File #2349: "2018_Book_BokoHaramAndInternationalLaw.pdf"
Testo
1|Dedication|5
1|Preface|6
1|Acknowledgements|8
1|Contents|9
1|About the Editors and Contributors|12
1|Part I: Violence and Statehood: International Law and New Insurgencies in Africa|17
2|Chapter 1: On the Brink? The Nigerian State and the Making of Boko Haram|18
3|1.1 Introduction|18
3|1.2 Terrorism and International Law at a Glance|20
3|1.3 Nigeria and Its Socio-Economic and Political Fault Lines|23
3|1.4 The Rise of Boko Haram Terrorism and the Collections in This Volume|24
3|References|28
2|Chapter 2: Dialectics of Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Violent Strategy in Africa|31
3|2.1 Introduction|31
3|2.2 Self-Determination and Conceptual Quandaries: Some Critical Questions|32
3|2.3 Problematics of Statehood, Sovereignty and Self-Determination in Africa|37
3|2.4 Web of Violence and the Future of Intra-Boundary Contestations in Africa|41
3|2.5 Conclusions|44
3|References|45
2|Chapter 3: Vipers Are Offsprings of Dragons: A Fanonian Analysis of Violent Conflicts in Africa with Specific Reference to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria|47
3|3.1 Introduction|47
3|3.2 Some Theories of Violence and Fanon’s Thesis|48
3|3.3 Colonialism and the Seed of Violence in Africa|53
3|3.4 The Violent Nature and Character of the Nigerian State and Politics|57
4|3.4.1 Violent Nature and Character of the Nigerian State|59
5|3.4.1.1 The Tiv Riots of 1960 and 1964 and Their Aftermaths|59
5|3.4.1.2 The Niger Delta Militancy and Its Aftermath|61
5|3.4.1.3 The Violent Suppression of the Mass Protests Against the Removal of Fuel Subsidy of January 2012|63
4|3.4.2 The Violent Nature and Character of Nigerian Politics|65
3|3.5 The Nexus Between the Violent Character of the Nigerian State and Politics and the Boko Haram Insurgency|68
3|3.6 Fanon’s Theory of Violence and the Boko Haram Insurgency|72
3|3.7 Conclusion|75
3|References|75
2|Chapter 4: Responding to Foreign Insurgencies in the Eastern DRC|81
3|4.1 Overview of Foreign Insurgencies Acting in the Eastern DRC|81
4|4.1.1 ADF/NALU|81
5|4.1.1.1 Background|81
5|4.1.1.2 Aims and Objectives|82
5|4.1.1.3 Leadership and Networks|82
5|4.1.1.4 Operations|83
4|4.1.2 FDLR|84
5|4.1.2.1 Background|84
5|4.1.2.2 Aims and Objectives|85
5|4.1.2.3 Leadership, Strength and Networks|85
5|4.1.2.4 Key Operations|86
4|4.1.3 FNL|87
4|4.1.4 LRA|87
5|4.1.4.1 Background|87
5|4.1.4.2 Aims and Objectives|88
5|4.1.4.3 Leadership, Networks and Strength|88
5|4.1.4.4 Key Operations|89
3|4.2 Responses to Foreign Insurgencies in the DRC|90
3|4.3 Responses from the DRC|91
3|4.4 Responses from the International Community|92
4|4.4.1 National Governments|92
4|4.4.2 Regional Organisations|93
3|4.5 Responses from the United Nations|93
3|4.6 Conclusion|94
3|References|95
1|Part II: Terrorism, Boko Haram and the Classification of Armed Conflicts in International Law|97
2|Chapter 5: International Law Response to Terrorism: Boko Haram in Perspective|98
3|5.1 Introduction|98
3|5.2 In Search of a Meaning|100
4|5.2.1 Origins of the Term ‘Terrorism’|100
4|5.2.2 Towards a Definition of ‘Terrorism’|101
3|5.3 International Law Response to Terrorism|107
4|5.3.1 A Sectoral Approach|107
4|5.3.2 An Institutional Approach|111
5|5.3.2.1 The United Nations and Counterterrorism|111
5|5.3.2.2 Regional Organisations and Counterterrorism|114
3|5.4 Terrorism and the Use of Force|117
3|5.5 The Right of Self-Defence Against Terrorist Attacks|118
3|5.6 Enforcement Action|121
3|5.7 Terrorism and International Criminal Law|122
4|5.7.1 Towards Terrorism as a Distinct Offence in International Law|122
4|5.7.2 An International Court with Jurisdiction Over Terrorism?|124
3|5.8 International Law and Boko Haram|127
3|5.9 Conclusion|131
3|References|132
2|Chapter 6: Terrorism and Cross-Border Insurgency as New Threats and Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa: The Boko Haram Insurgency|134
3|6.1 Introduction|134
3|6.2 A Brief Overview of Boko Haram and the Classification of Armed Conflicts Under International Humanitarian Law|136
4|6.2.1 The Status of Boko Haram|136
3|6.3 Terrorism and Trans-Boundary Operations|139
3|6.4 Means Employed by Various Groups Towards Achieving Their Objectives|140
4|6.4.1 Intensified Ideological Extremism|140
4|6.4.2 Enhanced Operational Capabilities|141
4|6.4.3 Flexible Organizational Network|141
4|6.4.4 Increased Weapon System Lethality|142
4|6.4.5 Intended Mass Casualties: Mayhem|142
