File #2683: "2019_Book_CertificationTrustAccountabili.pdf"
Text
1|Contents|6
1|Introduction|8
2|1 The Theme of the Book|8
2|2 The Structure of the Book|10
2|3 The Individual Chapters|11
3|3.1 Part 1: Foundations|11
3|3.2 Part 2: Success and Shortcomings of Certification Systems|12
3|3.3 Part 3: Liability for Negligent Certification|13
2|4 A Word of Thanks|14
2|References|14
1|Part I: Foundations|16
2|Certification as Solution to the Asymmetric Information Problem?|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 Markets for Search Goods, Experience Goods and Credence Goods|18
3|3 The Basic Viscusi Model|19
3|4 Opportunistic Certifying Agencies|20
3|5 Certification of Minimum Quality|22
3|6 Open Questions|24
3|7 Conclusions|26
3|References|27
2|Challenges for Responsible Certification in Institutional Context: The Case of Competition Law Enforcement in Markets with Certification|29
3|1 Certification as Regulation|29
3|2 Certification as Responsible Regulation in Context|30
4|2.1 Certification as a Statement|30
5|2.1.1 Certification as a Declarative-Assertive Act|30
5|2.1.2 Certification Upon Assessment|31
5|2.1.3 Significance of Certification|32
5|2.1.4 Certification as a Factual or Legal Act|32
4|2.2 Certification as Regulation|33
5|2.2.1 Certification Linking Behaviour to Outcomes|34
5|2.2.2 Regulatory Strategies Behind Certification|35
5|2.2.3 Regulatory Relations Behind (Strategies Behind) Certification|35
5|2.2.4 Certification Bodies and Regulatory Relations|36
5|2.2.5 Certification in Three Kinds|37
5|2.2.6 Certification as a Process|38
5|2.2.7 Certification: An Instrument and Object of Regulation|38
5|2.2.8 Certification as a Legal Institution|39
4|2.3 Responsible Certification in Governance Context|40
5|2.3.1 Modes of Governance|40
5|2.3.2 Modes of Legal Governance|41
5|2.3.3 Normative Alignment|42
4|2.4 Responsible Certification|42
5|2.4.1 Four Maxims|42
5|2.4.2 Institutional and Collective Choice Rules|43
5|2.4.3 On the Origin of Rules|44
5|2.4.4 Again: In Modes of Regulation|45
4|2.5 Certification as Regulation of Public Interests, Endogenous or Exogenous to Public Hierarchy?|47
5|2.5.1 Public Law Certification and Public Hierarchy Institutional Rules|48
5|2.5.2 Public Law Use and Consequences of Private Certification Schemes|48
5|2.5.3 Public Hierarchy Certification Regulation|49
4|2.6 Public Hierarchy and Responsible Certification: Intermediate Conclusions|51
3|3 Certification in the Institutional Context of Competitive Markets|52
4|3.1 Competition Law: Meta-regulation for (Certification) Markets|53
4|3.2 Certification Markets: Markets for Information, Assurances and Trust|55
3|4 Competition Concerns: Exclusion and Exploitation in the Context of Collaboration|57
4|4.1 A Theoretical Framework for Anticompetitive Private Regulation|58
4|4.2 Fixing ‘Prices’|59
5|4.2.1 Collusion in Parallel with Certification|59
5|4.2.2 Collusion Inherent in Certification|61
4|4.3 ‘Fixing Rivals’|63
5|4.3.1 Who Sits on the Board?|64
5|4.3.2 Fixing Rivals and Fixing Prices: A Recipe for Watertight Control|65
4|4.4 ‘Fixing Rules’|68
4|4.5 Suspect Cooperation|71
3|5 Certification as Unilateral Activity: Anticompetitive Concerns|72
3|6 Competition Issues in Certification Markets: Private Regulation Needs Public Interest Safeguards?|74
3|References|76
2|The Use of Conformity Assessment of Construction Products by the European Union and National Governments: Legitimacy, Effectiveness and the Functioning of the Union Market|78
3|1 Introduction|78
3|2 Conformity Assessment|79
3|3 Conformity Assessment Under Union Harmonisation Legislation|80
4|3.1 From New Approach to New Legislative Framework|80
