Conclusion|296
3|References|297
2|Natural Resources and the Arctic|300
3|1 Introduction|300
3|2 The International Legal Regime of the Arctic and Its Relevance to the Economic Use of Natural Resources|304
4|2.1 The International Legal Regime Applicable to the Arctic´s Land and Maritime Spaces|304
4|2.2 The Arctic Council|308
3|3 An Overview of the Economic Use of Natural Resources in the Arctic|313
4|3.1 Introductory Elements|313
4|3.2 Fishing|315
4|3.3 Oil and Natural Gas|317
3|4 Outlook of Natural Resources Law and the Arctic|319
3|References|320
2|Mining in Outer Space: Legal Aspects|323
3|1 Introduction|323
3|2 Legal Issues|325
3|3 International Legal Framework|326
4|3.1 Principle of Non-appropriation|326
4|3.2 The Environmental Perspective|327
5|3.2.1 General Character of the Rules|328
5|3.2.2 Applied to Space Mining|328
5|3.2.3 Environmental Protection According to the Moon Agreement|330
5|3.2.4 COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy|330
4|3.3 Outer Space as ``Province of All Mankind´´|332
5|3.3.1 Moratorium on National Legislation?|333
5|3.3.2 Content of the Multilateral Regime|335
3|4 National Legislation in Force|336
4|4.1 National Legislation and the Outer Space Treaty|336
4|4.2 The US Legislation|337
4|4.3 The Legislation of Luxembourg|339
3|5 Conclusion|341
3|References|342
1|Part II: Regions|345
2|Trade in Energy: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union|346
3|1 Introduction|346
3|2 Energy in Regional Trade Agreements|347
3|3 Eurasian Economic Union: Context|350
3|4 Energy in the Eurasian Economic Union|352
4|4.1 Energy Policies of the EAEU Members|352
4|4.2 Energy in WTO Commitments of EAEU Members|354
4|4.3 Transit of Energy|355
4|4.4 Common EAEU Energy Market|356
5|4.4.1 Common Gas Market|356
5|4.4.2 Common Oil and Petroleum Products Market|358
5|4.4.3 Common Electricity Energy Market|359
3|5 What Is Blocking Energy Integration Within the EAEU?|360
3|6 Conclusion|362
3|References|362
2|Regional Integration in the Caribbean: CARICOM and the Caribbean Court of Justice|364
3|1 Introduction|364
3|2 Brief Historical and Economic Overview|365
3|3 Nature of the Caribbean Court of Justice|368
3|4 Overview of the Decisions of the Caribbean Court of Justice|369
4|4.1 Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana|369
4|4.2 Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM|373
4|4.3 Johnson v. CARICAD|374
4|4.4 Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM|375
4|4.5 Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission|377
4|4.6 Shanique Myrie v Barbados|378
4|4.7 Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and Trinidad and Tobago|383
4|4.8 Rudisa Beverages and Juices NV v Guyana|384
4|4.9 SM Jaleel and Co Ltd and Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana|385
4|4.10 Cabral Douglas v Dominica|387
3|5 Conclusions and Comparisons with the EU|388
3|References|389
1|Part III: Institutions|390
2|Recent Developments in International Investment Law|391
3|1 Negotiations, Ratifications, Terminations|391
3|2 Megaregionals|395
3|3 The Establishment of an International Investment Court and Multilateral Reform of ISDS|400
3|4 Alternatives to ISDS|404
3|5 Intra-EU BITs|407
3|6 Conclusions|409
3|References|410
2|Renminbi Rising: The Inclusion of the Renminbi in the SDR Basket|412
3|1 Introduction|412
3|2 Creation of the SDR and Establishment of the SDR Department|413
4|2.1 Creation of the SDR|413
4|2.2 SDR Department, SDR Allocations and the SDR Interest Basket|414
4|2.3 The Use of SDR|415
3|3 SDR Valuation and the 2015 Review|416
4|3.1 The Selection Criteria: Exports and Freely Usable Currency|417
4|3.2 Exports Criterion and Currency Based Approach|418
4|3.3 Freely Usable Currency Criterion|418
5|3.3.1 The ``Freely Usable Currency´´ Concept Under the Second Amendment|419
5|3.3.2 Widely Used|421
5|3.3.3 What Are ``International Transactions´´?|421
5|3.3.4 Widely Traded|422
5|3.3.5 What Are ``Principal Exchange Markets´´?|422
5|3.3.6 The Role of Indicators and the Need for Judgment|423
