File #2694: "2019_Book_HumanRightsInTheExtractiveIndu.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|6
1|Contents|7
1|Editors and Contributors|9
1|Introduction|11
2|Reference|18
1|Part I: Transparency|19
2|The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a Human Rights Instrument: Potentials and Shortcomings|20
3|1 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)|20
4|1.1 Brief History of EITI|22
4|1.2 Requirements|23
4|1.3 Development of the EITI Standard|24
4|1.4 Structure of EITI|27
3|2 EITI and Human Rights Challenges|28
4|2.1 Civil Society Organisations’ Participation in EITI|29
4|2.2 Enabling Environment for Civil Society Participation in Repressive States|30
4|2.3 Reporting on Social and Environmental Impacts|32
4|2.4 Integrating Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining|32
3|3 Conclusion|34
3|Reference|34
2|United States Law and Conflict Minerals|35
3|1 Introduction|35
3|2 Conflicts and Conflict Minerals|37
3|3 Transparency Regimes|40
4|3.1 Examples of Transparency Regimes|40
5|3.1.1 Dodd-Frank: Conflict Minerals|40
5|3.1.2 Dodd Frank: Disclosure of Payments Provisions|43
5|3.1.3 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act|44
5|3.1.4 European Union Conflict Minerals Regulations|44
4|3.2 What Does Transparency Do, and How?|45
4|3.3 Early Results of Disclosure-Based Regulations|48
3|4 The Future of Transparency-Based Regulations|53
4|4.1 Less Transparency, Higher Risk of Corruption|53
4|4.2 Prospects for Reform|55
5|4.2.1 Increasing Compliance: More Guidance and Predictability|55
5|4.2.2 Increasing Impact: Leverage Consumer Attention|56
3|5 Conclusion|56
3|References|57
2|The 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: A Promising European Rite to Remove the Natural Resource Curse?|58
3|1 Introduction: Of “Natural Resource Curses” Resulting from “Conflict Minerals”—and Enhanced Transparency as a Possible Cure|58
3|2 Translating Foreign Policy Objectives into Practice: EU Constitutional Underpinnings of the 2017 Conflict Minerals Regulation|62
3|3 It’s a Long Way to …: On the Legislative History of the Regulation|65
3|4 Between “Dodd-Frank Act Plus” and “Dodd-Frank Act Minus”: Some Thoughts on the Regulatory Features of the Final Normative Outcome|69
4|4.1 Material Scope of Application: “Dodd-Frank Act Reloaded”|70
4|4.2 Personal Scope of Application: “Union Importers Only”|70
4|4.3 Territorial Scope of Application: “Only the World Is Enough”|72
4|4.4 Regulatory Approach: Stipulating Legally Binding Due Diligence Obligations|73
4|4.5 Enforcement Mechanisms: The Perceived Virtue of (Temporary) Modesty|75
3|5 (By Way of an) Outlook: Let There Be (also) Light and Information—On the More Limited Role of Transparency in the Steering Approaches of the 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation|77
3|References|79
2|Community Development Agreements as Tools for Local Participation in Natural Resource Projects in Africa|83
3|1 Introduction|83
3|2 Legal Regimes Governing CDAs in Africa|85
4|2.1 Statutory CDAs|85
4|2.2 CDAs as Tools for Providing Development Assistance|88
4|2.3 Voluntary Systems of CDAs|89
4|2.4 Challenges of Identifying the Affected “Local Community”|90
3|3 Contents of CDAs|92
3|4 CDAs as Tools for Local Participation in Natural Resource Projects|95
4|4.1 Community Participation in Project Implementation|95
4|4.2 Community Participation in Resource Benefit-Sharing|100
3|5 Factors Hindering the Utility of CDAs in Africa|103
4|5.1 Power Imbalance and Lack of Capacity|103
4|5.2 Non-disclosure|106
4|5.3 Enforceability and Access to Justice|107
4|5.4 Environmental Sustainability|108
4|5.5 Representation of Host Communities|109
4|5.6 Management of CDAs|111
3|6 Conclusion|113
3|References|114
2|Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: The Role of Transparency Initiatives|116
