File #2703: "2019_Book_InternationalInvestmentLawAndT.pdf"
Text
1|Editorial|6
1|Peer Reviewers|11
1|Contents|13
1|About the Editors|16
1|War and Peace in International Investment Law|18
2|1 Introduction|19
2|2 Fragmentation|20
2|3 Two Competing Policies|23
2|4 Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties|23
2|5 Impossibility of Performance and Fundamental Change of Circumstances|25
2|6 Full Protection and Security|27
2|7 Non-Discrimination Clauses|30
2|8 Extended War Clauses|31
2|9 Security Clauses|32
2|10 Necessity and Force Majeure|34
2|11 The Charter of the United Nations|36
2|12 Summary and Conclusion|37
2|References|38
1|Evaluating Social Benefits and Costs of Investment Treaties: Depoliticization of Investment Disputes|39
2|1 Introduction|40
2|2 Goals|40
2|3 Means|46
2|4 Achievements|54
2|References|56
1|Between War and Peace: Intermittent Armed Conflict and Investment Arbitration|59
2|1 Introduction|60
2|2 The Libyan Civil Wars|61
3|2.1 Political and Military Situation|61
3|2.2 Effects on Foreign Investors|63
2|3 Defining Armed Conflicts|66
3|3.1 International Armed Conflicts|66
3|3.2 Non-international Armed Conflicts|67
2|4 Suspension or Termination of IIAs During Armed Conflicts|68
3|4.1 2011 ILC Draft Articles|69
3|4.2 UNSC Resolutions|72
2|5 Operability Versus Applicability of IIAs During Armed Conflicts|73
3|5.1 Full Protection and Security|74
3|5.2 War Clauses|75
2|6 Defences Precluding Wrongfulness During Armed Conflicts|76
3|6.1 Necessity|77
3|6.2 Force Majeure|79
2|7 Conclusions|81
2|References|81
1|Investments Under Occupation: The Application of Investment Treaties to Occupied Territory|83
2|1 Introduction|84
2|2 The Occupied State’s Investment Treaties|85
3|2.1 The Authority and Obligations of the Occupying Power|86
3|2.2 Investment Treaty Obligations as “Laws in Force”|88
3|2.3 Consequences Arising Out of the Obligation to Respect Investment Treaty Obligations|92
4|2.3.1 Substantive Protection Standards|92
4|2.3.2 Availability of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|93
2|3 The Occupying State’s Investment Treaties|96
3|3.1 The Territorial Application of Treaties|96
3|3.2 Application to Occupied Territory Based on Teleological Considerations|98
3|3.3 Possible Conflicts with Other Rules of International Law|101
4|3.3.1 The Application of Treaties to Foreign Territory|101
4|3.3.2 The Occupied Sovereign and the Prohibition of Annexation|103
2|4 Conclusion|105
2|References|105
1|An Overview of State Succession Issues Arising as a Result of an Armed Conflict|109
2|1 Introduction|110
2|2 Analysis of the Practice of States Regarding the Continuation of “Old” BITs|112
3|2.1 Express Consent by the States Concerned|112
3|2.2 Tacit Consent by States Concerned|115
2|3 Is There a Principle in Favour of the Automatic Continuation of BITs?|117
2|4 Conclusion|122
2|References|125
1|Kosovo and Foreign Investment Protection|128
2|1 Introduction|129
2|2 The Legal Status of Foreign Investment in Kosovo Before Its Declaration of Independence (1999–2008)|129
3|2.1 The Legal Status of Foreign Investments in the Territory of Kosovo|130
3|2.2 Recourse Against the Author of the Violation|131
4|2.2.1 Recourse Against the UNMIK|132
4|2.2.2 Recourse Against Yugoslavia/Serbia|133
3|2.3 Recourse Against the State of Kosovo After Its Independence for Acts Prior to Its Independence|134
2|3 The Legal Status of Foreign Investment in Kosovo After Its Independence (2008)|135
3|3.1 The Legality of the Secession of Kosovo|135
3|3.2 The Legality of the Recognition of Kosovo|136
3|3.3 Recourse to the Domestic Courts of Kosovo|139
3|3.4 Recourse to an International Judicial Forum|140
3|3.5 Compensation by an Insurance Company|140
2|4 Conclusions|141
2|References|142
1|Procedural Aspects of the Obligation of Non-Recognition Before International Investment Tribunals|144
2|1 Introduction|145
2|2 The Content and Telos of the Obligation of Non-Recognition and Its Relevance for Investment Tribunals|146
2|3 Review of Jurisdiction on the Tribunal’s Own Motion in ICSID and Non-ICSID Proceedings|149
3|3.1 Article 41 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID Arbitration Rules 41(2) and 42(4), and Actions Taken by Arbitral Tribunals Ex Officio or Proprio Motu|149
4|3.1.1 Evaluation of ICSID Jurisprudence on the Matter|150
4|3.1.2 Forum Prorogatum and the Tribunal’s Discretion Under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(2)?|154
4|3.1.3 The Obligation of Non-Recognition as an Overriding Norm Within the ICSID System?|156
4|3.1.4 Interim Conclusion|156
3|3.2 The Tribunal’s Authority of Jurisdictional Review Independently from the Parties’ Arguments in Non-ICSID Arbitration|157
