File #2693: "2019_Book_PrincipledResistanceToECtHRJud.pdf"
Text
1|Dedication|6
1|Preface|7
1|Contents|9
1|Contributors|15
1|Abbreviations|16
1|Part I: Theoretical Framework|18
2|Chapter 1: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments: Dogmatic Framework and Conceptual Meaning|19
3|I. Introduction|20
3|II. The International Law Framework of ‘Principled Resistance’|21
4|1. The Principle of Supremacy of International Law|21
5|a. Treaty Law|21
5|b. Law of State Responsibility|23
4|2. Deviations from the Supremacy Principle|24
5|a. Article 46 VCLT|24
5|b. Internationalisation of Domestic Values|25
5|c. Contestation|28
4|3. The Convention Context|32
3|III. The Concept of ‘Principled Resistance’|34
4|1. National/Constitutional Identity|35
4|2. Similar Concepts|37
5|a. Andreas Føllesdal|37
5|b. Fiona de Londras and Konstantsin Dzehtsiarou|37
5|c. Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak and Micha Wiebusch|39
3|IV. Analytical Setting|40
4|1. Selection of Country Reports|41
4|2. Cases Not Selected for Country Reports|45
4|3. Questionnaire|49
4|4. Outlook|49
2|Chapter 2: Resistance to the European Court of Human Rights: The Institutional and Sociological Consequences of Principled Resistance|51
3|I. Introduction|51
3|II. Explaining Resistance to International Courts: A Sociological Take on Principled Resistance|53
3|III. Instances of Principled Resistance to the ECtHR|57
4|1. Accepting the Authority of the ECtHR: Ratification and Exit as Principled Resistance|57
5|a. Avoiding the Court: The Tiered Model of European Human Rights|57
5|b. Exiting the Court|60
4|2. Clashes Over Human Rights and National Legal Identities|61
5|a. The Battle of the Courts: Strasbourg Challenging Paris|62
5|b. Non-compliance Over Principled Issues: Hirst and the Supremacy of Parliament|64
3|IV. Conclusion|66
1|Part II: National Perspectives|69
2|Chapter 3: Principled Resistance to and Principled Compliance with ECtHR Judgments in Germany|70
3|I. Introduction: Compliance with and Resistance to ECtHR Judgments—the Overall Picture|71
3|II. Outline of the Legal Status of the Convention in Germany|72
4|1. Binding Force, Applicability and Rank of the Convention in Germany|72
4|2. The Soft Enhancement of the Domestic Rank of the Convention by the Federal Constitutional Court’s 1987 Decision on the Presumption of Innocence|73
3|III. Constitutional Limits to Compliance with ECtHR Judgments in the Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court|74
4|1. The Görgülü Decision|74
4|2. The Second Judgment on Preventive Detention|77
4|3. The Recent Judgment on the Constitutional Right to Strike|78
4|4. Conclusion|79
3|IV. Patterns of Principled Resistance in Practice|79
4|1. Explicit Resistance to ECtHR Judgments|80
5|a. Irrelevance of the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR|80
5|b. Lack of Persuasiveness of ECtHR Judgments|80
5|c. Legal Limits of the Obligation to Comply with ECtHR Judgments|82
6|(1) Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and the Constitution|82
6|(2) Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and the Binding Force of Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court|83
6|(3) Temporary Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and Statutory Law|84
6|(4) Remaining Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and the Legal Force of Judicial Decisions in Breach of the Convention|87
4|2. Implicit Resistance to ECtHR Judgments|88
5|a. Re-Interpretation of ECtHR Judgments|89
6|(1) The Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision on Catholic Labour Law|89
6|(2) Inheritance Rights of Children Born Out of Wedlock Between the Federal Constitutional Court and the ECtHR|92
6|(3) The Federal Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence on Police Incitement|94
5|b. Disregard of ECtHR Judgments|96
4|3. Important Cases Without Principled Resistance|98