3|1 Introduction|116
3|2 Overview of Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights|118
3|3 Corruption, Transparency and Scope of Stabilisation Clauses|122
3|4 Transparency Initiatives and Stabilization Clauses: Some Case Studies|127
4|4.1 Liberia|128
4|4.2 Zambia|132
4|4.3 Tanzania|135
4|4.4 Sierra Leone|139
3|5 Concluding Remarks|142
3|References|144
2|Improving Tax Strategy Transparency in the Extractive Industries Sector for the Advancement of Human Rights|145
3|1 Introduction|146
3|2 The Emerging Link Between Taxation and Human Rights: Domestic Resource Mobilisation|151
3|3 State Actors, Taxation, Natural Resources, and Human Rights|152
3|4 Business, Taxation, and Human Rights|158
3|5 The Extractive Industries Sector and Tax Strategy Transparency|162
3|6 Conclusion|166
3|References|167
1|Part II: Participation|170
2|The Evolving Duty to Consult and Obtain Free Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples for Extractive Projects in the United States and Canada|171
3|1 Introduction|171
3|2 Basis for and Content of the Duty to Consult in Canada and the US|174
3|3 US Context|177
4|3.1 Statutory Duty to Consult|177
4|3.2 Regulation and Executive Orders Addressing the Duty to Consult|179
4|3.3 US Jurisprudence and the Duty to Consult|183
4|3.4 Observations on Duty to Consult Under US Indian Law|187
3|4 Canadian Context|192
4|4.1 Statutory Duty to Consult and Guidance of the Federal Government in Canada|192
4|4.2 Canadian Jurisprudence Regarding Consultation, Accommodation and Consent: The Common Law Duty to Consult|197
4|4.3 Observations on Canadian Duty to Consult and Obtain Consent|205
3|5 General Observations|209
3|6 Conclusion|214
3|References|218
2|Asserting the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Extractive Industry Sector|221
3|1 Introduction|221
3|2 FPIC Normative Framework in Sub-Saharan Africa|224
3|3 Conceptualizing FPIC as a Right to Resist Power Imbalances and Raise Community Agency in the Extractive Industry Sector|228
3|4 Content and Scope of FPIC in Sub-Saharan Africa|232
4|4.1 FPIC Content|233
5|4.1.1 Unpacking the Concept|233
5|4.1.2 FPIC and the Right to Veto Extractive Projects|235
4|4.2 FPIC Scope: From Indigenous to Non-Indigenous Applicability|238
4|4.3 FPIC Implementation Challenges in the Extractive Industry in Africa|240
5|4.3.1 Shaky Legal Foundations of FPIC|241
5|4.3.2 Lack of Technical Expertise and Agency|242
5|4.3.3 Political Constraints|243
5|4.3.4 Socio-Cultural Challenges|244
3|5 Conclusion|245
3|References|246
2|The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Consultation Rights in the Americas: How the Inter-American System Can Better Promote Free, Prior, and Informed Consent|248
3|1 Introduction|248
3|2 FPIC Standards in the Americas|250
4|2.1 A Derivation from the Right to Property|251
4|2.2 The Use of Exogenous Instruments: ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP|253
4|2.3 The Duty to Consult as a Principle of International Law|257
4|2.4 FPIC as a Duty of the State in the Inter-American System|261
3|3 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect FPIC in the Inter-American System|263
4|3.1 The State Due Diligence Standard: A Source of Indirect Responsibility of Corporations|263
4|3.2 The Possibility of a Direct Responsibility of Corporations Under Inter-American Law|267
4|3.3 The Delegation to Businesses of the State Duty to Consult|268
3|4 How the Organs of the Inter-American System Can Help to Promote a Direct Corporate Responsibility to Respect FPIC|274
4|4.1 Constructing a Direct Corporate Responsibility in the IAHRS|274
4|4.2 Tackling the Procedural Obstacles|277
3|5 Conclusion|278
3|References|279
2|Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Philippines: A Fourth World Critique|281