4|3.2.1 The Perspective of the UNCITRAL, ICC and SCC Arbitration Rules|158
4|3.2.2 Compliance of the Award with the Legal Order at the Seat of the Arbitration and in Fora of Enforcement: The Obligation of Non-Recognition as a Matter of Public Policy?|160
4|3.2.3 Interim Conclusion|163
2|4 Conclusion and Outlook|164
2|References|165
1|Exploring the Links Between Nationality Changes and Investment Claims Arising Out of Armed Conflicts: The Case of Russian Passportization in Crimea|167
2|1 Introduction|168
2|2 The Relevance of Nationality in Investment Claims Arising Out of an Armed Conflict|170
2|3 Armed Conflicts, Protection of Foreign Investments and Territorial Application of Investment Treaties|173
2|4 Precedents and Recent State Practice in the Light of the Annexation of Crimea|178
2|5 Conclusions: Is Passportization Shifting Investment Protection?|184
2|References|185
1|Litigating the Use of Force: Reflections on the Interaction Between Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Other Forms of International Dispute Settlement in the Context of the Conflict in Ukraine|187
2|1 Introduction|188
2|2 Dispute Resolution Under the Ukraine-Russia BIT|190
2|3 Overview of Inter-State and Other Legal Proceedings Arising Out of the Conflict in Ukraine|194
3|3.1 The European Court of Human Rights|194
3|3.2 Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea|195
3|3.3 The International Criminal Court|197
2|4 Key Legal Issues in the Investment Claims Arising Out of the Conflict in Ukraine and Interaction with Other Proceedings|198
3|4.1 Territorial Scope of Application of the BIT|198
4|4.1.1 Investment Claims Relating to Crimea|199
4|4.1.2 Potential Investment Claims Relating to Eastern Ukraine|203
3|4.2 Deprivation of Property|206
3|4.3 Applicability of the BIT’s “War Clause”|208
2|5 Concluding Remarks|209
2|References|210
1|Non-discrimination and the Protection of Foreign Investments in the Context of an Armed Conflict|212
2|1 Introduction|213
2|2 War Clauses in Investment Treaties and Non-discrimination|214
3|2.1 War Clauses in Investment Treaties|215
3|2.2 The Relationship Between War Clauses and the Obligations of Non-discrimination and Full Protection and Security|216
2|3 The Role of Non-discrimination in Preventing Armed Conflicts and Enabling Post-conflict Reconstruction|220
3|3.1 Non-discrimination as a Means to Prevent Conflicts and Promote Peaceful Relations|220
3|3.2 Non-discrimination in International Economic Relations in the Context of Post-war Reconstruction|221
4|3.2.1 Non-discrimination in International Economic Relations Could Facilitate Reconstruction|222
4|3.2.2 Non-discrimination Obligations Do Not Limit States’ Power to Choose Different Regulatory Policies|223
2|4 Conclusions|226
2|References|226
1|The Full Protection and Security Standard in Investment Law: A Specific Obligation?|229
2|1 Introduction: Historical Approach|230
2|2 Nature of the FPS Standard|233
2|3 Scope of Application of the FPS Standard|235
2|4 Relationship Between the FPS Standard and Compensation for Losses Clauses|237
2|5 Conclusion|239
2|References|239
1|Armed Conflicts and Customary International Law on Investment: Codification and Fragmentation of “Protection and Security”|241
2|1 Introduction|242
2|2 Defining the Concepts|244
3|2.1 What Is an Armed Conflict?|244
3|2.2 Customary International Law on Investment|246
2|3 Evolution of Protection and Security|250
3|3.1 Replication and Magnification of the Bare Custom|252
3|3.2 Alteration and Fragmentation of the Bare Custom|256
2|4 Protection and Security in Armed Conflicts|261
3|4.1 Treaty or Customary Obligation|261
3|4.2 Autonomous Treaty or Customary Dependent Obligation|264
2|5 Concluding Remarks|267
2|References|267
1|Protection of Foreign Investments Against the Effects of Hostilities: A Framework for Assessing Compliance with Full Protection and Security|270
2|1 Introduction|271
2|2 Full Protection and Security and Customary Law on the Treatment of Aliens|275
3|2.1 The Customary Obligation to Take “Reasonable Care” and Its Content|276
3|2.2 Full Protection and Security Is a Reference to Customary Law|279
2|3 Full Protection and Security and Customary International Humanitarian Law|282
3|3.1 The Obligation to Take Feasible Precautions Against the Effects of Hostilities|283
3|3.2 The Relationship Between FPS and the Obligation to Take Precautionary Measures|286
2|4 Conclusion|290
2|References|290
1|Protection of Investments in War-Torn States: A Practitioner’s Perspective on War Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties|294
2|1 Introduction|295