4|4. A Short Note on ‘Principled Resistance to Principled Resistance’|100
3|V. Conclusion and Outlook|101
2|Chapter 4: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments in Austria|103
3|I. Introduction|104
3|II. Legal Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case Law of the ECtHR in Austria|106
4|1. Constitutional Rank of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Austrian Legal System|106
4|2. General Relevance of the ECtHR Case Law in the Austrian Legal Order|109
4|3. Constitutional Limits to Compliance with ECtHR Judgments in the Austrian System|111
3|III. The Rule: Loyalty and Shortcomings in Particular Cases|112
3|IV. The Exception: ‘Principled Resistance’|117
4|1. (Historical) ‘Resistance’ on Grounds of Austrian Constitutional Order|117
5|a. The Miltner Judgment and Its Context|118
5|b. Reactions to the Miltner Judgment|121
5|c. Development of the Conflict in the Aftermath of the Miltner Case|122
5|d. Final Conflict Settlement by the Constitutional Legislator|126
5|e. ‘Principled But Only Verbal Resistance’|127
4|2. ‘Resistance’ on Grounds of Supposed Misinterpretation of Austrian Law|127
4|3. (Continuous?) ‘Resistance’ on Grounds of Austrian Constitutional Law and Principles of Treaty Interpretation in International Law (‘Anti-Zolotukhin’)|129
5|a. Outline of the Problem|129
5|b. Initial Resistance|130
5|c. Interim Approximation|131
5|d. Resurgent Disagreement|132
5|e. New Convergence (?)|136
4|4. ‘Forced’ Resistance Due to Procedural Law|140
4|5. Resistance (?) on Grounds of Legal and Factual Particularities in Austria (‘Kärntner Jagdgesetz’)|141
3|V. Conclusion: ‘Principled Resistance’?|147
2|Chapter 5: Judicial Disobedience and the ECtHR: The Italian Case|150
3|I. Introduction|150
3|II. The Background|151
3|III. Judicial Strategies: Limits to Following the ECtHR’s Case Law|157
4|1. Systemic Differences Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR|157
4|2. Divergences Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR|159
5|a. A Different Context|161
5|b. Polysemous Concepts|162
5|c. Exclusion of the Convention from the Standard of Review|164
5|d. Established and Non-established Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights|166
3|IV. Final Remarks|168
2|Chapter 6: Resistance in Switzerland: Populist Rather Than Principled|174
3|I. Introduction|175
3|II. Status of the Convention in the Swiss Legal Order|176
4|1. Monism and Direct Applicability of the Convention|176
4|2. Supremacy of the Convention?|176
5|a. Statutory Law|176
5|b. Constitutional Law|179
4|3. Consequences for Switzerland’s Compliance with the Convention|181
5|a. Quasi-Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Scope of the Convention|181
5|b. Enforcement of the Convention in the Cantons|182
5|c. What Monism Cannot Solve|182
6|(1) Different Understandings of Human Rights|182
6|(2) First Wave of Severe Criticism|183
3|III. Tribunal Fédéral: Criticism but Compliance|184
4|1. Necessity of Revision Proceedings: A Matter for Debate|185
4|2. Passage of Time Leading to Convention Violations|185
4|3. Judging Ultra Vires on Positive Obligations Through Procedural Rights Adjudication|187
4|4. Assessment|188
3|IV. Critical Academic Review of the Court’s Case Law|188
4|1. Criticism Against Methodological Choices of the Court|189
5|a. Application and Interpretation of the Convention|189
6|(1) Positive Obligations|189
6|(2) Casuistic Balancing of Interests|190
6|(3) Procedural Rights Formalism|192
5|b. First and Fourth Instance|193
5|c. Margin of Appreciation and Subsidiarity|194
4|2. Constitutional and Political Criticism|195
5|a. Judicial Legitimacy and Separation of Powers|195
5|b. International Dimension: ‘Foreign’ Judges|197
3|V. Political Resistance: The Self-Determination Initiative|198
4|1. Background|199
4|2. Proposed Amendments and Possible Consequences|200
3|VI. Conclusion|201
2|Chapter 7: Principled Criticism and a Warning from the ‘UK’ to the ECtHR?|205
3|I. Introduction|206
