File #2704: "2019_Book_ForeignInvestmentUnderTheCompr.pdf"
Text
1|Foreword|6
1|Preface|9
1|Contents|11
1|About the Editors|13
1|CETA and the Debate on the Reform of the Investment Regime|15
2|1 Introduction|16
2|2 The Argument|17
3|2.1 Preference Bias|18
3|2.2 Partial Truths|19
3|2.3 Authority|20
3|2.4 Remedies|21
2|3 The Forum|23
3|3.1 Objectivity?|23
3|3.2 Pluralism and Democracy|24
3|3.3 Challenges for UNCITRAL|25
2|4 The Tools|27
3|4.1 Data and Artificial Intelligence|27
3|4.2 Treaty Drafting for Democracies|28
2|5 Conclusion|30
2|References|30
1|The Notion of Investment|32
2|1 Introduction|33
2|2 ‘Investment’ and ‘Covered Investment’|34
3|2.1 General Observations|34
3|2.2 Definition of Investment|35
3|2.3 The Characteristics of an Investment|36
4|The Salini Test|37
4|Defining the Characteristics of an Investment|38
3|2.4 Ownership and Control of Investments|39
4|Distinguishing Ownership and Control|40
4|Indirect Holding of Investments|41
3|2.5 Covered Investments|43
4|Investment Made in the Territory of the Host State|43
4|Investment Made in Accordance with the Applicable Law|44
2|3 Examples of Covered Investments|45
3|3.1 The Relevance of the Exemplary List of Investments|45
3|3.2 Interest in an Enterprise|46
4|The Notion of Enterprise|46
4|Interests in an Enterprise|47
3|3.3 Interests Arising from Concessions|47
3|3.4 Turnkey, Construction, Production or Revenue-Sharing Contracts and Other Similar Contracts|48
3|3.5 Intellectual Property Rights|48
3|3.6 Moveable Property, Tangible or Intangible, or Immovable Property and Related Rights|50
3|3.7 Claims to Money or Claims to Performance Under a Contract|50
3|3.8 Assets Not Mentioned Explicitly|51
4|Sovereign Debt|51
4|Judgments and Arbitral Awards|52
2|4 Investment Protection in CETA and the ICSID Convention|54
2|5 Conclusion and Outlook|55
2|References|55
1|National Treatment|58
2|1 Introduction|59
2|2 The National Treatment Principle in International Investment Law|61
3|2.1 The “Like Circumstances” or “Like Situations” Inquiry: Identifying a Domestic Comparator|62
3|2.2 Discriminatory Treatment: Identifying “Less Favourable Treatment”|65
3|2.3 Non-Discriminatory Reasons: Identifying a Justification|67
2|3 The Structure of CETA’s NT Provision|68
2|4 The Specificities of CETA’s NT Provision|70
3|4.1 The Scope Ratione Materiae of CETA’s NT Provision|70
3|4.2 Reservation and Exceptions to CETA’s NT Provision|73
3|4.3 The Application of the CETA’s NT Provision to Sub-National Government Entities|78
2|5 Conclusion: CETA’s NT Principle: A Traditional Standard of Protection in a New Setting|79
2|References|81
1|Most Favoured Nation Treatment|84
2|1 Introduction|85
2|2 The Originality of the MFN Formulation in the CETA Investment Chapter|88
2|3 What the CETA’s MFN Treatment Applicable to Investments Does Not Encompass|92
3|3.1 Sectors Excluded|92
3|3.2 Exceptions and Derogations|94
3|3.3 Reservations|97
3|3.4 Limitations|99
2|4 What the CETA’s MFN Treatment Applicable to Investments Encompasses|102
2|5 Conclusion|106
2|References|106
1|Fair and Equitable Treatment|108
2|1 Introduction|109
2|2 A Novel and Unique Approach to Drafting FET Clauses|111
3|2.1 The Initial Negotiation Position of the Parties and the Compromise Reached|111
3|2.2 The First Clause Containing a Closed List of Different Situations Involving a Breach of the FET Obligation|113
3|2.3 The Clause Is the Outcome of a New Generation of FET Clauses|114
3|2.4 The Absence of any Reference to the MST Under Custom|116
3|2.5 The Provision Reflects NAFTA Case Law on Article 1105|117
2|3 How NAFTA Tribunals Have Interpreted Article 1105|118
3|3.1 Article 1105 NAFTA Covers a Limited Number of Specific Elements of Protection|118
4|Legitimate Expectations|119