3|1 Introduction|282
3|2 A Fourth World Perspective of International Law|283
3|3 State Sovereignty Doctrine and the Privileged Status of the State in International Law|285
4|3.1 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|287
4|3.2 Regalian Doctrine|288
4|3.3 Free, Prior, and Informed Consent as an International Legal Norm|290
3|4 FPIC in the Philippines|293
4|4.1 FPIC on the Ground: Text Versus Application|295
4|4.2 FPIC Versus State Ownership of and Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|299
4|4.3 Problematizing Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in a State-Centric World: A Fourth World Critique of FPIC|302
3|5 Indigenous Sovereignty: Participation in International Law-Making as an Exercise of Self-Determination|304
3|6 Conclusion|307
3|References|308
2|Norm Contestation and (Non-)Compliance: The Right to Prior Consultation and FPIC in the Extractive Industries|310
3|1 Introduction|310
3|2 Norm Contestation and Non-compliance|314
3|3 The (Contested) Right to Prior Consultation and FPIC According to International Standards|316
3|4 Norm Contestation in the Domestic Sphere: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru|319
4|4.1 Prior Consultation and FPIC in Colombia|321
4|4.2 Prior Consultation and FPIC in Peru|322
4|4.3 Prior Consultation and FPIC in Bolivia|323
4|4.4 Issues of Contestation: Who? How? When? and with What Results?|325
5|4.4.1 Which Entity Leads Prior Consultation and FPIC Processes?|325
5|4.4.2 Who Is to Be Consulted?|326
5|4.4.3 Which Measures Require Consultation?|328
5|4.4.4 When and How Shall the Consultation Take Place?|329
5|4.4.5 What Is the Result of Consultation/FPIC Processes?|330
3|5 Discussion and Conclusions|332
3|References|334
2|State-Investor Contracts and Human Rights: Taking a Critical Look at Transparency and Participation|337
3|1 Introduction|337
3|2 State-Investor Contracts in the Extractive Industries|339
4|2.1 The Role and Function of State-Investor Contracts|340
4|2.2 State-Investor Contracts as a Governance Tool in the Mining Sector|341
4|2.3 Contractual and Licensing Regimes|342
4|2.4 Current Trends Concerning State-Investor Contracts|345
3|3 Key Human Rights Issues Associated with State-Investor Contracts|348
4|3.1 Human Rights Coverage in State-Investor Contracts|348
4|3.2 Asymmetry in Capacity and Information of Negotiating Parties|351
4|3.3 Stabilisation Clauses and Regulatory Chill|353
4|3.4 Transparency, Public Sector Oversight and Monitoring|357
4|3.5 Access to Remedy and Dispute Settlement|362
3|4 Conclusions|368
3|References|371
2|Disruption and Institutional Development: Corporate Standards and Practices on Responsible Mining|372
3|1 Introduction|372
3|2 Disruption and Institutional Development|375
4|2.1 Disruption: Mere Presence and Irresponsible Operations|375
4|2.2 Social Investments: Irrelevant or Even Problematic?|377
4|2.3 Institutional Development: The Missing Link|379
3|3 Shifts in CSR Strategy|382
4|3.1 Shifts in Social Investment|382
5|3.1.1 Shift from Philanthropy to Community Investment|382
5|3.1.2 Shift from Economic and Social Development to Institutional Development|383
4|3.2 Shifts in Social Responsibility|386
5|3.2.1 Shift from Punctual Interventions to More Encompassing Approaches|386
5|3.2.2 Shift from Partnerships to Meaningful Partnerships|388
3|4 Operational Settings|393
4|4.1 Water Management|394
4|4.2 Security Provisions|395
4|4.3 Contributions to Socio-Economic Development|400
4|4.4 Revenue Transparency|405
3|5 Conclusions|408
3|References|409
1|Part III: Resistance|410
2|Taking Sides in Scientific Research? The Struggle for the Right to Participate in Public Decision-Making Related to a Mining Project in Brazil|411
3|1 The Minas-Rio Iron Ore Mining Project and the Struggle of Local Communities|412
4|1.1 Background|412
