File #2677: "2019_Book_InterpretationWithoutTruth.pdf"
Text
1|Contents|6
1|Chapter 1: Introduction: The Path of Analytical Realism|10
2|1.1 On “Realism” and “Scepticism” in Jurisprudence|10
2|1.2 Overview|17
2|1.3 Conceptual Analysis|19
1|Chapter 2: Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Forms of Interpretive Discourse|25
2|2.1 A Haunting Problem|25
2|2.2 Legal Interpretation|26
3|2.2.1 Interpretation Proper to a Practical Purpose|27
4|2.2.1.1 Textual Interpretation|27
4|2.2.1.2 Meta-Textual Interpretation|31
3|2.2.2 Interpretation Proper to a Cognitive Purpose|35
4|2.2.2.1 Methodological Conjectures|36
4|2.2.2.2 Ideological Conjectures|37
4|2.2.2.3 Methodological Innovation|39
3|2.2.3 Interpretation Improper|39
4|2.2.3.1 Interpretation-Detection|39
4|2.2.3.2 Interpretation-Prediction|40
4|2.2.3.3 Interpretation-Prescription|40
2|2.3 Truth|42
3|2.3.1 Empirical Truth|43
3|2.3.2 Pragmatic Truth|45
3|2.3.3 Systemic Truth|46
4|2.3.3.1 Deductive Normative Systems|47
4|2.3.3.2 Rhetorical Normative Systems|48
3|2.3.4 Taking Stock|51
2|2.4 The Problem Unravelled|52
2|2.5 Truth and the Nature of Judicial Interpretation|54
1|Chapter 3: Interpretive Games|57
2|3.1 Big and Small(er) Problems|57
2|3.2 The Challenge of Linguistic Theories|58
3|3.2.1 The Word-Meaning Theory|59
3|3.2.2 The Sentence-Meaning Theory|60
2|3.3 The Failure of Linguistic Theories|61
2|3.4 Interpretive Games|67
3|3.4.1 Simple v. Complex Games|71
3|3.4.2 Open v. Well-Designed Games|72
3|3.4.3 Cognitive v. Practical Games|72
3|3.4.4 Privileged Rule-Making v. Universal Rule-Making Games|73
3|3.4.5 External Rule-Making v. Contextual Rule-Making Games|73
3|3.4.6 No-Reinterpretation, Unlimited Reinterpretation, Limited Reinterpretation Games|74
2|3.5 The Conversation Game|75
3|3.5.1 The Principle and Maxims of Conversation|76
3|3.5.2 The Principle and Maxims of Conversational Interpretation|77
2|3.6 The Statutory Interpretation Game|78
2|3.7 A Concluding Note|82
1|Chapter 4: Taking Context Seriously|83
2|4.1 A Kantian Reproach|83
2|4.2 Two Theories of Legal Interpretation|87
3|4.2.1 Semantic Formalism|87
3|4.2.2 Pragmatic Realism|91
2|4.3 Literalism v. Contextualism|94
3|4.3.1 Literalism|95
3|4.3.2 Contextualism|100
2|4.4 What a Jurist Can Learn|106
1|Chapter 5: Frames v. Containers|111
2|5.1 A Demarcation Problem|111
2|5.2 The Frame of Interpretations Theory|112
2|5.3 The Container-Retrieval Theory|120
2|5.4 A Few Virtues of the Frame Theory|123
3|5.4.1 Ab posse ad esse non valet consequentia|123
3|5.4.2 Two Misfired Critiques|125
4|5.4.2.1 On the Alleged Impossibility of Distinguishing Explicit from Implicit Norms|125
4|5.4.2.2 On the Alleged Impossibility of Making Sense of Legislation as a Source of Law|129
3|5.4.3 The Competitive Advantage of the Frame Theory|130
1|Chapter 6: Towards Pragmatic Realism|132
2|6.1 The Problem About Judicial Interpretation|132
2|6.2 A Conceptual Framework|133
2|6.3 Three Theories|137
3|6.3.1 Cognitivism: Integral and Limited|137
3|6.3.2 A Few Perplexities|139
3|6.3.3 Non-Cognitivism|141
2|6.4 Pragmatic Formalism|142
2|6.5 Pragmatic Realism: The Critical Side|148
3|6.5.1 Pragmatics and the Theory of Legal Interpretation|149
