File #2816: "2020_Book_TheAppellateBodyOfTheWTOAndIts.pdf"
Text
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|6
1|Editors and Contributors|8
1|The AB in the WTO Governance and Its Reform—Broader Perspectives|11
1|1 Introduction: Let the Jewel in the Crown Shine Again|12
2|1 From Being the Jewel in the Crown to Encountering a Survival Crisis|12
2|2 Polishing the Jewel from Broader Perspectives on Governance and Reform Issues|14
2|3 Polishing the Jewel by Addressing the Basic Function of the Appellate Body|16
2|4 Identifying Options to Let the Jewel Shine Again|18
1|2 Between “Member-Driven Governance” and “Judicialization”: Constitutional and Judicial Dilemmas in the World Trading System|23
2|1 Introduction: “Rule of Law” in Transnational Economic Relations?|24
2|2 “Member-Driven” WTO Governance and Its Constitutional Limits|27
3|2.1 Illegal US Blocking of the Filling of AB Vacancies in Violation of the DSU|28
3|2.2 US Failure to Legally Justify Its “Blocking Strategy”|30
3|2.3 “Constitutional Limits” of “Member-Driven WTO Governance”?|33
2|3 Need for Distinguishing Political, Administrative and Judicial Functions of “Member-Driven” WTO Governance|36
3|3.1 Member-Driven WTO Governance as a Political Rule-Making Procedure|37
3|3.2 Different WTO Administrative and Judicial Decision-Making Procedures|37
2|4 Four Options for WTO Members to Respond to Illegal “Blocking” of WTO Appellate Body Nominations|39
3|4.1 US Unwillingness to Resolve the AB Crisis Through DSU Reforms|39
3|4.2 Recourse to WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings?|41
3|4.3 Administrative Majority Voting on the Filling of the AB Vacancies?|41
3|4.4 Hegemonic WTO Reforms Imposed by the USA?|43
2|5 Outlook: The Limits of “Judicialization” and “Public Reason”|43
3|5.1 The Systemic Conflicts Caused by the US Trade Wars Test the Limits of “Judicialization”|45
3|5.2 Can Ordo-Liberal WTO Reforms Avoid a Power-Oriented Fragmentation of the WTO Legal System?|46
2|References|48
1|3 Reforming the Appellate Body|50
2|1 Is the WTO Appellate Body an International Trade Court?|50
2|2 Automaticity of Decision-Making|51
2|3 Compulsory Jurisdiction|52
2|4 Concern for Judicial Activism|54
2|5 Need for Stable and Effective Dispute Settlement Mechanism|55
2|6 Checks and Balances|56
2|7 Different Forms of Dispute Settlement Mechanism|57
2|8 Conclusion|58
2|References|59
1|4 The AB Crisis as Symptomatic of the WTO’s Foundational Defects or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the AB|60
2|1 Introduction|61
2|2 As an Initial Matter—The WTO’s AB Is not at Fault|63
2|3 The Faults Lie Within the WTO|67
2|4 Conclusions|70
2|References|72
1|5 The Impending Demise of the WTO Appellate Body: From Centrepiece to Historical Relic?|73
2|1 Introduction|73
2|2 Dispute Settlement in the GATT Years|74
2|3 The WTO Dispute Settlement System’s Central Reforms: Reasons for Its Downfall|75
3|3.1 Institutional Changes|75
3|3.2 Systemic Importance of the AB in the WTO System: Contractarian Versus Constitutional Views|79
3|3.3 Failure of the WTO’s Legislative Arm|80
3|3.4 Summary|83
2|4 US Criticism over the AB|84
3|4.1 General Criticism Against the WTO|84
3|4.2 Specific Criticism by the US Concerning the Role of the AB and WTO Members’ Responses|86
2|5 Conclusion|91
2|References|91
1|6 WTO Appellate Body Overreach and the Crisis in the Making: A View from the South|97
2|1 Introduction|97
2|2 The Crisis in Context and the US Justification|99
2|3 The “Exclusive Authority to Adopt Interpretations” in the WTO Framework|100
2|4 Judicial Overreach and the Crisis in the Making|103
2|5 Maintaining Negotiated Balance and Restoring State-Centric Nature of the WTO|105
3|5.1 Legitimizing DSB Interpretation and Reexamining Consensus Decision-Making Practice at the General Council|106