4|6.4.6 Targeted Economic Disruption|142
4|6.4.7 Exploited Mass Media Marketing|143
3|6.5 Enablers of Terror|143
4|6.5.1 The Gap Between What Is Expected of Government and What Can Be Delivered|144
4|6.5.2 Governmental Responsibilities|144
4|6.5.3 Societal Responsibilities|145
4|6.5.4 Individual Responsibilities|145
4|6.5.5 Security/Operational Responsibilities|145
3|6.6 Proposals by Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Towards Solving the Threats Posed by Boko Haram|146
4|6.6.1 At the Security Level|146
4|6.6.2 At the African and International Levels|146
3|6.7 Conclusion|147
3|References|147
2|Chapter 7: The Boko Haram Insurgency: Characterisation and Implications Under Municipal and International Laws|149
3|7.1 Introduction|149
3|7.2 Criteria for the Existence of Armed Conflict|150
3|7.3 The Perspective of Case Law|151
3|7.4 Features of the Conflict in Northeast Nigeria|152
3|7.5 Violent Response by Nigerian Security Forces|154
3|7.6 Responsibility to Respect International Humanitarian Law by Parties to a Conflict|155
3|7.7 Determining the Character of the Armed Confrontation|155
4|7.7.1 Intensity of the Armed Confrontation|156
4|7.7.2 Ability to Mount Sustained and Concerted Military Operations|156
4|7.7.3 Boko Haram as an Organised Armed Group and Under a Responsible Command|157
4|7.7.4 Exercise of Control Over a Part of Territory|158
3|7.8 The Threshold of Non-international Armed Conflict with Reference to the Boko Haram Insurgency|159
3|7.9 Implications Under Municipal and International Laws|161
4|7.9.1 Commitments Under Relevant Treaties|161
4|7.9.2 Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law|162
3|7.10 Regional Security Implications|163
3|7.11 Conclusion|163
3|References|164
2|Chapter 8: Calibrating the Legal Obligations in the Ongoing Non-international Armed Conflict in Nigeria|166
3|8.1 Introduction|166
3|8.2 Does the Boko Haram Situation Amount to a Non-international Armed Conflict?|167
4|8.2.1 Facts Relating to Armed Activities of Boko Haram|167
4|8.2.2 Legal Basis for Determining the Existence of a Non-international Armed Conflict|170
4|8.2.3 Does IHL Exclude BH from the Application of Municipal Criminal and Other Laws?|174
4|8.2.4 Characterisation of Boko Haram|175
3|8.3 Legal Consequences of the Involvement of the Civilian Joint Task Force|177
4|8.3.1 Combatants or Not?|177
4|8.3.2 Command Responsibility for the CJTF|178
3|8.4 Effect of the Participation of Bordering States|180
4|8.4.1 Does the Involvement of Multiple States Make the Conflict ‘International’?|180
4|8.4.2 Warnings from the Armed Activities Case|180
3|8.5 Asymmetrical Nature of the Conflict and the Role of Non-military Law Enforcement Authorities|181
4|8.5.1 Arrest or Kill?|181
4|8.5.2 Direct Participation of Non-military Law Enforcement Authorities|183
3|8.6 Conclusion|185
3|References|185
1|Part III: Boko Haram and Radical Ideology in Islamic Jurisprudence and International Law|188
2|Chapter 9: Boko Haram: On the Road to Algiers?|189
3|9.1 Introduction|189
3|9.2 The Emergence of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria|190
3|9.3 Atrocities of Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security Architecture|192
3|9.4 Boko Haram Reaches Out North and the Algerian Connection|196
3|9.5 Foreign Response to Boko Haram|198
3|9.6 National Response to Boko Haram|203
3|9.7 Boko Haram Insurgency Under International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law|206
4|9.7.1 International Humanitarian Law|206
4|9.7.2 International Criminal Law|208
3|9.8 Conclusion|209
3|References|210
2|Chapter 10: Boko Haram’s Radical Ideology and Islamic Jurisprudence|215
3|10.1 Introduction|215
3|10.2 Boko Haram and Its Ideology|216
4|10.2.1 Insurgent Activities of Boko Haram|218
3|10.3 Examining Boko Haram’s Condemnation of Western/Secular Institution in the Light of Islamic Jurisprudence|220
3|10.4 Examining Boko Haram’s Insurgency in the Light of Islamic Jurisprudence|227
4|10.4.1 Justification in the Use of Force in Islam (Islamic Jus ad Bellum)|227
4|10.4.2 The Competent Authority to Declare the Use of Force|229
4|10.4.3 Aggressive War in Islam|230
4|10.4.4 The Conduct of War (Islamic Jus in Bello)|233
3|10.5 Incompatibility of the Insurgent Activities of Boko Haram in the Light of Islamic Jus ad Bellum and Islamic Jus in Bello|240
4|10.5.1 Boko Haram and Islamic Jus ad Bellum|240
4|10.5.2 Boko Haram and Islamic Jus in Bello|241