2|2 War Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties|297
3|2.1 Non-discrimination War Clauses|300
3|2.2 Extended War Clauses|303
3|2.3 Strict Liability War Clauses|307
3|2.4 War Clauses and Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses|309
2|3 The Relationship Between War Clauses and Other Investment Protection Standards|310
3|3.1 Conflation|311
3|3.2 Derogation|312
3|3.3 Complementarity|316
2|4 Exceptional Defences in the Application of War Clauses|317
3|4.1 Essential Security Clauses|318
3|4.2 Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness|319
3|4.3 Assumption of Risk by Investors|321
2|5 Concluding Remarks|322
2|Annex: Survey of War Clauses in the BITs of Libya, Syria and Yemen|324
2|References|328
1|Investment Treaty Security Exceptions, Necessity and Self-Defence in the Context of Armed Conflict|329
2|1 Introduction|330
2|2 Security Exceptions in the Decided Cases|331
3|2.1 Security Exception Intertwined with Necessity and Self-Defence|332
4|2.1.1 Assimilating the Security Exception with the Necessity Defence|333
4|2.1.2 Security Exception as lex specialis vis-à-vis Necessity|335
5|2.1.2.1 Strong-Form lex specialis and Necessity|336
5|2.1.2.2 Weak-Form lex specialis and Necessity|336
5|2.1.2.3 A Tenable Interpretation?|338
4|2.1.3 Lex specialis and Self-defence|339
5|2.1.3.1 Strong-Form lex specialis and Self-defence|339
5|2.1.3.2 A Tenable Interpretation?|340
3|2.2 Security Exception as Conceptually Distinct from Necessity and Self-Defence|340
4|2.2.1 The Primary-Secondary Rule Distinction|340
4|2.2.2 Security Exceptions Limit the Scope of Investment Protections in the Treaty|341
4|2.2.3 Exception as Affirmative Defence|343
2|3 Implications of the Characterisation of the Security Exception|344
3|3.1 The Relationship Between the Security Exception and the Treaty’s Substantive Obligations|344
4|3.1.1 When to Determine the Applicability of the Exception|344
4|3.1.2 When to Consider Regulatory Purpose|345
3|3.2 The Burden of Proof|346
3|3.3 Compensation Where Treaty Exception Applies or State of Necessity Is Established|347
2|4 Conclusion|348
2|References|349
1|Supervening Impossibility of Performance and the Effect of Armed Conflict on Investment Treaties: Any Room for Manoeuvre?|351
2|1 Introduction|352
2|2 Supervening Impossibility of Performance and Treaties|353
3|2.1 Supervening Impossibility of Performance Between the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Doctrinal Elaboration|354
3|2.2 Supervening Impossibility of Performance in Practice|356
2|3 Supervening Impossibility of Performance, Treaties and Armed Conflict|359
3|3.1 Armed Conflicts and Treaties: Inter Armas Silent Leges or Fides Etiam Hostis Servanda?|360
3|3.2 The 2011 ILC Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflicts on Treaties Approach to the Effect of Armed Conflicts on International Agreements|363
2|4 Supervening Impossibility of Performance, Armed Conflicts and International Investment Agreements: Is There Any Scope for Application?|365
2|5 Concluding Remarks|370
2|References|371
1|Awarding Damages in Times of Armed Conflict: An Emerging Standard of “Economic Capacity” for the Host State|372
2|1 Introduction|373
2|2 Armed Conflict and the Current International Investment Regime|374
2|3 Awarding Damages During Armed Conflict|377
3|3.1 The Notion of Damages in International Investment Arbitration|378
3|3.2 The Resource to Claims Commission Decisions as an Analytical Option|381
2|4 The Damage Awards of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission EECC and the “Economic Capacity” Standard|383
2|5 The Application of an Economic Capacity Standard in Investment Arbitration|386
3|5.1 The Legal Nature of the Economic Capacity Standard|386
3|5.2 The Application of “Economic Capacity” in Parallel Proceedings|388
2|6 Conclusions|390
2|References|391
1|The Cross-Fertilisation of International Investment Law and International Humanitarian Law: Prospects and Pitfalls|393
2|1 Introduction|394
3|1.1 Overview|394
3|1.2 Development of the Core Argument|395
2|2 Theoretical Foundations for Legal Cross-Fertilisation of IHL and IIL|396
3|2.1 Critique of the Principle of Systematic Integration|396
3|2.2 Theory of Cross-Fertilisation as the Alternative Framework|396
4|2.2.1 General Concept of Cross-Fertilisation|396
4|2.2.2 Rationale for and Method of Cross-Fertilisation of IHL and IIL|397
2|3 Feasibility of Cross-Fertilisation Discourse: Specificities of IHL and IIL Regimes|399
3|3.1 The Macro-level Analysis|399
4|3.1.1 Different Underlying Philosophies of IHL and IIL|399
4|3.1.2 Different Approaches to Enforcement of Legal Obligations|400
3|3.2 The Micro-level Analysis|401
