File #2746: "2019_Book_TheWTODisputeSettlementMechani.pdf"
Text
1|Foreword|5
1|Prologue|7
1|Contents|11
1|Notes on Contributors|14
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|17
2|1.1 The Notion of Epistemic Communities and the Growing Role of Developing Countries in Global Governance|17
3|1.1.1 What Is an Epistemic Community and What Is Its Importance?|18
2|1.2 The Role of the WTO in the Regulation of International Trade|19
2|1.3 The Appellate Body’s Activity in the Resolution of International Disputes|21
2|1.4 The Articulation Between the Public and Private Sectors in the Cases Proposed by Brazil to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Mainly Related to the Cotton and Sugar Controversies|22
2|1.5 Overview of the Chapters of the Book|26
2|References|29
1|Part I: Assessment|31
2|Chapter 2: WTO in Crisis: Déjà Vu All Over Again or Terminal Agony?|32
3|References|38
2|Chapter 3: Speaking Up in the WTO: Brazil’s Voice in the Dispute Settlement Body|39
3|3.1 Introduction|39
3|3.2 Statements by Brazil in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body|43
4|3.2.1 Statements Relating to the Issue of Reappointment of Appellate Body Members|43
5|3.2.1.1 DSB Meeting: 25 November 2015|43
5|3.2.1.2 DSB Meeting: 23 May 2016|44
5|3.2.1.3 DSB Meeting: 21 July 2016|47
4|3.2.2 Statements Relating to the Issue of Selection Processes to Fill Vacancies for New Appellate Body Members|48
5|3.2.2.1 DSB Meeting: 23 October 2017|48
5|3.2.2.2 DSB Meeting: 22 November 2017|50
5|3.2.2.3 DSB Meeting: 22 January 2018|52
4|3.2.3 Statements Relating to the “Sequencing” Issue|53
5|3.2.3.1 DSB Meeting: 22 April 2016|53
5|3.2.3.2 DSB Meeting: 19 April 2017|54
5|3.2.3.3 DSB Meeting: 22 May 2017|55
3|References|56
2|Chapter 4: Dispute Settlement System of the WTO: A Powerful Weapon for Developing Countries|57
3|4.1 Introduction|57
3|4.2 When Rules Are Not Enough: Challenges for Developing Countries at the DSS|58
3|4.3 How Can Developing Countries Use DSS Strategically?|59
3|4.4 Retaliation: Is It Necessary?|60
3|4.5 Beyond Legal Boundaries: Is Retaliation a Solution or a Problem?|61
3|4.6 Leveraging Bargaining Power in Negotiations Related to WTO Disputes|64
3|4.7 Using Threats As a Strategy in Negotiations|65
3|4.8 Conclusion|66
3|References|66
2|Chapter 5: Developing Countries: Whether Legal (and Costly) Settlement of Disputes Is Better Than Political Settlement|68
3|5.1 Introduction|68
3|5.2 Advantages of Using WTO’s Dispute Settlement System|70
3|5.3 South-South Cases: A New Reality?|71
3|5.4 Reflections on Changes That Could Facilitate (and Encourage) the Use of the Dispute Settlement System by Developing Countries|75
3|5.5 Conclusion|78
3|References|78
1|Part II: Substantive Matters|80
2|Chapter 6: WTO as a Self-Limited Regime: The Case of Article XX of GATT|81
3|6.1 Introduction|81
3|6.2 The Meaning of Article XX of GATT|82
4|6.2.1 Life and Health Protection|83
4|6.2.2 Natural Resources|85
4|6.2.3 Compliance with Other WTO-Consistent Rules|88
4|6.2.4 Public Morals|89
4|6.2.5 The Interpretation of the Chapeau in Article XX|90
3|6.3 Is WTO a Self-Limited Regime?|91
3|6.4 Conclusion|93
3|References|94
2|Chapter 7: The Impact of WTO Case Law on the Use of Local Content Requirements|95
3|7.1 Introduction|96
3|7.2 The Fragmentation of the IIL Regime|97
3|7.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of LCRs|98
3|7.4 Article III of GATT 1994 and the TRIMs|99
3|7.5 The Consistent and Coherent Findings and Rulings by the AB and the Panel Against the Use of LCRs|101
3|7.6 Further and Stricter Restrictions to the Use of LCRs. The Inadequacy of LCRs|103
3|7.7 Concluding Remarks|106
3|References|108
4|Case Law|108