4|Arbitrary Conduct|123
4|Discriminatory Conduct|125
4|Denial of Justice and Due Process|125
3|3.2 A Necessary High Threshold of Severity|130
2|4 Conclusion: The Benefits of the CETA FET Clause|133
2|References|136
1|Expropriation|140
2|1 Introduction|141
2|2 Classic Aspects|143
2|3 Clarifications on the Identification Criteria of an Indirect Expropriation|144
3|3.1 Substantial Deprivation|145
3|3.2 Permanent or Temporary Deprivation|147
3|3.3 Relevance of “Legitimate Expectations”|148
3|3.4 Object, Context and Intent of the Measure(s)|151
3|3.5 Relationship Between the Identification Factors of Indirect Expropriation: The Proportionality Issue|153
2|4 Compensation Requirement|156
3|4.1 “Prompt, Adequate and Effective” Compensation|156
3|4.2 Reference to the “Fair Market Value”|157
3|4.3 Date of Evaluation|160
3|4.4 Interest and Currency|161
2|5 The State’s Right to Regulate|162
3|5.1 General Protection of the Right to Regulate|163
3|5.2 Particular Status of TRIPS-Related Measures|166
2|6 Concluding Remarks|168
2|References|168
1|The Right to Regulate|171
2|1 Introduction|172
2|2 The Concept of the Right to Regulate|174
2|3 CETA Negotiations and the New EU Investment Policy|176
2|4 The Preamble: In General and in CETA|178
2|5 The Right to Regulate and the Main Corpus of the Agreement|182
3|5.1 Investment and Regulatory Measures|182
3|5.2 Most-Favoured-Nation Clause|184
3|5.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment & Full Protection and Security|185
3|5.4 Expropriation|187
3|5.5 Transfers|189
3|5.6 Prudential Carve-Out|189
3|5.7 Chapter on General Exceptions|190
2|6 Concluding Remarks|193
2|References|194
1|Resolution of Investment Disputes|196
2|1 Introduction|197
2|2 Increasing Consistency and Predictability|198
2|3 Ensuring Legal Correctness|201
2|4 Fostering Impartiality and Independence|203
2|5 Preventing Potential Misuses of the System|205
2|6 Emphasising the Responsibilities of the Contracting Parties|207
2|7 Ensuring a Transparent and Inclusive Process|208
2|8 Clarifying the Boundaries Between Different Legal Orders|210
2|9 Conclusion: CETA as a First Step Towards a Multilateral Reform of ISDS|213
2|References|215
1|The CETA Investment Chapter and Sustainable Development: Interpretative Issues|218
2|1 Introduction|219
2|2 Sustainable Development in the Course of Elaboration of CETA|221
3|2.1 The Sustainability Impact Assessment on CETA|222
3|2.2 The European Commission Position Paper on the CETA SIA|223
2|3 Sustainable Development Expressis Verbis in the CETA Text|224
3|3.1 Sustainable Development in the CETA Preamble|224
3|3.2 The Sustainable Development Chapter(s) of CETA|225
4|References to International Social and Environmental Standards|226
4|Provisions on the Right to Regulate|227
4|Cooperation and Dialogue Provisions|228
4|The Dispute Settlement Mechanism|229
3|3.3 The CETA Joint Interpretative Instrument|229
2|4 Implications for the Interpretation of the CETA Investment Chapter|230
3|4.1 Contextual Interpretation|232
3|4.2 Object and Purpose|235
3|4.3 The Potential Relevance of Supplementary Means of Interpretation|238
4|Travaux Préparatoires|239
4|The Circumstances of the Conclusion|240
3|4.4 Evolutionary Interpretation|241
3|4.5 Integration: An Interpretative Tool|243
4|The Principle of Integration as Part of Sustainable Development|243
4|Systemic Integration|245
2|5 Conclusion|247
2|References|248
1|An African View on the CETA Investment Chapter|250
2|1 Introduction|251
2|2 Anatomy of the CETA Investment Protection Standards|252
3|2.1 Preamble, Objective and Scope|252
3|2.2 Definition of Investment|254
4|Requiring Characteristics of an Investment|256
4|Carve-Outs and Interpretations|256