5|3.3.7 Determining the Free Usability of the RMB|424
4|3.4 Addition of the RMB in the SDR Basket|425
5|3.4.1 Exchange Rates|426
5|3.4.2 Components of the SDR Interest Rate|427
5|3.4.3 Size of the SDR Basket|428
4|3.5 Currency Weights and Amounts in the SDR Basket|428
3|4 Conclusion|429
3|References|430
2|Overview of WTO Jurisprudence in 2016|431
3|1 EU - Fatty Alcohols: Panel Report|432
4|1.1 Facts of the Dispute|432
4|1.2 Salient Legal Findings|433
5|1.2.1 Adjustment to the Export Price Under Article 2.4|433
5|1.2.2 Non-attribution Under Article 3.5 and Disclosure of Verification Results Under Article 6.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement|434
4|1.3 Appeal|435
4|1.4 Observations on the Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|435
3|2 EU - Biodiesel: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|436
4|2.1 Facts of the Case|436
4|2.2 Salient Legal Findings|436
5|2.2.1 Legal Foundations|436
5|2.2.2 Other Findings|438
4|2.3 Treaties|439
3|3 US - Washers: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|440
4|3.1 Factual Background|440
4|3.2 Salient Legal Issues|441
5|3.2.1 Interpretation of Article 2.4.2 Second Sentence|441
5|3.2.2 Regional Specificity Under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement|444
4|3.3 Observations on the Salient Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body Report|445
3|4 US - Anti-Dumping Methodologies: Panel Report|446
4|4.1 Factual Background|446
4|4.2 Salient Legal Findings|446
5|4.2.1 The Use of the WA-T Methodology in Dumping Calculations (with Zeroing)|447
5|4.2.2 The Country-Wide Duty Rate for NME Countries|448
5|4.2.3 Whether the AFA Norm Constitutes a Norm of ``General and Prospective Application´´|450
3|5 EC - Fasteners (21.5): Appellate Body Report|451
4|5.1 Facts of the Case|451
4|5.2 Salient Legal Findings|451
5|5.2.1 Ex Post Explanations in Confidential Information Under Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement|452
5|5.2.2 The ``Dialogue´´ Required in Article 2.4, Last Sentence, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement|452
5|5.2.3 The Issue of Whether the Authority May Disregard Certain Product Models in Conducting the Comparison Required in Article...|453
5|5.2.4 The Domestic Industry Defined as Those Companies That Were Cooperating and Agreed to Be Included in the Injury Sample|454
3|6 India - Solar Panels: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|454
4|6.1 Factual Background|454
4|6.2 Salient Legal Findings|455
5|6.2.1 Article 2 of the TRIMS Agreement and Articles III:4 and III:8(a) of the GATT 1994|455
5|6.2.2 India´s Defense Under Article XX(j)|456
5|6.2.3 India´s Defense Under Article XX(d)|457
5|6.2.4 Reflections on the Salient Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body Report|458
3|7 EC - Large Civil Aircraft (21.5): Panel Report|459
4|7.1 Facts of the Case|459
4|7.2 Salient Legal Findings|459
5|7.2.1 EU Actions Constituting Actual Compliance Steps|459
5|7.2.2 Scope of the Compliance Dispute|460
5|7.2.3 Issues Concerning Prohibited Subsidies|461
5|7.2.4 The EU´s Failure to Take Appropriate Steps to Withdraw the Subsidy or Remove Its Adverse Effects|462
3|8 US - Tax Incentives: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|463
4|8.1 Facts of the Case|463
4|8.2 Salient Legal Findings|464
5|8.2.1 The Aerospace Tax Measures Are Subsidies Within the Meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement|464
5|8.2.2 The First Siting Provision, Considered Separately, Does Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent|465
5|8.2.3 The Second Siting Provision, Considered Separately, Does Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent|466
5|8.2.4 The First and Second Siting Provisions, Considered Jointly, Do Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent|466
5|8.2.5 The First and Second Siting Provisions, Considered Jointly, Make the BandO Tax Rate De Facto Contingent|466
4|8.3 Appellate Body Report|467
3|9 Colombia - Textiles: Appellate Body Report|468