2|Chapter 8: WTO Case Law on TBT and SPS: It Is Time to Review Some Concepts|110
3|8.1 Introduction|111
3|8.2 A Brief History of the Development of TBT and SPS Agreements|111
3|8.3 Regulatory Barriers and Scope of Each Agreement|113
3|8.4 MFN and National Treatment Under TBT and SPS|119
4|8.4.1 Like Products in TBT|119
4|8.4.2 Like Products in SPS|122
3|8.5 The Requirement for Necessity Tests|122
4|8.5.1 The Necessity Requirement in TBT|123
4|8.5.2 The Necessity Requirement in SPS|125
3|8.6 Process and Production Methods (PPMs)|126
4|8.6.1 PPMs Under TBT|126
4|8.6.2 PPMs Under SPS|127
3|8.7 When Regulatory Measures Are Obstacles to International Trade|127
4|8.7.1 Obstacle to Trade Within TBT|128
4|8.7.2 Obstacles to Trade Within SPS|129
3|8.8 Transparency: Enquiry Points and Notifications|130
4|8.8.1 TBT and SPS Committees and the Specific Trade Concerns|132
3|8.9 Conclusions|135
3|References|137
2|Chapter 9: Are ISO/IEC Rules the Odds Out of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement?|138
3|9.1 Introduction|138
3|9.2 Odds Out of the System? From the TBT Agreement to the EC-Sardines and US-Tuna Cases|139
4|9.2.1 WTO Rules|139
4|9.2.2 WTO Cases|140
3|9.3 The Clash of Rationales from Different Organizations|141
4|9.3.1 The WTO Rationale|142
4|9.3.2 ISO and IEC Rationales|142
3|9.4 ISO/IEC Guide 2 as the Odds Out of the WTO System|145
4|9.4.1 The Mismatches Between Memberships|146
4|9.4.2 The Mismatches Between Decision-Making Requirements|147
4|9.4.3 Synthesis|148
3|9.5 Final Considerations|148
3|Appendix: Membership Compared|149
3|References|153
2|Chapter 10: Alternative Dispute Resolution and the WTO|156
3|10.1 Introduction|156
3|10.2 Compliance and T&E Disputes|158
3|10.3 The Case for Non-adjudicatory Mechanisms in T&E Disputes|160
4|10.3.1 A Word on Adjusted Winner|161
4|10.3.2 Friendly Settlement in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding|163
3|10.4 Adjudication Versus Alternative Dispute Resolution|165
4|10.4.1 Japan: Agricultural Products|165
3|10.5 Final Remarks|170
3|References|172
2|Chapter 11: Litigation and Negotiation in the WTO. Is Litigation the Continuation of Negotiation by Other Means?|174
3|11.1 Negotiation and Dispute Settlement in the WTO|174
4|11.1.1 Underdeveloped Negotiations|175
4|11.1.2 Overdeveloped Dispute Settlement|176
3|11.2 Litigation or Negotiation|177
4|11.2.1 Litigation as an Inducement to Negotiation|178
4|11.2.2 Litigation as an Alternative to Negotiation|180
3|11.3 An Unstable Equilibrium|183
3|References|186
2|Chapter 12: Countermeasures in the WTO Law and the Principle of Proportionality: A Developing Country’s Perspective|188
3|12.1 Introduction|188
3|12.2 The Quantitative Element of the Principle of Proportionality of Countermeasures in the WTO Law|191
3|12.3 The Qualitative Element of the Principle of Proportionality in the WTO Law on Countermeasures|195
3|12.4 Conclusions|199
3|References|200
4|Books and Articles|200
4|Decisions of International Dispute Settlement Bodies|201
4|Arbitral Awards|201
4|International Court of Justice|201
4|GATT Decisions|201
4|WTO Decisions|201
2|Chapter 13: Sequencing: Ad Hoc Solutions to a Systemic Problem|202
3|13.1 Introduction|202
3|13.2 The Sequencing Problem|203
3|13.3 The EC-Bananas III Dispute|204
3|13.4 Following Disputes|206
3|13.5 Proposals Regarding Sequencing Under the DSU Review|209
3|13.6 Ad Hoc Solutions|210
3|13.7 The India-Agricultural Products Dispute|211
3|13.8 Conclusion|212
3|References|213
2|Chapter 14: The Interpretive Technique of the WTO Appellate Body|214
3|14.1 Introduction|214
3|14.2 The AB’s Interpretative Technique|215
3|14.3 Is the AB’s Technique Consistent with the Rules Established by the WTO Members?|217