3|2.3 Definition of Investor|258
3|2.4 Most Favoured Nation Treatment and National Treatment|259
4|Absence of Clarification for “Like Situations”|260
4|Scope of Reservations and Exceptions|261
3|2.5 Fair and Equitable Treatment|263
3|2.6 Transfer of Funds|264
3|2.7 Performance Requirements|266
2|3 Absence of Distinct and Specific Investor Obligations Under the CETA|267
2|4 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is It the Gold Standard?|269
3|4.1 Salient Provisions of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under the CETA|270
3|4.2 Appraisal of CETA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement Regime: Much Ado About Nothing?|272
3|4.3 African Perspective on Investor-State Dispute Settlement|274
2|5 Conclusion|278
2|References|279
1|An Asian View on the CETA Investment Chapter|281
2|1 Introduction: The Global Context of CETA|282
3|1.1 Asia’s Interest in the CETA: An Overview|283
3|1.2 EU-Singapore FTA and EU-Vietnam FTA|284
3|1.3 EU-ASEAN FTA Negotiations|285
3|1.4 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): Asian Signatory Parties|285
2|2 Investment Liberalization|285
2|3 CETA Investment Chapter: Salient Provisions|286
3|3.1 Scope of Coverage|286
3|3.2 State-Owned Enterprises|287
3|3.3 Investment Screening Systems and Investor-State Dispute Settlement|289
3|3.4 Investment Agreements|291
3|3.5 Denial of Benefits|291
3|3.6 Other Exclusions|292
3|3.7 Selected Obligations|294
4|Market Access|294
4|Performance Requirements and Exceptions|294
4|Fair and Equitable Treatment, Full Protection and Security|295
4|Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN)|298
4|Expropriation|298
3|3.8 Third Party Funding|299
3|3.9 The Role of Mediation|300
3|3.10 Interpretative Matters|301
4|Parties’ Right to Regulate and Flexibilities|301
4|Interpretative Rules in CETA|302
4|Applicable Law|302
2|4 CETA Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview|303
3|4.1 Consideration of Developing Country Needs and Needs of Claimants Which Are Natural Persons and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SMEs)|305
3|4.2 Salient Features of the CETA ISDS “Model”|306
2|5 Asia’s Fragmented Responses in ISDS “Reform”: A Summary|307
2|6 Other Institutions and Models in Asia|308
2|7 The Death of Ad hoc ISDS Might Be Greatly Exaggerated|309
2|8 Conclusion|310
2|References|311
1|A Latin American View on the CETA Investment Chapter|313
2|1 Introduction|314
2|2 Latin American Historical Opposition to Investor-State Arbitration|315
2|3 European and Canadian Delayed Skepticism Towards Investment Arbitration|317
2|4 Resolution of Investment Disputes Beyond the CETA Investment Chapter: Moving Towards a Multilateral Investment Court|321
2|5 Latin American Diversified Views on the Settlement of Investment Disputes|326
3|5.1 Mexico and the Renegotiation of the NAFTA|326
3|5.2 Peru, Chile and Colombia|328
3|5.3 Mercosur and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: From Brazil’s Historical Hostility to Argentina’s Reconciliation|330
3|5.4 Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela: From the Bolivarian Alliance to the Union of South American Nations|335
3|5.5 Central American and the Caribbean|338
2|6 Latin America and Beyond: Emerging Alternatives to the European Alternative|342
2|7 Conclusion|344
2|References|345
1|CETA and Investment: What Is It About and What Lies Beyond?|348
2|1 Introduction|349
2|2 The Provisions on Investor Rights and Government Regulatory Space|352
3|2.1 Investor Rights Newly Drafted: More Form Than Substance|352
3|2.2 Right to Regulate|355
3|2.3 Investor Obligations|359
3|2.4 A New Investor-State Court System|360
2|3 Supporting Investor Rights to Maximize Profits|362