3|5.2 Providing Systemic Checks and Balances|108
2|6 Conclusion|109
2|References|111
1|Reforms in Relation to the Basic Functions of the AB|114
1|7 Why the WTO Adjudicatory Crisis Will Not Be Easily Solved: Defining and Responding to “Judicial Activism”|115
2|1 Mismatch Thesis|115
2|2 America’s Two Core DSU Criticisms|116
3|2.1 Not Merely a Trumpian Phenomenon|116
3|2.2 “Judicial Activism” and Its Two Elements|117
2|3 Critical Analysis of EU and Canadian DSU Reform Proposals|120
3|3.1 DSU Reform Ideas|120
3|3.2 Mismatch Between EU Proposals and “Judicial Activism” Elements|121
3|3.3 Mismatch Between Canadian Proposals and “Judicial Activism” Elements|124
2|4 Concluding Observations About Textual Interpretation and Stare Decisis|125
2|References|126
1|8 A Proper Balance Between WTO’s Members-Driven Nature and the Appellate Body’s Role as an Adjudicator—Careful Exercise of Judicial Activism|128
2|1 Introduction|128
2|2 The Dispute Settlement in the Age of the GATT 1947—Power Oriented with Parties-Driven Features|130
3|2.1 The Power-Oriented Feature of GATT 1947|130
3|2.2 “Collective Parties-Driven” Versus “Single-Party-Driven”|131
3|2.3 The Assisting Role of the Dispute Settlement Panel|132
2|3 The Dispute Settlement in the Age of the WTO-Rule-Based with “Members-Driven” Features|133
3|3.1 The Rule-Based Features Under the WTO Dispute Settlement|133
3|3.2 The “Collective Members-Driven” Idea Is Emphasized, but Some “Single-Member-Driven” Elements Are Still Seen|135
3|3.3 The Appellate Body’s Mixed Roles of Assisting WTO Members and as an Adjudicator|136
2|4 The Imbalance and Rebalance Between the “Members-Driven” Nature and the Appellate Body’s Role as an Adjudicator|137
3|4.1 The Imbalance—Ignoring Members-Driven Nature Leading to Undesirable Judicial Activism|137
3|4.2 A Rebalance—The Adjudicating Role to Assure Constitutionalism for Fundamental Values Vs. the Assisting Role for Other Issues to Maintain “Members-Driven” Nature|139
2|5 Concluding Remarks—Careful Exercise of Judicial Activism|140
2|References|141
1|9 The Judicial Style of the Appellate Body|143
2|1 Introduction|144
2|2 What is Style?|145
2|3 The Appellate Body’s Style|150
2|4 Factors Affecting the Style of the Appellate Body|156
3|4.1 The Appellate Body’s Nature as an International Tribunal|156
3|4.2 Language|158
3|4.3 Common Law or Civil Law Styles|159
3|4.4 Collegiality|162
3|4.5 The Importance of Candour|163
3|4.6 Personality|164
2|5 Conclusion|165
2|References|166
1|10 Interpretative Authority of the Appellate Body: Replies to the Criticism by the United States|168
2|1 Introduction|168
2|2 Seven Errors in the Criticisms by the United States of the Appellate Body’s Interpretative Approach|169
3|2.1 First Error: The Exclusive Authority of WTO Members to Adopt Authoritative Interpretations|170
3|2.2 Second Error: Analogy to a Common Law System|172
3|2.3 Third Error: Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law|173
3|2.4 Fourth Error: Departure from the Appellate Body’s Own Approach|175
3|2.5 Fifth Error: Objective Assessment by Panels|177
3|2.6 Sixth Error: Hierarchical Structure in the WTO Dispute Settlement System|179
3|2.7 Seventh Error: Support by Other Members|181
2|3 Conclusion|182
2|References|183
1|11 Judicial Economy and Advisory Opinions of the Appellate Body–Potential Reform of Article 17.12 of the DSU|185
2|1 Concerns Over Advisory Opinions Stated in the Report by the Appellate Body|186
3|1.1 Concerns Raised by the United States that are Relevant to Reform of Article 17.12 DSU|186
3|1.2 The Problem of Advisory Opinions Stated in the Report by the Appellate Body|187
2|2 Judicial Economy at the Appeal Level Under the DSU|188
3|2.1 Judicial Economy as a Tool to Reduce Advisory Opinions|188
3|2.2 Judicial Economy Under Article 17.12 of the DSU|189