3|10.6 Conclusion|242
3|References|243
2|Chapter 11: Government Regulation of Freedom of Religion in a Democratic Society: Islamic Preaching Board Laws and Boko Haram in Nigeria|246
3|11.1 Introduction|246
3|11.2 Conceptual Clarification|249
4|11.2.1 Islamic Religious Preaching|249
4|11.2.2 Regulation of Islamic Religious Preaching|250
4|11.2.3 Boko Haram|250
3|11.3 Islamic Preaching Board Laws and Boko Haram|251
4|11.3.1 Historical Context|251
4|11.3.2 Borno State Islamic Preaching Board and Boko Haram|256
4|11.3.3 The Experience in Niger State|257
4|11.3.4 Consequences of Religious Regulation|258
4|11.3.5 Changes in the Preaching Board Laws|259
4|11.3.6 Legal Considerations|259
3|11.4 Conclusion|261
3|11.5 Recommendation|262
3|References|263
1|Part IV: Wither International Law? Women, Children and Girls in the Boko Haram Insurgency|265
2|Chapter 12: The Weaponisation of Women by Boko Haram and the Prospects of Accountability|266
3|12.1 Introduction|266
3|12.2 A Brief Sketch of the Evolution of the Weaponisation of Women in Boko Haram’s Tactics|268
4|12.2.1 Women as Targets of Boko Haram Attacks|270
4|12.2.2 Women as Operatives and Suicide Bombers|271
4|12.2.3 Women as ‘Wives’ and Sex Slaves|272
4|12.2.4 Women as Procreators of Boko Haram’s Next Generation of Jihadists|273
4|12.2.5 Women as Boko Haram’s Recruitment Strategy|275
4|12.2.6 Women as Boko Haram’s Baits and Chips|275
3|12.3 Weaponising Women in the Boko Haram’s Insurgency|276
4|12.3.1 Women as War Booty in the Jihad Against Infidels|276
4|12.3.2 Women as Coerced Members of Boko Haram|276
4|12.3.3 Women as Cajoled Members of Boko Haram|277
4|12.3.4 Women as Objects of Boko Haram Rituals and Cannibalism|278
4|12.3.5 Women as Volunteer Wives and Members of Boko Haram|279
3|12.4 Women’s Motivations for Boko Haram Membership|279
3|12.5 How Boko Haram Justifies Its Weaponisation of Women|280
3|12.6 The Legal Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Armed Conflict|282
4|12.6.1 Specific Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Conflict Under International Humanitarian Law|283
4|12.6.2 Specific Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Conflict Under International Human Rights Law|285
4|12.6.3 Specific Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Armed Conflict Under International Criminal Law|288
3|12.7 The Fate of Women in the Aftermath of Boko Haram and the Prospects of Accountability|289
4|12.7.1 The Plight of Women|289
4|12.7.2 The Prospects of Accountability|289
4|12.7.3 The Fate of Women Is Sealed in Nigeria’s Pervasive Culture of Impunity|291
3|12.8 Conclusion|292
3|References|293
2|Chapter 13: Protecting Conflict-Induced Displacees in Northern Nigeria: Assessing the Compliance of the State with Article 9(2) of the Kampala Convention|299
3|13.1 Introduction|299
3|13.2 The Insurgency, Violence and Displacement|301
3|13.3 Domestication|303
3|13.4 The Obligation Under Article 9(2) of the Kampala Convention|304
3|13.5 Concluding Remarks|311
3|References|312
2|Chapter 14: Boko Haram and the Abduction of Schoolgirls in Nigeria: Reflecting on ‘Gender-Based Crimes’ as a Legal Misnomer|317
3|14.1 Introduction|317
3|14.2 Boko Haram Abduction of Over 250 Schoolgirls in 2014|319
4|14.2.1 The Abduction of Schoolgirls as Gender-Based Discrimination|319
4|14.2.2 The Abduction of Schoolgirls as Gender-Based Violence|320
3|14.3 Does the Abduction of the Schoolgirls Constitute Gender-Based Crimes in International Criminal Law?|321
4|14.3.1 Legal Scholars and Their Thoughts on ‘Gender-Based Crimes’|322
3|14.4 The Categorisation of Gender-Based Crimes: The Reticence of International Criminal Law Instruments|324
4|14.4.1 International Criminal Law Instrument(s) Before 1945|325
4|14.4.2 The Charters of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Nuremberg, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Tokyo|325
4|14.4.3 Post-1945 Developments in International Criminal Law|327
5|14.4.3.1 The Genocide Convention|328
5|14.4.3.2 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (Hereafter Supplementary Convention)|330
5|14.4.3.3 The Work of the International Law Commission (ILC)|331
6|The 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (the 1954 Draft Code of Offences)|331
6|The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Hereafter the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes)|332
5|14.4.3.4 The Convention Against Torture|333