2|4 The Invisible Chapter: Domestic Regulation|364
2|5 Conclusion: What Lies Beyond?|366
2|References|368
1|Preface|9
1|Contents|11
1|About the Editors|13
1|CETA and the Debate on the Reform of the Investment Regime|15
2|1 Introduction|16
2|2 The Argument|17
3|2.1 Preference Bias|18
3|2.2 Partial Truths|19
3|2.3 Authority|20
3|2.4 Remedies|21
2|3 The Forum|23
3|3.1 Objectivity?|23
3|3.2 Pluralism and Democracy|24
3|3.3 Challenges for UNCITRAL|25
2|4 The Tools|27
3|4.1 Data and Artificial Intelligence|27
3|4.2 Treaty Drafting for Democracies|28
2|5 Conclusion|30
2|References|30
1|The Notion of Investment|32
2|1 Introduction|33
2|2 ‘Investment’ and ‘Covered Investment’|34
3|2.1 General Observations|34
3|2.2 Definition of Investment|35
3|2.3 The Characteristics of an Investment|36
4|The Salini Test|37
4|Defining the Characteristics of an Investment|38
3|2.4 Ownership and Control of Investments|39
4|Distinguishing Ownership and Control|40
4|Indirect Holding of Investments|41
3|2.5 Covered Investments|43
4|Investment Made in the Territory of the Host State|43
4|Investment Made in Accordance with the Applicable Law|44
2|3 Examples of Covered Investments|45
3|3.1 The Relevance of the Exemplary List of Investments|45
3|3.2 Interest in an Enterprise|46
4|The Notion of Enterprise|46
4|Interests in an Enterprise|47
3|3.3 Interests Arising from Concessions|47
3|3.4 Turnkey, Construction, Production or Revenue-Sharing Contracts and Other Similar Contracts|48
3|3.5 Intellectual Property Rights|48
3|3.6 Moveable Property, Tangible or Intangible, or Immovable Property and Related Rights|50
3|3.7 Claims to Money or Claims to Performance Under a Contract|50
3|3.8 Assets Not Mentioned Explicitly|51
4|Sovereign Debt|51
4|Judgments and Arbitral Awards|52
2|4 Investment Protection in CETA and the ICSID Convention|54
2|5 Conclusion and Outlook|55
2|References|55
1|National Treatment|58
2|1 Introduction|59
2|2 The National Treatment Principle in International Investment Law|61
3|2.1 The “Like Circumstances” or “Like Situations” Inquiry: Identifying a Domestic Comparator|62
3|2.2 Discriminatory Treatment: Identifying “Less Favourable Treatment”|65
3|2.3 Non-Discriminatory Reasons: Identifying a Justification|67
2|3 The Structure of CETA’s NT Provision|68
2|4 The Specificities of CETA’s NT Provision|70
3|4.1 The Scope Ratione Materiae of CETA’s NT Provision|70
3|4.2 Reservation and Exceptions to CETA’s NT Provision|73
3|4.3 The Application of the CETA’s NT Provision to Sub-National Government Entities|78
2|5 Conclusion: CETA’s NT Principle: A Traditional Standard of Protection in a New Setting|79
2|References|81
1|Most Favoured Nation Treatment|84
2|1 Introduction|85
2|2 The Originality of the MFN Formulation in the CETA Investment Chapter|88
2|3 What the CETA’s MFN Treatment Applicable to Investments Does Not Encompass|92
3|3.1 Sectors Excluded|92
3|3.2 Exceptions and Derogations|94
3|3.3 Reservations|97
3|3.4 Limitations|99
2|4 What the CETA’s MFN Treatment Applicable to Investments Encompasses|102
2|5 Conclusion|106
2|References|106
1|Fair and Equitable Treatment|108
2|1 Introduction|109
2|2 A Novel and Unique Approach to Drafting FET Clauses|111
3|2.1 The Initial Negotiation Position of the Parties and the Compromise Reached|111
3|2.2 The First Clause Containing a Closed List of Different Situations Involving a Breach of the FET Obligation|113
3|2.3 The Clause Is the Outcome of a New Generation of FET Clauses|114
3|2.4 The Absence of any Reference to the MST Under Custom|116
3|2.5 The Provision Reflects NAFTA Case Law on Article 1105|117
2|3 How NAFTA Tribunals Have Interpreted Article 1105|118
3|3.1 Article 1105 NAFTA Covers a Limited Number of Specific Elements of Protection|118