2|3 The Appellate Body’s Adoption of Judicial Economy|190
2|4 Potential Reform of Article 17.12 DSU|193
3|4.1 The Goals for the Article 17.12 DSU Reform|193
3|4.2 EU Proposal|195
3|4.3 The Reform Proposal|196
2|5 Concluding Remarks|197
2|References|197
1|12 The Use of Panel Process to Improve the Function of the Appellate Body: A Proposal to Utilize the Expert Review Group|199
2|1 Introduction|200
2|2 Options to Amend the DSU to Save the Function of the Appellate Body|201
3|2.1 Options Already Proposed|201
3|2.2 Viability of Proposals Involving Amendment to the DSU|202
2|3 Alternative Options|205
3|3.1 Options that Do not Require Amendment to the DSU|205
3|3.2 Looking Upside Down: Using Panel Process to Incorporate the Thrust of Functions of the AB|205
2|4 Conclusions|209
2|References|210
1|Options to Address the Crisis and Wider Implications Beyond the WTO|212
1|13 Disruptive Construction or Constructive Destruction? Reflections on the Appellate Body Crisis|213
2|1 Disruptive Construction: The U.S. Criticisms|213
2|2 A System of Precedents?|217
3|2.1 Common Law System?|218
3|2.2 System of Precedents|222
2|3 Prohibition of Obiter Dicta or Advisory Opinion?|227
2|4 Disruptive Construction or Constructive Destruction?|230
2|References|234
1|14 WTO Appellate Body at Cross Roads: Options and Alternatives|237
2|1 Introduction|237
2|2 The U.S. Position and Interests|238
2|3 Options and Alternatives|242
3|3.1 Option 1: At Least Two Members of AB Should be Appointed|242
3|3.2 Option 2: Use of FTA Dispute Resolution Forum|243
3|3.3 Option 3: Use of Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation in WTO and FTA|244
3|3.4 Option 4: Interim Appeal Through Arbitration Under WTO|245
3|3.5 Alternative: Use of a Forum Outside WTO|248
2|4 Conclusion|250
2|References|250
1|15 Appointment and Reappointment of the Appellate Body Members: Judiciary or Politics|253
2|1 The AB Member Appointment and Reappointment Processes: Rules and Practices|255
3|1.1 Appointment|255
3|1.2 Reappointment|258
2|2 The Distribution of the AB Membership|259
3|2.1 The Turbulences in 2014–16|261
3|2.2 The Crisis in 2016–18|264
2|3 Conclusion|267
2|References|268
1|16 Should Appellate Body Members Work Full Time?|270
2|1 The Appellate Body in Theory: A Part-Time Job|270
2|2 The Appellate Body in Practice: A Full Time Commitment|275
2|3 Searching for Consensus|281
2|4 Weighing the Pros and Cons|286
2|5 Final Remarks|292
2|References|294
1|17 The WTO Appellate Body as a Trailblazer—Facilitation of Appellate Mechanism Discussion in Other International Courts|299
2|1 Introduction—Appellate Body’s Contribution and Ripple Effect|299
2|2 International Adjudicative Bodies with Appellate Review Systems|301
3|2.1 International Courts with Appellate Mechanisms|302
3|2.2 Other Forms of (Quasi)-appellate Judicial Review|309
3|2.3 Non-interstate Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|311
3|2.4 The WTO’s Appellate Body as a Unique Example|316
2|3 Institutional Aspect—Benefits of Having an Appellate Mechanism|317
3|3.1 Enhancement of Rule of Law|317
3|3.2 Trust for Judicialization and Institutionalization|319
3|3.3 Confidence in a Multilateral Arrangement|319
2|4 Legal Aspect—Testing Grounds for Legal Issues Associated with Appeal|320
3|4.1 Scope of Appeals—Legal Issues Only Versus Both Legal and Factual Issues|320
3|4.2 Standard of Appellate Review|321
3|4.3 Remand Issue|322
2|5 Concluding Thought—Importance of Maintaining and Expanding the Appellate Body’s Contribution|324
2|References|324
1|18 WTO AB as a Model for Other Adjudicatory Bodies—The Case of EU’s Investment Court System|327
2|1 Introduction|327
2|2 Historical Proposals|329
2|3 Institutional Design and Adjudicatory Powers|331
2|4 Procedural Transparency|335