4|1. Criticism with a Principled Element to It: And a Warning?|208
4|2. The Special Nature of Strasbourg’s Jurisdiction (Relevance to ‘Criticism’ and ‘Warnings’)|210
4|3. Keeping Matters in Proportion: Some Important Considerations at the Outset|212
4|4. Structure of This Chapter|213
3|II. Context: The UK Constitutional Framework|215
4|1. The ‘Alienating Effect’ of the HRA?|215
4|2. Parliament’s Ability to Express Resistance Under the HRA Regime|217
4|3. The Courts’ Ability to Express Resistance Under the HRA Regime|218
5|a. The ‘Mirror Approach’, and the Shift Away from It After 2010|218
5|b. Constitutional Redlines: Never Invoked|221
5|c. The UK Supreme Court in the 2010s: No Longer Excessively Deferential|222
4|4. A Propensity for UK Push-Back? Strasbourg’s Vulnerability to Constitutional-Like Interrogation|222
3|III. Recent UK Political Inter-actions with Strasbourg|225
4|1. Politicians’ Opposition: Feeding Off UK Sensitivity Toward Strasbourg?|225
4|2. Reforming the Convention, and Ignoring Progress?|229
4|3. Prisoner Voting: Political Defiance, Not ‘Principled Resistance’|231
5|a. Background|231
5|b. Resolution of the Affair by the Committee of Ministers: A Dangerous Precedent (Rewarding MPs’ Resistance?)|232
3|IV. Recent Extra-Judicial Criticism: More Than Simply Political Constitutionalists Venting Frustration at Strasbourg?|234
3|V. UK Criticism of Strasbourg Post-2010: ‘Principled’ Criticism and a Valid Warning?|237
4|1. The Contestable Nature of the Core Position|238
4|2. Relevance of Criticism to Strasbourg’s Authority|241
3|VI. Reaction to Warning: Responses in London (UK Supreme Court) and Strasbourg? Judicial Inter-actions Post-2010: The Case for a Principled Warning Deflated?|243
4|1. Animal Defenders International v UK: Successful Defence of ‘A Position of National Cultural Importance’?|244
4|2. Getting Strasbourg to Reconsider Its Position on Aspects of UK Law?|245
5|a. ‘Please Think Again’: Horncastle/Al-Khawaja|246
5|b. ‘We Really Do Insist You Think Again’: The UK Supreme Court’s Recent Reprimanding of Strasbourg (Poshteh (2017)/Nealon & Hallam (2019))?|247
5|c. Life Sentences Without Parole: Did Strasbourg Back Down in Hutchinson?|250
4|3. ‘Strasbourg Has Spoken, the Case Is [Not] Closed’?|252
3|VII. Conclusion|253
2|Chapter 8: The Execution of ECtHR Judgements and the ‘Right to Object’ of the Russian Constitutional Court|257
3|I. Introduction|257
3|II. Russia as a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights|260
4|1. The Status of the Convention in Russian Law|260
5|a. The Convention and the Russian Constitution|261
5|b. The Status of the ECtHR’s Judgments|263
4|2. Implementation and Assimilation of ECHR Norms|264
5|a. The Death Penalty Case|266
5|b. The Implementation Case|266
4|3. Russia’s Growing Resistance to the ECtHR|267
3|III. Creation and Application of a Mechanism Blocking Execution of ECtHR Judgments in Russia|271
4|1. The National Law Dimension|272
4|2. The International Law Dimension|274
4|3. Case Studies|277
5|a. Judgment of 19 April 2016 N 12-P (Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia)|277
5|b. Judgment of 15 November 2016 N 24-P (Khoroshenko v Russia)|278
5|c. Judgment of 19 January 2017 N 1-P (Yukos v Russia)|279
3|IV. Conclusion|282
1|Part III: International Perspectives|285
2|Chapter 9: The Perspective of the Venice Commission|286
3|I. Introduction|286
3|II. The Russian Law and Its First Application in the Case of Anchugov and Gladkov|287
3|III. The Opinion of the Venice Commission|291
3|IV. Developments Following the Venice Commission’s Opinion|295
3|V. Reasons Why the Supremacy Doctrine Under International Law (and Article 46 ECHR More Specifically) Is Under Attack by Constitutional Law Exceptions|296
4|1. How Is the Supremacy Doctrine Under International Law Challenged?|297
5|a. The ECtHR Is Performing in a Manner That Goes Beyond the Scope of the Treaty Obligation the State Concerned Voluntarily Subjected Itself to Upon Ratification|297