3|6.5.2 The Interpretive Relevance of Linguistic Meaning|151
3|6.5.3 Art, Law and Ordinary Conversation|152
3|6.5.4 Which Easiness Easy Cases?|154
3|6.5.5 The Sting of Normative Conflicts|156
3|6.5.6 The Sting of Pragmatic Indeterminacies|158
4|6.5.6.1 Mismatch Problems|158
4|6.5.6.2 Legal Implicatures Problems|159
2|6.6 Pragmatic Realism: The Proposal Side|160
1|Chapter 7: Legal Gaps|166
2|7.1 Two Traditions|166
2|7.2 The Civil Law Side|167
3|7.2.1 Normative Gaps Proper|170
3|7.2.2 Switchover Gaps|171
3|7.2.3 Adding-Up Gaps|172
2|7.3 The Common Law Side|173
3|7.3.1 Schauer|174
3|7.3.2 Bix|176
3|7.3.3 Coleman and Leiter|178
3|7.3.4 Dworkin|179
3|7.3.5 Raz|182
2|7.4 Comparative Jurisprudence|184
3|7.4.1 Puzzle-Theories v. Servants-Theories|184
3|7.4.2 Jealous Statutes v. Generous Codes|185
3|7.4.3 Philosophers v. Watch-Repairers|186
1|Chapter 8: Judicial Fictions|187
2|8.1 The Need for Clarification|187
2|8.2 A Few Extant Characterizations|188
3|8.2.1 Kelsen|188
3|8.2.2 Ross|190
3|8.2.3 Gottlieb|191
3|8.2.4 Schauer|192
3|8.2.5 Del Mar|193
2|8.3 Characterizations Analysed|194
2|8.4 A Further Characterization|200
3|8.4.1 Solving an Axiological Gap Without Fiction: The Sweeping Abortion Prohibition|201
3|8.4.2 Solving an Axiological Gap Without Fiction: Mothers’ Parental Leave|203
3|8.4.3 Solving an Axiological Gap by Fiction: The Macallister Case|204
3|8.4.4 Solving an Axiological Gap by Fiction: The Minorca Case|205
1|Chapter 9: Precedent|207
2|9.1 The Philosophy of Precedent: Two Varieties|207
2|9.2 “Judicial Precedent”|208
2|9.3 “Ratio Decidendi”, “Obiter Dictum”|209
2|9.4 “Interpreting Precedents”|214
3|9.4.1 Interpreting the Ratio Decidendi: Textual Techniques|215
3|9.4.2 Interpreting the Ratio Decidendi: Meta-Textual Techniques|216
3|9.4.3 Models for Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case|217
2|9.5 The Practical Relevance of Judicial Precedents|217
3|9.5.1 A Few Distinctions|218
3|9.5.2 The Bielefelder Kreis|219
3|9.5.3 Eight Ideal-Typical Systems|221
1|Chapter 10: Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy|227
2|10.1 The Problem|227
2|10.2 Legal Indeterminacy|227
3|10.2.1 Indeterminacy in Law and Its Sources|228
4|10.2.1.1 Indeterminate Legal Solutions|229
4|10.2.1.2 Mutually Exclusive Answers|229
4|10.2.1.3 Plurality of Competing Answers|231
4|10.2.1.4 No-Answer|233
3|10.2.2 Five Notions of Legal Indeterminacy|233
2|10.3 Defeasibility in Law|235
3|10.3.1 Objects and Sources|237
4|10.3.1.1 Defeasible Facts|237
4|10.3.1.2 Defeasible Beliefs|238
4|10.3.1.3 Defeasible Concepts|239
4|10.3.1.4 Defeasible Provisions|241
4|10.3.1.5 Defeasible Interpretations|243
4|10.3.1.6 Defeasible Reasoning|244
4|10.3.1.7 Defeasible Conclusions|245
4|10.3.1.8 Defeasible Arrangements, Positions, Claims|245
4|10.3.1.9 Defeasible Norms|246
2|10.4 Explicit v. Implicit Norm-Defeasibility|252
2|10.5 Norm-Defeasibility and Axiological Gaps|253
2|10.6 A Tentative Reconstruction|254
2|10.7 Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy|257
1|Chapter 11: Legislation|260
2|11.1 The New Science of Legislation|260
2|11.2 Legal Realism|262
2|11.3 Legal Realism and Legislation|263
