File #2377: "2018_Book_CoreConceptsAndContemporaryIss.pdf"
Testo
1|Acknowledgments|6
1|Contents|7
1|About the Editors|9
1|Introduction: Conceptualizing Privacy Harms and Values|10
2|1 Background Theory and Application: Critical Moments in the Development of a Philosophy of Privacy|12
2|2 Privacy and Digital Technology|13
2|3 Privacy and Social Identity|14
2|4 Organization and Content of this Volume|15
3|4.1 Privacy: Core Concepts|15
3|4.2 Personal Information Privacy|17
3|4.3 Privacy and Technology|19
3|4.4 Privacy in Different Contexts: Work, Sex, Family, and Crime|20
2|References|22
1|Part I: Privacy: Core Concepts|23
2|The Conceptual Coherence of Privacy As Developed in Law|24
3|1 Introduction|24
3|2 History|25
3|3 Privacy in Law and Ethics: Its Scope and Value|26
3|4 Arguments Connecting the Three Privacy Interests Developed in Law|33
3|5 Conclusion|35
3|References|36
2|Privacy: Concept, Value, Right?|38
3|1 Introduction|38
3|2 Concept(s) of Privacy As Descriptive?|39
3|3 Privacy As a Desideratum?|45
3|4 Right(s) to Privacy?|49
3|References|52
2|The Nature and Value of Privacy|53
3|1 Introduction|53
3|2 A Definition of Privacy|54
3|3 The Benefits and Costs of a Privacy Regime|57
3|4 A Deeper Appreciation of the Benefits of Privacy|59
3|5 The Overriding Benefit of Privacy|64
3|References|67
2|Privacy and Responsibility|68
3|1 Introduction|68
3|2 A Model for Understanding the Right to Privacy|70
3|3 How the Right to Privacy Protects the ``Drafting Space´´|72
3|4 Implications|73
4|4.1 Explanation of Some Puzzling Aspects of Privacy|73
4|4.2 Widespread vs. Localized Invasions of Privacy|74
4|4.3 Announced vs. Surreptitious Invasions of Privacy|75
4|4.4 Protection of Privacy as a Concern of the Society as a Whole|76
4|4.5 Why It Is Difficult to Respect the Right to Privacy|76
4|4.6 Two Methods of Protecting Privacy|77
3|5 Replies to Objections|79
3|References|81
1|Part II: Personal Information Privacy|82
2|Information, Privacy, and False Light|83
3|1 Introduction|83
3|2 Veridicalism and Non-veridicalism in Information Theory|84
3|3 Privacy: Factive and Propositional|86
3|4 False Light Privacy Tort|88
3|5 Conclusion|92
3|References|93
2|The Unrelenting Darkness of False Light: A Sui Generis Tort|95
3|1 Introduction and Overview|95
3|2 Warren and Brandeis on the Right to Privacy|97
4|2.1 The Right to Privacy: One´s ``Interior Equanimity´´|97
4|2.2 Warren and Brandeis on Reputation and Standing: One´s ``Social Persona´´|98
4|2.3 The Relationship Between Social Persona and Interior Equanimity|99
3|3 The Right to Privacy|100
4|3.1 Prosser on Privacy Torts|100
3|4 False Light|101
4|4.1 Robison´s Doctor, Bathed in False Light|102
4|4.2 Prosser´s Categories of Privacy Torts|103
4|4.3 False Light as Privacy Tort Versus False Light as Sui Generis Tort|105
4|4.4 The Coup de Grace: ``Coerced Divulgence´´|107
3|5 Conclusions|108
3|References|109
2|Privacy, Public Space, and Personal Information|111
3|1 Introduction|111
3|2 An Approach to the Complexity and Ambiguity of Privacy|112
3|3 The Opaqueness of ``Public´´ and ``Public Space´´|116
3|4 Personal Information, Privacy, and Harm from Commercial Interests|120
3|References|124
2|Privacy and Religious Exemptions|125
3|1 An Illustrative Case: Nikolao v. Lyon et al.|125