4|1.2 Theoretical Contextualization|414
3|2 Overview of the Environmental Licensing Process: The Logics of Legal Proceduralization in Legislation|416
4|2.1 The Rights to Information and Participation in Environmental Law: The Potential for Democratic Proceduralization|418
4|2.2 Two Tentative Interpretations of Participation: An Intrinsic Requisite of Democracy, a Functional Demand in Proceduralization|422
3|3 The Rights to Information and Participation in the Minas-Rio|424
4|3.1 The Right to Information|426
5|3.1.1 Controlling Knowledge Production|426
5|3.1.2 Restricting Access to Information|428
4|3.2 The Right to Participation|431
5|3.2.1 Participation: To Which End?|431
5|3.2.2 Coping with Physical Obstacles to Participate and Pushing Institutional Ones|433
4|3.3 Frustrating Information and Participation: Demobilizing and Fostering Mobilization|438
3|4 The Emptying of Rights to Information and Participation in Brazil: A Brief Reflection on the Challenges and Potential Benefits of Action Research|440
4|4.1 Action Research|440
4|4.2 Choosing the Case|442
4|4.3 Redefining the Research Object Together with Participants|443
4|4.4 Worldview, Positionality and Subjectivity|444
4|4.5 Double Accountability and Pitfalls of Action Research|445
3|References|448
2|Building the Case for a Home-State Grievance Mechanism: Law Reform Strategies in the Canadian Resource Justice Movement|451
3|1 Introduction: Context, Issues and Debates|452
3|2 Establishing the Nature of the Problem with Empirical Research (1999–2017)|455
4|2.1 Canadian Global Dominance in Resource Extraction and Canadian State Support|455
4|2.2 Problematizing the Impacts of Canadian Resource Companies Abroad|458
4|2.3 Problematizing the Canadian State’s Support for Companies|464
3|3 Canada’s Corporate Social Responsibility Policy Response (2009–2017)|467
4|3.1 CSR Policy and CSR Counsellor: 2009–2014|468
4|3.2 CSR Policy and CSR Counsellor: 2014–2017|470
4|3.3 Canada’s National Contact Point|473
3|4 Empirical, Normative and Political Critiques of Canada’s CSR Policy|475
4|4.1 Critiques of Canada’s National Contact Point|476
4|4.2 Critiques of Canada’s 2014 CSR Policy and Counsellor|478
3|5 Building Strong Consensus with International Human Rights Bodies (2002–2017)|481
3|6 Creating and Advocating for Concrete Law Reform Proposals (2009–2016)|484
4|6.1 Draft Legislation: The Business & Human Rights Act (2016)|485
4|6.2 Administrative Body, Regulatory Objectives and Jurisdiction|486
4|6.3 Standards|489
4|6.4 Investigatory Powers and Recommendations|491
4|6.5 Potential Sanctions|496
4|6.6 Analysis of the Draft Business & Human Rights Act|497
3|7 The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (January 2018)|498
3|8 Conclusion and Future Research|500
3|References|504
2|Transnational Human Rights and Environmental Litigation: A Study of Case Law Relating to Shell in Nigeria|506
3|1 Introduction|507
3|2 Background|509
4|2.1 The Environmental Impact of Oil Extraction Activities in the Niger Delta|509
4|2.2 Corporate Accountability for Human Rights and Environmental Violations Abroad|511
3|3 Transnational Human Rights Litigation Relating to Shell Operations in Nigeria|514
4|3.1 The Wiwa-Case (US)|514
4|3.2 The Kiobel-Case (US)|517
4|3.3 The Kiobel II-Case (Netherlands)|520
3|4 Transnational Environmental Litigation Relating to Shell Operations in Nigeria|522
4|4.1 The Akpan-Case (Netherlands)|522
4|4.2 The Bodo-Case (UK)|525
4|4.3 The Okpabi-Case (UK)|526
3|5 Discussion|529
4|5.1 Jurisdiction|530
5|5.1.1 Personal Jurisdiction in Foreign Direct Liability Cases Before EU Member State Courts|530
6|(a) Connected Claims|531
6|(b) Forum Necessitatis|532
5|5.1.2 Personal Jurisdiction in Foreign Direct Liability Cases Before US Courts|533
4|5.2 Applicable Law|535