4|9.1 Facts of the Case|468
4|9.2 Salient Legal Findings|468
5|9.2.1 The Appellate Body Concluded That the Text of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 Does Not Exclude What Colombia Cl...|469
5|9.2.2 The Appellate Body Found That the Compound Tariff Was ``Designed´´ but Not ``Necessary´´ to Protect Public Morals|470
5|9.2.3 The Appellate Body Found That the Compound Tariff Was ``Designed´´ but Not Necessary to Ensure Compliance with Article 3...|470
4|9.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Appellate Body Report|471
3|10 Russia - Tariff Treatment: Panel Report|471
4|10.1 Facts of the Case|471
4|10.2 Salient Legal Findings|472
5|10.2.1 The Panel Found That Article II:1(b), First Sentence, of the GATT 1994 Prohibits Any ``Excess´´ in the Imposition of Du...|472
5|10.2.2 The Panel Found That Measures 1-11 Were Inconsistent with Russia´s Obligations Under Article II:1(b), First Sentence, o...|473
5|10.2.3 The Panel Made Findings on a Measure That Provided for the Future Application of a Duty Rate and Was Not Implemented at...|473
5|10.2.4 The Panel Found That the EU Failed to Prove the Existence of the SDV|475
4|10.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|475
3|11 Russia - Pigs: Panel Report|476
4|11.1 Facts of the Case|476
4|11.2 Salient Legal Findings|477
5|11.2.1 The Panel Found That the EU Had Demonstrated the Existence of the EU-Wide Ban, and That There Was No Limitation in Russ...|477
5|11.2.2 The Panel Found That Although Russia Recognized the Concepts Under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, It Did Not Adapt I...|479
4|11.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|480
3|12 Indonesia - Import Licensing Regimes (New Zealand) (United States): Panel Report|481
4|12.1 Facts of the Case|481
4|12.2 Salient Legal Findings|482
5|12.2.1 The Panel Concluded That Automatic Import Licensing Regimes Are Not Excluded from the Scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT...|482
5|12.2.2 The Panel Concluded That Article XI:2(c) of the GATT 1994 Had Been Rendered Inoperative by the Entry into Force of Arti...|483
5|12.2.3 The Panel Found That Measures 1-17 Were Not Justified Under Article XX of the GATT 1994|483
4|12.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|484
3|13 Argentina - Financial Services: Appellate Body Report|485
4|13.1 Facts of the Case|485
4|13.2 Salient Legal Findings|485
5|13.2.1 The Interpretation of ``Likeness´´ in Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS|486
5|13.2.2 The Interpretation of ``Treatment No Less Favourable´´ in Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS|486
5|13.2.3 The Issue of Whether a Measure Is ``Designed´´ to Achieve a Listed Objective Under Article XIV of the GATS|487
5|13.2.4 The Interpretation of the Prudential Exception in Paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services|488
1|Part IV: Book Reviews|490
2|Manjiao Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development in International Investment Law|491
2|Ben Saul, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Travaux Préparatoires|496
2|Jorun Baumgartner, Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law|500
2|David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy|504
3|Reference|508
2|Pierre Sauvé and Martin Roy, Research Handbook on Trade in Services|509
3|1 Introduction|509
3|2 The Handbook in More Detail: Empirical Perspectives|511
3|3 The Handbook in More Detail: Legal Perspectives|512
3|4 The Handbook in More Detail: Political Economy and Development Perspectives|513
3|5 Overall Assessment|514
2|Julien Chaisse (Ed.), Charting the Water Regulatory Future: Issues, Challenges and Directions|516
3|1 Overview|516
3|2 Key Lessons|518
3|3 Contribution to the Literature|520
2|New Research on the Deep Seabed and Its Resources|521
1|Contents|11
1|Editors and Contributors|14
1|Part I: Natural Resources Law|17
2|The Role of Sustainable Development in Natural Resources Law|18
3|1 Introduction|18
3|2 What Is Natural Resources Law?|20