6|(1) Interpretation of the Convention Beyond Its Original Intended Meaning|297
6|(2) An Alleged Departure by the ECtHR of Its ‘in concreto’ Approach|298
6|(3) Procedural Tools That Allegedly Shift the Original Balance Between the Various Institutional Actors|299
5|b. The ECtHR Lacks the Legitimacy to Overturn Domestic Democratic Processes of Decision-Making|301
4|2. Why Is the Supremacy Doctrine Under International Law Challenged?|302
5|a. Tension Between the Judicial Domain and the Political Domain|303
5|b. These International Standards Are Imposed Onto the Domestic Legal Culture and Do Not Sufficiently Take Into Account the Specific National Socio-Cultural Context|304
5|c. The ECtHR’s Reasoning Is Not Considered Persuasive|306
3|VI. Concluding Comments|307
2|Chapter 10: The National Identity Criterion in the Crossfire Between European Integration and the Preservation of National Sovereignty|309
3|I. Introduction|309
3|II. Select Examples of Conflict Situations|310
4|1. Constitutional Identity Reservation by the Federal Constitutional Court|311
4|2. National Identity Arguments by the Italian Constitutional Court|314
3|III. EU Identity Clause Versus National Identity Concepts|317
4|1. EU Law Perspective on National Identity Protection|318
4|2. National Constitutional Views on the Preservation of National Identity|323
3|IV. Conclusion|329
2|Chapter 11: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments: An Appraisal|333
3|I. Introduction|333
3|II. The Concept of ‘Principled Resistance’|334
3|III. The Res Judicata Effect of ECtHR Judgments|337
3|IV. The Res Interpretata Effect of ECtHR Judgments|343
4|1. Concept and Meaning of Res Interpretata|344
4|2. Does the Res Interpretata Effect Produce Legal Obligations?|346
4|3. The Need for Respectful Disobedience|349
4|4. Different Significance for Chamber and Grand Chamber Judgments?|352
3|V. What Makes a ‘Principled Resistance’ Case?|354
4|1. Hierarchy of Norms|354
4|2. National Identity|355
4|3. The Proper Allocation of Power|358
1|Preface|7
1|Contents|9
1|Contributors|15
1|Abbreviations|16
1|Part I: Theoretical Framework|18
2|Chapter 1: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments: Dogmatic Framework and Conceptual Meaning|19
3|I. Introduction|20
3|II. The International Law Framework of ‘Principled Resistance’|21
4|1. The Principle of Supremacy of International Law|21
5|a. Treaty Law|21
5|b. Law of State Responsibility|23
4|2. Deviations from the Supremacy Principle|24
5|a. Article 46 VCLT|24
5|b. Internationalisation of Domestic Values|25
5|c. Contestation|28
4|3. The Convention Context|32
3|III. The Concept of ‘Principled Resistance’|34
4|1. National/Constitutional Identity|35
4|2. Similar Concepts|37
5|a. Andreas Føllesdal|37
5|b. Fiona de Londras and Konstantsin Dzehtsiarou|37
5|c. Mikael Rask Madsen, Pola Cebulak and Micha Wiebusch|39
3|IV. Analytical Setting|40
4|1. Selection of Country Reports|41
4|2. Cases Not Selected for Country Reports|45
4|3. Questionnaire|49
4|4. Outlook|49
2|Chapter 2: Resistance to the European Court of Human Rights: The Institutional and Sociological Consequences of Principled Resistance|51
3|I. Introduction|51
3|II. Explaining Resistance to International Courts: A Sociological Take on Principled Resistance|53
3|III. Instances of Principled Resistance to the ECtHR|57
4|1. Accepting the Authority of the ECtHR: Ratification and Exit as Principled Resistance|57
5|a. Avoiding the Court: The Tiered Model of European Human Rights|57
5|b. Exiting the Court|60
4|2. Clashes Over Human Rights and National Legal Identities|61
5|a. The Battle of the Courts: Strasbourg Challenging Paris|62
5|b. Non-compliance Over Principled Issues: Hirst and the Supremacy of Parliament|64
3|IV. Conclusion|66
1|Part II: National Perspectives|69
2|Chapter 3: Principled Resistance to and Principled Compliance with ECtHR Judgments in Germany|70