5|14.4.3.5 The Statutes of the United Nations’ ad Hoc Tribunals|334
6|The Statute of the ICTY|334
6|The Statute of the ICTR|336
5|14.4.3.6 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)|338
3|14.5 Have There Been Prosecutions for ‘Gender-Based Crimes’ at the International Criminal Tribunals?|340
4|14.5.1 The Nuremberg Trials|341
4|14.5.2 Allied Control Council Law No. 10 of 1945|342
4|14.5.3 The IMTFE, Tokyo|343
4|14.5.4 The UN ad Hoc Tribunals|345
5|14.5.4.1 Gender-Based Violence as Genocide|345
5|14.5.4.2 Violence Against Women as a Crime Against Humanity|347
5|14.5.4.3 Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II|349
4|14.5.5 The Overlapping Provisions of the Different Crimes|349
3|14.6 Conclusion|351
3|References|352
1|Part V: Responding to Insurgency: Boko Haram and the (In)Adequate Reach of International Law|356
2|Chapter 15: Eradicating Extremism: A Ten Cs Approach|357
3|15.1 Prologue|357
3|15.2 The Causes of Extremism in Africa|358
3|15.3 How to Eradicate Extremism in Africa|360
4|15.3.1 Conflict Prevention Through Broad-Based Socio-Economic Development|360
4|15.3.2 Countering Extremism with Respect for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law|361
4|15.3.3 Capability of Security Agents to Protect Populations at Risk|362
4|15.3.4 Community Empowerment to Deter Extremist Groups and Control Borders|363
4|15.3.5 Choking Off Extremists’ Financing|364
4|15.3.6 Combating Corruption and Promoting the Rule of Law and Good Governance|365
4|15.3.7 Curbing Terrorist Propaganda and Recruitment Through the Internet|366
4|15.3.8 Counter-radicalisation and De-radicalisation Programmes|367
4|15.3.9 Condemning Violence and Correcting Misinterpretations|368
4|15.3.10 Communication Through Cross- and Intra-cultural, Faith and Political Dialogue|369
3|15.4 Epilogue|370
3|References|372
2|Chapter 16: Beyond the Law to Socio-Legal Intervention: The Boko Haram Insurgency and the Nigerian Child|375
3|16.1 Introduction|375
3|16.2 The Historical Background of Northern and Southern Nigeria|377
3|16.3 Emergence of the Boko Haram and Militia Groups|380
3|16.4 Nigeria’s Responsibilities Under National and International Laws: Is a Legal Regime Sufficient?|381
4|16.4.1 The Response of the Law to the Emergence of Militia Groups|384
4|16.4.2 Nigerian Law and Emerging Acts of Terror-Specific Response to Boko Haram|385
3|16.5 Socio-Legal Approach to Curbing the Boko Haram Menace|386
3|16.6 Conclusions|390
3|16.7 Recommendations|390
3|References|391
2|Chapter 17: After Dusk They Came: International Responsibility of States in Relation to Human Rights Violations Committed by Rebel Groups|394
3|17.1 Introduction|394
3|17.2 Nigerian Abduction and Ukrainian Plane Downing: Is There Anything to Compare?|395
3|17.3 When Pilate Tries to Wash His Hands: Responsibility of States in Relation to Acts of Private Entities Under General International Law|397
4|17.3.1 Insurgents Are Not State Organs|397
4|17.3.2 But Their Acts May Still Involve State Responsibility|399
3|17.4 States as Guardian Angels: Is It Not Too Much to Expect?|400
4|17.4.1 Positive Obligations Under Relevant Human Rights Treaties|400
4|17.4.2 Within or Without? Much Ado About States’ Jurisdiction|402
5|17.4.2.1 European Court’s Position: Jurisdiction as the Actual Power to Secure Human Rights and Freedoms: Thus It May Be Tailored|402
5|17.4.2.2 African Commission’s Position: Territorial Jurisdiction: A Competence That Is Not to Be Tailored|405
4|17.4.3 Was There Anything to Be Done to Avoid Casualties?|407
5|17.4.3.1 Positive Obligation in Substantive Aspect|408
5|17.4.3.2 Positive Obligation in Procedural Aspect|412
4|17.4.4 Attribution: Everybody Knows|413
3|17.5 Conclusion|413
3|References|415
2|Chapter 18: Boko Haram and the Ambivalence of International Legal Response|417
3|18.1 Terrorism, Boko Haram and International Law|417
3|18.2 Reconstructing Nigeria’s Many Fault Lines and Responding to Insurgencies|418
3|18.3 Forging a Coherent Response to Insurgencies Amidst Ethnic and Religious Diversity|420
3|18.4 The Legal Regulation of Use of Force Against Boko Haram|421
3|18.5 The Spread of Radical Ideology and the Groundswell of Terrorism in West Africa: Preparing for the Dangers Ahead|423
3|18.6 Differing to Sovereignty: International Protection of Women and Girls During the Boko Haram Insurgency|425
3|18.7 The International Law Obligations of State to Respond to the Boko Haram Insurgency and Prevent Violations|427
3|18.8 Conclusion and Future Research|429