3|14.4 Does the Technique Respond to the Needs of the Multilateral Trade System, Which Are Stability and Predictability?|219
3|14.5 Is the Technique Generally Consistent with the Expectations of the WTO Members?|221
3|14.6 Conclusion|222
3|References|223
2|Chapter 15: The Dispute Settlement Body and the GATS|225
3|15.1 Introduction|225
4|15.1.1 GATS and the DSB|226
3|15.2 Overview of the Disputes Involving Trade in Services|227
3|15.3 Summary of the Disputes|228
3|15.4 Relevant Findings of the DSB|230
4|15.4.1 GATS Goals and Objectives|230
4|15.4.2 Scope of the Specific Commitments|232
4|15.4.3 Violation to Market Access and National Treatment Obligations|233
3|15.5 Conclusions|235
3|References|236
1|Part III: WTO Cases and Conflicts|237
2|Chapter 16: The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Regional Trade Tribunals: The Potential for Conflict and Solutions|238
3|16.1 Introduction|238
3|16.2 Preferential Trade Agreements and Their Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|239
4|16.2.1 PTAs and the WTO: A Hybrid Structure|240
4|16.2.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in PTAs|241
4|16.2.3 Dispute Settlement in a Hybrid Structure|242
3|16.3 Disputes Within a PTA: The Coordination of a Hybrid Dispute Settlement Structure|242
4|16.3.1 Overlaps in Dispute Settlement|243
5|16.3.1.1 Parallel Norms and Dispute Settlement Procedures|243
5|16.3.1.2 ‘Retaliation’|244
5|16.3.1.3 Other Possible Scenarios of an Overlap|245
4|16.3.2 A Coherent Relationship Between Dispute Settlement in PTAs and the WTO|245
5|16.3.2.1 Is Parallel or Subsequent WTO Adjudication Prevented by General Doctrines of Procedure?|245
5|16.3.2.2 May WTO Dispute Institutions Refuse to Adjudicate a Case Concerning Relationships Within A PTA?|246
5|16.3.2.3 Can Parties to a PTA Be Prevented from Bringing a WTO Complaint?|246
5|16.3.2.4 Are Forum Clauses in PTAs Helpful?|248
4|16.3.3 Conclusion: How to Achieve a Harmonious Coexistence Between WTO and PTA Dispute Settlements|249
3|16.4 The Protection of Rights of Third WTO Members and of the Common Interest: A Matter for WTO Dispute Settlement|249
4|16.4.1 Turkey Textiles|250
4|16.4.2 Brazil Tyres|250
3|16.5 Coherent Interpretation and Application of Rules in a Hybrid World Trade Order|251
3|16.6 Conclusion and Outlook|252
3|References|252
2|Chapter 17: The Eminent Conflict Between the WTO DSB and the Proposed International Investment Court to Deal with Investment Disputes|254
3|17.1 Introduction|254
3|17.2 The Consolidation of the WTO and the DSB in the World Economic Order and the Emergence and Proliferation of the International Investment Agreements|255
3|17.3 The New Preferential Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Provisions: A Step forward?|259
3|17.4 The Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA): A Brazilian Perspective|267
3|17.5 The Confrontation Between WTO System and the Recent Initiatives on International Investment Law: A Critical Analysis|271
3|17.6 Conclusion|274
3|References|275
2|Chapter 18: The Cotton Case: Litigation, Retaliation, Negotiation|277
3|18.1 Introduction|277
3|18.2 The Litigation Process|278
4|18.2.1 The Original Panel and the Implementation Proceedings|278
4|18.2.2 Request for Authorization to Take Countermeasures|282
4|18.2.3 The Award|285
3|18.3 Post-litigation: Setting Up the Retaliatory Measures and Negotiating a Mutually Agreed Solution|287
4|18.3.1 Preparing to Retaliate|287
4|18.3.2 Retaliation on Trade in Goods|288
4|18.3.3 Cross-Retaliation|290
4|18.3.4 In Parallel, Bilateral Negotiations|292
3|18.4 Conclusion|294
3|References|295