4|3.2.1 Unique Concept of Property Protection in IHL|401
4|3.2.2 The Right to a Remedy and Reparation|402
2|4 The Cross-Fertilisation Discourse|403
3|4.1 Liability for Failure to Exercise Due Diligence to Protect Investment Against Rebels|404
3|4.2 Liability for Discriminatory Compensation|406
3|4.3 Liability for Destruction or Losses Caused by Governmental Forces|407
4|4.3.1 Failure to Take Adequate Precautions Before Launching an Attach|407
4|4.3.2 Drawing from the Notion of Military Necessity in IHL|409
5|4.3.2.1 Identification of Underlying Military Justification|411
5|4.3.2.2 Distinction Between Military Objective and Civilian Objective|411
2|5 Proportionality and Military Necessity|412
2|6 Policy and Legal Implications of Cross-Fertilisation of IHL and IIL|413
3|6.1 Improvement of Substantive Rules|413
3|6.2 Fostering Judicial Dialogue and Indirect Enforcement of IHL|414
2|7 Conclusions|414
2|References|415
1|International Investment Arbitration and Non-binding Standards Applicable in Conflict: Parallel or Merging Worlds?|418
2|1 Introduction|419
2|2 Standards Applicable in Conflict|421
3|2.1 United Nations Guiding Principles|422
3|2.2 UN Global Compact|424
3|2.3 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and National Contact Points|425
3|2.4 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas 2010|425
3|2.5 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights|426
3|2.6 Kimberley Process|427
3|2.7 Key Themes|428
2|3 Standards in Investment Treaty Arbitration|428
3|3.1 Dispute Resolution Provisions|429
3|3.2 Applicable Law|430
4|3.2.1 Treaty Wording|430
4|3.2.2 The Invocation of “Wider” Norms|431
4|3.2.3 Interpretation: Applicable Rules|433
4|3.2.4 Interpretation: A Broader Governance Structure|434
4|3.2.5 Illegality and International Public Policy|435
2|4 Investment Protections|437
3|4.1 Fair and Equitable Treatment|438
3|4.2 Full Protection and Security|439
2|5 Procedure|441
3|5.1 Transparency|441
3|5.2 Participation|442
2|6 Conclusions|443
2|References|443
1|Responsible Investment in Occupied Territories: Beyond the UN & OECD Principles|446
2|1 Introduction|447
2|2 The Current Situation Under International Humanitarian Law|449
3|2.1 Occupation and Other Forms of Foreign Territorial Administration|449
3|2.2 Conducting the Economic Affairs of the Occupied: The Rights and Duties of the Administrator|450
2|3 The Current Situation Under International Investment Law|454
3|3.1 The Actors of Responsible Investment and Their Role|454
3|3.2 The Concept of Responsible Investment as a Good Governance Value|457
2|4 The Case of Western Sahara|459
3|4.1 A Clash of Legal Principles or a Geopolitical Game?|459
3|4.2 Investing in Western Sahara: A Prelude to Independence?|461
2|5 Closing Remarks|464
2|References|464
1|Corporations and Crimes Against Humanity: Financial Liability Through ISDS?|466
2|1 Introduction|467
2|2 Background on Urbaser|470
2|3 On Corporate Subjectivity to International Law|471
2|4 The Urbaser Spectrum: Three Standards for Corporate Obligations|474
3|4.1 Urbaser’s First Standard: An Obligation Not to Aim at Destroying Human Rights|475
3|4.2 Urbaser’s Second Standard: An Obligation to Perform|477
3|4.3 Urbaser’s Third Standard: An Obligation to Abstain|478
2|5 Corporate Subjectivity and Individual Liability in ICL: Possible “Boundary Crossings”?|480
2|6 How Could “Aiding and Abetting” Liability Serve as a Basis for Financial Liability Under the Urbaser Spectrum?|484
3|6.1 Hypothetical One: Monsanto and Vietnam|485
3|6.2 Hypothetical Two: The Reich Group and Nazi Germany|487
3|6.3 Hypothetical Three: Northrop Grumman and Afghanistan|489
2|7 Conclusion|491
2|References|492
1|The Recourse to Private Military and Security Companies by Foreign Investors in Conflict-Affected Countries: Dangers, Opportunities and the Need to Regulate|494
2|1 Introduction|495
2|2 The Growing Recourse to PMSCS and the Need for a Regulatory Framework|497
3|2.1 The Private Security Industry: An Overview of Its Development|497
3|2.2 The Unsuccessful Attempts to Regulate PMSCs as a Sign of a Regulatory Framework in the Making|501
2|3 The Use of PMSCs by Foreign Investors in Armed Conflict-Affected Host States: Dangers and Opportunities|508
2|4 Towards a Regulation of the Use of PMSCs by Foreign Investors Through IIAs|514
2|5 Conclusion|520
2|References|521
1|The Paradox of the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law—Some Elementary Remarks|523
2|1 Introduction|523
2|2 From the Sovereign Right to Use Force to the Prohibition of the Use of Force|524
2|3 The Paradox: No Credible Alternative to the Use of Force|528