3|References|430
1|Preface|6
1|Acknowledgements|8
1|Contents|9
1|About the Editors and Contributors|12
1|Part I: Violence and Statehood: International Law and New Insurgencies in Africa|17
2|Chapter 1: On the Brink? The Nigerian State and the Making of Boko Haram|18
3|1.1 Introduction|18
3|1.2 Terrorism and International Law at a Glance|20
3|1.3 Nigeria and Its Socio-Economic and Political Fault Lines|23
3|1.4 The Rise of Boko Haram Terrorism and the Collections in This Volume|24
3|References|28
2|Chapter 2: Dialectics of Sovereignty, Self-Determination and Violent Strategy in Africa|31
3|2.1 Introduction|31
3|2.2 Self-Determination and Conceptual Quandaries: Some Critical Questions|32
3|2.3 Problematics of Statehood, Sovereignty and Self-Determination in Africa|37
3|2.4 Web of Violence and the Future of Intra-Boundary Contestations in Africa|41
3|2.5 Conclusions|44
3|References|45
2|Chapter 3: Vipers Are Offsprings of Dragons: A Fanonian Analysis of Violent Conflicts in Africa with Specific Reference to the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria|47
3|3.1 Introduction|47
3|3.2 Some Theories of Violence and Fanon’s Thesis|48
3|3.3 Colonialism and the Seed of Violence in Africa|53
3|3.4 The Violent Nature and Character of the Nigerian State and Politics|57
4|3.4.1 Violent Nature and Character of the Nigerian State|59
5|3.4.1.1 The Tiv Riots of 1960 and 1964 and Their Aftermaths|59
5|3.4.1.2 The Niger Delta Militancy and Its Aftermath|61
5|3.4.1.3 The Violent Suppression of the Mass Protests Against the Removal of Fuel Subsidy of January 2012|63
4|3.4.2 The Violent Nature and Character of Nigerian Politics|65
3|3.5 The Nexus Between the Violent Character of the Nigerian State and Politics and the Boko Haram Insurgency|68
3|3.6 Fanon’s Theory of Violence and the Boko Haram Insurgency|72
3|3.7 Conclusion|75
3|References|75
2|Chapter 4: Responding to Foreign Insurgencies in the Eastern DRC|81
3|4.1 Overview of Foreign Insurgencies Acting in the Eastern DRC|81
4|4.1.1 ADF/NALU|81
5|4.1.1.1 Background|81
5|4.1.1.2 Aims and Objectives|82
5|4.1.1.3 Leadership and Networks|82
5|4.1.1.4 Operations|83
4|4.1.2 FDLR|84
5|4.1.2.1 Background|84
5|4.1.2.2 Aims and Objectives|85
5|4.1.2.3 Leadership, Strength and Networks|85
5|4.1.2.4 Key Operations|86
4|4.1.3 FNL|87
4|4.1.4 LRA|87
5|4.1.4.1 Background|87
5|4.1.4.2 Aims and Objectives|88
5|4.1.4.3 Leadership, Networks and Strength|88
5|4.1.4.4 Key Operations|89
3|4.2 Responses to Foreign Insurgencies in the DRC|90
3|4.3 Responses from the DRC|91
3|4.4 Responses from the International Community|92
4|4.4.1 National Governments|92
4|4.4.2 Regional Organisations|93
3|4.5 Responses from the United Nations|93
3|4.6 Conclusion|94
3|References|95
1|Part II: Terrorism, Boko Haram and the Classification of Armed Conflicts in International Law|97
2|Chapter 5: International Law Response to Terrorism: Boko Haram in Perspective|98
3|5.1 Introduction|98
3|5.2 In Search of a Meaning|100
4|5.2.1 Origins of the Term ‘Terrorism’|100
4|5.2.2 Towards a Definition of ‘Terrorism’|101
3|5.3 International Law Response to Terrorism|107
4|5.3.1 A Sectoral Approach|107
4|5.3.2 An Institutional Approach|111
5|5.3.2.1 The United Nations and Counterterrorism|111
5|5.3.2.2 Regional Organisations and Counterterrorism|114
3|5.4 Terrorism and the Use of Force|117
3|5.5 The Right of Self-Defence Against Terrorist Attacks|118
3|5.6 Enforcement Action|121
3|5.7 Terrorism and International Criminal Law|122
4|5.7.1 Towards Terrorism as a Distinct Offence in International Law|122
4|5.7.2 An International Court with Jurisdiction Over Terrorism?|124
3|5.8 International Law and Boko Haram|127
3|5.9 Conclusion|131
3|References|132
2|Chapter 6: Terrorism and Cross-Border Insurgency as New Threats and Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa: The Boko Haram Insurgency|134
3|6.1 Introduction|134
3|6.2 A Brief Overview of Boko Haram and the Classification of Armed Conflicts Under International Humanitarian Law|136
4|6.2.1 The Status of Boko Haram|136
3|6.3 Terrorism and Trans-Boundary Operations|139
3|6.4 Means Employed by Various Groups Towards Achieving Their Objectives|140
4|6.4.1 Intensified Ideological Extremism|140
4|6.4.2 Enhanced Operational Capabilities|141
4|6.4.3 Flexible Organizational Network|141
4|6.4.4 Increased Weapon System Lethality|142
4|6.4.5 Intended Mass Casualties: Mayhem|142
4|6.4.6 Targeted Economic Disruption|142