3|I. Introduction: Compliance with and Resistance to ECtHR Judgments—the Overall Picture|71
3|II. Outline of the Legal Status of the Convention in Germany|72
4|1. Binding Force, Applicability and Rank of the Convention in Germany|72
4|2. The Soft Enhancement of the Domestic Rank of the Convention by the Federal Constitutional Court’s 1987 Decision on the Presumption of Innocence|73
3|III. Constitutional Limits to Compliance with ECtHR Judgments in the Jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court|74
4|1. The Görgülü Decision|74
4|2. The Second Judgment on Preventive Detention|77
4|3. The Recent Judgment on the Constitutional Right to Strike|78
4|4. Conclusion|79
3|IV. Patterns of Principled Resistance in Practice|79
4|1. Explicit Resistance to ECtHR Judgments|80
5|a. Irrelevance of the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR|80
5|b. Lack of Persuasiveness of ECtHR Judgments|80
5|c. Legal Limits of the Obligation to Comply with ECtHR Judgments|82
6|(1) Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and the Constitution|82
6|(2) Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and the Binding Force of Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court|83
6|(3) Temporary Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and Statutory Law|84
6|(4) Remaining Conflicts Between the ECtHR’s Jurisprudence and the Legal Force of Judicial Decisions in Breach of the Convention|87
4|2. Implicit Resistance to ECtHR Judgments|88
5|a. Re-Interpretation of ECtHR Judgments|89
6|(1) The Federal Constitutional Court’s Decision on Catholic Labour Law|89
6|(2) Inheritance Rights of Children Born Out of Wedlock Between the Federal Constitutional Court and the ECtHR|92
6|(3) The Federal Constitutional Court’s Jurisprudence on Police Incitement|94
5|b. Disregard of ECtHR Judgments|96
4|3. Important Cases Without Principled Resistance|98
4|4. A Short Note on ‘Principled Resistance to Principled Resistance’|100
3|V. Conclusion and Outlook|101
2|Chapter 4: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments in Austria|103
3|I. Introduction|104
3|II. Legal Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case Law of the ECtHR in Austria|106
4|1. Constitutional Rank of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Austrian Legal System|106
4|2. General Relevance of the ECtHR Case Law in the Austrian Legal Order|109
4|3. Constitutional Limits to Compliance with ECtHR Judgments in the Austrian System|111
3|III. The Rule: Loyalty and Shortcomings in Particular Cases|112
3|IV. The Exception: ‘Principled Resistance’|117
4|1. (Historical) ‘Resistance’ on Grounds of Austrian Constitutional Order|117
5|a. The Miltner Judgment and Its Context|118
5|b. Reactions to the Miltner Judgment|121
5|c. Development of the Conflict in the Aftermath of the Miltner Case|122
5|d. Final Conflict Settlement by the Constitutional Legislator|126
5|e. ‘Principled But Only Verbal Resistance’|127
4|2. ‘Resistance’ on Grounds of Supposed Misinterpretation of Austrian Law|127
4|3. (Continuous?) ‘Resistance’ on Grounds of Austrian Constitutional Law and Principles of Treaty Interpretation in International Law (‘Anti-Zolotukhin’)|129
5|a. Outline of the Problem|129
5|b. Initial Resistance|130
5|c. Interim Approximation|131
5|d. Resurgent Disagreement|132
5|e. New Convergence (?)|136
4|4. ‘Forced’ Resistance Due to Procedural Law|140
4|5. Resistance (?) on Grounds of Legal and Factual Particularities in Austria (‘Kärntner Jagdgesetz’)|141
3|V. Conclusion: ‘Principled Resistance’?|147
2|Chapter 5: Judicial Disobedience and the ECtHR: The Italian Case|150
3|I. Introduction|150
3|II. The Background|151
3|III. Judicial Strategies: Limits to Following the ECtHR’s Case Law|157
4|1. Systemic Differences Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR|157
4|2. Divergences Between the Italian Constitutional Court and the ECtHR|159
5|a. A Different Context|161