4|Legitimate Expectations|119
4|Arbitrary Conduct|123
4|Discriminatory Conduct|125
4|Denial of Justice and Due Process|125
3|3.2 A Necessary High Threshold of Severity|130
2|4 Conclusion: The Benefits of the CETA FET Clause|133
2|References|136
1|Expropriation|140
2|1 Introduction|141
2|2 Classic Aspects|143
2|3 Clarifications on the Identification Criteria of an Indirect Expropriation|144
3|3.1 Substantial Deprivation|145
3|3.2 Permanent or Temporary Deprivation|147
3|3.3 Relevance of “Legitimate Expectations”|148
3|3.4 Object, Context and Intent of the Measure(s)|151
3|3.5 Relationship Between the Identification Factors of Indirect Expropriation: The Proportionality Issue|153
2|4 Compensation Requirement|156
3|4.1 “Prompt, Adequate and Effective” Compensation|156
3|4.2 Reference to the “Fair Market Value”|157
3|4.3 Date of Evaluation|160
3|4.4 Interest and Currency|161
2|5 The State’s Right to Regulate|162
3|5.1 General Protection of the Right to Regulate|163
3|5.2 Particular Status of TRIPS-Related Measures|166
2|6 Concluding Remarks|168
2|References|168
1|The Right to Regulate|171
2|1 Introduction|172
2|2 The Concept of the Right to Regulate|174
2|3 CETA Negotiations and the New EU Investment Policy|176
2|4 The Preamble: In General and in CETA|178
2|5 The Right to Regulate and the Main Corpus of the Agreement|182
3|5.1 Investment and Regulatory Measures|182
3|5.2 Most-Favoured-Nation Clause|184
3|5.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment & Full Protection and Security|185
3|5.4 Expropriation|187
3|5.5 Transfers|189
3|5.6 Prudential Carve-Out|189
3|5.7 Chapter on General Exceptions|190
2|6 Concluding Remarks|193
2|References|194
1|Resolution of Investment Disputes|196
2|1 Introduction|197
2|2 Increasing Consistency and Predictability|198
2|3 Ensuring Legal Correctness|201
2|4 Fostering Impartiality and Independence|203
2|5 Preventing Potential Misuses of the System|205
2|6 Emphasising the Responsibilities of the Contracting Parties|207
2|7 Ensuring a Transparent and Inclusive Process|208
2|8 Clarifying the Boundaries Between Different Legal Orders|210
2|9 Conclusion: CETA as a First Step Towards a Multilateral Reform of ISDS|213
2|References|215
1|The CETA Investment Chapter and Sustainable Development: Interpretative Issues|218
2|1 Introduction|219
2|2 Sustainable Development in the Course of Elaboration of CETA|221
3|2.1 The Sustainability Impact Assessment on CETA|222
3|2.2 The European Commission Position Paper on the CETA SIA|223
2|3 Sustainable Development Expressis Verbis in the CETA Text|224
3|3.1 Sustainable Development in the CETA Preamble|224
3|3.2 The Sustainable Development Chapter(s) of CETA|225
4|References to International Social and Environmental Standards|226
4|Provisions on the Right to Regulate|227
4|Cooperation and Dialogue Provisions|228
4|The Dispute Settlement Mechanism|229
3|3.3 The CETA Joint Interpretative Instrument|229
2|4 Implications for the Interpretation of the CETA Investment Chapter|230
3|4.1 Contextual Interpretation|232
3|4.2 Object and Purpose|235
3|4.3 The Potential Relevance of Supplementary Means of Interpretation|238
4|Travaux Préparatoires|239
4|The Circumstances of the Conclusion|240
3|4.4 Evolutionary Interpretation|241
3|4.5 Integration: An Interpretative Tool|243
4|The Principle of Integration as Part of Sustainable Development|243
4|Systemic Integration|245
2|5 Conclusion|247
2|References|248
1|An African View on the CETA Investment Chapter|250
2|1 Introduction|251
2|2 Anatomy of the CETA Investment Protection Standards|252
3|2.1 Preamble, Objective and Scope|252
3|2.2 Definition of Investment|254
4|Requiring Characteristics of an Investment|256
4|Carve-Outs and Interpretations|256
