File #2808: "2020_Book_CompetitionLawInChina.pdf"
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1|Preface: Competition Law in China—A Law and Economics Perspective|5
1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|About the Author|13
1|Abbreviations|14
1|List of Charts|16
1|1 Introduction|17
2|1.1 Introduction|17
2|1.2 Structure of the Book|19
2|1.3 Methodology|20
3|1.3.1 Law and Economics|20
3|1.3.2 Institutional Economics|20
3|1.3.3 Behavioural Law and Economics|21
3|1.3.4 Comparative Legal Studies|22
2|1.4 Academic Relevance and Limitations|22
2|References|23
1|Part I Overview of the Anti-monopoly Law|24
1|2 Competition Law in China: An Overview|25
2|2.1 Introduction|25
2|2.2 Competition Rules Before the AML|26
2|2.3 Drafting Process of the AML|30
2|2.4 Overview of the AML|31
3|2.4.1 Overview of the AML Enforcement Agencies|33
3|2.4.2 Overview of the Procedural Law|36
2|2.5 Conclusions|42
2|References|43
1|3 Goals of the Competition Law|44
2|3.1 Introduction|44
2|3.2 The Debate of Competition Goals in China|45
3|3.2.1 Economic and Non-economic Goals of the AML|45
3|3.2.2 The Development of a Socialist Market Economy|47
3|3.2.3 SOE|48
3|3.2.4 Industrial Policy|51
3|3.2.5 Public Interests|53
3|3.2.6 National Security Review|55
2|3.3 Trading off Different Competition Goals|56
3|3.3.1 Efficiency and Welfare Standards|56
3|3.3.2 The Legislative Debate|58
2|3.4 Conclusions|61
2|References|61
1|Part II Substantive Law of the AML|64
1|4 Horizontal Restrictions|65
2|4.1 Introduction|65
2|4.2 Cartel Agreements in Economic Theory|67
3|4.2.1 Cartel Stability and Duration|67
3|4.2.2 Cartel Surcharges and Detection|69
3|4.2.3 Cartel Punishment|71
2|4.3 Chapter 2 of the AML|74
3|4.3.1 Definition of Monopoly Agreements|74
3|4.3.2 Types of Horizontal Agreements Under the AML|75
3|4.3.3 Exemptions|77
3|4.3.4 Cartel Fines|78
3|4.3.5 Leniency|81
2|4.4 Industrial Associations|83
2|4.5 Case Law|86
2|4.6 Conclusions|88
2|References|89
1|5 Vertical Restrictions|93
2|5.1 Introduction|93
2|5.2 Economic Analysis of Vertical Agreements|95
3|5.2.1 Agency Problem|95
3|5.2.2 Free-Riding|96
3|5.2.3 Brand Impact|96
3|5.2.4 Supply and Marketing Network|97
3|5.2.5 The Anti-competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements|97
2|5.3 Vertical Restrictions in the AML|98
3|5.3.1 Vertical Agreements|98
3|5.3.2 Article 14 of the AML|98
3|5.3.3 RPM Cases|98
3|5.3.4 Other Types of Vertical Restrictions|102
2|5.4 Evaluating Pro- and Anti-competitive Effects|103
2|5.5 Conclusions|104
2|References|105
1|6 Abuse of Dominant Position|106
2|6.1 Introduction|106
2|6.2 Defining Dominant Position|107
2|6.3 Defining Abusive Conduct|109
2|6.4 Determining Abusive Conduct|114
2|6.5 Conclusions|114
2|References|115
1|7 Merger Control|116
2|7.1 Introduction|116
2|7.2 Economic Analysis of Concentrations|118
2|7.3 Chapter 4 of the AML on Merger Control|119
3|7.3.1 Notification|119
3|7.3.2 Review Process|122
3|7.3.3 Assessment|123
3|7.3.4 Merger Remedies|124
3|7.3.5 National Security Review|124
2|7.4 Overview of the Cases|125
3|7.4.1 The Extensive Use of Behavioural Remedies|127
3|7.4.2 The Investigation Process|131
2|7.5 Conclusions|138
2|References|139
1|8 Administrative Monopolies|141
2|8.1 Introduction|141
2|8.2 Administrative Monopolies in China|142
2|8.3 Anti-competitive Effects of Administrative Monopolies|144
2|8.4 Chapter 5 of the Anti-monopoly Law|145
2|8.5 The Fair Competition Review System|149
2|8.6 Cases|152
2|8.7 Conclusions|157
2|References|158
1|Part III The Enforcement of the AML|161
1|9 Enforcement of Competition Law: Public Enforcement and Competition Agencies|162
2|9.1 Introduction|163