2|Chapter 19: Reshaping International Trade with the WTO Dispute Settlement: The Sugar Case (DS 265/266/283)|296
3|19.1 Introduction|297
3|19.2 The European Sugar Regime|298
3|19.3 The WTO Case|303
3|19.4 The New EU Sugar Regime|309
3|References|310
2|Chapter 20: The Case EC – Seal Products: The WTO Dispute Settlement System Before a “Trilemma” Between Free Trade, Animal Welfare, and Rights of Indigenous Peoples|311
3|20.1 Introduction|312
3|20.2 The EU Seal Regime: General Prohibition and Exceptions|313
3|20.3 Reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body|314
4|20.3.1 The EU Regime for Seals Is Inconsistent with the Most-Favored Nation and National Treatment Principles|315
4|20.3.2 The General Prohibition Under the EU Regime for Seals Is a Necessary Measure for the Protection of Public Morals|315
5|20.3.2.1 Identification of the Main Objective of the Regime|316
5|20.3.2.2 Consideration of Such Main Objective as a Matter of Public Morality|316
5|20.3.2.3 The Necessity Test|317
4|20.3.3 Exceptions Provided in the EU Seal Regime Are Considered Means of Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination|318
3|20.4 Implementation by the EU of the Adopted Reports|321
3|20.5 Final Considerations|322
3|References|324
2|Chapter 21: The Retreaded Tyres Case in WTO: An Important Multilateral Achievement by Brazil|326
3|21.1 Introduction|326
3|21.2 The Panel|329
4|21.2.1 EU Arguments|329
5|21.2.1.1 The Facts|330
5|21.2.1.2 The Legal Arguments|330
4|21.2.2 Brazil’s Arguments|331
5|21.2.2.1 The Facts|331
5|21.2.2.2 The Legal Arguments|332
4|21.2.3 The Panel Report|333
5|21.2.3.1 Overall Conclusion of the Panel|335
3|21.3 The Appeal Phase|336
4|21.3.1 Challenges by the EU and Conclusions of the Appellate Body|337
3|21.4 The Implementation of Dispute Settlement Body Decision|339
3|21.5 Conclusion|341
3|References|342
4|WTO Documents|342
4|Federal Supreme Court|343
4|Electronic Sources|343
2|Chapter 22: Flexibilities Under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data and the Case of Brazil|344
3|22.1 Introduction|344
3|22.2 The Brazilian Case: The Test Data Protection Debate|346
4|22.2.1 Protection of Test Data Under the Brazilian Law|346
4|22.2.2 The Lundbeck Case|348
3|22.3 Legal Scope of Obligations Under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement|349
4|22.3.1 Ordinary Meaning and Context|350
4|22.3.2 Use|350
5|22.3.2.1 Unfair Commercial Use|352
4|22.3.3 Object and Purpose|354
4|22.3.4 Other Contextual Elements|355
5|22.3.4.1 Subsequent Agreement|355
5|22.3.4.2 State Practice|355
5|22.3.4.3 Negotiating History|356
4|22.3.5 WTO Dispute Settlement|358
3|22.4 Conclusion|358
3|References|359
2|Chapter 23: Flying Over Uncharted Territory: The Brazil–Canada Regional Aircraft Disputes in the WTO|361
3|23.1 Introduction|361
3|23.2 Background|363
4|23.2.1 The WTO Disputes|365
3|23.3 The Question of the “Benefit”|367
3|23.4 The Issue of De Facto Export Contingency|369
3|23.5 An “Unusual” Provision: The Second Paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies|372
3|23.6 Conclusion|375
3|References|377
2|Chapter 24: Not Just About Embraer: A Brazilian View of the Brazil-Canada Aircraft Disputes at the WTO|379
3|24.1 Introduction|379
3|24.2 The Players and Their Interests|380
4|24.2.1 Brazil|380
4|24.2.2 Canada|383
3|24.3 The Scenario: GATT and the WTO|384
3|24.4 Brazil and Canada: Disputes and Negotiations|386
4|24.4.1 The Disputes at the WTO|386
5|24.4.1.1 Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (DS46)|386
5|24.4.1.2 Canada: Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (DS70)|387
5|24.4.1.3 Canada: Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (DS222)|387
4|24.4.2 Bilaterals and OECD|388