4|3.2 CE Marking and Conformity Assessment Under the Construction Products Regulation|82
3|4 Voluntary Certification of Construction Products and Processes Under National Legislation: The Dutch Building Decree as an Example|86
3|5 Use of Conformity Assessment of Construction Products by the European Union and National Governments: Legitimacy and Effectiveness|87
4|5.1 Legitimacy and Effectiveness: General Aspects|88
4|5.2 Legitimacy of Conformity Assessment of Construction Products|89
5|5.2.1 Conformity Assessment Under the CPR|89
6|Legitimacy of Underlying Harmonised Standards|89
6|Legitimacy of the Procedure of Notification of Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies|92
5|5.2.2 Conformity Assessment Under National Legislation: The Dutch Building Decree as an Example|92
6|Legitimacy of Underlying Standards|93
6|Legitimacy of Certification Schemes|93
6|Accreditation of Conformity Assessment Bodies and Legitimacy of Conformity Assessment|94
4|5.3 Effectiveness|94
5|5.3.1 Assessment and Verification of Constancy of Performance Under CPR|95
5|5.3.2 Third Party Conformity Assessment Under National Legislation: The Dutch Building Decree as an Example|96
3|6 Voluntary Certification of Construction Products: Three Legal Issues|97
4|6.1 Article 8(3) CPR|98
4|6.2 Article 34 TFEU|101
4|6.3 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU|104
3|7 Main Findings|107
3|References|110
1|Part II: Success and Shortcomings of Certification Systems|112
2|Privacy Through Certification?: The New Certification Scheme of the General Data Protection Regulation|113
3|1 Introduction|113
3|2 German Data Protection Law|115
3|3 General Data Protection Regulation|116
3|4 Data Protection Certification Mechanisms|118
4|4.1 Concept|118
5|4.1.1 Scope and Mode of Examination|119
6|Certification|119
6|Audit|119
5|4.1.2 Standard of Examination|120
5|4.1.3 Verifying Authority|121
5|4.1.4 Legal Effects|122
4|4.2 The Status Quo in Europe|123
5|4.2.1 German Law|123
5|4.2.2 EU Law: The Data Protection Directive|124
4|4.3 General Data Protection Regulation|125
5|4.3.1 Proposals|125
6|European Commission Proposal|125
6|Position of the European Parliament|125
6|Position of the Council|126
5|4.3.2 Final Content of the Regulation|126
6|General Approach|126
6|Specific Aspects|127
7|Subject|127
7|Standard of Examination|127
7|Certification Bodies|129
7|Legal Effects|130
3|5 Conclusions|132
3|References|132
2|Can Certification Enhance the Feasibility of Insurance?|136
3|1 Introduction|136
3|2 Two Key Factors Determining the Insurability of Risks and the Potential Role of Certification|137
4|2.1 Key Factors of Insurability|137
4|2.2 Potential Role of Certification|138
3|3 Selected Cases|138
4|3.1 Case 1: Liability Insurance for Animal Feed Companies|139
4|3.2 Case 2: Epidemic Disease Insurance for Farmers|141
4|3.3 Case 3: Liability Insurance for the Horse Business|142
3|4 Discussion and Conclusions|143
3|References|144
2|Control in the Label: Self-Declared, Certified, Accredited?|146
3|1 Introduction|146
3|2 Compliance Control in Food Schemes|148
4|2.1 The Tripartite Standards Regime framework|148
4|2.2 The Compliance Control of Voluntary Food Schemes Under EU Law|149
5|2.2.1 Compliance Control in Voluntary Food Schemes: Accreditation Endorsed But Not Imposed|150
5|2.2.2 Control in ‘Public’ EU Food Schemes: The Organic Scheme and Quality Scheme (PDO, PGI)|151
5|2.2.3 Summary|151
3|3 Communicating Compliance Control to the Consumer|152
4|3.1 Consumer Perception Studies on Standards and Their Compliance Control|152
4|3.2 How Do Schemes Communicate Compliance Control to Consumers?|153