3|2 Mandated Disclosure: Revealing the Substance and Sincerity of Objections|127
3|3 A Traditional Conception of Religious Exemptions|129
3|4 When Moral Theology Gets Complicated|131
3|5 Religion and Conscience|133
3|6 The Law´s Expansive Conceptions of Religion|134
3|7 Conclusion|136
3|References|136
1|Part III: Privacy and Technology|138
2|The Need for Privacy Torts in an Era of Ubiquitous Disclosure and Surveillance|139
3|1 Nature and the Value of Privacy|140
4|1.1 Behavioral Patterns|140
4|1.2 Liberal Theory of Personhood|141
4|1.3 Conflicting Values|143
3|2 Digital Technology|143
3|3 Legal Protections of Privacy|145
4|3.1 Privacy Generally|145
4|3.2 The Restatements of Torts|146
4|3.3 Role of Tort Privacy Claims|147
3|4 Contextual Application of Privacy Torts|148
4|4.1 Tort Law|148
4|4.2 Conceptual Framework|149
5|4.2.1 Reasonable Expectation of Privacy|149
5|4.2.2 Defenses|149
5|4.2.3 Important Misconceptions|150
4|4.3 The Role of Courts|151
3|5 Doctrinal Issues Raised by New Digital Technologies|152
4|5.1 Ubiquitous Disclosure: Consensual Disclosure and Duty of Confidentiality|153
4|5.2 Ubiquitous Surveillance: Intrusion, Privacy, and the Public Sphere|154
4|5.3 Public Disclosure and Free Speech|155
3|6 Conclusion|157
3|References|157
2|The Chance ``to Melt into the Shadows of Obscurity´´: Developing a ``Right to be Forgotten´´ in the United States|160
3|1 Introduction|160
3|2 The Dual Nature of the Right To Be Forgotten|161
4|2.1 Interests in Being Forgotten|163
4|2.2 Interests in Forgetting|166
3|3 The Right To Be Forgotten in the Digital Age|167
4|3.1 Search Engines Results as ``Digital Dossiers´´|167
4|3.2 Regulating Search Engines|170
3|4 Conclusion|173
3|References|174
2|Parents, Privacy, and Facebook: Legal and Social Responses to the Problem of ``Over-Sharing´´|176
3|1 Introduction|177
3|2 Continental vs. Anglo-American Privacy Law and the Right to One´s Image|178
3|3 The Right to Privacy Within the Family|182
3|4 Should Children Have a ``Right to be Forgotten´´?|184
3|5 Conclusion|188
3|References|188
2|Digitizing Privacy|190
3|1 Introduction|190
3|2 Leibniz 2.0|191
3|3 Digital Intrusion|192
3|4 Disclosure and False Light|195
3|5 Appropriation|197
3|6 What Has Changed?|199
3|7 The Underlying Harms|200
3|References|204
1|Part IV: Privacy in Different Contexts: Work, Sex, Family, and Crime|206
2|Privacy, Employment, and Dignity|207
3|1 Introduction|207
3|2 Dignity and Work|208
3|3 Employee Privacy and the Dignity of Work|210
4|3.1 Employee Informational Privacy|210
4|3.2 Searches and Employee Space|212
4|3.3 Behavior Outside of Work|213
3|4 Informational Privacy and Dignity|214
3|5 Conclusion|217
3|References|217
2|Privacy and Outing|219
3|1 Preface|219
3|2 Introduction|221
3|3 The Right to Privacy, at the Outset|225
3|4 Outing, Whose Right?|228
3|5 A Privation of the Public|230
3|References|232
2|Marriage: Public Institution or Private Contract|234
3|1 Introduction|234
3|2 Against Civil Marriage|236
3|3 Why Civil Marriage?|241
3|4 Conclusion|246
3|References|247
2|Criminal Acts, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, and the Private/Public Split|249
3|1 Introduction|249
3|2 A Rear Window View of Privacy|253
3|3 Garbage Disposal and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Greenwood|255
3|4 The Private/Public Split|260