4|5.3 Legal Basis for Corporate Liability|537
4|5.4 Procedural Rules and Practices|541
3|6 Conclusion|544
3|References|545
1|Contents|7
1|Editors and Contributors|9
1|Introduction|11
2|Reference|18
1|Part I: Transparency|19
2|The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a Human Rights Instrument: Potentials and Shortcomings|20
3|1 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)|20
4|1.1 Brief History of EITI|22
4|1.2 Requirements|23
4|1.3 Development of the EITI Standard|24
4|1.4 Structure of EITI|27
3|2 EITI and Human Rights Challenges|28
4|2.1 Civil Society Organisations’ Participation in EITI|29
4|2.2 Enabling Environment for Civil Society Participation in Repressive States|30
4|2.3 Reporting on Social and Environmental Impacts|32
4|2.4 Integrating Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining|32
3|3 Conclusion|34
3|Reference|34
2|United States Law and Conflict Minerals|35
3|1 Introduction|35
3|2 Conflicts and Conflict Minerals|37
3|3 Transparency Regimes|40
4|3.1 Examples of Transparency Regimes|40
5|3.1.1 Dodd-Frank: Conflict Minerals|40
5|3.1.2 Dodd Frank: Disclosure of Payments Provisions|43
5|3.1.3 California Transparency in Supply Chains Act|44
5|3.1.4 European Union Conflict Minerals Regulations|44
4|3.2 What Does Transparency Do, and How?|45
4|3.3 Early Results of Disclosure-Based Regulations|48
3|4 The Future of Transparency-Based Regulations|53
4|4.1 Less Transparency, Higher Risk of Corruption|53
4|4.2 Prospects for Reform|55
5|4.2.1 Increasing Compliance: More Guidance and Predictability|55
5|4.2.2 Increasing Impact: Leverage Consumer Attention|56
3|5 Conclusion|56
3|References|57
2|The 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation: A Promising European Rite to Remove the Natural Resource Curse?|58
3|1 Introduction: Of “Natural Resource Curses” Resulting from “Conflict Minerals”—and Enhanced Transparency as a Possible Cure|58
3|2 Translating Foreign Policy Objectives into Practice: EU Constitutional Underpinnings of the 2017 Conflict Minerals Regulation|62
3|3 It’s a Long Way to …: On the Legislative History of the Regulation|65
3|4 Between “Dodd-Frank Act Plus” and “Dodd-Frank Act Minus”: Some Thoughts on the Regulatory Features of the Final Normative Outcome|69
4|4.1 Material Scope of Application: “Dodd-Frank Act Reloaded”|70
4|4.2 Personal Scope of Application: “Union Importers Only”|70
4|4.3 Territorial Scope of Application: “Only the World Is Enough”|72
4|4.4 Regulatory Approach: Stipulating Legally Binding Due Diligence Obligations|73
4|4.5 Enforcement Mechanisms: The Perceived Virtue of (Temporary) Modesty|75
3|5 (By Way of an) Outlook: Let There Be (also) Light and Information—On the More Limited Role of Transparency in the Steering Approaches of the 2017 EU Conflict Minerals Regulation|77
3|References|79
2|Community Development Agreements as Tools for Local Participation in Natural Resource Projects in Africa|83
3|1 Introduction|83
3|2 Legal Regimes Governing CDAs in Africa|85
4|2.1 Statutory CDAs|85
4|2.2 CDAs as Tools for Providing Development Assistance|88
4|2.3 Voluntary Systems of CDAs|89
4|2.4 Challenges of Identifying the Affected “Local Community”|90
3|3 Contents of CDAs|92
3|4 CDAs as Tools for Local Participation in Natural Resource Projects|95
4|4.1 Community Participation in Project Implementation|95
4|4.2 Community Participation in Resource Benefit-Sharing|100
3|5 Factors Hindering the Utility of CDAs in Africa|103
4|5.1 Power Imbalance and Lack of Capacity|103
4|5.2 Non-disclosure|106
4|5.3 Enforceability and Access to Justice|107
4|5.4 Environmental Sustainability|108
4|5.5 Representation of Host Communities|109
4|5.6 Management of CDAs|111
3|6 Conclusion|113
3|References|114
2|Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: The Role of Transparency Initiatives|116