3|3 SD as a Political Objective|22
3|4 SD as a Concept of International Law|24
4|4.1 The Conceptual Content of SD|24
4|4.2 The Legal Effects of SD|29
4|4.3 The Legal Status of SD|30
5|4.3.1 The General Debate|31
5|4.3.2 SD as a Principle of International Law?|32
4|4.4 SD as Regulatory Objective|37
5|4.4.1 The Typical Evolution from Political to Regulatory Objective|38
5|4.4.2 Law as an Instrument Fostering the Development of Society|40
5|4.4.3 SD as Regulatory Objective in Treaty Regimes|44
5|4.4.4 SD as Regulatory Objective Outside Treaty Regimes|46
4|4.5 SD as the Overall Object and Purpose of NRL|48
3|5 Conclusions|50
3|References|51
2|Chinese Natural Resources Disputes: A Never-Ending Story?|54
3|1 Introduction|54
3|2 Driving Factors Behind Chinese Natural Resources Disputes|57
4|2.1 Pervasiveness of China´s Regime on Export Restrictions|57
4|2.2 Criticality of Targeted Raw Materials|59
4|2.3 Magnitude of the Economic Effects of China´s Export Restrictions|61
3|3 China-Specific WTO Obligations on the Export Side|63
4|3.1 China´s WTO Obligations on the Use of Export Duties|63
4|3.2 China´s WTO Obligations on the Use of Export Quantitative Restrictions|65
3|4 Assessing China´s Regulatory Autonomy to Impose (Mineral) Export Restraints|67
4|4.1 Regulatory Autonomy to Impose Export Duties|67
4|4.2 Regulatory Autonomy to Impose Export Quotas|70
3|5 Conclusion|73
3|References|74
2|Energy and Fossil Fuels as a Topic of WTO Accession Protocols|76
3|1 Introduction|76
3|2 Accession to the GATT and the WTO|77
3|3 Energy and Fossil Fuels in WTO Accession Protocols|79
4|3.1 Status of Raw Materials in Trade Law|79
4|3.2 WTO Accession Protocols|80
3|4 Energy in Accession Protocols 1996-2015|81
4|4.1 Ecuador (1996)|82
4|4.2 Oman (2000)|82
4|4.3 China (2001)|83
4|4.4 Saudi Arabia (2005)|84
4|4.5 Ukraine (2008)|86
4|4.6 Russia (2012)|88
4|4.7 Kazakhstan (2015)|92
3|5 Concluding Remarks on WTO Accession Protocols and Energy|93
3|References|94
2|All that Glitters: Conflict Diamonds, Dirty Gold and the WTO Legal Framework on Trade and Human Rights|96
3|1 Introduction|97
3|2 Conflict Minerals or Minerals from Conflict-Affected Areas: From Regulating Products to Regulating Supply Chains|99
3|3 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme|101
4|3.1 The Kimberley Process|101
4|3.2 The Kimberley System|102
4|3.3 The Weaknesses|103
4|3.4 Regulation of Conflict Gold|105
4|3.5 US Law on Trade in Conflict Minerals|105
4|3.6 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas|106
4|3.7 European Union Regulation on Trade in Minerals and Metals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas|107
3|4 Regulation of Supply Chains and WTO Law|108
4|4.1 WTO Principles|110
4|4.2 Market Access Restrictions|111
5|4.2.1 The Prohibition on Quantitative Restrictions|111
5|4.2.2 Non-discrimination|111
5|4.2.3 Technical Barriers to Trade|111
4|4.3 The WTO Conformity of Regulation of Supply Chains|112
5|4.3.1 Kimberley Process Certification Scheme|112
5|4.3.2 Potential Solutions to WTO Violations|113
4|4.4 The Path Taken|115
3|5 Regulating Dirty Gold: International Attempts to Rid the Gold Supply Chains of Human Rights Abuses|118
4|5.1 Other Standards|122
3|6 Conclusion|124
3|References|125
2|Beyond Antagonism: Legal Protection of Foreign Investment in the Natural Resources Sector|127
3|1 Introduction|127
3|2 Definition of Natural Resources|128
3|3 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources|130
3|4 Sustainable Development|134
3|5 Regulatory Powers|137
3|6 Protection of the Environment|140
3|7 Human Rights and Corporate Responsibility|146
3|8 Good Governance|150
3|9 Conclusion|152
3|References|153
2|Reconsidering Sovereignty, Ownership and Consent in Natural Resource Contracts: From Concepts to Practice|157
3|1 Introduction|157
3|2 The Foundations of Natural Resource Contracts|160
4|2.1 Sovereignty|160
4|2.2 Ownership|165
4|2.3 Consent|169
3|3 From Concepts to Practice: Illustrative Issues|173
4|3.1 Investor-State Contracts|173
4|3.2 Community-Investor and Multi-Actor Contracts|179