3|5 Gender Equality and Privacy|261
3|References|262
1|Contents|7
1|About the Editors|9
1|Introduction: Conceptualizing Privacy Harms and Values|10
2|1 Background Theory and Application: Critical Moments in the Development of a Philosophy of Privacy|12
2|2 Privacy and Digital Technology|13
2|3 Privacy and Social Identity|14
2|4 Organization and Content of this Volume|15
3|4.1 Privacy: Core Concepts|15
3|4.2 Personal Information Privacy|17
3|4.3 Privacy and Technology|19
3|4.4 Privacy in Different Contexts: Work, Sex, Family, and Crime|20
2|References|22
1|Part I: Privacy: Core Concepts|23
2|The Conceptual Coherence of Privacy As Developed in Law|24
3|1 Introduction|24
3|2 History|25
3|3 Privacy in Law and Ethics: Its Scope and Value|26
3|4 Arguments Connecting the Three Privacy Interests Developed in Law|33
3|5 Conclusion|35
3|References|36
2|Privacy: Concept, Value, Right?|38
3|1 Introduction|38
3|2 Concept(s) of Privacy As Descriptive?|39
3|3 Privacy As a Desideratum?|45
3|4 Right(s) to Privacy?|49
3|References|52
2|The Nature and Value of Privacy|53
3|1 Introduction|53
3|2 A Definition of Privacy|54
3|3 The Benefits and Costs of a Privacy Regime|57
3|4 A Deeper Appreciation of the Benefits of Privacy|59
3|5 The Overriding Benefit of Privacy|64
3|References|67
2|Privacy and Responsibility|68
3|1 Introduction|68
3|2 A Model for Understanding the Right to Privacy|70
3|3 How the Right to Privacy Protects the ``Drafting Space´´|72
3|4 Implications|73
4|4.1 Explanation of Some Puzzling Aspects of Privacy|73
4|4.2 Widespread vs. Localized Invasions of Privacy|74
4|4.3 Announced vs. Surreptitious Invasions of Privacy|75
4|4.4 Protection of Privacy as a Concern of the Society as a Whole|76
4|4.5 Why It Is Difficult to Respect the Right to Privacy|76
4|4.6 Two Methods of Protecting Privacy|77
3|5 Replies to Objections|79
3|References|81
1|Part II: Personal Information Privacy|82
2|Information, Privacy, and False Light|83
3|1 Introduction|83
3|2 Veridicalism and Non-veridicalism in Information Theory|84
3|3 Privacy: Factive and Propositional|86
3|4 False Light Privacy Tort|88
3|5 Conclusion|92
3|References|93
2|The Unrelenting Darkness of False Light: A Sui Generis Tort|95
3|1 Introduction and Overview|95
3|2 Warren and Brandeis on the Right to Privacy|97
4|2.1 The Right to Privacy: One´s ``Interior Equanimity´´|97
4|2.2 Warren and Brandeis on Reputation and Standing: One´s ``Social Persona´´|98
4|2.3 The Relationship Between Social Persona and Interior Equanimity|99
3|3 The Right to Privacy|100
4|3.1 Prosser on Privacy Torts|100
3|4 False Light|101
4|4.1 Robison´s Doctor, Bathed in False Light|102
4|4.2 Prosser´s Categories of Privacy Torts|103
4|4.3 False Light as Privacy Tort Versus False Light as Sui Generis Tort|105
4|4.4 The Coup de Grace: ``Coerced Divulgence´´|107
3|5 Conclusions|108
3|References|109
2|Privacy, Public Space, and Personal Information|111
3|1 Introduction|111
3|2 An Approach to the Complexity and Ambiguity of Privacy|112
3|3 The Opaqueness of ``Public´´ and ``Public Space´´|116
3|4 Personal Information, Privacy, and Harm from Commercial Interests|120
3|References|124
2|Privacy and Religious Exemptions|125
3|1 An Illustrative Case: Nikolao v. Lyon et al.|125
3|2 Mandated Disclosure: Revealing the Substance and Sincerity of Objections|127