3|4 The EU Legal Framework from a Consumer Perspective|155
4|4.1 The Legal Framework: Prohibition on Misleading the Consumer and Food Information Requirements|155
5|4.1.1 General Prohibition of Misleading Practices|156
5|4.1.2 Food Information: The UCPD and Specific Food Information Law|157
4|4.2 Consumer Communication|158
3|5 Conclusions and the Way Forward|161
3|References|162
2|Certification of the Sustainability of Biofuels in Global Supply Chains|165
3|1 Introduction|165
3|2 The Renewable Energy Directive of 2009|165
4|2.1 Substantive Law|165
4|2.2 The Compliance System|167
5|2.2.1 The German National Scheme|168
5|2.2.2 Voluntary Schemes|171
3|3 Evaluation and Critique of the Original System|172
4|3.1 Preconditions of a Functioning System|172
4|3.2 Substantive Requirements on Biofuels|173
4|3.3 Implementation of the Sustainability Criteria|174
4|3.4 The Approval of Voluntary Schemes|176
4|3.5 Monitoring|178
4|3.6 Reliability of Voluntary Schemes|180
3|4 Competition Between Different Systems: A Race to the Bottom?|180
3|5 Amendments in 2015|182
4|5.1 Substantive Law Novelties|182
4|5.2 Procedural Novelties|183
3|6 The Proposal of 2016|183
4|6.1 Substantive Law Novelties|184
4|6.2 Procedural Novelties|184
3|7 Conclusions|185
3|References|186
1|Part III: Liability for Negligent Certification|188
2|Certification of Medical Devices: Lessons from the PIP Scandal|189
3|1 Introduction|189
3|2 The Function of Certification Bodies in the Medical Devices Directive 93/42/EEC|191
4|2.1 Duties of Notified Bodies|191
4|2.2 The Broader Function of Notified Bodies|193
3|3 Quality Control|195
3|4 Immediate Reaction of the European Commission|197
4|4.1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 920/2013|197
4|4.2 Recommendation 2013/473/EU|199
3|5 The New Regulation on Medical Devices|199
4|5.1 Duties of Notified Bodies|200
4|5.2 Requirements for Notified Bodies|200
4|5.3 The Amended Control System|201
5|5.3.1 Control of Notified Bodies|201
5|5.3.2 Control of Designating Bodies|202
3|6 Complementary Tort Liability?|203
4|6.1 The CJEU Judgment in Elisabeth Schmitt|203
4|6.2 A New Situation Under the Medical Devices Regulation?|206
4|6.3 National Law and Private International Law|207
3|7 Conclusion|208
3|References|209
2|Public Function Liability of Classification Societies|212
3|1 Introduction|212
3|2 Private Function Liability|214
3|3 Public Function Liability|215
4|3.1 Introduction|215
4|3.2 Immunity Defenses According to EU Law|216
4|3.3 Procedural Immunity Defense at the National Level|218
4|3.4 Substantial Immunity Defense at the National Level|220
5|3.4.1 Introduction|220
5|3.4.2 US: Principle of Immunity|220
5|3.4.3 Germany: Limited immunity|221
5|3.4.4 UK: Ordinary Tort Law Principles Apply|222
5|3.4.5 Scandinavia: Professional Liability Standard?|222
4|3.5 Summing Up|222
3|4 The Blurring of the Distinction Between Private and Public Function and Liability Consequences|223
4|4.1 Introduction|223
4|4.2 The Interplay and Overlap Between Private and Public Certification|223
4|4.3 IMO Code for Recognized Organizations|224
4|4.4 Recent Cases|226
3|5 Conclusion|227
3|References|227
2|Liability of Rating Agencies Under German and European Law|229
3|1 Introduction|229
3|2 Jurisdiction|231
3|3 Conflicts of Law|232
4|3.1 Application of Article 4(1) Rome II Regulation|233
4|3.2 Application of Article 4(3) Rome II Regulation|234
3|4 European Union Ratings Regulation|235
4|4.1 Application and Function|236
4|4.2 Liability Standard|237
3|5 German Substantive Law|238
4|5.1 The Contract with Protective Effect for Third Parties|238
4|5.2 Codified Tort Law|241
4|5.3 Disclaimer Language|243