3|24.5 Aftermath and Final Thoughts|389
3|References|391
1|Prologue|7
1|Contents|11
1|Notes on Contributors|14
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|17
2|1.1 The Notion of Epistemic Communities and the Growing Role of Developing Countries in Global Governance|17
3|1.1.1 What Is an Epistemic Community and What Is Its Importance?|18
2|1.2 The Role of the WTO in the Regulation of International Trade|19
2|1.3 The Appellate Body’s Activity in the Resolution of International Disputes|21
2|1.4 The Articulation Between the Public and Private Sectors in the Cases Proposed by Brazil to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, Mainly Related to the Cotton and Sugar Controversies|22
2|1.5 Overview of the Chapters of the Book|26
2|References|29
1|Part I: Assessment|31
2|Chapter 2: WTO in Crisis: Déjà Vu All Over Again or Terminal Agony?|32
3|References|38
2|Chapter 3: Speaking Up in the WTO: Brazil’s Voice in the Dispute Settlement Body|39
3|3.1 Introduction|39
3|3.2 Statements by Brazil in the WTO Dispute Settlement Body|43
4|3.2.1 Statements Relating to the Issue of Reappointment of Appellate Body Members|43
5|3.2.1.1 DSB Meeting: 25 November 2015|43
5|3.2.1.2 DSB Meeting: 23 May 2016|44
5|3.2.1.3 DSB Meeting: 21 July 2016|47
4|3.2.2 Statements Relating to the Issue of Selection Processes to Fill Vacancies for New Appellate Body Members|48
5|3.2.2.1 DSB Meeting: 23 October 2017|48
5|3.2.2.2 DSB Meeting: 22 November 2017|50
5|3.2.2.3 DSB Meeting: 22 January 2018|52
4|3.2.3 Statements Relating to the “Sequencing” Issue|53
5|3.2.3.1 DSB Meeting: 22 April 2016|53
5|3.2.3.2 DSB Meeting: 19 April 2017|54
5|3.2.3.3 DSB Meeting: 22 May 2017|55
3|References|56
2|Chapter 4: Dispute Settlement System of the WTO: A Powerful Weapon for Developing Countries|57
3|4.1 Introduction|57
3|4.2 When Rules Are Not Enough: Challenges for Developing Countries at the DSS|58
3|4.3 How Can Developing Countries Use DSS Strategically?|59
3|4.4 Retaliation: Is It Necessary?|60
3|4.5 Beyond Legal Boundaries: Is Retaliation a Solution or a Problem?|61
3|4.6 Leveraging Bargaining Power in Negotiations Related to WTO Disputes|64
3|4.7 Using Threats As a Strategy in Negotiations|65
3|4.8 Conclusion|66
3|References|66
2|Chapter 5: Developing Countries: Whether Legal (and Costly) Settlement of Disputes Is Better Than Political Settlement|68
3|5.1 Introduction|68
3|5.2 Advantages of Using WTO’s Dispute Settlement System|70
3|5.3 South-South Cases: A New Reality?|71
3|5.4 Reflections on Changes That Could Facilitate (and Encourage) the Use of the Dispute Settlement System by Developing Countries|75
3|5.5 Conclusion|78
3|References|78
1|Part II: Substantive Matters|80
2|Chapter 6: WTO as a Self-Limited Regime: The Case of Article XX of GATT|81
3|6.1 Introduction|81
3|6.2 The Meaning of Article XX of GATT|82
4|6.2.1 Life and Health Protection|83
4|6.2.2 Natural Resources|85
4|6.2.3 Compliance with Other WTO-Consistent Rules|88
4|6.2.4 Public Morals|89
4|6.2.5 The Interpretation of the Chapeau in Article XX|90
3|6.3 Is WTO a Self-Limited Regime?|91
3|6.4 Conclusion|93
3|References|94
2|Chapter 7: The Impact of WTO Case Law on the Use of Local Content Requirements|95
3|7.1 Introduction|96
3|7.2 The Fragmentation of the IIL Regime|97
3|7.3 The Advantages and Disadvantages of LCRs|98
3|7.4 Article III of GATT 1994 and the TRIMs|99
3|7.5 The Consistent and Coherent Findings and Rulings by the AB and the Panel Against the Use of LCRs|101
3|7.6 Further and Stricter Restrictions to the Use of LCRs. The Inadequacy of LCRs|103
3|7.7 Concluding Remarks|106
3|References|108
4|Case Law|108
2|Chapter 8: WTO Case Law on TBT and SPS: It Is Time to Review Some Concepts|110