2|5 Status and Enforceability of Rulings|338
2|6 Concluding Remarks|341
2|References|342
1|Contents|6
1|Editors and Contributors|8
1|The AB in the WTO Governance and Its Reform—Broader Perspectives|11
1|1 Introduction: Let the Jewel in the Crown Shine Again|12
2|1 From Being the Jewel in the Crown to Encountering a Survival Crisis|12
2|2 Polishing the Jewel from Broader Perspectives on Governance and Reform Issues|14
2|3 Polishing the Jewel by Addressing the Basic Function of the Appellate Body|16
2|4 Identifying Options to Let the Jewel Shine Again|18
1|2 Between “Member-Driven Governance” and “Judicialization”: Constitutional and Judicial Dilemmas in the World Trading System|23
2|1 Introduction: “Rule of Law” in Transnational Economic Relations?|24
2|2 “Member-Driven” WTO Governance and Its Constitutional Limits|27
3|2.1 Illegal US Blocking of the Filling of AB Vacancies in Violation of the DSU|28
3|2.2 US Failure to Legally Justify Its “Blocking Strategy”|30
3|2.3 “Constitutional Limits” of “Member-Driven WTO Governance”?|33
2|3 Need for Distinguishing Political, Administrative and Judicial Functions of “Member-Driven” WTO Governance|36
3|3.1 Member-Driven WTO Governance as a Political Rule-Making Procedure|37
3|3.2 Different WTO Administrative and Judicial Decision-Making Procedures|37
2|4 Four Options for WTO Members to Respond to Illegal “Blocking” of WTO Appellate Body Nominations|39
3|4.1 US Unwillingness to Resolve the AB Crisis Through DSU Reforms|39
3|4.2 Recourse to WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings?|41
3|4.3 Administrative Majority Voting on the Filling of the AB Vacancies?|41
3|4.4 Hegemonic WTO Reforms Imposed by the USA?|43
2|5 Outlook: The Limits of “Judicialization” and “Public Reason”|43
3|5.1 The Systemic Conflicts Caused by the US Trade Wars Test the Limits of “Judicialization”|45
3|5.2 Can Ordo-Liberal WTO Reforms Avoid a Power-Oriented Fragmentation of the WTO Legal System?|46
2|References|48
1|3 Reforming the Appellate Body|50
2|1 Is the WTO Appellate Body an International Trade Court?|50
2|2 Automaticity of Decision-Making|51
2|3 Compulsory Jurisdiction|52
2|4 Concern for Judicial Activism|54
2|5 Need for Stable and Effective Dispute Settlement Mechanism|55
2|6 Checks and Balances|56
2|7 Different Forms of Dispute Settlement Mechanism|57
2|8 Conclusion|58
2|References|59
1|4 The AB Crisis as Symptomatic of the WTO’s Foundational Defects or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the AB|60
2|1 Introduction|61
2|2 As an Initial Matter—The WTO’s AB Is not at Fault|63
2|3 The Faults Lie Within the WTO|67
2|4 Conclusions|70
2|References|72
1|5 The Impending Demise of the WTO Appellate Body: From Centrepiece to Historical Relic?|73
2|1 Introduction|73
2|2 Dispute Settlement in the GATT Years|74
2|3 The WTO Dispute Settlement System’s Central Reforms: Reasons for Its Downfall|75
3|3.1 Institutional Changes|75
3|3.2 Systemic Importance of the AB in the WTO System: Contractarian Versus Constitutional Views|79
3|3.3 Failure of the WTO’s Legislative Arm|80
3|3.4 Summary|83
2|4 US Criticism over the AB|84
3|4.1 General Criticism Against the WTO|84
3|4.2 Specific Criticism by the US Concerning the Role of the AB and WTO Members’ Responses|86
2|5 Conclusion|91
2|References|91
1|6 WTO Appellate Body Overreach and the Crisis in the Making: A View from the South|97
2|1 Introduction|97
2|2 The Crisis in Context and the US Justification|99
2|3 The “Exclusive Authority to Adopt Interpretations” in the WTO Framework|100
2|4 Judicial Overreach and the Crisis in the Making|103
2|5 Maintaining Negotiated Balance and Restoring State-Centric Nature of the WTO|105
3|5.1 Legitimizing DSB Interpretation and Reexamining Consensus Decision-Making Practice at the General Council|106
3|5.2 Providing Systemic Checks and Balances|108