3|1 Introduction|116
3|2 Overview of Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights|118
3|3 Corruption, Transparency and Scope of Stabilisation Clauses|122
3|4 Transparency Initiatives and Stabilization Clauses: Some Case Studies|127
4|4.1 Liberia|128
4|4.2 Zambia|132
4|4.3 Tanzania|135
4|4.4 Sierra Leone|139
3|5 Concluding Remarks|142
3|References|144
2|Improving Tax Strategy Transparency in the Extractive Industries Sector for the Advancement of Human Rights|145
3|1 Introduction|146
3|2 The Emerging Link Between Taxation and Human Rights: Domestic Resource Mobilisation|151
3|3 State Actors, Taxation, Natural Resources, and Human Rights|152
3|4 Business, Taxation, and Human Rights|158
3|5 The Extractive Industries Sector and Tax Strategy Transparency|162
3|6 Conclusion|166
3|References|167
1|Part II: Participation|170
2|The Evolving Duty to Consult and Obtain Free Prior and Informed Consent of Indigenous Peoples for Extractive Projects in the United States and Canada|171
3|1 Introduction|171
3|2 Basis for and Content of the Duty to Consult in Canada and the US|174
3|3 US Context|177
4|3.1 Statutory Duty to Consult|177
4|3.2 Regulation and Executive Orders Addressing the Duty to Consult|179
4|3.3 US Jurisprudence and the Duty to Consult|183
4|3.4 Observations on Duty to Consult Under US Indian Law|187
3|4 Canadian Context|192
4|4.1 Statutory Duty to Consult and Guidance of the Federal Government in Canada|192
4|4.2 Canadian Jurisprudence Regarding Consultation, Accommodation and Consent: The Common Law Duty to Consult|197
4|4.3 Observations on Canadian Duty to Consult and Obtain Consent|205
3|5 General Observations|209
3|6 Conclusion|214
3|References|218
2|Asserting the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) in Sub-Saharan Africa in the Extractive Industry Sector|221
3|1 Introduction|221
3|2 FPIC Normative Framework in Sub-Saharan Africa|224
3|3 Conceptualizing FPIC as a Right to Resist Power Imbalances and Raise Community Agency in the Extractive Industry Sector|228
3|4 Content and Scope of FPIC in Sub-Saharan Africa|232
4|4.1 FPIC Content|233
5|4.1.1 Unpacking the Concept|233
5|4.1.2 FPIC and the Right to Veto Extractive Projects|235
4|4.2 FPIC Scope: From Indigenous to Non-Indigenous Applicability|238
4|4.3 FPIC Implementation Challenges in the Extractive Industry in Africa|240
5|4.3.1 Shaky Legal Foundations of FPIC|241
5|4.3.2 Lack of Technical Expertise and Agency|242
5|4.3.3 Political Constraints|243
5|4.3.4 Socio-Cultural Challenges|244
3|5 Conclusion|245
3|References|246
2|The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Consultation Rights in the Americas: How the Inter-American System Can Better Promote Free, Prior, and Informed Consent|248
3|1 Introduction|248
3|2 FPIC Standards in the Americas|250
4|2.1 A Derivation from the Right to Property|251
4|2.2 The Use of Exogenous Instruments: ILO Convention 169 and UNDRIP|253
4|2.3 The Duty to Consult as a Principle of International Law|257
4|2.4 FPIC as a Duty of the State in the Inter-American System|261
3|3 The Corporate Responsibility to Respect FPIC in the Inter-American System|263
4|3.1 The State Due Diligence Standard: A Source of Indirect Responsibility of Corporations|263
4|3.2 The Possibility of a Direct Responsibility of Corporations Under Inter-American Law|267
4|3.3 The Delegation to Businesses of the State Duty to Consult|268
3|4 How the Organs of the Inter-American System Can Help to Promote a Direct Corporate Responsibility to Respect FPIC|274
4|4.1 Constructing a Direct Corporate Responsibility in the IAHRS|274
4|4.2 Tackling the Procedural Obstacles|277
3|5 Conclusion|278
3|References|279
2|Free, Prior, and Informed Consent in the Philippines: A Fourth World Critique|281
3|1 Introduction|282
3|2 A Fourth World Perspective of International Law|283
