File #2668: "2019_Book_TheNormativeForceOfTheFactual.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|6
1|Contents|7
1|Introduction|9
1|Georg Jellinek’s Theory of the Two Sides of the State (“Zwei-Seiten-Lehre des Staates”)|12
2|1 The Claim of the Two-Sides-Theory|13
3|1.1 Definition and Theoretical Basis|13
3|1.2 The Program of the Two-Sides-Theory|14
3|1.3 The Juridical Starting Point of the Two-Sides-Theory|15
3|1.4 The Uniformity of the State as a Juridical Problem|16
2|2 The Content of the Two-Sides-Theory|17
3|2.1 The Social Conception of the State|17
3|2.2 The Juridical Conception of the State|18
3|2.3 The Systematic Relationship Between the Social and the Juridical Side of the State|19
2|3 The Two-Sides-Theory as an Expression of Three Problems of Juridical Methodology|20
3|3.1 The Concept of Law as the Epistemological “Trigger” of the Two-Sides-Theory|21
3|3.2 Interdisciplinary Issues|23
3|3.3 Political Issues|24
2|4 The Context of the Two-Sides-Theory|26
3|4.1 Neo-Kantianism and Epistemology|26
3|4.2 Jellinek’s Juridical Implementation of Neo-Kantianism|27
3|4.3 Epistemological Reasons for the Criticism of Jellinek|28
2|5 The Categorical Impact of the Two-Sides-Theory|29
3|5.1 Interdisciplinary Fundamental Conceptions|30
3|5.2 Basic Epistemological Insights|31
3|5.3 The Concept of State as an Expression of Scientific Political Expectations|32
2|References|33
1|Sein and Sollen, “Is” and “Ought” and the Problem of Normativity in Hans Kelsen|36
2|1 The Is/Ought Distinction: An Ontological Distinction|36
2|2 The Distinction Between Causal and Normative Sciences|38
2|3 The Ontological Function of the Norm|40
2|4 Is and Ought and Legal Proposition (Rechtssatz)|41
2|5 The Function of the Basic Norm|43
2|6 Natural Law, Positivism and Rational Choice|44
2|7 Conclusion|49
2|References|50
1|Law as Fact and Norm. Georg Jellinek and the Dual Nature of Law|51
2|1 Introduction|51
2|2 The Normative Force of the Factual|52
3|2.1 The Intellectual-Historical Background|52
3|2.2 Jellinek’s Psychological Account of the Nature of Law|53
3|2.3 Kelsen’s Critique|54
2|3 The Is-Ought-Fallacy|55
3|3.1 Searle and von Wright on Is and Ought|55
3|3.2 Jellinek Revisited|57
3|3.3 Conclusion on Kelsen Versus Jellinek|60
2|4 Law’s Dual Nature|60
3|4.1 Jellinek’s Two-Sided Theory of the State|61
3|4.2 The Dual Nature Thesis|62
3|4.3 The Bridge Problem|63
2|5 Legal Discourse Bridging Is and Ought|65
3|5.1 The Dual Nature of Legal Argumentation|65
3|5.2 The Canons of Interpretation|66
3|5.3 Further Development of the Law|66
2|6 Conclusion|67
2|References|68
1|The ‘Normative Force of the Factual’: A Positivist’s Panegyric|71
2|1 Sub-Standard|71
2|2 The Original Understanding|72
2|3 An Olive Branch|73
2|4 A Fallacy|74
2|5 Thousandfold Norms|75
2|6 Animal Computans|76
2|7 Lawless Irregularity|77
2|8 Watching Television|78
2|9 A Suitable Cross-Check|80
2|10 Both Sides of the Dichotomy|81
2|References|82
1|The Effectiveness-Legitimacy Conundrum in the International Law of State Formation|84
2|1 The Orthodox Account: Formation of States as a Mere Fact|85
2|2 ISIS: Challenging the Dogma of the Purely Factual Character of State Formation|87
2|3 The Advent of Jus Cogens: Frustrating State Formation Due to Fundamental Flaws of Legitimacy|90
3|3.1 The Contribution of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion|90
3|3.2 Jus Cogens Violations as an Obstacle to State Formation|91
3|3.3 Relevant Jus Cogens Norms|93
2|4 Legitimacy Concerns and Policies of Recognition|96
2|5 Conclusion|98
2|References|99
1|How the Facts Enter Into the Law|101
2|1 Introduction: Legal Mind and Expert Mind|101
2|2 The State of Facts as a Component of Legal Procedure|104
3|2.1 Is and Ought|104
3|2.2 The Truth of the Facts|104
3|2.3 The “Ought” of the Facts|106
3|2.4 The Function of the State of Facts|107
2|3 The Janus-Faced Facts|108
3|3.1 The State of Facts as a Re-Entry of the Facts|108