4|5.4 Contributory Negligence|244
3|6 Outlook|245
3|References|246
1|Introduction|8
2|1 The Theme of the Book|8
2|2 The Structure of the Book|10
2|3 The Individual Chapters|11
3|3.1 Part 1: Foundations|11
3|3.2 Part 2: Success and Shortcomings of Certification Systems|12
3|3.3 Part 3: Liability for Negligent Certification|13
2|4 A Word of Thanks|14
2|References|14
1|Part I: Foundations|16
2|Certification as Solution to the Asymmetric Information Problem?|17
3|1 Introduction|17
3|2 Markets for Search Goods, Experience Goods and Credence Goods|18
3|3 The Basic Viscusi Model|19
3|4 Opportunistic Certifying Agencies|20
3|5 Certification of Minimum Quality|22
3|6 Open Questions|24
3|7 Conclusions|26
3|References|27
2|Challenges for Responsible Certification in Institutional Context: The Case of Competition Law Enforcement in Markets with Certification|29
3|1 Certification as Regulation|29
3|2 Certification as Responsible Regulation in Context|30
4|2.1 Certification as a Statement|30
5|2.1.1 Certification as a Declarative-Assertive Act|30
5|2.1.2 Certification Upon Assessment|31
5|2.1.3 Significance of Certification|32
5|2.1.4 Certification as a Factual or Legal Act|32
4|2.2 Certification as Regulation|33
5|2.2.1 Certification Linking Behaviour to Outcomes|34
5|2.2.2 Regulatory Strategies Behind Certification|35
5|2.2.3 Regulatory Relations Behind (Strategies Behind) Certification|35
5|2.2.4 Certification Bodies and Regulatory Relations|36
5|2.2.5 Certification in Three Kinds|37
5|2.2.6 Certification as a Process|38
5|2.2.7 Certification: An Instrument and Object of Regulation|38
5|2.2.8 Certification as a Legal Institution|39
4|2.3 Responsible Certification in Governance Context|40
5|2.3.1 Modes of Governance|40
5|2.3.2 Modes of Legal Governance|41
5|2.3.3 Normative Alignment|42
4|2.4 Responsible Certification|42
5|2.4.1 Four Maxims|42
5|2.4.2 Institutional and Collective Choice Rules|43
5|2.4.3 On the Origin of Rules|44
5|2.4.4 Again: In Modes of Regulation|45
4|2.5 Certification as Regulation of Public Interests, Endogenous or Exogenous to Public Hierarchy?|47
5|2.5.1 Public Law Certification and Public Hierarchy Institutional Rules|48
5|2.5.2 Public Law Use and Consequences of Private Certification Schemes|48
5|2.5.3 Public Hierarchy Certification Regulation|49
4|2.6 Public Hierarchy and Responsible Certification: Intermediate Conclusions|51
3|3 Certification in the Institutional Context of Competitive Markets|52
4|3.1 Competition Law: Meta-regulation for (Certification) Markets|53
4|3.2 Certification Markets: Markets for Information, Assurances and Trust|55
3|4 Competition Concerns: Exclusion and Exploitation in the Context of Collaboration|57
4|4.1 A Theoretical Framework for Anticompetitive Private Regulation|58
4|4.2 Fixing ‘Prices’|59
5|4.2.1 Collusion in Parallel with Certification|59
5|4.2.2 Collusion Inherent in Certification|61
4|4.3 ‘Fixing Rivals’|63
5|4.3.1 Who Sits on the Board?|64
5|4.3.2 Fixing Rivals and Fixing Prices: A Recipe for Watertight Control|65
4|4.4 ‘Fixing Rules’|68
4|4.5 Suspect Cooperation|71
3|5 Certification as Unilateral Activity: Anticompetitive Concerns|72
3|6 Competition Issues in Certification Markets: Private Regulation Needs Public Interest Safeguards?|74
3|References|76
2|The Use of Conformity Assessment of Construction Products by the European Union and National Governments: Legitimacy, Effectiveness and the Functioning of the Union Market|78
3|1 Introduction|78
3|2 Conformity Assessment|79
3|3 Conformity Assessment Under Union Harmonisation Legislation|80
4|3.1 From New Approach to New Legislative Framework|80