2|6 Conclusion|109
2|References|111
1|Reforms in Relation to the Basic Functions of the AB|114
1|7 Why the WTO Adjudicatory Crisis Will Not Be Easily Solved: Defining and Responding to “Judicial Activism”|115
2|1 Mismatch Thesis|115
2|2 America’s Two Core DSU Criticisms|116
3|2.1 Not Merely a Trumpian Phenomenon|116
3|2.2 “Judicial Activism” and Its Two Elements|117
2|3 Critical Analysis of EU and Canadian DSU Reform Proposals|120
3|3.1 DSU Reform Ideas|120
3|3.2 Mismatch Between EU Proposals and “Judicial Activism” Elements|121
3|3.3 Mismatch Between Canadian Proposals and “Judicial Activism” Elements|124
2|4 Concluding Observations About Textual Interpretation and Stare Decisis|125
2|References|126
1|8 A Proper Balance Between WTO’s Members-Driven Nature and the Appellate Body’s Role as an Adjudicator—Careful Exercise of Judicial Activism|128
2|1 Introduction|128
2|2 The Dispute Settlement in the Age of the GATT 1947—Power Oriented with Parties-Driven Features|130
3|2.1 The Power-Oriented Feature of GATT 1947|130
3|2.2 “Collective Parties-Driven” Versus “Single-Party-Driven”|131
3|2.3 The Assisting Role of the Dispute Settlement Panel|132
2|3 The Dispute Settlement in the Age of the WTO-Rule-Based with “Members-Driven” Features|133
3|3.1 The Rule-Based Features Under the WTO Dispute Settlement|133
3|3.2 The “Collective Members-Driven” Idea Is Emphasized, but Some “Single-Member-Driven” Elements Are Still Seen|135
3|3.3 The Appellate Body’s Mixed Roles of Assisting WTO Members and as an Adjudicator|136
2|4 The Imbalance and Rebalance Between the “Members-Driven” Nature and the Appellate Body’s Role as an Adjudicator|137
3|4.1 The Imbalance—Ignoring Members-Driven Nature Leading to Undesirable Judicial Activism|137
3|4.2 A Rebalance—The Adjudicating Role to Assure Constitutionalism for Fundamental Values Vs. the Assisting Role for Other Issues to Maintain “Members-Driven” Nature|139
2|5 Concluding Remarks—Careful Exercise of Judicial Activism|140
2|References|141
1|9 The Judicial Style of the Appellate Body|143
2|1 Introduction|144
2|2 What is Style?|145
2|3 The Appellate Body’s Style|150
2|4 Factors Affecting the Style of the Appellate Body|156
3|4.1 The Appellate Body’s Nature as an International Tribunal|156
3|4.2 Language|158
3|4.3 Common Law or Civil Law Styles|159
3|4.4 Collegiality|162
3|4.5 The Importance of Candour|163
3|4.6 Personality|164
2|5 Conclusion|165
2|References|166
1|10 Interpretative Authority of the Appellate Body: Replies to the Criticism by the United States|168
2|1 Introduction|168
2|2 Seven Errors in the Criticisms by the United States of the Appellate Body’s Interpretative Approach|169
3|2.1 First Error: The Exclusive Authority of WTO Members to Adopt Authoritative Interpretations|170
3|2.2 Second Error: Analogy to a Common Law System|172
3|2.3 Third Error: Customary Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law|173
3|2.4 Fourth Error: Departure from the Appellate Body’s Own Approach|175
3|2.5 Fifth Error: Objective Assessment by Panels|177
3|2.6 Sixth Error: Hierarchical Structure in the WTO Dispute Settlement System|179
3|2.7 Seventh Error: Support by Other Members|181
2|3 Conclusion|182
2|References|183
1|11 Judicial Economy and Advisory Opinions of the Appellate Body–Potential Reform of Article 17.12 of the DSU|185
2|1 Concerns Over Advisory Opinions Stated in the Report by the Appellate Body|186
3|1.1 Concerns Raised by the United States that are Relevant to Reform of Article 17.12 DSU|186
3|1.2 The Problem of Advisory Opinions Stated in the Report by the Appellate Body|187
2|2 Judicial Economy at the Appeal Level Under the DSU|188
3|2.1 Judicial Economy as a Tool to Reduce Advisory Opinions|188
3|2.2 Judicial Economy Under Article 17.12 of the DSU|189