5|b. Polysemous Concepts|162
5|c. Exclusion of the Convention from the Standard of Review|164
5|d. Established and Non-established Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights|166
3|IV. Final Remarks|168
2|Chapter 6: Resistance in Switzerland: Populist Rather Than Principled|174
3|I. Introduction|175
3|II. Status of the Convention in the Swiss Legal Order|176
4|1. Monism and Direct Applicability of the Convention|176
4|2. Supremacy of the Convention?|176
5|a. Statutory Law|176
5|b. Constitutional Law|179
4|3. Consequences for Switzerland’s Compliance with the Convention|181
5|a. Quasi-Constitutional Jurisdiction in the Scope of the Convention|181
5|b. Enforcement of the Convention in the Cantons|182
5|c. What Monism Cannot Solve|182
6|(1) Different Understandings of Human Rights|182
6|(2) First Wave of Severe Criticism|183
3|III. Tribunal Fédéral: Criticism but Compliance|184
4|1. Necessity of Revision Proceedings: A Matter for Debate|185
4|2. Passage of Time Leading to Convention Violations|185
4|3. Judging Ultra Vires on Positive Obligations Through Procedural Rights Adjudication|187
4|4. Assessment|188
3|IV. Critical Academic Review of the Court’s Case Law|188
4|1. Criticism Against Methodological Choices of the Court|189
5|a. Application and Interpretation of the Convention|189
6|(1) Positive Obligations|189
6|(2) Casuistic Balancing of Interests|190
6|(3) Procedural Rights Formalism|192
5|b. First and Fourth Instance|193
5|c. Margin of Appreciation and Subsidiarity|194
4|2. Constitutional and Political Criticism|195
5|a. Judicial Legitimacy and Separation of Powers|195
5|b. International Dimension: ‘Foreign’ Judges|197
3|V. Political Resistance: The Self-Determination Initiative|198
4|1. Background|199
4|2. Proposed Amendments and Possible Consequences|200
3|VI. Conclusion|201
2|Chapter 7: Principled Criticism and a Warning from the ‘UK’ to the ECtHR?|205
3|I. Introduction|206
4|1. Criticism with a Principled Element to It: And a Warning?|208
4|2. The Special Nature of Strasbourg’s Jurisdiction (Relevance to ‘Criticism’ and ‘Warnings’)|210
4|3. Keeping Matters in Proportion: Some Important Considerations at the Outset|212
4|4. Structure of This Chapter|213
3|II. Context: The UK Constitutional Framework|215
4|1. The ‘Alienating Effect’ of the HRA?|215
4|2. Parliament’s Ability to Express Resistance Under the HRA Regime|217
4|3. The Courts’ Ability to Express Resistance Under the HRA Regime|218
5|a. The ‘Mirror Approach’, and the Shift Away from It After 2010|218
5|b. Constitutional Redlines: Never Invoked|221
5|c. The UK Supreme Court in the 2010s: No Longer Excessively Deferential|222
4|4. A Propensity for UK Push-Back? Strasbourg’s Vulnerability to Constitutional-Like Interrogation|222
3|III. Recent UK Political Inter-actions with Strasbourg|225
4|1. Politicians’ Opposition: Feeding Off UK Sensitivity Toward Strasbourg?|225
4|2. Reforming the Convention, and Ignoring Progress?|229
4|3. Prisoner Voting: Political Defiance, Not ‘Principled Resistance’|231
5|a. Background|231
5|b. Resolution of the Affair by the Committee of Ministers: A Dangerous Precedent (Rewarding MPs’ Resistance?)|232
3|IV. Recent Extra-Judicial Criticism: More Than Simply Political Constitutionalists Venting Frustration at Strasbourg?|234
3|V. UK Criticism of Strasbourg Post-2010: ‘Principled’ Criticism and a Valid Warning?|237
4|1. The Contestable Nature of the Core Position|238
4|2. Relevance of Criticism to Strasbourg’s Authority|241
3|VI. Reaction to Warning: Responses in London (UK Supreme Court) and Strasbourg? Judicial Inter-actions Post-2010: The Case for a Principled Warning Deflated?|243
4|1. Animal Defenders International v UK: Successful Defence of ‘A Position of National Cultural Importance’?|244
4|2. Getting Strasbourg to Reconsider Its Position on Aspects of UK Law?|245
5|a. ‘Please Think Again’: Horncastle/Al-Khawaja|246