4|3.2 CE Marking and Conformity Assessment Under the Construction Products Regulation|82
3|4 Voluntary Certification of Construction Products and Processes Under National Legislation: The Dutch Building Decree as an Example|86
3|5 Use of Conformity Assessment of Construction Products by the European Union and National Governments: Legitimacy and Effectiveness|87
4|5.1 Legitimacy and Effectiveness: General Aspects|88
4|5.2 Legitimacy of Conformity Assessment of Construction Products|89
5|5.2.1 Conformity Assessment Under the CPR|89
6|Legitimacy of Underlying Harmonised Standards|89
6|Legitimacy of the Procedure of Notification of Third Party Conformity Assessment Bodies|92
5|5.2.2 Conformity Assessment Under National Legislation: The Dutch Building Decree as an Example|92
6|Legitimacy of Underlying Standards|93
6|Legitimacy of Certification Schemes|93
6|Accreditation of Conformity Assessment Bodies and Legitimacy of Conformity Assessment|94
4|5.3 Effectiveness|94
5|5.3.1 Assessment and Verification of Constancy of Performance Under CPR|95
5|5.3.2 Third Party Conformity Assessment Under National Legislation: The Dutch Building Decree as an Example|96
3|6 Voluntary Certification of Construction Products: Three Legal Issues|97
4|6.1 Article 8(3) CPR|98
4|6.2 Article 34 TFEU|101
4|6.3 Articles 101 and 102 TFEU|104
3|7 Main Findings|107
3|References|110
1|Part II: Success and Shortcomings of Certification Systems|112
2|Privacy Through Certification?: The New Certification Scheme of the General Data Protection Regulation|113
3|1 Introduction|113
3|2 German Data Protection Law|115
3|3 General Data Protection Regulation|116
3|4 Data Protection Certification Mechanisms|118
4|4.1 Concept|118
5|4.1.1 Scope and Mode of Examination|119
6|Certification|119
6|Audit|119
5|4.1.2 Standard of Examination|120
5|4.1.3 Verifying Authority|121
5|4.1.4 Legal Effects|122
4|4.2 The Status Quo in Europe|123
5|4.2.1 German Law|123
5|4.2.2 EU Law: The Data Protection Directive|124
4|4.3 General Data Protection Regulation|125
5|4.3.1 Proposals|125
6|European Commission Proposal|125
6|Position of the European Parliament|125
6|Position of the Council|126
5|4.3.2 Final Content of the Regulation|126
6|General Approach|126
6|Specific Aspects|127
7|Subject|127
7|Standard of Examination|127
7|Certification Bodies|129
7|Legal Effects|130
3|5 Conclusions|132
3|References|132
2|Can Certification Enhance the Feasibility of Insurance?|136
3|1 Introduction|136
3|2 Two Key Factors Determining the Insurability of Risks and the Potential Role of Certification|137
4|2.1 Key Factors of Insurability|137
4|2.2 Potential Role of Certification|138
3|3 Selected Cases|138
4|3.1 Case 1: Liability Insurance for Animal Feed Companies|139
4|3.2 Case 2: Epidemic Disease Insurance for Farmers|141
4|3.3 Case 3: Liability Insurance for the Horse Business|142
3|4 Discussion and Conclusions|143
3|References|144
2|Control in the Label: Self-Declared, Certified, Accredited?|146
3|1 Introduction|146
3|2 Compliance Control in Food Schemes|148
4|2.1 The Tripartite Standards Regime framework|148
4|2.2 The Compliance Control of Voluntary Food Schemes Under EU Law|149
5|2.2.1 Compliance Control in Voluntary Food Schemes: Accreditation Endorsed But Not Imposed|150
5|2.2.2 Control in ‘Public’ EU Food Schemes: The Organic Scheme and Quality Scheme (PDO, PGI)|151
5|2.2.3 Summary|151
3|3 Communicating Compliance Control to the Consumer|152
4|3.1 Consumer Perception Studies on Standards and Their Compliance Control|152
4|3.2 How Do Schemes Communicate Compliance Control to Consumers?|153
3|4 The EU Legal Framework from a Consumer Perspective|155