2|4 Adapting to the Paradox: Limiting and Circumventing the Principle|532
2|5 Conclusion|538
2|References|540
1|Peer Reviewers|11
1|Contents|13
1|About the Editors|16
1|War and Peace in International Investment Law|18
2|1 Introduction|19
2|2 Fragmentation|20
2|3 Two Competing Policies|23
2|4 Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties|23
2|5 Impossibility of Performance and Fundamental Change of Circumstances|25
2|6 Full Protection and Security|27
2|7 Non-Discrimination Clauses|30
2|8 Extended War Clauses|31
2|9 Security Clauses|32
2|10 Necessity and Force Majeure|34
2|11 The Charter of the United Nations|36
2|12 Summary and Conclusion|37
2|References|38
1|Evaluating Social Benefits and Costs of Investment Treaties: Depoliticization of Investment Disputes|39
2|1 Introduction|40
2|2 Goals|40
2|3 Means|46
2|4 Achievements|54
2|References|56
1|Between War and Peace: Intermittent Armed Conflict and Investment Arbitration|59
2|1 Introduction|60
2|2 The Libyan Civil Wars|61
3|2.1 Political and Military Situation|61
3|2.2 Effects on Foreign Investors|63
2|3 Defining Armed Conflicts|66
3|3.1 International Armed Conflicts|66
3|3.2 Non-international Armed Conflicts|67
2|4 Suspension or Termination of IIAs During Armed Conflicts|68
3|4.1 2011 ILC Draft Articles|69
3|4.2 UNSC Resolutions|72
2|5 Operability Versus Applicability of IIAs During Armed Conflicts|73
3|5.1 Full Protection and Security|74
3|5.2 War Clauses|75
2|6 Defences Precluding Wrongfulness During Armed Conflicts|76
3|6.1 Necessity|77
3|6.2 Force Majeure|79
2|7 Conclusions|81
2|References|81
1|Investments Under Occupation: The Application of Investment Treaties to Occupied Territory|83
2|1 Introduction|84
2|2 The Occupied State’s Investment Treaties|85
3|2.1 The Authority and Obligations of the Occupying Power|86
3|2.2 Investment Treaty Obligations as “Laws in Force”|88
3|2.3 Consequences Arising Out of the Obligation to Respect Investment Treaty Obligations|92
4|2.3.1 Substantive Protection Standards|92
4|2.3.2 Availability of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|93
2|3 The Occupying State’s Investment Treaties|96
3|3.1 The Territorial Application of Treaties|96
3|3.2 Application to Occupied Territory Based on Teleological Considerations|98
3|3.3 Possible Conflicts with Other Rules of International Law|101
4|3.3.1 The Application of Treaties to Foreign Territory|101
4|3.3.2 The Occupied Sovereign and the Prohibition of Annexation|103
2|4 Conclusion|105
2|References|105
1|An Overview of State Succession Issues Arising as a Result of an Armed Conflict|109
2|1 Introduction|110
2|2 Analysis of the Practice of States Regarding the Continuation of “Old” BITs|112
3|2.1 Express Consent by the States Concerned|112
3|2.2 Tacit Consent by States Concerned|115
2|3 Is There a Principle in Favour of the Automatic Continuation of BITs?|117
2|4 Conclusion|122
2|References|125
1|Kosovo and Foreign Investment Protection|128
2|1 Introduction|129
2|2 The Legal Status of Foreign Investment in Kosovo Before Its Declaration of Independence (1999–2008)|129
3|2.1 The Legal Status of Foreign Investments in the Territory of Kosovo|130
3|2.2 Recourse Against the Author of the Violation|131
4|2.2.1 Recourse Against the UNMIK|132
4|2.2.2 Recourse Against Yugoslavia/Serbia|133
3|2.3 Recourse Against the State of Kosovo After Its Independence for Acts Prior to Its Independence|134
2|3 The Legal Status of Foreign Investment in Kosovo After Its Independence (2008)|135
3|3.1 The Legality of the Secession of Kosovo|135
3|3.2 The Legality of the Recognition of Kosovo|136
3|3.3 Recourse to the Domestic Courts of Kosovo|139
3|3.4 Recourse to an International Judicial Forum|140
3|3.5 Compensation by an Insurance Company|140
2|4 Conclusions|141
2|References|142
1|Procedural Aspects of the Obligation of Non-Recognition Before International Investment Tribunals|144
2|1 Introduction|145
2|2 The Content and Telos of the Obligation of Non-Recognition and Its Relevance for Investment Tribunals|146
2|3 Review of Jurisdiction on the Tribunal’s Own Motion in ICSID and Non-ICSID Proceedings|149
3|3.1 Article 41 of the ICSID Convention, ICSID Arbitration Rules 41(2) and 42(4), and Actions Taken by Arbitral Tribunals Ex Officio or Proprio Motu|149
4|3.1.1 Evaluation of ICSID Jurisprudence on the Matter|150
4|3.1.2 Forum Prorogatum and the Tribunal’s Discretion Under ICSID Arbitration Rule 41(2)?|154
4|3.1.3 The Obligation of Non-Recognition as an Overriding Norm Within the ICSID System?|156
4|3.1.4 Interim Conclusion|156
3|3.2 The Tribunal’s Authority of Jurisdictional Review Independently from the Parties’ Arguments in Non-ICSID Arbitration|157