3|8.1 Introduction|111
3|8.2 A Brief History of the Development of TBT and SPS Agreements|111
3|8.3 Regulatory Barriers and Scope of Each Agreement|113
3|8.4 MFN and National Treatment Under TBT and SPS|119
4|8.4.1 Like Products in TBT|119
4|8.4.2 Like Products in SPS|122
3|8.5 The Requirement for Necessity Tests|122
4|8.5.1 The Necessity Requirement in TBT|123
4|8.5.2 The Necessity Requirement in SPS|125
3|8.6 Process and Production Methods (PPMs)|126
4|8.6.1 PPMs Under TBT|126
4|8.6.2 PPMs Under SPS|127
3|8.7 When Regulatory Measures Are Obstacles to International Trade|127
4|8.7.1 Obstacle to Trade Within TBT|128
4|8.7.2 Obstacles to Trade Within SPS|129
3|8.8 Transparency: Enquiry Points and Notifications|130
4|8.8.1 TBT and SPS Committees and the Specific Trade Concerns|132
3|8.9 Conclusions|135
3|References|137
2|Chapter 9: Are ISO/IEC Rules the Odds Out of the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement?|138
3|9.1 Introduction|138
3|9.2 Odds Out of the System? From the TBT Agreement to the EC-Sardines and US-Tuna Cases|139
4|9.2.1 WTO Rules|139
4|9.2.2 WTO Cases|140
3|9.3 The Clash of Rationales from Different Organizations|141
4|9.3.1 The WTO Rationale|142
4|9.3.2 ISO and IEC Rationales|142
3|9.4 ISO/IEC Guide 2 as the Odds Out of the WTO System|145
4|9.4.1 The Mismatches Between Memberships|146
4|9.4.2 The Mismatches Between Decision-Making Requirements|147
4|9.4.3 Synthesis|148
3|9.5 Final Considerations|148
3|Appendix: Membership Compared|149
3|References|153
2|Chapter 10: Alternative Dispute Resolution and the WTO|156
3|10.1 Introduction|156
3|10.2 Compliance and T&E Disputes|158
3|10.3 The Case for Non-adjudicatory Mechanisms in T&E Disputes|160
4|10.3.1 A Word on Adjusted Winner|161
4|10.3.2 Friendly Settlement in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding|163
3|10.4 Adjudication Versus Alternative Dispute Resolution|165
4|10.4.1 Japan: Agricultural Products|165
3|10.5 Final Remarks|170
3|References|172
2|Chapter 11: Litigation and Negotiation in the WTO. Is Litigation the Continuation of Negotiation by Other Means?|174
3|11.1 Negotiation and Dispute Settlement in the WTO|174
4|11.1.1 Underdeveloped Negotiations|175
4|11.1.2 Overdeveloped Dispute Settlement|176
3|11.2 Litigation or Negotiation|177
4|11.2.1 Litigation as an Inducement to Negotiation|178
4|11.2.2 Litigation as an Alternative to Negotiation|180
3|11.3 An Unstable Equilibrium|183
3|References|186
2|Chapter 12: Countermeasures in the WTO Law and the Principle of Proportionality: A Developing Country’s Perspective|188
3|12.1 Introduction|188
3|12.2 The Quantitative Element of the Principle of Proportionality of Countermeasures in the WTO Law|191
3|12.3 The Qualitative Element of the Principle of Proportionality in the WTO Law on Countermeasures|195
3|12.4 Conclusions|199
3|References|200
4|Books and Articles|200
4|Decisions of International Dispute Settlement Bodies|201
4|Arbitral Awards|201
4|International Court of Justice|201
4|GATT Decisions|201
4|WTO Decisions|201
2|Chapter 13: Sequencing: Ad Hoc Solutions to a Systemic Problem|202
3|13.1 Introduction|202
3|13.2 The Sequencing Problem|203
3|13.3 The EC-Bananas III Dispute|204
3|13.4 Following Disputes|206
3|13.5 Proposals Regarding Sequencing Under the DSU Review|209
3|13.6 Ad Hoc Solutions|210
3|13.7 The India-Agricultural Products Dispute|211
3|13.8 Conclusion|212
3|References|213
2|Chapter 14: The Interpretive Technique of the WTO Appellate Body|214
3|14.1 Introduction|214
3|14.2 The AB’s Interpretative Technique|215
3|14.3 Is the AB’s Technique Consistent with the Rules Established by the WTO Members?|217