3|3.2 The Stratification of the Facts|109
2|4 On the Possibility of a Distribution of Roles|110
3|4.1 A Question of Law or of Fact as a Criterion?|110
3|4.2 Knowing and Willing|111
3|4.3 Coexistence|112
2|References|113
1|The Fact of Norms|115
2|1 The Problem|115
2|2 Is and Ought|116
2|3 Perception|117
2|4 Existences|119
2|5 Objectivity|120
2|6 Conclusion|123
2|References|124
1|Ex facto jus oritur|125
2|1 The Historicity of Reason|125
2|2 The Legal Relation|126
2|3 Universalization|127
2|4 From Judgment to Choice|128
2|5 Limits of the Reasonable|129
2|6 The Subjectivity of Law|130
2|7 Sources Speaking Themselves|132
2|8 Different Outlooks|133
2|9 From Subjectivity to Intersubjectivity|134
2|10 Reconciliation|135
2|11 Irony|137
2|References|137
1|The Many Forces in Law: Rational, Physical and Psychological Coercion|139
2|1 Reception Theory: Kelsen and Hart|139
2|2 Coercion Is Generally Part of the Law But Occasionally May Be Not|141
2|3 What Hart Thinks of Kelsen and What Kelsen Actually Intended to Say|143
2|4 Rational, Physical and Psychological Coercion|145
3|4.1 Rational Coercion|146
3|4.2 Psychological Coercion|147
3|4.3 Physical Coercion|148
2|5 The Case of International Law… or Is It International Morals?|150
2|6 Conclusion|152
2|References|152
1|Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity|154
2|1 A Value-Based Conception of Reasons as Facts|156
2|2 Legal Directives as Incomplete Reasons|159
2|3 Enoch on Triggering Reason-Giving|161
2|4 The Misattribution Objection|163
2|5 Can Law-Given Reasons Acquire (System-Wide or Localized) Value-Independent Force?|165
2|6 Conclusion|171
2|References|172
1|On the Alleged Problem of Legal Normativity|174
2|1 Legal Normativity: A Problem?|174
2|2 An Obligation to Follow the Law?|175
2|3 Instrumental Purposes|176
2|4 The Voice of the “Ought”|177
2|5 Conditional Normativity|178
2|6 A “Pseudo-Problem”?|179
2|7 Moral Impact|180
2|8 Conclusion: Against Normativity|181
2|References|182
1|Contents|7
1|Introduction|9
1|Georg Jellinek’s Theory of the Two Sides of the State (“Zwei-Seiten-Lehre des Staates”)|12
2|1 The Claim of the Two-Sides-Theory|13
3|1.1 Definition and Theoretical Basis|13
3|1.2 The Program of the Two-Sides-Theory|14
3|1.3 The Juridical Starting Point of the Two-Sides-Theory|15
3|1.4 The Uniformity of the State as a Juridical Problem|16
2|2 The Content of the Two-Sides-Theory|17
3|2.1 The Social Conception of the State|17
3|2.2 The Juridical Conception of the State|18
3|2.3 The Systematic Relationship Between the Social and the Juridical Side of the State|19
2|3 The Two-Sides-Theory as an Expression of Three Problems of Juridical Methodology|20
3|3.1 The Concept of Law as the Epistemological “Trigger” of the Two-Sides-Theory|21
3|3.2 Interdisciplinary Issues|23
3|3.3 Political Issues|24
2|4 The Context of the Two-Sides-Theory|26
3|4.1 Neo-Kantianism and Epistemology|26
3|4.2 Jellinek’s Juridical Implementation of Neo-Kantianism|27
3|4.3 Epistemological Reasons for the Criticism of Jellinek|28
2|5 The Categorical Impact of the Two-Sides-Theory|29
3|5.1 Interdisciplinary Fundamental Conceptions|30
3|5.2 Basic Epistemological Insights|31
3|5.3 The Concept of State as an Expression of Scientific Political Expectations|32
2|References|33
1|Sein and Sollen, “Is” and “Ought” and the Problem of Normativity in Hans Kelsen|36
2|1 The Is/Ought Distinction: An Ontological Distinction|36
2|2 The Distinction Between Causal and Normative Sciences|38
2|3 The Ontological Function of the Norm|40
2|4 Is and Ought and Legal Proposition (Rechtssatz)|41
2|5 The Function of the Basic Norm|43
2|6 Natural Law, Positivism and Rational Choice|44
2|7 Conclusion|49
2|References|50
1|Law as Fact and Norm. Georg Jellinek and the Dual Nature of Law|51
2|1 Introduction|51
2|2 The Normative Force of the Factual|52
3|2.1 The Intellectual-Historical Background|52