2|11.4 The Realistic Theory of Legislation|264
1|References|272
1|Chapter 1: Introduction: The Path of Analytical Realism|10
2|1.1 On “Realism” and “Scepticism” in Jurisprudence|10
2|1.2 Overview|17
2|1.3 Conceptual Analysis|19
1|Chapter 2: Interpretation, Truth, and the Logical Forms of Interpretive Discourse|25
2|2.1 A Haunting Problem|25
2|2.2 Legal Interpretation|26
3|2.2.1 Interpretation Proper to a Practical Purpose|27
4|2.2.1.1 Textual Interpretation|27
4|2.2.1.2 Meta-Textual Interpretation|31
3|2.2.2 Interpretation Proper to a Cognitive Purpose|35
4|2.2.2.1 Methodological Conjectures|36
4|2.2.2.2 Ideological Conjectures|37
4|2.2.2.3 Methodological Innovation|39
3|2.2.3 Interpretation Improper|39
4|2.2.3.1 Interpretation-Detection|39
4|2.2.3.2 Interpretation-Prediction|40
4|2.2.3.3 Interpretation-Prescription|40
2|2.3 Truth|42
3|2.3.1 Empirical Truth|43
3|2.3.2 Pragmatic Truth|45
3|2.3.3 Systemic Truth|46
4|2.3.3.1 Deductive Normative Systems|47
4|2.3.3.2 Rhetorical Normative Systems|48
3|2.3.4 Taking Stock|51
2|2.4 The Problem Unravelled|52
2|2.5 Truth and the Nature of Judicial Interpretation|54
1|Chapter 3: Interpretive Games|57
2|3.1 Big and Small(er) Problems|57
2|3.2 The Challenge of Linguistic Theories|58
3|3.2.1 The Word-Meaning Theory|59
3|3.2.2 The Sentence-Meaning Theory|60
2|3.3 The Failure of Linguistic Theories|61
2|3.4 Interpretive Games|67
3|3.4.1 Simple v. Complex Games|71
3|3.4.2 Open v. Well-Designed Games|72
3|3.4.3 Cognitive v. Practical Games|72
3|3.4.4 Privileged Rule-Making v. Universal Rule-Making Games|73
3|3.4.5 External Rule-Making v. Contextual Rule-Making Games|73
3|3.4.6 No-Reinterpretation, Unlimited Reinterpretation, Limited Reinterpretation Games|74
2|3.5 The Conversation Game|75
3|3.5.1 The Principle and Maxims of Conversation|76
3|3.5.2 The Principle and Maxims of Conversational Interpretation|77
2|3.6 The Statutory Interpretation Game|78
2|3.7 A Concluding Note|82
1|Chapter 4: Taking Context Seriously|83
2|4.1 A Kantian Reproach|83
2|4.2 Two Theories of Legal Interpretation|87
3|4.2.1 Semantic Formalism|87
3|4.2.2 Pragmatic Realism|91
2|4.3 Literalism v. Contextualism|94
3|4.3.1 Literalism|95
3|4.3.2 Contextualism|100
2|4.4 What a Jurist Can Learn|106
1|Chapter 5: Frames v. Containers|111
2|5.1 A Demarcation Problem|111
2|5.2 The Frame of Interpretations Theory|112
2|5.3 The Container-Retrieval Theory|120
2|5.4 A Few Virtues of the Frame Theory|123
3|5.4.1 Ab posse ad esse non valet consequentia|123
3|5.4.2 Two Misfired Critiques|125
4|5.4.2.1 On the Alleged Impossibility of Distinguishing Explicit from Implicit Norms|125
4|5.4.2.2 On the Alleged Impossibility of Making Sense of Legislation as a Source of Law|129
3|5.4.3 The Competitive Advantage of the Frame Theory|130
1|Chapter 6: Towards Pragmatic Realism|132
2|6.1 The Problem About Judicial Interpretation|132
2|6.2 A Conceptual Framework|133
2|6.3 Three Theories|137
3|6.3.1 Cognitivism: Integral and Limited|137
3|6.3.2 A Few Perplexities|139
3|6.3.3 Non-Cognitivism|141
2|6.4 Pragmatic Formalism|142
2|6.5 Pragmatic Realism: The Critical Side|148
3|6.5.1 Pragmatics and the Theory of Legal Interpretation|149