4|6.4.7 Exploited Mass Media Marketing|143
3|6.5 Enablers of Terror|143
4|6.5.1 The Gap Between What Is Expected of Government and What Can Be Delivered|144
4|6.5.2 Governmental Responsibilities|144
4|6.5.3 Societal Responsibilities|145
4|6.5.4 Individual Responsibilities|145
4|6.5.5 Security/Operational Responsibilities|145
3|6.6 Proposals by Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence Towards Solving the Threats Posed by Boko Haram|146
4|6.6.1 At the Security Level|146
4|6.6.2 At the African and International Levels|146
3|6.7 Conclusion|147
3|References|147
2|Chapter 7: The Boko Haram Insurgency: Characterisation and Implications Under Municipal and International Laws|149
3|7.1 Introduction|149
3|7.2 Criteria for the Existence of Armed Conflict|150
3|7.3 The Perspective of Case Law|151
3|7.4 Features of the Conflict in Northeast Nigeria|152
3|7.5 Violent Response by Nigerian Security Forces|154
3|7.6 Responsibility to Respect International Humanitarian Law by Parties to a Conflict|155
3|7.7 Determining the Character of the Armed Confrontation|155
4|7.7.1 Intensity of the Armed Confrontation|156
4|7.7.2 Ability to Mount Sustained and Concerted Military Operations|156
4|7.7.3 Boko Haram as an Organised Armed Group and Under a Responsible Command|157
4|7.7.4 Exercise of Control Over a Part of Territory|158
3|7.8 The Threshold of Non-international Armed Conflict with Reference to the Boko Haram Insurgency|159
3|7.9 Implications Under Municipal and International Laws|161
4|7.9.1 Commitments Under Relevant Treaties|161
4|7.9.2 Individual Criminal Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law|162
3|7.10 Regional Security Implications|163
3|7.11 Conclusion|163
3|References|164
2|Chapter 8: Calibrating the Legal Obligations in the Ongoing Non-international Armed Conflict in Nigeria|166
3|8.1 Introduction|166
3|8.2 Does the Boko Haram Situation Amount to a Non-international Armed Conflict?|167
4|8.2.1 Facts Relating to Armed Activities of Boko Haram|167
4|8.2.2 Legal Basis for Determining the Existence of a Non-international Armed Conflict|170
4|8.2.3 Does IHL Exclude BH from the Application of Municipal Criminal and Other Laws?|174
4|8.2.4 Characterisation of Boko Haram|175
3|8.3 Legal Consequences of the Involvement of the Civilian Joint Task Force|177
4|8.3.1 Combatants or Not?|177
4|8.3.2 Command Responsibility for the CJTF|178
3|8.4 Effect of the Participation of Bordering States|180
4|8.4.1 Does the Involvement of Multiple States Make the Conflict ‘International’?|180
4|8.4.2 Warnings from the Armed Activities Case|180
3|8.5 Asymmetrical Nature of the Conflict and the Role of Non-military Law Enforcement Authorities|181
4|8.5.1 Arrest or Kill?|181
4|8.5.2 Direct Participation of Non-military Law Enforcement Authorities|183
3|8.6 Conclusion|185
3|References|185
1|Part III: Boko Haram and Radical Ideology in Islamic Jurisprudence and International Law|188
2|Chapter 9: Boko Haram: On the Road to Algiers?|189
3|9.1 Introduction|189
3|9.2 The Emergence of the Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria|190
3|9.3 Atrocities of Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security Architecture|192
3|9.4 Boko Haram Reaches Out North and the Algerian Connection|196
3|9.5 Foreign Response to Boko Haram|198
3|9.6 National Response to Boko Haram|203
3|9.7 Boko Haram Insurgency Under International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law|206
4|9.7.1 International Humanitarian Law|206
4|9.7.2 International Criminal Law|208
3|9.8 Conclusion|209
3|References|210
2|Chapter 10: Boko Haram’s Radical Ideology and Islamic Jurisprudence|215
3|10.1 Introduction|215
3|10.2 Boko Haram and Its Ideology|216
4|10.2.1 Insurgent Activities of Boko Haram|218
3|10.3 Examining Boko Haram’s Condemnation of Western/Secular Institution in the Light of Islamic Jurisprudence|220
3|10.4 Examining Boko Haram’s Insurgency in the Light of Islamic Jurisprudence|227
4|10.4.1 Justification in the Use of Force in Islam (Islamic Jus ad Bellum)|227
4|10.4.2 The Competent Authority to Declare the Use of Force|229
4|10.4.3 Aggressive War in Islam|230
4|10.4.4 The Conduct of War (Islamic Jus in Bello)|233
3|10.5 Incompatibility of the Insurgent Activities of Boko Haram in the Light of Islamic Jus ad Bellum and Islamic Jus in Bello|240
4|10.5.1 Boko Haram and Islamic Jus ad Bellum|240
4|10.5.2 Boko Haram and Islamic Jus in Bello|241
3|10.6 Conclusion|242
3|References|243