3|14.4 Does the Technique Respond to the Needs of the Multilateral Trade System, Which Are Stability and Predictability?|219
3|14.5 Is the Technique Generally Consistent with the Expectations of the WTO Members?|221
3|14.6 Conclusion|222
3|References|223
2|Chapter 15: The Dispute Settlement Body and the GATS|225
3|15.1 Introduction|225
4|15.1.1 GATS and the DSB|226
3|15.2 Overview of the Disputes Involving Trade in Services|227
3|15.3 Summary of the Disputes|228
3|15.4 Relevant Findings of the DSB|230
4|15.4.1 GATS Goals and Objectives|230
4|15.4.2 Scope of the Specific Commitments|232
4|15.4.3 Violation to Market Access and National Treatment Obligations|233
3|15.5 Conclusions|235
3|References|236
1|Part III: WTO Cases and Conflicts|237
2|Chapter 16: The WTO Dispute Settlement System and Regional Trade Tribunals: The Potential for Conflict and Solutions|238
3|16.1 Introduction|238
3|16.2 Preferential Trade Agreements and Their Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|239
4|16.2.1 PTAs and the WTO: A Hybrid Structure|240
4|16.2.2 Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in PTAs|241
4|16.2.3 Dispute Settlement in a Hybrid Structure|242
3|16.3 Disputes Within a PTA: The Coordination of a Hybrid Dispute Settlement Structure|242
4|16.3.1 Overlaps in Dispute Settlement|243
5|16.3.1.1 Parallel Norms and Dispute Settlement Procedures|243
5|16.3.1.2 ‘Retaliation’|244
5|16.3.1.3 Other Possible Scenarios of an Overlap|245
4|16.3.2 A Coherent Relationship Between Dispute Settlement in PTAs and the WTO|245
5|16.3.2.1 Is Parallel or Subsequent WTO Adjudication Prevented by General Doctrines of Procedure?|245
5|16.3.2.2 May WTO Dispute Institutions Refuse to Adjudicate a Case Concerning Relationships Within A PTA?|246
5|16.3.2.3 Can Parties to a PTA Be Prevented from Bringing a WTO Complaint?|246
5|16.3.2.4 Are Forum Clauses in PTAs Helpful?|248
4|16.3.3 Conclusion: How to Achieve a Harmonious Coexistence Between WTO and PTA Dispute Settlements|249
3|16.4 The Protection of Rights of Third WTO Members and of the Common Interest: A Matter for WTO Dispute Settlement|249
4|16.4.1 Turkey Textiles|250
4|16.4.2 Brazil Tyres|250
3|16.5 Coherent Interpretation and Application of Rules in a Hybrid World Trade Order|251
3|16.6 Conclusion and Outlook|252
3|References|252
2|Chapter 17: The Eminent Conflict Between the WTO DSB and the Proposed International Investment Court to Deal with Investment Disputes|254
3|17.1 Introduction|254
3|17.2 The Consolidation of the WTO and the DSB in the World Economic Order and the Emergence and Proliferation of the International Investment Agreements|255
3|17.3 The New Preferential Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Provisions: A Step forward?|259
3|17.4 The Cooperation and Facilitation Investment Agreement (CFIA): A Brazilian Perspective|267
3|17.5 The Confrontation Between WTO System and the Recent Initiatives on International Investment Law: A Critical Analysis|271
3|17.6 Conclusion|274
3|References|275
2|Chapter 18: The Cotton Case: Litigation, Retaliation, Negotiation|277
3|18.1 Introduction|277
3|18.2 The Litigation Process|278
4|18.2.1 The Original Panel and the Implementation Proceedings|278
4|18.2.2 Request for Authorization to Take Countermeasures|282
4|18.2.3 The Award|285
3|18.3 Post-litigation: Setting Up the Retaliatory Measures and Negotiating a Mutually Agreed Solution|287
4|18.3.1 Preparing to Retaliate|287
4|18.3.2 Retaliation on Trade in Goods|288
4|18.3.3 Cross-Retaliation|290
4|18.3.4 In Parallel, Bilateral Negotiations|292
3|18.4 Conclusion|294
3|References|295
2|Chapter 19: Reshaping International Trade with the WTO Dispute Settlement: The Sugar Case (DS 265/266/283)|296