3|2.3 Definition of Investor|258
3|2.4 Most Favoured Nation Treatment and National Treatment|259
4|Absence of Clarification for “Like Situations”|260
4|Scope of Reservations and Exceptions|261
3|2.5 Fair and Equitable Treatment|263
3|2.6 Transfer of Funds|264
3|2.7 Performance Requirements|266
2|3 Absence of Distinct and Specific Investor Obligations Under the CETA|267
2|4 Investor-State Dispute Settlement: Is It the Gold Standard?|269
3|4.1 Salient Provisions of Investor-State Dispute Settlement Under the CETA|270
3|4.2 Appraisal of CETA’s Investor-State Dispute Settlement Regime: Much Ado About Nothing?|272
3|4.3 African Perspective on Investor-State Dispute Settlement|274
2|5 Conclusion|278
2|References|279
1|An Asian View on the CETA Investment Chapter|281
2|1 Introduction: The Global Context of CETA|282
3|1.1 Asia’s Interest in the CETA: An Overview|283
3|1.2 EU-Singapore FTA and EU-Vietnam FTA|284
3|1.3 EU-ASEAN FTA Negotiations|285
3|1.4 The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP): Asian Signatory Parties|285
2|2 Investment Liberalization|285
2|3 CETA Investment Chapter: Salient Provisions|286
3|3.1 Scope of Coverage|286
3|3.2 State-Owned Enterprises|287
3|3.3 Investment Screening Systems and Investor-State Dispute Settlement|289
3|3.4 Investment Agreements|291
3|3.5 Denial of Benefits|291
3|3.6 Other Exclusions|292
3|3.7 Selected Obligations|294
4|Market Access|294
4|Performance Requirements and Exceptions|294
4|Fair and Equitable Treatment, Full Protection and Security|295
4|Most Favoured Nation Treatment (MFN)|298
4|Expropriation|298
3|3.8 Third Party Funding|299
3|3.9 The Role of Mediation|300
3|3.10 Interpretative Matters|301
4|Parties’ Right to Regulate and Flexibilities|301
4|Interpretative Rules in CETA|302
4|Applicable Law|302
2|4 CETA Investor-State Dispute Settlement: An Overview|303
3|4.1 Consideration of Developing Country Needs and Needs of Claimants Which Are Natural Persons and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise (SMEs)|305
3|4.2 Salient Features of the CETA ISDS “Model”|306
2|5 Asia’s Fragmented Responses in ISDS “Reform”: A Summary|307
2|6 Other Institutions and Models in Asia|308
2|7 The Death of Ad hoc ISDS Might Be Greatly Exaggerated|309
2|8 Conclusion|310
2|References|311
1|A Latin American View on the CETA Investment Chapter|313
2|1 Introduction|314
2|2 Latin American Historical Opposition to Investor-State Arbitration|315
2|3 European and Canadian Delayed Skepticism Towards Investment Arbitration|317
2|4 Resolution of Investment Disputes Beyond the CETA Investment Chapter: Moving Towards a Multilateral Investment Court|321
2|5 Latin American Diversified Views on the Settlement of Investment Disputes|326
3|5.1 Mexico and the Renegotiation of the NAFTA|326
3|5.2 Peru, Chile and Colombia|328
3|5.3 Mercosur and Investor-State Dispute Settlement: From Brazil’s Historical Hostility to Argentina’s Reconciliation|330
3|5.4 Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela: From the Bolivarian Alliance to the Union of South American Nations|335
3|5.5 Central American and the Caribbean|338
2|6 Latin America and Beyond: Emerging Alternatives to the European Alternative|342
2|7 Conclusion|344
2|References|345
1|CETA and Investment: What Is It About and What Lies Beyond?|348
2|1 Introduction|349
2|2 The Provisions on Investor Rights and Government Regulatory Space|352
3|2.1 Investor Rights Newly Drafted: More Form Than Substance|352
3|2.2 Right to Regulate|355
3|2.3 Investor Obligations|359
3|2.4 A New Investor-State Court System|360
2|3 Supporting Investor Rights to Maximize Profits|362
2|4 The Invisible Chapter: Domestic Regulation|364
2|5 Conclusion: What Lies Beyond?|366
2|References|368