4|3.2.1 The Perspective of the UNCITRAL, ICC and SCC Arbitration Rules|158
4|3.2.2 Compliance of the Award with the Legal Order at the Seat of the Arbitration and in Fora of Enforcement: The Obligation of Non-Recognition as a Matter of Public Policy?|160
4|3.2.3 Interim Conclusion|163
2|4 Conclusion and Outlook|164
2|References|165
1|Exploring the Links Between Nationality Changes and Investment Claims Arising Out of Armed Conflicts: The Case of Russian Passportization in Crimea|167
2|1 Introduction|168
2|2 The Relevance of Nationality in Investment Claims Arising Out of an Armed Conflict|170
2|3 Armed Conflicts, Protection of Foreign Investments and Territorial Application of Investment Treaties|173
2|4 Precedents and Recent State Practice in the Light of the Annexation of Crimea|178
2|5 Conclusions: Is Passportization Shifting Investment Protection?|184
2|References|185
1|Litigating the Use of Force: Reflections on the Interaction Between Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Other Forms of International Dispute Settlement in the Context of the Conflict in Ukraine|187
2|1 Introduction|188
2|2 Dispute Resolution Under the Ukraine-Russia BIT|190
2|3 Overview of Inter-State and Other Legal Proceedings Arising Out of the Conflict in Ukraine|194
3|3.1 The European Court of Human Rights|194
3|3.2 Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea|195
3|3.3 The International Criminal Court|197
2|4 Key Legal Issues in the Investment Claims Arising Out of the Conflict in Ukraine and Interaction with Other Proceedings|198
3|4.1 Territorial Scope of Application of the BIT|198
4|4.1.1 Investment Claims Relating to Crimea|199
4|4.1.2 Potential Investment Claims Relating to Eastern Ukraine|203
3|4.2 Deprivation of Property|206
3|4.3 Applicability of the BIT’s “War Clause”|208
2|5 Concluding Remarks|209
2|References|210
1|Non-discrimination and the Protection of Foreign Investments in the Context of an Armed Conflict|212
2|1 Introduction|213
2|2 War Clauses in Investment Treaties and Non-discrimination|214
3|2.1 War Clauses in Investment Treaties|215
3|2.2 The Relationship Between War Clauses and the Obligations of Non-discrimination and Full Protection and Security|216
2|3 The Role of Non-discrimination in Preventing Armed Conflicts and Enabling Post-conflict Reconstruction|220
3|3.1 Non-discrimination as a Means to Prevent Conflicts and Promote Peaceful Relations|220
3|3.2 Non-discrimination in International Economic Relations in the Context of Post-war Reconstruction|221
4|3.2.1 Non-discrimination in International Economic Relations Could Facilitate Reconstruction|222
4|3.2.2 Non-discrimination Obligations Do Not Limit States’ Power to Choose Different Regulatory Policies|223
2|4 Conclusions|226
2|References|226
1|The Full Protection and Security Standard in Investment Law: A Specific Obligation?|229
2|1 Introduction: Historical Approach|230
2|2 Nature of the FPS Standard|233
2|3 Scope of Application of the FPS Standard|235
2|4 Relationship Between the FPS Standard and Compensation for Losses Clauses|237
2|5 Conclusion|239
2|References|239
1|Armed Conflicts and Customary International Law on Investment: Codification and Fragmentation of “Protection and Security”|241
2|1 Introduction|242
2|2 Defining the Concepts|244
3|2.1 What Is an Armed Conflict?|244
3|2.2 Customary International Law on Investment|246
2|3 Evolution of Protection and Security|250
3|3.1 Replication and Magnification of the Bare Custom|252
3|3.2 Alteration and Fragmentation of the Bare Custom|256
2|4 Protection and Security in Armed Conflicts|261
3|4.1 Treaty or Customary Obligation|261
3|4.2 Autonomous Treaty or Customary Dependent Obligation|264
2|5 Concluding Remarks|267
2|References|267
1|Protection of Foreign Investments Against the Effects of Hostilities: A Framework for Assessing Compliance with Full Protection and Security|270
2|1 Introduction|271
2|2 Full Protection and Security and Customary Law on the Treatment of Aliens|275
3|2.1 The Customary Obligation to Take “Reasonable Care” and Its Content|276
3|2.2 Full Protection and Security Is a Reference to Customary Law|279
2|3 Full Protection and Security and Customary International Humanitarian Law|282
3|3.1 The Obligation to Take Feasible Precautions Against the Effects of Hostilities|283
3|3.2 The Relationship Between FPS and the Obligation to Take Precautionary Measures|286
2|4 Conclusion|290
2|References|290
1|Protection of Investments in War-Torn States: A Practitioner’s Perspective on War Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties|294
2|1 Introduction|295
2|2 War Clauses in Bilateral Investment Treaties|297