5|b. ‘We Really Do Insist You Think Again’: The UK Supreme Court’s Recent Reprimanding of Strasbourg (Poshteh (2017)/Nealon & Hallam (2019))?|247
5|c. Life Sentences Without Parole: Did Strasbourg Back Down in Hutchinson?|250
4|3. ‘Strasbourg Has Spoken, the Case Is [Not] Closed’?|252
3|VII. Conclusion|253
2|Chapter 8: The Execution of ECtHR Judgements and the ‘Right to Object’ of the Russian Constitutional Court|257
3|I. Introduction|257
3|II. Russia as a Party to the European Convention on Human Rights|260
4|1. The Status of the Convention in Russian Law|260
5|a. The Convention and the Russian Constitution|261
5|b. The Status of the ECtHR’s Judgments|263
4|2. Implementation and Assimilation of ECHR Norms|264
5|a. The Death Penalty Case|266
5|b. The Implementation Case|266
4|3. Russia’s Growing Resistance to the ECtHR|267
3|III. Creation and Application of a Mechanism Blocking Execution of ECtHR Judgments in Russia|271
4|1. The National Law Dimension|272
4|2. The International Law Dimension|274
4|3. Case Studies|277
5|a. Judgment of 19 April 2016 N 12-P (Anchugov and Gladkov v Russia)|277
5|b. Judgment of 15 November 2016 N 24-P (Khoroshenko v Russia)|278
5|c. Judgment of 19 January 2017 N 1-P (Yukos v Russia)|279
3|IV. Conclusion|282
1|Part III: International Perspectives|285
2|Chapter 9: The Perspective of the Venice Commission|286
3|I. Introduction|286
3|II. The Russian Law and Its First Application in the Case of Anchugov and Gladkov|287
3|III. The Opinion of the Venice Commission|291
3|IV. Developments Following the Venice Commission’s Opinion|295
3|V. Reasons Why the Supremacy Doctrine Under International Law (and Article 46 ECHR More Specifically) Is Under Attack by Constitutional Law Exceptions|296
4|1. How Is the Supremacy Doctrine Under International Law Challenged?|297
5|a. The ECtHR Is Performing in a Manner That Goes Beyond the Scope of the Treaty Obligation the State Concerned Voluntarily Subjected Itself to Upon Ratification|297
6|(1) Interpretation of the Convention Beyond Its Original Intended Meaning|297
6|(2) An Alleged Departure by the ECtHR of Its ‘in concreto’ Approach|298
6|(3) Procedural Tools That Allegedly Shift the Original Balance Between the Various Institutional Actors|299
5|b. The ECtHR Lacks the Legitimacy to Overturn Domestic Democratic Processes of Decision-Making|301
4|2. Why Is the Supremacy Doctrine Under International Law Challenged?|302
5|a. Tension Between the Judicial Domain and the Political Domain|303
5|b. These International Standards Are Imposed Onto the Domestic Legal Culture and Do Not Sufficiently Take Into Account the Specific National Socio-Cultural Context|304
5|c. The ECtHR’s Reasoning Is Not Considered Persuasive|306
3|VI. Concluding Comments|307
2|Chapter 10: The National Identity Criterion in the Crossfire Between European Integration and the Preservation of National Sovereignty|309
3|I. Introduction|309
3|II. Select Examples of Conflict Situations|310
4|1. Constitutional Identity Reservation by the Federal Constitutional Court|311
4|2. National Identity Arguments by the Italian Constitutional Court|314
3|III. EU Identity Clause Versus National Identity Concepts|317
4|1. EU Law Perspective on National Identity Protection|318
4|2. National Constitutional Views on the Preservation of National Identity|323
3|IV. Conclusion|329
2|Chapter 11: ‘Principled Resistance’ to ECtHR Judgments: An Appraisal|333
3|I. Introduction|333
3|II. The Concept of ‘Principled Resistance’|334
3|III. The Res Judicata Effect of ECtHR Judgments|337
3|IV. The Res Interpretata Effect of ECtHR Judgments|343
4|1. Concept and Meaning of Res Interpretata|344
4|2. Does the Res Interpretata Effect Produce Legal Obligations?|346
4|3. The Need for Respectful Disobedience|349
4|4. Different Significance for Chamber and Grand Chamber Judgments?|352
3|V. What Makes a ‘Principled Resistance’ Case?|354
4|1. Hierarchy of Norms|354
4|2. National Identity|355
4|3. The Proper Allocation of Power|358