3|4 Conclusion|184
3|References|185
2|Fracking, Sovereignty over Natural Resources and International Investment Law|189
3|1 Introduction|190
3|2 Shale Gas: Boom, Bust or Here to Stay?|191
4|2.1 Shale Gas Economics: State-of-Play|192
4|2.2 Domestic Regulation of Shale Gas in the US, Canada and the EU (and Its MS)|193
3|3 Natural Resource Exploitation and International Law|196
4|3.1 UN General Assembly Declaration on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources (1962)|196
4|3.2 Other Relevant Norms of International Law|199
3|4 Fracking and International Economic Law: More than Just Another Example of the Tension Between Trade/Investment Liberalizati...|200
4|4.1 Lone Pine Resources v Canada|200
5|4.1.1 Can Permits and Licenses Constitute an ``Investment´´|201
5|4.1.2 The Revocation of the River Permit as Expropriation?|203
5|4.1.3 The Scope of the Minimum Standard of Treatment|204
5|4.1.4 Status of the Arbitration|204
4|4.2 The Changing Tide for Investment Arbitration Involving Natural Resources|204
5|4.2.1 Domestic Legislation on Sovereignty over Natural Resources: Tanzania|205
4|4.3 International Developments: The EU´s MIC Proposal and the CPTPP|209
5|4.3.1 The EU´s ICS and MIC|209
5|4.3.2 The CPTPP|210
3|5 Conclusion|211
3|References|212
2|Towards a European Natural Resources Law?|216
3|1 A European Natural Resources Law: Consolidation or Emergence of a (New) Field of Union Law/Policy?|217
3|2 The EU in the Global Competition for Raw Materials|219
4|2.1 Raw Materials and Natural Resources Law|219
4|2.2 The Commodity Dependence of the EU in a Global Context|220
4|2.3 Developments on the Global Commodity Market|221
4|2.4 The Legal Structure of the Global Commodity Market|222
3|3 Requirements of European Union Law|223
4|3.1 Legal Foundations|223
4|3.2 Natural Resources Law as an Independent Field of Law?|224
4|3.3 The Momentum of the Treaty of Lisbon|225
5|3.3.1 The Consolidation of the European Energy Policy|226
5|3.3.2 The Strengthening of the Foreign Policy Profile of the Union|227
5|3.3.3 The Extension of the Competences in the Common Commercial Policy|227
5|3.3.4 The Development of EU Environmental Law|228
3|4 Underlying Structures and Demarcation|229
4|4.1 Natural Resources Law in Between the Internal Market and Environmental Policy|229
4|4.2 The Objectives and Principles of a European Natural Resources Law|230
5|4.2.1 Security of Supply|231
5|4.2.2 Sustainability|231
5|4.2.3 Efficiency|232
5|4.2.4 The General Objectives and Principles of Union Law|232
4|4.3 European Natural Resources Law and National Law|233
4|4.4 European Natural Resources Law and International Law|233
3|5 The Framework of the European Raw Materials Initiative|234
4|5.1 The European Raw Materials Initiative|234
4|5.2 A European Raw Materials Governance|236
4|5.3 The Challenges for European Law|236
3|6 Conclusion|237
3|References|238
2|The EU Legal Framework on Trade in Timber and Timber Products: Recent Developments in the Implementation and Enforcement of th...|242
3|1 Introduction|242
3|2 The EU Regime on Timber (and Timber Products) Trade|245
4|2.1 The First Pillar: The FLEGT Action Plan (2003) and the FLEGT Regulation (2005)|246
4|2.2 The Second Pillar: The EU Timber Regulation (2010)|248
5|2.2.1 The Regulatory Framework of the Timber Regulation|248
5|2.2.2 The Commission´s Delegated and Implementing Regulations (2012)|253
5|2.2.3 The Commission´s Guidance Document for the Timber Regulation (2013, 2016)|254
4|2.3 The Role of the Timber Regulation Within the EU´s and International Anti-Illegal Logging Legislative Framework and Its Pos...|260
3|3 EUTR Implementing Practice 5 Years After Its Entry into Application: Where Do We Are?|263
3|4 Recent National EUTR Case Law: Signals of an Emerging `Due Diligence Jurisprudence´?|264
3|5 Concluding Remarks|270
3|References|271
2|The International Legal Regime Applicable to the Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed|273
3|1 Introduction|273
3|2 Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed|276