2|3 The Appellate Body’s Adoption of Judicial Economy|190
2|4 Potential Reform of Article 17.12 DSU|193
3|4.1 The Goals for the Article 17.12 DSU Reform|193
3|4.2 EU Proposal|195
3|4.3 The Reform Proposal|196
2|5 Concluding Remarks|197
2|References|197
1|12 The Use of Panel Process to Improve the Function of the Appellate Body: A Proposal to Utilize the Expert Review Group|199
2|1 Introduction|200
2|2 Options to Amend the DSU to Save the Function of the Appellate Body|201
3|2.1 Options Already Proposed|201
3|2.2 Viability of Proposals Involving Amendment to the DSU|202
2|3 Alternative Options|205
3|3.1 Options that Do not Require Amendment to the DSU|205
3|3.2 Looking Upside Down: Using Panel Process to Incorporate the Thrust of Functions of the AB|205
2|4 Conclusions|209
2|References|210
1|Options to Address the Crisis and Wider Implications Beyond the WTO|212
1|13 Disruptive Construction or Constructive Destruction? Reflections on the Appellate Body Crisis|213
2|1 Disruptive Construction: The U.S. Criticisms|213
2|2 A System of Precedents?|217
3|2.1 Common Law System?|218
3|2.2 System of Precedents|222
2|3 Prohibition of Obiter Dicta or Advisory Opinion?|227
2|4 Disruptive Construction or Constructive Destruction?|230
2|References|234
1|14 WTO Appellate Body at Cross Roads: Options and Alternatives|237
2|1 Introduction|237
2|2 The U.S. Position and Interests|238
2|3 Options and Alternatives|242
3|3.1 Option 1: At Least Two Members of AB Should be Appointed|242
3|3.2 Option 2: Use of FTA Dispute Resolution Forum|243
3|3.3 Option 3: Use of Good Offices, Conciliation and Mediation in WTO and FTA|244
3|3.4 Option 4: Interim Appeal Through Arbitration Under WTO|245
3|3.5 Alternative: Use of a Forum Outside WTO|248
2|4 Conclusion|250
2|References|250
1|15 Appointment and Reappointment of the Appellate Body Members: Judiciary or Politics|253
2|1 The AB Member Appointment and Reappointment Processes: Rules and Practices|255
3|1.1 Appointment|255
3|1.2 Reappointment|258
2|2 The Distribution of the AB Membership|259
3|2.1 The Turbulences in 2014–16|261
3|2.2 The Crisis in 2016–18|264
2|3 Conclusion|267
2|References|268
1|16 Should Appellate Body Members Work Full Time?|270
2|1 The Appellate Body in Theory: A Part-Time Job|270
2|2 The Appellate Body in Practice: A Full Time Commitment|275
2|3 Searching for Consensus|281
2|4 Weighing the Pros and Cons|286
2|5 Final Remarks|292
2|References|294
1|17 The WTO Appellate Body as a Trailblazer—Facilitation of Appellate Mechanism Discussion in Other International Courts|299
2|1 Introduction—Appellate Body’s Contribution and Ripple Effect|299
2|2 International Adjudicative Bodies with Appellate Review Systems|301
3|2.1 International Courts with Appellate Mechanisms|302
3|2.2 Other Forms of (Quasi)-appellate Judicial Review|309
3|2.3 Non-interstate Dispute Settlement Mechanisms|311
3|2.4 The WTO’s Appellate Body as a Unique Example|316
2|3 Institutional Aspect—Benefits of Having an Appellate Mechanism|317
3|3.1 Enhancement of Rule of Law|317
3|3.2 Trust for Judicialization and Institutionalization|319
3|3.3 Confidence in a Multilateral Arrangement|319
2|4 Legal Aspect—Testing Grounds for Legal Issues Associated with Appeal|320
3|4.1 Scope of Appeals—Legal Issues Only Versus Both Legal and Factual Issues|320
3|4.2 Standard of Appellate Review|321
3|4.3 Remand Issue|322
2|5 Concluding Thought—Importance of Maintaining and Expanding the Appellate Body’s Contribution|324
2|References|324
1|18 WTO AB as a Model for Other Adjudicatory Bodies—The Case of EU’s Investment Court System|327
2|1 Introduction|327
2|2 Historical Proposals|329
2|3 Institutional Design and Adjudicatory Powers|331
2|4 Procedural Transparency|335
2|5 Status and Enforceability of Rulings|338
2|6 Concluding Remarks|341
2|References|342