3|3 State Sovereignty Doctrine and the Privileged Status of the State in International Law|285
4|3.1 Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|287
4|3.2 Regalian Doctrine|288
4|3.3 Free, Prior, and Informed Consent as an International Legal Norm|290
3|4 FPIC in the Philippines|293
4|4.1 FPIC on the Ground: Text Versus Application|295
4|4.2 FPIC Versus State Ownership of and Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|299
4|4.3 Problematizing Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in a State-Centric World: A Fourth World Critique of FPIC|302
3|5 Indigenous Sovereignty: Participation in International Law-Making as an Exercise of Self-Determination|304
3|6 Conclusion|307
3|References|308
2|Norm Contestation and (Non-)Compliance: The Right to Prior Consultation and FPIC in the Extractive Industries|310
3|1 Introduction|310
3|2 Norm Contestation and Non-compliance|314
3|3 The (Contested) Right to Prior Consultation and FPIC According to International Standards|316
3|4 Norm Contestation in the Domestic Sphere: Bolivia, Colombia and Peru|319
4|4.1 Prior Consultation and FPIC in Colombia|321
4|4.2 Prior Consultation and FPIC in Peru|322
4|4.3 Prior Consultation and FPIC in Bolivia|323
4|4.4 Issues of Contestation: Who? How? When? and with What Results?|325
5|4.4.1 Which Entity Leads Prior Consultation and FPIC Processes?|325
5|4.4.2 Who Is to Be Consulted?|326
5|4.4.3 Which Measures Require Consultation?|328
5|4.4.4 When and How Shall the Consultation Take Place?|329
5|4.4.5 What Is the Result of Consultation/FPIC Processes?|330
3|5 Discussion and Conclusions|332
3|References|334
2|State-Investor Contracts and Human Rights: Taking a Critical Look at Transparency and Participation|337
3|1 Introduction|337
3|2 State-Investor Contracts in the Extractive Industries|339
4|2.1 The Role and Function of State-Investor Contracts|340
4|2.2 State-Investor Contracts as a Governance Tool in the Mining Sector|341
4|2.3 Contractual and Licensing Regimes|342
4|2.4 Current Trends Concerning State-Investor Contracts|345
3|3 Key Human Rights Issues Associated with State-Investor Contracts|348
4|3.1 Human Rights Coverage in State-Investor Contracts|348
4|3.2 Asymmetry in Capacity and Information of Negotiating Parties|351
4|3.3 Stabilisation Clauses and Regulatory Chill|353
4|3.4 Transparency, Public Sector Oversight and Monitoring|357
4|3.5 Access to Remedy and Dispute Settlement|362
3|4 Conclusions|368
3|References|371
2|Disruption and Institutional Development: Corporate Standards and Practices on Responsible Mining|372
3|1 Introduction|372
3|2 Disruption and Institutional Development|375
4|2.1 Disruption: Mere Presence and Irresponsible Operations|375
4|2.2 Social Investments: Irrelevant or Even Problematic?|377
4|2.3 Institutional Development: The Missing Link|379
3|3 Shifts in CSR Strategy|382
4|3.1 Shifts in Social Investment|382
5|3.1.1 Shift from Philanthropy to Community Investment|382
5|3.1.2 Shift from Economic and Social Development to Institutional Development|383
4|3.2 Shifts in Social Responsibility|386
5|3.2.1 Shift from Punctual Interventions to More Encompassing Approaches|386
5|3.2.2 Shift from Partnerships to Meaningful Partnerships|388
3|4 Operational Settings|393
4|4.1 Water Management|394
4|4.2 Security Provisions|395
4|4.3 Contributions to Socio-Economic Development|400
4|4.4 Revenue Transparency|405
3|5 Conclusions|408
3|References|409
1|Part III: Resistance|410
2|Taking Sides in Scientific Research? The Struggle for the Right to Participate in Public Decision-Making Related to a Mining Project in Brazil|411
3|1 The Minas-Rio Iron Ore Mining Project and the Struggle of Local Communities|412
4|1.1 Background|412
4|1.2 Theoretical Contextualization|414