2|9.2 Economic Analysis of Public Enforcement of Law|166
2|9.3 Economic Analysis of Agency Design|168
3|9.3.1 Structural Independence|169
3|9.3.2 Independence in Resourcing, Staffing and Reporting|170
3|9.3.3 Unity of Competition Agencies|170
2|9.4 Agency Capacity Building|172
3|9.4.1 Training Professional Agency Staff|173
3|9.4.2 Improve the Organization of the Agency|174
3|9.4.3 Leadership of the Agency|175
2|9.5 Competition Agencies in China|177
3|9.5.1 SAIC|177
3|9.5.2 NDRC|178
3|9.5.3 MOFCOM|179
3|9.5.4 SAMR|180
2|9.6 Assessing the Competition Agencies in China|181
2|9.7 Conclusions|184
2|References|185
1|10 Enforcement of Competition Law—Economic Analysis of Antitrust Sanctions|189
2|10.1 Introduction|189
2|10.2 Economic Analysis on Antitrust Sanctions|191
3|10.2.1 The Deterrence Goal|191
3|10.2.2 Becker Model and Criminal Law|192
3|10.2.3 Administrative Versus Criminal Penalties|194
3|10.2.4 Under Enforcement of Antitrust Sanctions|195
3|10.2.5 Towards an Optimal Antitrust Sanction|196
2|10.3 Choice of Sanctions in the AML|198
3|10.3.1 Administrative Sanctions|198
3|10.3.2 Criminal Sanctions|201
2|10.4 An Analysis of Choice of Sanctions in Chinese Antitrust|203
2|10.5 Conclusions|204
2|References|204
1|11 Enforcement of Competition Law—Role of the Courts and Economic Experts|208
2|11.1 Introduction|208
2|11.2 Economic Complexity of the Competition Cases|211
2|11.3 Economic Experts at the Agency Versus Court|213
3|11.3.1 Economic Experts at the Agency|213
3|11.3.2 Economic Experts at the Court|214
3|11.3.3 Comparing Experts at the Agency Versus Courts|215
2|11.4 Party Versus Court Appointed Experts|216
3|11.4.1 Party Appointed Experts|216
3|11.4.2 Courts Appointed Experts|219
2|11.5 The Role of the Court in the AML|221
3|11.5.1 Private Actions|221
3|11.5.2 Judicial Capacity|224
3|11.5.3 Role of Economic Experts|227
2|11.6 Conclusions|228
2|References|229
1|12 The Enforcement of Competition Law—A Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective|233
2|12.1 Introduction|233
2|12.2 Behavioural Economics|235
2|12.3 Behavioural Biases of Public Agencies|238
3|12.3.1 Selection Bias and Myopia|238
3|12.3.2 Expert Bias and Overconfidence|240
3|12.3.3 Anchoring and Coherence Effects|241
3|12.3.4 The Behaviour of Regulatee|242
3|12.3.5 Implications|242
2|12.4 The Behaviour of Private Litigants|243
3|12.4.1 The Behaviour of Litigants|243
3|12.4.2 Implications|246
2|12.5 Behavioural of Criminals|247
2|12.6 Behavioural of Judges|248
2|12.7 Comparing Behavioral Biases|248
3|12.7.1 Behavioural Agent Theory|249
3|12.7.2 Behavioural Political Economy Theory|250
2|12.8 Compare Debiasing Strategies|251
3|12.8.1 Learning Effects|251
3|12.8.2 Mitigating Errors|251
2|12.9 Towards an Optimal Enforcement|252
2|12.10 Conclusions|254
2|References|255
1|13 Extraterritorial Effects of Chinese Competition Law: A Comparative View on Merger Policy|262
2|13.1 Introduction|262
2|13.2 Extraterritorial Enforcement and Conflict of Merger Regulation|263
3|13.2.1 US Antitrust Law|263
3|13.2.2 EU Competition Law|264
3|13.2.3 Conflicts of Regulatory Regimes|265
3|13.2.4 A Perspective from Competition Goals|266
2|13.3 The Internationalization of Competition Law: Cooperation and Convergence|267
3|13.3.1 Bilateral Agreements|267
3|13.3.2 Transnational Networks and Multilateral Agreements|269
3|13.3.3 Harmonization|272
3|13.3.4 International Regulators|273
2|13.4 Practices in China|274
2|13.5 Conclusions|275
2|References|276
1|14 Conclusions|279
2|14.1 The AML at the Twelfth Year|279
2|14.2 A Competition System Mixed with Industrial Policy|280
2|14.3 Economic Analysis on Case Decisions|282
2|14.4 Enforcement of the Law|283