3|2.1 Non-discrimination War Clauses|300
3|2.2 Extended War Clauses|303
3|2.3 Strict Liability War Clauses|307
3|2.4 War Clauses and Most-Favoured-Nation Clauses|309
2|3 The Relationship Between War Clauses and Other Investment Protection Standards|310
3|3.1 Conflation|311
3|3.2 Derogation|312
3|3.3 Complementarity|316
2|4 Exceptional Defences in the Application of War Clauses|317
3|4.1 Essential Security Clauses|318
3|4.2 Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness|319
3|4.3 Assumption of Risk by Investors|321
2|5 Concluding Remarks|322
2|Annex: Survey of War Clauses in the BITs of Libya, Syria and Yemen|324
2|References|328
1|Investment Treaty Security Exceptions, Necessity and Self-Defence in the Context of Armed Conflict|329
2|1 Introduction|330
2|2 Security Exceptions in the Decided Cases|331
3|2.1 Security Exception Intertwined with Necessity and Self-Defence|332
4|2.1.1 Assimilating the Security Exception with the Necessity Defence|333
4|2.1.2 Security Exception as lex specialis vis-à-vis Necessity|335
5|2.1.2.1 Strong-Form lex specialis and Necessity|336
5|2.1.2.2 Weak-Form lex specialis and Necessity|336
5|2.1.2.3 A Tenable Interpretation?|338
4|2.1.3 Lex specialis and Self-defence|339
5|2.1.3.1 Strong-Form lex specialis and Self-defence|339
5|2.1.3.2 A Tenable Interpretation?|340
3|2.2 Security Exception as Conceptually Distinct from Necessity and Self-Defence|340
4|2.2.1 The Primary-Secondary Rule Distinction|340
4|2.2.2 Security Exceptions Limit the Scope of Investment Protections in the Treaty|341
4|2.2.3 Exception as Affirmative Defence|343
2|3 Implications of the Characterisation of the Security Exception|344
3|3.1 The Relationship Between the Security Exception and the Treaty’s Substantive Obligations|344
4|3.1.1 When to Determine the Applicability of the Exception|344
4|3.1.2 When to Consider Regulatory Purpose|345
3|3.2 The Burden of Proof|346
3|3.3 Compensation Where Treaty Exception Applies or State of Necessity Is Established|347
2|4 Conclusion|348
2|References|349
1|Supervening Impossibility of Performance and the Effect of Armed Conflict on Investment Treaties: Any Room for Manoeuvre?|351
2|1 Introduction|352
2|2 Supervening Impossibility of Performance and Treaties|353
3|2.1 Supervening Impossibility of Performance Between the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and Doctrinal Elaboration|354
3|2.2 Supervening Impossibility of Performance in Practice|356
2|3 Supervening Impossibility of Performance, Treaties and Armed Conflict|359
3|3.1 Armed Conflicts and Treaties: Inter Armas Silent Leges or Fides Etiam Hostis Servanda?|360
3|3.2 The 2011 ILC Articles on the Effect of Armed Conflicts on Treaties Approach to the Effect of Armed Conflicts on International Agreements|363
2|4 Supervening Impossibility of Performance, Armed Conflicts and International Investment Agreements: Is There Any Scope for Application?|365
2|5 Concluding Remarks|370
2|References|371
1|Awarding Damages in Times of Armed Conflict: An Emerging Standard of “Economic Capacity” for the Host State|372
2|1 Introduction|373
2|2 Armed Conflict and the Current International Investment Regime|374
2|3 Awarding Damages During Armed Conflict|377
3|3.1 The Notion of Damages in International Investment Arbitration|378
3|3.2 The Resource to Claims Commission Decisions as an Analytical Option|381
2|4 The Damage Awards of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission EECC and the “Economic Capacity” Standard|383
2|5 The Application of an Economic Capacity Standard in Investment Arbitration|386
3|5.1 The Legal Nature of the Economic Capacity Standard|386
3|5.2 The Application of “Economic Capacity” in Parallel Proceedings|388
2|6 Conclusions|390
2|References|391
1|The Cross-Fertilisation of International Investment Law and International Humanitarian Law: Prospects and Pitfalls|393
2|1 Introduction|394
3|1.1 Overview|394
3|1.2 Development of the Core Argument|395
2|2 Theoretical Foundations for Legal Cross-Fertilisation of IHL and IIL|396
3|2.1 Critique of the Principle of Systematic Integration|396
3|2.2 Theory of Cross-Fertilisation as the Alternative Framework|396
4|2.2.1 General Concept of Cross-Fertilisation|396
4|2.2.2 Rationale for and Method of Cross-Fertilisation of IHL and IIL|397
2|3 Feasibility of Cross-Fertilisation Discourse: Specificities of IHL and IIL Regimes|399
3|3.1 The Macro-level Analysis|399
4|3.1.1 Different Underlying Philosophies of IHL and IIL|399
4|3.1.2 Different Approaches to Enforcement of Legal Obligations|400
3|3.2 The Micro-level Analysis|401
4|3.2.1 Unique Concept of Property Protection in IHL|401
4|3.2.2 The Right to a Remedy and Reparation|402