3|19.1 Introduction|297
3|19.2 The European Sugar Regime|298
3|19.3 The WTO Case|303
3|19.4 The New EU Sugar Regime|309
3|References|310
2|Chapter 20: The Case EC – Seal Products: The WTO Dispute Settlement System Before a “Trilemma” Between Free Trade, Animal Welfare, and Rights of Indigenous Peoples|311
3|20.1 Introduction|312
3|20.2 The EU Seal Regime: General Prohibition and Exceptions|313
3|20.3 Reports of the Panel and the Appellate Body|314
4|20.3.1 The EU Regime for Seals Is Inconsistent with the Most-Favored Nation and National Treatment Principles|315
4|20.3.2 The General Prohibition Under the EU Regime for Seals Is a Necessary Measure for the Protection of Public Morals|315
5|20.3.2.1 Identification of the Main Objective of the Regime|316
5|20.3.2.2 Consideration of Such Main Objective as a Matter of Public Morality|316
5|20.3.2.3 The Necessity Test|317
4|20.3.3 Exceptions Provided in the EU Seal Regime Are Considered Means of Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination|318
3|20.4 Implementation by the EU of the Adopted Reports|321
3|20.5 Final Considerations|322
3|References|324
2|Chapter 21: The Retreaded Tyres Case in WTO: An Important Multilateral Achievement by Brazil|326
3|21.1 Introduction|326
3|21.2 The Panel|329
4|21.2.1 EU Arguments|329
5|21.2.1.1 The Facts|330
5|21.2.1.2 The Legal Arguments|330
4|21.2.2 Brazil’s Arguments|331
5|21.2.2.1 The Facts|331
5|21.2.2.2 The Legal Arguments|332
4|21.2.3 The Panel Report|333
5|21.2.3.1 Overall Conclusion of the Panel|335
3|21.3 The Appeal Phase|336
4|21.3.1 Challenges by the EU and Conclusions of the Appellate Body|337
3|21.4 The Implementation of Dispute Settlement Body Decision|339
3|21.5 Conclusion|341
3|References|342
4|WTO Documents|342
4|Federal Supreme Court|343
4|Electronic Sources|343
2|Chapter 22: Flexibilities Under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of Pharmaceutical Test Data and the Case of Brazil|344
3|22.1 Introduction|344
3|22.2 The Brazilian Case: The Test Data Protection Debate|346
4|22.2.1 Protection of Test Data Under the Brazilian Law|346
4|22.2.2 The Lundbeck Case|348
3|22.3 Legal Scope of Obligations Under Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement|349
4|22.3.1 Ordinary Meaning and Context|350
4|22.3.2 Use|350
5|22.3.2.1 Unfair Commercial Use|352
4|22.3.3 Object and Purpose|354
4|22.3.4 Other Contextual Elements|355
5|22.3.4.1 Subsequent Agreement|355
5|22.3.4.2 State Practice|355
5|22.3.4.3 Negotiating History|356
4|22.3.5 WTO Dispute Settlement|358
3|22.4 Conclusion|358
3|References|359
2|Chapter 23: Flying Over Uncharted Territory: The Brazil–Canada Regional Aircraft Disputes in the WTO|361
3|23.1 Introduction|361
3|23.2 Background|363
4|23.2.1 The WTO Disputes|365
3|23.3 The Question of the “Benefit”|367
3|23.4 The Issue of De Facto Export Contingency|369
3|23.5 An “Unusual” Provision: The Second Paragraph of Item (k) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies|372
3|23.6 Conclusion|375
3|References|377
2|Chapter 24: Not Just About Embraer: A Brazilian View of the Brazil-Canada Aircraft Disputes at the WTO|379
3|24.1 Introduction|379
3|24.2 The Players and Their Interests|380
4|24.2.1 Brazil|380
4|24.2.2 Canada|383
3|24.3 The Scenario: GATT and the WTO|384
3|24.4 Brazil and Canada: Disputes and Negotiations|386
4|24.4.1 The Disputes at the WTO|386
5|24.4.1.1 Brazil: Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (DS46)|386
5|24.4.1.2 Canada: Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (DS70)|387
5|24.4.1.3 Canada: Aircraft Credits and Guarantees (DS222)|387
4|24.4.2 Bilaterals and OECD|388
3|24.5 Aftermath and Final Thoughts|389
3|References|391