3|2 Overview of the Environmental Licensing Process: The Logics of Legal Proceduralization in Legislation|416
4|2.1 The Rights to Information and Participation in Environmental Law: The Potential for Democratic Proceduralization|418
4|2.2 Two Tentative Interpretations of Participation: An Intrinsic Requisite of Democracy, a Functional Demand in Proceduralization|422
3|3 The Rights to Information and Participation in the Minas-Rio|424
4|3.1 The Right to Information|426
5|3.1.1 Controlling Knowledge Production|426
5|3.1.2 Restricting Access to Information|428
4|3.2 The Right to Participation|431
5|3.2.1 Participation: To Which End?|431
5|3.2.2 Coping with Physical Obstacles to Participate and Pushing Institutional Ones|433
4|3.3 Frustrating Information and Participation: Demobilizing and Fostering Mobilization|438
3|4 The Emptying of Rights to Information and Participation in Brazil: A Brief Reflection on the Challenges and Potential Benefits of Action Research|440
4|4.1 Action Research|440
4|4.2 Choosing the Case|442
4|4.3 Redefining the Research Object Together with Participants|443
4|4.4 Worldview, Positionality and Subjectivity|444
4|4.5 Double Accountability and Pitfalls of Action Research|445
3|References|448
2|Building the Case for a Home-State Grievance Mechanism: Law Reform Strategies in the Canadian Resource Justice Movement|451
3|1 Introduction: Context, Issues and Debates|452
3|2 Establishing the Nature of the Problem with Empirical Research (1999–2017)|455
4|2.1 Canadian Global Dominance in Resource Extraction and Canadian State Support|455
4|2.2 Problematizing the Impacts of Canadian Resource Companies Abroad|458
4|2.3 Problematizing the Canadian State’s Support for Companies|464
3|3 Canada’s Corporate Social Responsibility Policy Response (2009–2017)|467
4|3.1 CSR Policy and CSR Counsellor: 2009–2014|468
4|3.2 CSR Policy and CSR Counsellor: 2014–2017|470
4|3.3 Canada’s National Contact Point|473
3|4 Empirical, Normative and Political Critiques of Canada’s CSR Policy|475
4|4.1 Critiques of Canada’s National Contact Point|476
4|4.2 Critiques of Canada’s 2014 CSR Policy and Counsellor|478
3|5 Building Strong Consensus with International Human Rights Bodies (2002–2017)|481
3|6 Creating and Advocating for Concrete Law Reform Proposals (2009–2016)|484
4|6.1 Draft Legislation: The Business & Human Rights Act (2016)|485
4|6.2 Administrative Body, Regulatory Objectives and Jurisdiction|486
4|6.3 Standards|489
4|6.4 Investigatory Powers and Recommendations|491
4|6.5 Potential Sanctions|496
4|6.6 Analysis of the Draft Business & Human Rights Act|497
3|7 The Canadian Ombudsperson for Responsible Enterprise (January 2018)|498
3|8 Conclusion and Future Research|500
3|References|504
2|Transnational Human Rights and Environmental Litigation: A Study of Case Law Relating to Shell in Nigeria|506
3|1 Introduction|507
3|2 Background|509
4|2.1 The Environmental Impact of Oil Extraction Activities in the Niger Delta|509
4|2.2 Corporate Accountability for Human Rights and Environmental Violations Abroad|511
3|3 Transnational Human Rights Litigation Relating to Shell Operations in Nigeria|514
4|3.1 The Wiwa-Case (US)|514
4|3.2 The Kiobel-Case (US)|517
4|3.3 The Kiobel II-Case (Netherlands)|520
3|4 Transnational Environmental Litigation Relating to Shell Operations in Nigeria|522
4|4.1 The Akpan-Case (Netherlands)|522
4|4.2 The Bodo-Case (UK)|525
4|4.3 The Okpabi-Case (UK)|526
3|5 Discussion|529
4|5.1 Jurisdiction|530
5|5.1.1 Personal Jurisdiction in Foreign Direct Liability Cases Before EU Member State Courts|530
6|(a) Connected Claims|531
6|(b) Forum Necessitatis|532
5|5.1.2 Personal Jurisdiction in Foreign Direct Liability Cases Before US Courts|533
4|5.2 Applicable Law|535
4|5.3 Legal Basis for Corporate Liability|537
4|5.4 Procedural Rules and Practices|541
3|6 Conclusion|544
3|References|545