3|6.5.2 The Interpretive Relevance of Linguistic Meaning|151
3|6.5.3 Art, Law and Ordinary Conversation|152
3|6.5.4 Which Easiness Easy Cases?|154
3|6.5.5 The Sting of Normative Conflicts|156
3|6.5.6 The Sting of Pragmatic Indeterminacies|158
4|6.5.6.1 Mismatch Problems|158
4|6.5.6.2 Legal Implicatures Problems|159
2|6.6 Pragmatic Realism: The Proposal Side|160
1|Chapter 7: Legal Gaps|166
2|7.1 Two Traditions|166
2|7.2 The Civil Law Side|167
3|7.2.1 Normative Gaps Proper|170
3|7.2.2 Switchover Gaps|171
3|7.2.3 Adding-Up Gaps|172
2|7.3 The Common Law Side|173
3|7.3.1 Schauer|174
3|7.3.2 Bix|176
3|7.3.3 Coleman and Leiter|178
3|7.3.4 Dworkin|179
3|7.3.5 Raz|182
2|7.4 Comparative Jurisprudence|184
3|7.4.1 Puzzle-Theories v. Servants-Theories|184
3|7.4.2 Jealous Statutes v. Generous Codes|185
3|7.4.3 Philosophers v. Watch-Repairers|186
1|Chapter 8: Judicial Fictions|187
2|8.1 The Need for Clarification|187
2|8.2 A Few Extant Characterizations|188
3|8.2.1 Kelsen|188
3|8.2.2 Ross|190
3|8.2.3 Gottlieb|191
3|8.2.4 Schauer|192
3|8.2.5 Del Mar|193
2|8.3 Characterizations Analysed|194
2|8.4 A Further Characterization|200
3|8.4.1 Solving an Axiological Gap Without Fiction: The Sweeping Abortion Prohibition|201
3|8.4.2 Solving an Axiological Gap Without Fiction: Mothers’ Parental Leave|203
3|8.4.3 Solving an Axiological Gap by Fiction: The Macallister Case|204
3|8.4.4 Solving an Axiological Gap by Fiction: The Minorca Case|205
1|Chapter 9: Precedent|207
2|9.1 The Philosophy of Precedent: Two Varieties|207
2|9.2 “Judicial Precedent”|208
2|9.3 “Ratio Decidendi”, “Obiter Dictum”|209
2|9.4 “Interpreting Precedents”|214
3|9.4.1 Interpreting the Ratio Decidendi: Textual Techniques|215
3|9.4.2 Interpreting the Ratio Decidendi: Meta-Textual Techniques|216
3|9.4.3 Models for Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case|217
2|9.5 The Practical Relevance of Judicial Precedents|217
3|9.5.1 A Few Distinctions|218
3|9.5.2 The Bielefelder Kreis|219
3|9.5.3 Eight Ideal-Typical Systems|221
1|Chapter 10: Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy|227
2|10.1 The Problem|227
2|10.2 Legal Indeterminacy|227
3|10.2.1 Indeterminacy in Law and Its Sources|228
4|10.2.1.1 Indeterminate Legal Solutions|229
4|10.2.1.2 Mutually Exclusive Answers|229
4|10.2.1.3 Plurality of Competing Answers|231
4|10.2.1.4 No-Answer|233
3|10.2.2 Five Notions of Legal Indeterminacy|233
2|10.3 Defeasibility in Law|235
3|10.3.1 Objects and Sources|237
4|10.3.1.1 Defeasible Facts|237
4|10.3.1.2 Defeasible Beliefs|238
4|10.3.1.3 Defeasible Concepts|239
4|10.3.1.4 Defeasible Provisions|241
4|10.3.1.5 Defeasible Interpretations|243
4|10.3.1.6 Defeasible Reasoning|244
4|10.3.1.7 Defeasible Conclusions|245
4|10.3.1.8 Defeasible Arrangements, Positions, Claims|245
4|10.3.1.9 Defeasible Norms|246
2|10.4 Explicit v. Implicit Norm-Defeasibility|252
2|10.5 Norm-Defeasibility and Axiological Gaps|253
2|10.6 A Tentative Reconstruction|254
2|10.7 Defeasibility and Legal Indeterminacy|257
1|Chapter 11: Legislation|260
2|11.1 The New Science of Legislation|260
2|11.2 Legal Realism|262
2|11.3 Legal Realism and Legislation|263
2|11.4 The Realistic Theory of Legislation|264
1|References|272