2|Chapter 11: Government Regulation of Freedom of Religion in a Democratic Society: Islamic Preaching Board Laws and Boko Haram in Nigeria|246
3|11.1 Introduction|246
3|11.2 Conceptual Clarification|249
4|11.2.1 Islamic Religious Preaching|249
4|11.2.2 Regulation of Islamic Religious Preaching|250
4|11.2.3 Boko Haram|250
3|11.3 Islamic Preaching Board Laws and Boko Haram|251
4|11.3.1 Historical Context|251
4|11.3.2 Borno State Islamic Preaching Board and Boko Haram|256
4|11.3.3 The Experience in Niger State|257
4|11.3.4 Consequences of Religious Regulation|258
4|11.3.5 Changes in the Preaching Board Laws|259
4|11.3.6 Legal Considerations|259
3|11.4 Conclusion|261
3|11.5 Recommendation|262
3|References|263
1|Part IV: Wither International Law? Women, Children and Girls in the Boko Haram Insurgency|265
2|Chapter 12: The Weaponisation of Women by Boko Haram and the Prospects of Accountability|266
3|12.1 Introduction|266
3|12.2 A Brief Sketch of the Evolution of the Weaponisation of Women in Boko Haram’s Tactics|268
4|12.2.1 Women as Targets of Boko Haram Attacks|270
4|12.2.2 Women as Operatives and Suicide Bombers|271
4|12.2.3 Women as ‘Wives’ and Sex Slaves|272
4|12.2.4 Women as Procreators of Boko Haram’s Next Generation of Jihadists|273
4|12.2.5 Women as Boko Haram’s Recruitment Strategy|275
4|12.2.6 Women as Boko Haram’s Baits and Chips|275
3|12.3 Weaponising Women in the Boko Haram’s Insurgency|276
4|12.3.1 Women as War Booty in the Jihad Against Infidels|276
4|12.3.2 Women as Coerced Members of Boko Haram|276
4|12.3.3 Women as Cajoled Members of Boko Haram|277
4|12.3.4 Women as Objects of Boko Haram Rituals and Cannibalism|278
4|12.3.5 Women as Volunteer Wives and Members of Boko Haram|279
3|12.4 Women’s Motivations for Boko Haram Membership|279
3|12.5 How Boko Haram Justifies Its Weaponisation of Women|280
3|12.6 The Legal Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Armed Conflict|282
4|12.6.1 Specific Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Conflict Under International Humanitarian Law|283
4|12.6.2 Specific Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Conflict Under International Human Rights Law|285
4|12.6.3 Specific Protection of Women in the Boko Haram Armed Conflict Under International Criminal Law|288
3|12.7 The Fate of Women in the Aftermath of Boko Haram and the Prospects of Accountability|289
4|12.7.1 The Plight of Women|289
4|12.7.2 The Prospects of Accountability|289
4|12.7.3 The Fate of Women Is Sealed in Nigeria’s Pervasive Culture of Impunity|291
3|12.8 Conclusion|292
3|References|293
2|Chapter 13: Protecting Conflict-Induced Displacees in Northern Nigeria: Assessing the Compliance of the State with Article 9(2) of the Kampala Convention|299
3|13.1 Introduction|299
3|13.2 The Insurgency, Violence and Displacement|301
3|13.3 Domestication|303
3|13.4 The Obligation Under Article 9(2) of the Kampala Convention|304
3|13.5 Concluding Remarks|311
3|References|312
2|Chapter 14: Boko Haram and the Abduction of Schoolgirls in Nigeria: Reflecting on ‘Gender-Based Crimes’ as a Legal Misnomer|317
3|14.1 Introduction|317
3|14.2 Boko Haram Abduction of Over 250 Schoolgirls in 2014|319
4|14.2.1 The Abduction of Schoolgirls as Gender-Based Discrimination|319
4|14.2.2 The Abduction of Schoolgirls as Gender-Based Violence|320
3|14.3 Does the Abduction of the Schoolgirls Constitute Gender-Based Crimes in International Criminal Law?|321
4|14.3.1 Legal Scholars and Their Thoughts on ‘Gender-Based Crimes’|322
3|14.4 The Categorisation of Gender-Based Crimes: The Reticence of International Criminal Law Instruments|324
4|14.4.1 International Criminal Law Instrument(s) Before 1945|325
4|14.4.2 The Charters of the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Nuremberg, and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE), Tokyo|325
4|14.4.3 Post-1945 Developments in International Criminal Law|327
5|14.4.3.1 The Genocide Convention|328
5|14.4.3.2 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery (Hereafter Supplementary Convention)|330
5|14.4.3.3 The Work of the International Law Commission (ILC)|331
6|The 1954 Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (the 1954 Draft Code of Offences)|331
6|The 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind (Hereafter the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes)|332
5|14.4.3.4 The Convention Against Torture|333
5|14.4.3.5 The Statutes of the United Nations’ ad Hoc Tribunals|334