4|2.1 A Comparison of Natural Resource Rights Within Coastal State Maritime Zones and the Area|276
4|2.2 Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed Beyond National Jurisdiction|279
4|2.3 Deep Seabed Mining for Rare Earth Elements|283
3|3 The UNCLOS Deep Seabed Mining Regime|286
4|3.1 Key Aspects of the Deep Seabed Mining Regime|286
4|3.2 The Licensing Process for Deep Seabed Mineral Exploration and Exploitation|290
4|3.3 The Current Extent of Deep Seabed Mining Activities|293
3|4 Conclusion|296
3|References|297
2|Natural Resources and the Arctic|300
3|1 Introduction|300
3|2 The International Legal Regime of the Arctic and Its Relevance to the Economic Use of Natural Resources|304
4|2.1 The International Legal Regime Applicable to the Arctic´s Land and Maritime Spaces|304
4|2.2 The Arctic Council|308
3|3 An Overview of the Economic Use of Natural Resources in the Arctic|313
4|3.1 Introductory Elements|313
4|3.2 Fishing|315
4|3.3 Oil and Natural Gas|317
3|4 Outlook of Natural Resources Law and the Arctic|319
3|References|320
2|Mining in Outer Space: Legal Aspects|323
3|1 Introduction|323
3|2 Legal Issues|325
3|3 International Legal Framework|326
4|3.1 Principle of Non-appropriation|326
4|3.2 The Environmental Perspective|327
5|3.2.1 General Character of the Rules|328
5|3.2.2 Applied to Space Mining|328
5|3.2.3 Environmental Protection According to the Moon Agreement|330
5|3.2.4 COSPAR Planetary Protection Policy|330
4|3.3 Outer Space as ``Province of All Mankind´´|332
5|3.3.1 Moratorium on National Legislation?|333
5|3.3.2 Content of the Multilateral Regime|335
3|4 National Legislation in Force|336
4|4.1 National Legislation and the Outer Space Treaty|336
4|4.2 The US Legislation|337
4|4.3 The Legislation of Luxembourg|339
3|5 Conclusion|341
3|References|342
1|Part II: Regions|345
2|Trade in Energy: The Case of the Eurasian Economic Union|346
3|1 Introduction|346
3|2 Energy in Regional Trade Agreements|347
3|3 Eurasian Economic Union: Context|350
3|4 Energy in the Eurasian Economic Union|352
4|4.1 Energy Policies of the EAEU Members|352
4|4.2 Energy in WTO Commitments of EAEU Members|354
4|4.3 Transit of Energy|355
4|4.4 Common EAEU Energy Market|356
5|4.4.1 Common Gas Market|356
5|4.4.2 Common Oil and Petroleum Products Market|358
5|4.4.3 Common Electricity Energy Market|359
3|5 What Is Blocking Energy Integration Within the EAEU?|360
3|6 Conclusion|362
3|References|362
2|Regional Integration in the Caribbean: CARICOM and the Caribbean Court of Justice|364
3|1 Introduction|364
3|2 Brief Historical and Economic Overview|365
3|3 Nature of the Caribbean Court of Justice|368
3|4 Overview of the Decisions of the Caribbean Court of Justice|369
4|4.1 Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Inc v. Guyana|369
4|4.2 Trinidad Cement Limited v. CARICOM|373
4|4.3 Johnson v. CARICAD|374
4|4.4 Hummingbird Rice Mills v. Suriname and CARICOM|375
4|4.5 Trinidad Cement Limited v The Competition Commission|377
4|4.6 Shanique Myrie v Barbados|378
4|4.7 Maurice Tomlinson v Belize and Trinidad and Tobago|383
4|4.8 Rudisa Beverages and Juices NV v Guyana|384
4|4.9 SM Jaleel and Co Ltd and Guyana Beverages Inc v Guyana|385
4|4.10 Cabral Douglas v Dominica|387
3|5 Conclusions and Comparisons with the EU|388
3|References|389
1|Part III: Institutions|390
2|Recent Developments in International Investment Law|391
3|1 Negotiations, Ratifications, Terminations|391
3|2 Megaregionals|395
3|3 The Establishment of an International Investment Court and Multilateral Reform of ISDS|400
3|4 Alternatives to ISDS|404
3|5 Intra-EU BITs|407
3|6 Conclusions|409
3|References|410
2|Renminbi Rising: The Inclusion of the Renminbi in the SDR Basket|412
3|1 Introduction|412
3|2 Creation of the SDR and Establishment of the SDR Department|413
4|2.1 Creation of the SDR|413
4|2.2 SDR Department, SDR Allocations and the SDR Interest Basket|414
4|2.3 The Use of SDR|415
3|3 SDR Valuation and the 2015 Review|416
4|3.1 The Selection Criteria: Exports and Freely Usable Currency|417