2|4 The Cross-Fertilisation Discourse|403
3|4.1 Liability for Failure to Exercise Due Diligence to Protect Investment Against Rebels|404
3|4.2 Liability for Discriminatory Compensation|406
3|4.3 Liability for Destruction or Losses Caused by Governmental Forces|407
4|4.3.1 Failure to Take Adequate Precautions Before Launching an Attach|407
4|4.3.2 Drawing from the Notion of Military Necessity in IHL|409
5|4.3.2.1 Identification of Underlying Military Justification|411
5|4.3.2.2 Distinction Between Military Objective and Civilian Objective|411
2|5 Proportionality and Military Necessity|412
2|6 Policy and Legal Implications of Cross-Fertilisation of IHL and IIL|413
3|6.1 Improvement of Substantive Rules|413
3|6.2 Fostering Judicial Dialogue and Indirect Enforcement of IHL|414
2|7 Conclusions|414
2|References|415
1|International Investment Arbitration and Non-binding Standards Applicable in Conflict: Parallel or Merging Worlds?|418
2|1 Introduction|419
2|2 Standards Applicable in Conflict|421
3|2.1 United Nations Guiding Principles|422
3|2.2 UN Global Compact|424
3|2.3 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and National Contact Points|425
3|2.4 OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas 2010|425
3|2.5 Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights|426
3|2.6 Kimberley Process|427
3|2.7 Key Themes|428
2|3 Standards in Investment Treaty Arbitration|428
3|3.1 Dispute Resolution Provisions|429
3|3.2 Applicable Law|430
4|3.2.1 Treaty Wording|430
4|3.2.2 The Invocation of “Wider” Norms|431
4|3.2.3 Interpretation: Applicable Rules|433
4|3.2.4 Interpretation: A Broader Governance Structure|434
4|3.2.5 Illegality and International Public Policy|435
2|4 Investment Protections|437
3|4.1 Fair and Equitable Treatment|438
3|4.2 Full Protection and Security|439
2|5 Procedure|441
3|5.1 Transparency|441
3|5.2 Participation|442
2|6 Conclusions|443
2|References|443
1|Responsible Investment in Occupied Territories: Beyond the UN & OECD Principles|446
2|1 Introduction|447
2|2 The Current Situation Under International Humanitarian Law|449
3|2.1 Occupation and Other Forms of Foreign Territorial Administration|449
3|2.2 Conducting the Economic Affairs of the Occupied: The Rights and Duties of the Administrator|450
2|3 The Current Situation Under International Investment Law|454
3|3.1 The Actors of Responsible Investment and Their Role|454
3|3.2 The Concept of Responsible Investment as a Good Governance Value|457
2|4 The Case of Western Sahara|459
3|4.1 A Clash of Legal Principles or a Geopolitical Game?|459
3|4.2 Investing in Western Sahara: A Prelude to Independence?|461
2|5 Closing Remarks|464
2|References|464
1|Corporations and Crimes Against Humanity: Financial Liability Through ISDS?|466
2|1 Introduction|467
2|2 Background on Urbaser|470
2|3 On Corporate Subjectivity to International Law|471
2|4 The Urbaser Spectrum: Three Standards for Corporate Obligations|474
3|4.1 Urbaser’s First Standard: An Obligation Not to Aim at Destroying Human Rights|475
3|4.2 Urbaser’s Second Standard: An Obligation to Perform|477
3|4.3 Urbaser’s Third Standard: An Obligation to Abstain|478
2|5 Corporate Subjectivity and Individual Liability in ICL: Possible “Boundary Crossings”?|480
2|6 How Could “Aiding and Abetting” Liability Serve as a Basis for Financial Liability Under the Urbaser Spectrum?|484
3|6.1 Hypothetical One: Monsanto and Vietnam|485
3|6.2 Hypothetical Two: The Reich Group and Nazi Germany|487
3|6.3 Hypothetical Three: Northrop Grumman and Afghanistan|489
2|7 Conclusion|491
2|References|492
1|The Recourse to Private Military and Security Companies by Foreign Investors in Conflict-Affected Countries: Dangers, Opportunities and the Need to Regulate|494
2|1 Introduction|495
2|2 The Growing Recourse to PMSCS and the Need for a Regulatory Framework|497
3|2.1 The Private Security Industry: An Overview of Its Development|497
3|2.2 The Unsuccessful Attempts to Regulate PMSCs as a Sign of a Regulatory Framework in the Making|501
2|3 The Use of PMSCs by Foreign Investors in Armed Conflict-Affected Host States: Dangers and Opportunities|508
2|4 Towards a Regulation of the Use of PMSCs by Foreign Investors Through IIAs|514
2|5 Conclusion|520
2|References|521
1|The Paradox of the Prohibition of the Use of Force in Contemporary International Law—Some Elementary Remarks|523
2|1 Introduction|523
2|2 From the Sovereign Right to Use Force to the Prohibition of the Use of Force|524
2|3 The Paradox: No Credible Alternative to the Use of Force|528
2|4 Adapting to the Paradox: Limiting and Circumventing the Principle|532
2|5 Conclusion|538
2|References|540