6|The Statute of the ICTY|334
6|The Statute of the ICTR|336
5|14.4.3.6 The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)|338
3|14.5 Have There Been Prosecutions for ‘Gender-Based Crimes’ at the International Criminal Tribunals?|340
4|14.5.1 The Nuremberg Trials|341
4|14.5.2 Allied Control Council Law No. 10 of 1945|342
4|14.5.3 The IMTFE, Tokyo|343
4|14.5.4 The UN ad Hoc Tribunals|345
5|14.5.4.1 Gender-Based Violence as Genocide|345
5|14.5.4.2 Violence Against Women as a Crime Against Humanity|347
5|14.5.4.3 Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II|349
4|14.5.5 The Overlapping Provisions of the Different Crimes|349
3|14.6 Conclusion|351
3|References|352
1|Part V: Responding to Insurgency: Boko Haram and the (In)Adequate Reach of International Law|356
2|Chapter 15: Eradicating Extremism: A Ten Cs Approach|357
3|15.1 Prologue|357
3|15.2 The Causes of Extremism in Africa|358
3|15.3 How to Eradicate Extremism in Africa|360
4|15.3.1 Conflict Prevention Through Broad-Based Socio-Economic Development|360
4|15.3.2 Countering Extremism with Respect for Human Rights and Humanitarian Law|361
4|15.3.3 Capability of Security Agents to Protect Populations at Risk|362
4|15.3.4 Community Empowerment to Deter Extremist Groups and Control Borders|363
4|15.3.5 Choking Off Extremists’ Financing|364
4|15.3.6 Combating Corruption and Promoting the Rule of Law and Good Governance|365
4|15.3.7 Curbing Terrorist Propaganda and Recruitment Through the Internet|366
4|15.3.8 Counter-radicalisation and De-radicalisation Programmes|367
4|15.3.9 Condemning Violence and Correcting Misinterpretations|368
4|15.3.10 Communication Through Cross- and Intra-cultural, Faith and Political Dialogue|369
3|15.4 Epilogue|370
3|References|372
2|Chapter 16: Beyond the Law to Socio-Legal Intervention: The Boko Haram Insurgency and the Nigerian Child|375
3|16.1 Introduction|375
3|16.2 The Historical Background of Northern and Southern Nigeria|377
3|16.3 Emergence of the Boko Haram and Militia Groups|380
3|16.4 Nigeria’s Responsibilities Under National and International Laws: Is a Legal Regime Sufficient?|381
4|16.4.1 The Response of the Law to the Emergence of Militia Groups|384
4|16.4.2 Nigerian Law and Emerging Acts of Terror-Specific Response to Boko Haram|385
3|16.5 Socio-Legal Approach to Curbing the Boko Haram Menace|386
3|16.6 Conclusions|390
3|16.7 Recommendations|390
3|References|391
2|Chapter 17: After Dusk They Came: International Responsibility of States in Relation to Human Rights Violations Committed by Rebel Groups|394
3|17.1 Introduction|394
3|17.2 Nigerian Abduction and Ukrainian Plane Downing: Is There Anything to Compare?|395
3|17.3 When Pilate Tries to Wash His Hands: Responsibility of States in Relation to Acts of Private Entities Under General International Law|397
4|17.3.1 Insurgents Are Not State Organs|397
4|17.3.2 But Their Acts May Still Involve State Responsibility|399
3|17.4 States as Guardian Angels: Is It Not Too Much to Expect?|400
4|17.4.1 Positive Obligations Under Relevant Human Rights Treaties|400
4|17.4.2 Within or Without? Much Ado About States’ Jurisdiction|402
5|17.4.2.1 European Court’s Position: Jurisdiction as the Actual Power to Secure Human Rights and Freedoms: Thus It May Be Tailored|402
5|17.4.2.2 African Commission’s Position: Territorial Jurisdiction: A Competence That Is Not to Be Tailored|405
4|17.4.3 Was There Anything to Be Done to Avoid Casualties?|407
5|17.4.3.1 Positive Obligation in Substantive Aspect|408
5|17.4.3.2 Positive Obligation in Procedural Aspect|412
4|17.4.4 Attribution: Everybody Knows|413
3|17.5 Conclusion|413
3|References|415
2|Chapter 18: Boko Haram and the Ambivalence of International Legal Response|417
3|18.1 Terrorism, Boko Haram and International Law|417
3|18.2 Reconstructing Nigeria’s Many Fault Lines and Responding to Insurgencies|418
3|18.3 Forging a Coherent Response to Insurgencies Amidst Ethnic and Religious Diversity|420
3|18.4 The Legal Regulation of Use of Force Against Boko Haram|421
3|18.5 The Spread of Radical Ideology and the Groundswell of Terrorism in West Africa: Preparing for the Dangers Ahead|423
3|18.6 Differing to Sovereignty: International Protection of Women and Girls During the Boko Haram Insurgency|425
3|18.7 The International Law Obligations of State to Respond to the Boko Haram Insurgency and Prevent Violations|427
3|18.8 Conclusion and Future Research|429
3|References|430