2|14.5 Towards Antitrust Internationalization|284
2|14.6 Future Research|285
2|References|286
1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|About the Author|13
1|Abbreviations|14
1|List of Charts|16
1|1 Introduction|17
2|1.1 Introduction|17
2|1.2 Structure of the Book|19
2|1.3 Methodology|20
3|1.3.1 Law and Economics|20
3|1.3.2 Institutional Economics|20
3|1.3.3 Behavioural Law and Economics|21
3|1.3.4 Comparative Legal Studies|22
2|1.4 Academic Relevance and Limitations|22
2|References|23
1|Part I Overview of the Anti-monopoly Law|24
1|2 Competition Law in China: An Overview|25
2|2.1 Introduction|25
2|2.2 Competition Rules Before the AML|26
2|2.3 Drafting Process of the AML|30
2|2.4 Overview of the AML|31
3|2.4.1 Overview of the AML Enforcement Agencies|33
3|2.4.2 Overview of the Procedural Law|36
2|2.5 Conclusions|42
2|References|43
1|3 Goals of the Competition Law|44
2|3.1 Introduction|44
2|3.2 The Debate of Competition Goals in China|45
3|3.2.1 Economic and Non-economic Goals of the AML|45
3|3.2.2 The Development of a Socialist Market Economy|47
3|3.2.3 SOE|48
3|3.2.4 Industrial Policy|51
3|3.2.5 Public Interests|53
3|3.2.6 National Security Review|55
2|3.3 Trading off Different Competition Goals|56
3|3.3.1 Efficiency and Welfare Standards|56
3|3.3.2 The Legislative Debate|58
2|3.4 Conclusions|61
2|References|61
1|Part II Substantive Law of the AML|64
1|4 Horizontal Restrictions|65
2|4.1 Introduction|65
2|4.2 Cartel Agreements in Economic Theory|67
3|4.2.1 Cartel Stability and Duration|67
3|4.2.2 Cartel Surcharges and Detection|69
3|4.2.3 Cartel Punishment|71
2|4.3 Chapter 2 of the AML|74
3|4.3.1 Definition of Monopoly Agreements|74
3|4.3.2 Types of Horizontal Agreements Under the AML|75
3|4.3.3 Exemptions|77
3|4.3.4 Cartel Fines|78
3|4.3.5 Leniency|81
2|4.4 Industrial Associations|83
2|4.5 Case Law|86
2|4.6 Conclusions|88
2|References|89
1|5 Vertical Restrictions|93
2|5.1 Introduction|93
2|5.2 Economic Analysis of Vertical Agreements|95
3|5.2.1 Agency Problem|95
3|5.2.2 Free-Riding|96
3|5.2.3 Brand Impact|96
3|5.2.4 Supply and Marketing Network|97
3|5.2.5 The Anti-competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements|97
2|5.3 Vertical Restrictions in the AML|98
3|5.3.1 Vertical Agreements|98
3|5.3.2 Article 14 of the AML|98
3|5.3.3 RPM Cases|98
3|5.3.4 Other Types of Vertical Restrictions|102
2|5.4 Evaluating Pro- and Anti-competitive Effects|103
2|5.5 Conclusions|104
2|References|105
1|6 Abuse of Dominant Position|106
2|6.1 Introduction|106
2|6.2 Defining Dominant Position|107
2|6.3 Defining Abusive Conduct|109
2|6.4 Determining Abusive Conduct|114
2|6.5 Conclusions|114
2|References|115
1|7 Merger Control|116
2|7.1 Introduction|116
2|7.2 Economic Analysis of Concentrations|118
2|7.3 Chapter 4 of the AML on Merger Control|119
3|7.3.1 Notification|119
3|7.3.2 Review Process|122
3|7.3.3 Assessment|123
3|7.3.4 Merger Remedies|124
3|7.3.5 National Security Review|124
2|7.4 Overview of the Cases|125
3|7.4.1 The Extensive Use of Behavioural Remedies|127
3|7.4.2 The Investigation Process|131
2|7.5 Conclusions|138
2|References|139
1|8 Administrative Monopolies|141
2|8.1 Introduction|141
2|8.2 Administrative Monopolies in China|142
2|8.3 Anti-competitive Effects of Administrative Monopolies|144
2|8.4 Chapter 5 of the Anti-monopoly Law|145
2|8.5 The Fair Competition Review System|149
2|8.6 Cases|152
2|8.7 Conclusions|157
2|References|158
1|Part III The Enforcement of the AML|161
1|9 Enforcement of Competition Law: Public Enforcement and Competition Agencies|162
2|9.1 Introduction|163
2|9.2 Economic Analysis of Public Enforcement of Law|166
2|9.3 Economic Analysis of Agency Design|168