4|3.2 Exports Criterion and Currency Based Approach|418
4|3.3 Freely Usable Currency Criterion|418
5|3.3.1 The ``Freely Usable Currency´´ Concept Under the Second Amendment|419
5|3.3.2 Widely Used|421
5|3.3.3 What Are ``International Transactions´´?|421
5|3.3.4 Widely Traded|422
5|3.3.5 What Are ``Principal Exchange Markets´´?|422
5|3.3.6 The Role of Indicators and the Need for Judgment|423
5|3.3.7 Determining the Free Usability of the RMB|424
4|3.4 Addition of the RMB in the SDR Basket|425
5|3.4.1 Exchange Rates|426
5|3.4.2 Components of the SDR Interest Rate|427
5|3.4.3 Size of the SDR Basket|428
4|3.5 Currency Weights and Amounts in the SDR Basket|428
3|4 Conclusion|429
3|References|430
2|Overview of WTO Jurisprudence in 2016|431
3|1 EU - Fatty Alcohols: Panel Report|432
4|1.1 Facts of the Dispute|432
4|1.2 Salient Legal Findings|433
5|1.2.1 Adjustment to the Export Price Under Article 2.4|433
5|1.2.2 Non-attribution Under Article 3.5 and Disclosure of Verification Results Under Article 6.7 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement|434
4|1.3 Appeal|435
4|1.4 Observations on the Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|435
3|2 EU - Biodiesel: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|436
4|2.1 Facts of the Case|436
4|2.2 Salient Legal Findings|436
5|2.2.1 Legal Foundations|436
5|2.2.2 Other Findings|438
4|2.3 Treaties|439
3|3 US - Washers: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|440
4|3.1 Factual Background|440
4|3.2 Salient Legal Issues|441
5|3.2.1 Interpretation of Article 2.4.2 Second Sentence|441
5|3.2.2 Regional Specificity Under Article 2.2 of the SCM Agreement|444
4|3.3 Observations on the Salient Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body Report|445
3|4 US - Anti-Dumping Methodologies: Panel Report|446
4|4.1 Factual Background|446
4|4.2 Salient Legal Findings|446
5|4.2.1 The Use of the WA-T Methodology in Dumping Calculations (with Zeroing)|447
5|4.2.2 The Country-Wide Duty Rate for NME Countries|448
5|4.2.3 Whether the AFA Norm Constitutes a Norm of ``General and Prospective Application´´|450
3|5 EC - Fasteners (21.5): Appellate Body Report|451
4|5.1 Facts of the Case|451
4|5.2 Salient Legal Findings|451
5|5.2.1 Ex Post Explanations in Confidential Information Under Article 6.5 of the Anti-Dumping Agreement|452
5|5.2.2 The ``Dialogue´´ Required in Article 2.4, Last Sentence, of the Anti-Dumping Agreement|452
5|5.2.3 The Issue of Whether the Authority May Disregard Certain Product Models in Conducting the Comparison Required in Article...|453
5|5.2.4 The Domestic Industry Defined as Those Companies That Were Cooperating and Agreed to Be Included in the Injury Sample|454
3|6 India - Solar Panels: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|454
4|6.1 Factual Background|454
4|6.2 Salient Legal Findings|455
5|6.2.1 Article 2 of the TRIMS Agreement and Articles III:4 and III:8(a) of the GATT 1994|455
5|6.2.2 India´s Defense Under Article XX(j)|456
5|6.2.3 India´s Defense Under Article XX(d)|457
5|6.2.4 Reflections on the Salient Aspects of the Panel and Appellate Body Report|458
3|7 EC - Large Civil Aircraft (21.5): Panel Report|459
4|7.1 Facts of the Case|459
4|7.2 Salient Legal Findings|459
5|7.2.1 EU Actions Constituting Actual Compliance Steps|459
5|7.2.2 Scope of the Compliance Dispute|460
5|7.2.3 Issues Concerning Prohibited Subsidies|461
5|7.2.4 The EU´s Failure to Take Appropriate Steps to Withdraw the Subsidy or Remove Its Adverse Effects|462
3|8 US - Tax Incentives: Panel Report and Appellate Body Report|463
4|8.1 Facts of the Case|463
4|8.2 Salient Legal Findings|464
5|8.2.1 The Aerospace Tax Measures Are Subsidies Within the Meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement|464
5|8.2.2 The First Siting Provision, Considered Separately, Does Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent|465
5|8.2.3 The Second Siting Provision, Considered Separately, Does Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent|466