3|2.2 Jellinek’s Psychological Account of the Nature of Law|53
3|2.3 Kelsen’s Critique|54
2|3 The Is-Ought-Fallacy|55
3|3.1 Searle and von Wright on Is and Ought|55
3|3.2 Jellinek Revisited|57
3|3.3 Conclusion on Kelsen Versus Jellinek|60
2|4 Law’s Dual Nature|60
3|4.1 Jellinek’s Two-Sided Theory of the State|61
3|4.2 The Dual Nature Thesis|62
3|4.3 The Bridge Problem|63
2|5 Legal Discourse Bridging Is and Ought|65
3|5.1 The Dual Nature of Legal Argumentation|65
3|5.2 The Canons of Interpretation|66
3|5.3 Further Development of the Law|66
2|6 Conclusion|67
2|References|68
1|The ‘Normative Force of the Factual’: A Positivist’s Panegyric|71
2|1 Sub-Standard|71
2|2 The Original Understanding|72
2|3 An Olive Branch|73
2|4 A Fallacy|74
2|5 Thousandfold Norms|75
2|6 Animal Computans|76
2|7 Lawless Irregularity|77
2|8 Watching Television|78
2|9 A Suitable Cross-Check|80
2|10 Both Sides of the Dichotomy|81
2|References|82
1|The Effectiveness-Legitimacy Conundrum in the International Law of State Formation|84
2|1 The Orthodox Account: Formation of States as a Mere Fact|85
2|2 ISIS: Challenging the Dogma of the Purely Factual Character of State Formation|87
2|3 The Advent of Jus Cogens: Frustrating State Formation Due to Fundamental Flaws of Legitimacy|90
3|3.1 The Contribution of the Kosovo Advisory Opinion|90
3|3.2 Jus Cogens Violations as an Obstacle to State Formation|91
3|3.3 Relevant Jus Cogens Norms|93
2|4 Legitimacy Concerns and Policies of Recognition|96
2|5 Conclusion|98
2|References|99
1|How the Facts Enter Into the Law|101
2|1 Introduction: Legal Mind and Expert Mind|101
2|2 The State of Facts as a Component of Legal Procedure|104
3|2.1 Is and Ought|104
3|2.2 The Truth of the Facts|104
3|2.3 The “Ought” of the Facts|106
3|2.4 The Function of the State of Facts|107
2|3 The Janus-Faced Facts|108
3|3.1 The State of Facts as a Re-Entry of the Facts|108
3|3.2 The Stratification of the Facts|109
2|4 On the Possibility of a Distribution of Roles|110
3|4.1 A Question of Law or of Fact as a Criterion?|110
3|4.2 Knowing and Willing|111
3|4.3 Coexistence|112
2|References|113
1|The Fact of Norms|115
2|1 The Problem|115
2|2 Is and Ought|116
2|3 Perception|117
2|4 Existences|119
2|5 Objectivity|120
2|6 Conclusion|123
2|References|124
1|Ex facto jus oritur|125
2|1 The Historicity of Reason|125
2|2 The Legal Relation|126
2|3 Universalization|127
2|4 From Judgment to Choice|128
2|5 Limits of the Reasonable|129
2|6 The Subjectivity of Law|130
2|7 Sources Speaking Themselves|132
2|8 Different Outlooks|133
2|9 From Subjectivity to Intersubjectivity|134
2|10 Reconciliation|135
2|11 Irony|137
2|References|137
1|The Many Forces in Law: Rational, Physical and Psychological Coercion|139
2|1 Reception Theory: Kelsen and Hart|139
2|2 Coercion Is Generally Part of the Law But Occasionally May Be Not|141
2|3 What Hart Thinks of Kelsen and What Kelsen Actually Intended to Say|143
2|4 Rational, Physical and Psychological Coercion|145
3|4.1 Rational Coercion|146
3|4.2 Psychological Coercion|147
3|4.3 Physical Coercion|148
2|5 The Case of International Law… or Is It International Morals?|150
2|6 Conclusion|152
2|References|152
1|Legal Facts and Reasons for Action: Between Deflationary and Robust Conceptions of Law’s Reason-Giving Capacity|154
2|1 A Value-Based Conception of Reasons as Facts|156
2|2 Legal Directives as Incomplete Reasons|159
2|3 Enoch on Triggering Reason-Giving|161
2|4 The Misattribution Objection|163
2|5 Can Law-Given Reasons Acquire (System-Wide or Localized) Value-Independent Force?|165
2|6 Conclusion|171
2|References|172
1|On the Alleged Problem of Legal Normativity|174
2|1 Legal Normativity: A Problem?|174
2|2 An Obligation to Follow the Law?|175
2|3 Instrumental Purposes|176
2|4 The Voice of the “Ought”|177
2|5 Conditional Normativity|178
2|6 A “Pseudo-Problem”?|179
2|7 Moral Impact|180
2|8 Conclusion: Against Normativity|181
2|References|182