3|3 A Traditional Conception of Religious Exemptions|129
3|4 When Moral Theology Gets Complicated|131
3|5 Religion and Conscience|133
3|6 The Law´s Expansive Conceptions of Religion|134
3|7 Conclusion|136
3|References|136
1|Part III: Privacy and Technology|138
2|The Need for Privacy Torts in an Era of Ubiquitous Disclosure and Surveillance|139
3|1 Nature and the Value of Privacy|140
4|1.1 Behavioral Patterns|140
4|1.2 Liberal Theory of Personhood|141
4|1.3 Conflicting Values|143
3|2 Digital Technology|143
3|3 Legal Protections of Privacy|145
4|3.1 Privacy Generally|145
4|3.2 The Restatements of Torts|146
4|3.3 Role of Tort Privacy Claims|147
3|4 Contextual Application of Privacy Torts|148
4|4.1 Tort Law|148
4|4.2 Conceptual Framework|149
5|4.2.1 Reasonable Expectation of Privacy|149
5|4.2.2 Defenses|149
5|4.2.3 Important Misconceptions|150
4|4.3 The Role of Courts|151
3|5 Doctrinal Issues Raised by New Digital Technologies|152
4|5.1 Ubiquitous Disclosure: Consensual Disclosure and Duty of Confidentiality|153
4|5.2 Ubiquitous Surveillance: Intrusion, Privacy, and the Public Sphere|154
4|5.3 Public Disclosure and Free Speech|155
3|6 Conclusion|157
3|References|157
2|The Chance ``to Melt into the Shadows of Obscurity´´: Developing a ``Right to be Forgotten´´ in the United States|160
3|1 Introduction|160
3|2 The Dual Nature of the Right To Be Forgotten|161
4|2.1 Interests in Being Forgotten|163
4|2.2 Interests in Forgetting|166
3|3 The Right To Be Forgotten in the Digital Age|167
4|3.1 Search Engines Results as ``Digital Dossiers´´|167
4|3.2 Regulating Search Engines|170
3|4 Conclusion|173
3|References|174
2|Parents, Privacy, and Facebook: Legal and Social Responses to the Problem of ``Over-Sharing´´|176
3|1 Introduction|177
3|2 Continental vs. Anglo-American Privacy Law and the Right to One´s Image|178
3|3 The Right to Privacy Within the Family|182
3|4 Should Children Have a ``Right to be Forgotten´´?|184
3|5 Conclusion|188
3|References|188
2|Digitizing Privacy|190
3|1 Introduction|190
3|2 Leibniz 2.0|191
3|3 Digital Intrusion|192
3|4 Disclosure and False Light|195
3|5 Appropriation|197
3|6 What Has Changed?|199
3|7 The Underlying Harms|200
3|References|204
1|Part IV: Privacy in Different Contexts: Work, Sex, Family, and Crime|206
2|Privacy, Employment, and Dignity|207
3|1 Introduction|207
3|2 Dignity and Work|208
3|3 Employee Privacy and the Dignity of Work|210
4|3.1 Employee Informational Privacy|210
4|3.2 Searches and Employee Space|212
4|3.3 Behavior Outside of Work|213
3|4 Informational Privacy and Dignity|214
3|5 Conclusion|217
3|References|217
2|Privacy and Outing|219
3|1 Preface|219
3|2 Introduction|221
3|3 The Right to Privacy, at the Outset|225
3|4 Outing, Whose Right?|228
3|5 A Privation of the Public|230
3|References|232
2|Marriage: Public Institution or Private Contract|234
3|1 Introduction|234
3|2 Against Civil Marriage|236
3|3 Why Civil Marriage?|241
3|4 Conclusion|246
3|References|247
2|Criminal Acts, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, and the Private/Public Split|249
3|1 Introduction|249
3|2 A Rear Window View of Privacy|253
3|3 Garbage Disposal and Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in Greenwood|255
3|4 The Private/Public Split|260
3|5 Gender Equality and Privacy|261
3|References|262