File #2783: "2019_Book_VerticalIntegrationAndRegulati.pdf"

2019_Book_VerticalIntegrationAndRegulati.pdf

Text

1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|Abbreviations|10
1|List of Figures|11
1|1 Introduction|12
2|1.1 Subject of Investigation|13
2|1.2 Aim of the Investigation|13
2|1.3 Objections to the Investigation|14
2|1.4 Course of Investigation|14
2|References|15
1|2 Theoretical Discussion of Vertical Integration and Regulation|17
2|2.1 General Concept of Regulation|17
3|2.1.1 General Regulation Law|18
3|2.1.2 General Regulation Economics|19
3|2.1.3 Sector Specific Regulation|23
4|2.1.3.1 Commonalities in Sector Specific Regulation|23
4|2.1.3.2 Special Characteristics of Sector Specific Regulation|25
3|2.1.4 Constitutional Limits and Obligations of Regulation|27
4|2.1.4.1 Professional Freedom|27
4|2.1.4.2 Freedom of Property|28
4|2.1.4.3 General Freedom of Actions|29
4|2.1.4.4 Principle of Equality|29
4|2.1.4.5 Principle of Proportionality|29
4|2.1.4.6 National Objectives and National Structural Principles|30
4|2.1.4.7 Application of Fundamental Rights to Enterprises|31
4|2.1.4.8 Obligations from EU Law|31
4|2.1.4.9 Obligations from the European Convention of Human Rights|32
4|2.1.4.10 Obligations from Other International Law Sources|32
2|2.2 Legal Aspects of Vertical Integration|33
3|2.2.1 General Regulation|33
3|2.2.2 Unbundling Regulations/Disintegration Regulations|34
4|2.2.2.1 Accounting Separation|34
4|2.2.2.2 Organisational Separation|35
3|2.2.3 Net Access|35
4|2.2.3.1 Right to Net Access|35
4|2.2.3.2 Fees for Net Access|36
3|2.2.4 Regulation of Capacity Shortages|37
3|2.2.5 Transparency Regulations|37
3|2.2.6 Market Entry Regulation|37
3|2.2.7 Market Behaviour Regulation|38
2|2.3 Economic Aspects of Vertical Integration|39
3|2.3.1 Collusive Conduct|40
4|2.3.1.1 Parallel Pricing|40
4|2.3.1.2 Edgeworth Cycles|40
3|2.3.2 Double Marginalization|41
3|2.3.3 Efficiency Effects|41
3|2.3.4 Elimination of Competitors|42
4|2.3.4.1 Refusal to Supply and Preferential Supply|42
4|2.3.4.2 Limit Pricing and Predatory Pricing|43
4|2.3.4.3 Price Discrimination and Raising Rival Costs|43
3|2.3.5 Circumvention of Regulation|44
4|2.3.5.1 Vertical Restraints|44
4|2.3.5.2 Resale Price Maintenance|44
3|2.3.6 Additional Market Effects|45
2|References|45
1|3 Evaluation of Vertical Integration|51
2|3.1 General Concerns and Positive Aspects|52
2|3.2 Foreclosure of Inputs|53
2|3.3 Foreclosure of Costumers|55
2|3.4 Other Possible Effects|56
2|3.5 Assessment of Positive and Negative Aspects|57
2|3.6 Preliminary Conclusion|57
2|References|58
1|4 Legal Implications and Suggested Amendments|59
2|4.1 Vertically Integrated Enterprises Shall Be Obliged to Forward Their Price Development Rationale to the Federal German Cartel Office to Have It Investigated in Order to Determine Whether or not They Violate the Prohibition of Margin-Squeezes|59
3|4.1.1 Current Legal Obligations|59
3|4.1.2 Legal Shortcomings|60
3|4.1.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|60
3|4.1.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|61
2|4.2 Refusal to Supply Shall Become an Element of Offence in German Competition Law|61
3|4.2.1 Current Legal Obligation|61
3|4.2.2 Legal Shortcoming|61
3|4.2.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|61
3|4.2.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|62
2|4.3 Price Discrimination on Highly Concentrated Markets Must Be Subject to Strict Regulation|62
3|4.3.1 Current Legal Obligation|62
3|4.3.2 Legal Shortcoming|62
3|4.3.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|63
3|4.3.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|63
2|4.4 A Complaint Structure Is Needed to Detect Lacking Competition in Individual Sectors|63
3|4.4.1 Current Legal Obligation|63
3|4.4.2 Legal Shortcoming|63
3|4.4.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|63
3|4.4.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|64
2|4.5 There Needs to Be a Regulation on How to Deal with Capacity Shortages|64
3|4.5.1 Current Legal Obligation|64
3|4.5.2 Legal Shortcoming|64
3|4.5.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|64
3|4.5.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|65
2|4.6 A Vertical Separation Is the Ultima Rationale and Shall Be Introduced to Competition and Regulation Law|65
3|4.6.1 Current Legal Obligation|65
3|4.6.2 Legal Shortcoming|65
3|4.6.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|65
3|4.6.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|66
2|4.7 Consumers Need to Be Educated on How the Market Functions in Order to Inform Them About Oligopoly Collusion Tactics of Major Enterprises in Particular Markets|66
3|4.7.1 Current Legal Obligation|66
3|4.7.2 Legal Shortcoming|66
3|4.7.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|67
3|4.7.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|67
2|4.8 The German Competition Authorities Should Continue Monitoring Mergers in Highly Concentrated Markets|67
3|4.8.1 Current Legal Obligation|67
3|4.8.2 Legal Shortcoming|67
3|4.8.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|68
3|4.8.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|68
2|4.9 German Regulation Authorities Should Investigate the Efficiency of the Level of the Upstream Market of Highly Concentrated Industries|68
3|4.9.1 Current Legal Obligation|68
3|4.9.2 Legal Shortcomings|68
3|4.9.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|69
3|4.9.4 Suggested Amendment|69
2|4.10 A Regulatory Regime Is Required that Focusses on the Challenges of Digital Networks (like Facebook) or Highly Integrated Market Place Enterprises (Such as Amazon)|69
3|4.10.1 Current Legal Obligation|69
3|4.10.2 Legal Shortcoming|70
3|4.10.3 Legal and Constitutional Restraints|70
3|4.10.4 Suggested Legal Amendment|70
1|5 Conclusion|71