4|4.1 The Legal Framework: Prohibition on Misleading the Consumer and Food Information Requirements|155
5|4.1.1 General Prohibition of Misleading Practices|156
5|4.1.2 Food Information: The UCPD and Specific Food Information Law|157
4|4.2 Consumer Communication|158
3|5 Conclusions and the Way Forward|161
3|References|162
2|Certification of the Sustainability of Biofuels in Global Supply Chains|165
3|1 Introduction|165
3|2 The Renewable Energy Directive of 2009|165
4|2.1 Substantive Law|165
4|2.2 The Compliance System|167
5|2.2.1 The German National Scheme|168
5|2.2.2 Voluntary Schemes|171
3|3 Evaluation and Critique of the Original System|172
4|3.1 Preconditions of a Functioning System|172
4|3.2 Substantive Requirements on Biofuels|173
4|3.3 Implementation of the Sustainability Criteria|174
4|3.4 The Approval of Voluntary Schemes|176
4|3.5 Monitoring|178
4|3.6 Reliability of Voluntary Schemes|180
3|4 Competition Between Different Systems: A Race to the Bottom?|180
3|5 Amendments in 2015|182
4|5.1 Substantive Law Novelties|182
4|5.2 Procedural Novelties|183
3|6 The Proposal of 2016|183
4|6.1 Substantive Law Novelties|184
4|6.2 Procedural Novelties|184
3|7 Conclusions|185
3|References|186
1|Part III: Liability for Negligent Certification|188
2|Certification of Medical Devices: Lessons from the PIP Scandal|189
3|1 Introduction|189
3|2 The Function of Certification Bodies in the Medical Devices Directive 93/42/EEC|191
4|2.1 Duties of Notified Bodies|191
4|2.2 The Broader Function of Notified Bodies|193
3|3 Quality Control|195
3|4 Immediate Reaction of the European Commission|197
4|4.1 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 920/2013|197
4|4.2 Recommendation 2013/473/EU|199
3|5 The New Regulation on Medical Devices|199
4|5.1 Duties of Notified Bodies|200
4|5.2 Requirements for Notified Bodies|200
4|5.3 The Amended Control System|201
5|5.3.1 Control of Notified Bodies|201
5|5.3.2 Control of Designating Bodies|202
3|6 Complementary Tort Liability?|203
4|6.1 The CJEU Judgment in Elisabeth Schmitt|203
4|6.2 A New Situation Under the Medical Devices Regulation?|206
4|6.3 National Law and Private International Law|207
3|7 Conclusion|208
3|References|209
2|Public Function Liability of Classification Societies|212
3|1 Introduction|212
3|2 Private Function Liability|214
3|3 Public Function Liability|215
4|3.1 Introduction|215
4|3.2 Immunity Defenses According to EU Law|216
4|3.3 Procedural Immunity Defense at the National Level|218
4|3.4 Substantial Immunity Defense at the National Level|220
5|3.4.1 Introduction|220
5|3.4.2 US: Principle of Immunity|220
5|3.4.3 Germany: Limited immunity|221
5|3.4.4 UK: Ordinary Tort Law Principles Apply|222
5|3.4.5 Scandinavia: Professional Liability Standard?|222
4|3.5 Summing Up|222
3|4 The Blurring of the Distinction Between Private and Public Function and Liability Consequences|223
4|4.1 Introduction|223
4|4.2 The Interplay and Overlap Between Private and Public Certification|223
4|4.3 IMO Code for Recognized Organizations|224
4|4.4 Recent Cases|226
3|5 Conclusion|227
3|References|227
2|Liability of Rating Agencies Under German and European Law|229
3|1 Introduction|229
3|2 Jurisdiction|231
3|3 Conflicts of Law|232
4|3.1 Application of Article 4(1) Rome II Regulation|233
4|3.2 Application of Article 4(3) Rome II Regulation|234
3|4 European Union Ratings Regulation|235
4|4.1 Application and Function|236
4|4.2 Liability Standard|237
3|5 German Substantive Law|238
4|5.1 The Contract with Protective Effect for Third Parties|238
4|5.2 Codified Tort Law|241
4|5.3 Disclaimer Language|243
4|5.4 Contributory Negligence|244
3|6 Outlook|245
3|References|246