5|8.2.4 The First and Second Siting Provisions, Considered Jointly, Do Not Make the Measures De Jure Contingent|466
5|8.2.5 The First and Second Siting Provisions, Considered Jointly, Make the BandO Tax Rate De Facto Contingent|466
4|8.3 Appellate Body Report|467
3|9 Colombia - Textiles: Appellate Body Report|468
4|9.1 Facts of the Case|468
4|9.2 Salient Legal Findings|468
5|9.2.1 The Appellate Body Concluded That the Text of Article II:1(a) and (b) of the GATT 1994 Does Not Exclude What Colombia Cl...|469
5|9.2.2 The Appellate Body Found That the Compound Tariff Was ``Designed´´ but Not ``Necessary´´ to Protect Public Morals|470
5|9.2.3 The Appellate Body Found That the Compound Tariff Was ``Designed´´ but Not Necessary to Ensure Compliance with Article 3...|470
4|9.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Appellate Body Report|471
3|10 Russia - Tariff Treatment: Panel Report|471
4|10.1 Facts of the Case|471
4|10.2 Salient Legal Findings|472
5|10.2.1 The Panel Found That Article II:1(b), First Sentence, of the GATT 1994 Prohibits Any ``Excess´´ in the Imposition of Du...|472
5|10.2.2 The Panel Found That Measures 1-11 Were Inconsistent with Russia´s Obligations Under Article II:1(b), First Sentence, o...|473
5|10.2.3 The Panel Made Findings on a Measure That Provided for the Future Application of a Duty Rate and Was Not Implemented at...|473
5|10.2.4 The Panel Found That the EU Failed to Prove the Existence of the SDV|475
4|10.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|475
3|11 Russia - Pigs: Panel Report|476
4|11.1 Facts of the Case|476
4|11.2 Salient Legal Findings|477
5|11.2.1 The Panel Found That the EU Had Demonstrated the Existence of the EU-Wide Ban, and That There Was No Limitation in Russ...|477
5|11.2.2 The Panel Found That Although Russia Recognized the Concepts Under Article 6.2 of the SPS Agreement, It Did Not Adapt I...|479
4|11.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|480
3|12 Indonesia - Import Licensing Regimes (New Zealand) (United States): Panel Report|481
4|12.1 Facts of the Case|481
4|12.2 Salient Legal Findings|482
5|12.2.1 The Panel Concluded That Automatic Import Licensing Regimes Are Not Excluded from the Scope of Article XI:1 of the GATT...|482
5|12.2.2 The Panel Concluded That Article XI:2(c) of the GATT 1994 Had Been Rendered Inoperative by the Entry into Force of Arti...|483
5|12.2.3 The Panel Found That Measures 1-17 Were Not Justified Under Article XX of the GATT 1994|483
4|12.3 Observations on Salient Aspects of the Panel Report|484
3|13 Argentina - Financial Services: Appellate Body Report|485
4|13.1 Facts of the Case|485
4|13.2 Salient Legal Findings|485
5|13.2.1 The Interpretation of ``Likeness´´ in Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS|486
5|13.2.2 The Interpretation of ``Treatment No Less Favourable´´ in Articles II:1 and XVII of the GATS|486
5|13.2.3 The Issue of Whether a Measure Is ``Designed´´ to Achieve a Listed Objective Under Article XIV of the GATS|487
5|13.2.4 The Interpretation of the Prudential Exception in Paragraph 2(a) of the Annex on Financial Services|488
1|Part IV: Book Reviews|490
2|Manjiao Chi, Integrating Sustainable Development in International Investment Law|491
2|Ben Saul, The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Travaux Préparatoires|496
2|Jorun Baumgartner, Treaty Shopping in International Investment Law|500
2|David Kennedy, A World of Struggle: How Power, Law and Expertise Shape Global Political Economy|504
3|Reference|508
2|Pierre Sauvé and Martin Roy, Research Handbook on Trade in Services|509
3|1 Introduction|509
3|2 The Handbook in More Detail: Empirical Perspectives|511
3|3 The Handbook in More Detail: Legal Perspectives|512
3|4 The Handbook in More Detail: Political Economy and Development Perspectives|513
3|5 Overall Assessment|514
2|Julien Chaisse (Ed.), Charting the Water Regulatory Future: Issues, Challenges and Directions|516
3|1 Overview|516
3|2 Key Lessons|518
3|3 Contribution to the Literature|520
2|New Research on the Deep Seabed and Its Resources|521