3|9.3.1 Structural Independence|169
3|9.3.2 Independence in Resourcing, Staffing and Reporting|170
3|9.3.3 Unity of Competition Agencies|170
2|9.4 Agency Capacity Building|172
3|9.4.1 Training Professional Agency Staff|173
3|9.4.2 Improve the Organization of the Agency|174
3|9.4.3 Leadership of the Agency|175
2|9.5 Competition Agencies in China|177
3|9.5.1 SAIC|177
3|9.5.2 NDRC|178
3|9.5.3 MOFCOM|179
3|9.5.4 SAMR|180
2|9.6 Assessing the Competition Agencies in China|181
2|9.7 Conclusions|184
2|References|185
1|10 Enforcement of Competition Law—Economic Analysis of Antitrust Sanctions|189
2|10.1 Introduction|189
2|10.2 Economic Analysis on Antitrust Sanctions|191
3|10.2.1 The Deterrence Goal|191
3|10.2.2 Becker Model and Criminal Law|192
3|10.2.3 Administrative Versus Criminal Penalties|194
3|10.2.4 Under Enforcement of Antitrust Sanctions|195
3|10.2.5 Towards an Optimal Antitrust Sanction|196
2|10.3 Choice of Sanctions in the AML|198
3|10.3.1 Administrative Sanctions|198
3|10.3.2 Criminal Sanctions|201
2|10.4 An Analysis of Choice of Sanctions in Chinese Antitrust|203
2|10.5 Conclusions|204
2|References|204
1|11 Enforcement of Competition Law—Role of the Courts and Economic Experts|208
2|11.1 Introduction|208
2|11.2 Economic Complexity of the Competition Cases|211
2|11.3 Economic Experts at the Agency Versus Court|213
3|11.3.1 Economic Experts at the Agency|213
3|11.3.2 Economic Experts at the Court|214
3|11.3.3 Comparing Experts at the Agency Versus Courts|215
2|11.4 Party Versus Court Appointed Experts|216
3|11.4.1 Party Appointed Experts|216
3|11.4.2 Courts Appointed Experts|219
2|11.5 The Role of the Court in the AML|221
3|11.5.1 Private Actions|221
3|11.5.2 Judicial Capacity|224
3|11.5.3 Role of Economic Experts|227
2|11.6 Conclusions|228
2|References|229
1|12 The Enforcement of Competition Law—A Behavioral Law and Economics Perspective|233
2|12.1 Introduction|233
2|12.2 Behavioural Economics|235
2|12.3 Behavioural Biases of Public Agencies|238
3|12.3.1 Selection Bias and Myopia|238
3|12.3.2 Expert Bias and Overconfidence|240
3|12.3.3 Anchoring and Coherence Effects|241
3|12.3.4 The Behaviour of Regulatee|242
3|12.3.5 Implications|242
2|12.4 The Behaviour of Private Litigants|243
3|12.4.1 The Behaviour of Litigants|243
3|12.4.2 Implications|246
2|12.5 Behavioural of Criminals|247
2|12.6 Behavioural of Judges|248
2|12.7 Comparing Behavioral Biases|248
3|12.7.1 Behavioural Agent Theory|249
3|12.7.2 Behavioural Political Economy Theory|250
2|12.8 Compare Debiasing Strategies|251
3|12.8.1 Learning Effects|251
3|12.8.2 Mitigating Errors|251
2|12.9 Towards an Optimal Enforcement|252
2|12.10 Conclusions|254
2|References|255
1|13 Extraterritorial Effects of Chinese Competition Law: A Comparative View on Merger Policy|262
2|13.1 Introduction|262
2|13.2 Extraterritorial Enforcement and Conflict of Merger Regulation|263
3|13.2.1 US Antitrust Law|263
3|13.2.2 EU Competition Law|264
3|13.2.3 Conflicts of Regulatory Regimes|265
3|13.2.4 A Perspective from Competition Goals|266
2|13.3 The Internationalization of Competition Law: Cooperation and Convergence|267
3|13.3.1 Bilateral Agreements|267
3|13.3.2 Transnational Networks and Multilateral Agreements|269
3|13.3.3 Harmonization|272
3|13.3.4 International Regulators|273
2|13.4 Practices in China|274
2|13.5 Conclusions|275
2|References|276
1|14 Conclusions|279
2|14.1 The AML at the Twelfth Year|279
2|14.2 A Competition System Mixed with Industrial Policy|280
2|14.3 Economic Analysis on Case Decisions|282
2|14.4 Enforcement of the Law|283
2|14.5 Towards Antitrust Internationalization|284
2|14.6 Future Research|285
2|References|286