File #2388: "2018_Book_RatioLegis.pdf"
Testo
1|Introduction|5
1|Contents|9
1|Part I: What Is Ratio Legis?|11
2|The Real Ratio Legis and Where to Find It|12
3|1 When Practitioners Should Think About Concepts and Why|12
3|2 Different Uses of ``the Argument from Ratio Legis´´|17
3|3 Some Possible Clarifications and Qualifications|20
3|4 General Conclusion|25
3|References|26
2|Ratio Legis as a Binding Legal Value|27
3|1 The Assumption of Axiological Rationality of the Legislator|27
3|2 Axiological System of the Legislator|29
4|2.1 Legal Values (Legally Binding Values)|29
4|2.2 Reference Values|31
4|2.3 Universal Values|31
3|3 Axiological Law Interpretation|32
3|4 Ratio Legis as a Value|33
3|5 Rationes Legis System|33
3|References|35
2|Articulating Ratio Legis and Practical Reasoning|37
3|1 Ratio Legis and Legal Interpretation|38
4|1.1 Narrow Focus of Ratio Legis Debates. The Case of Polish Jurisprudence|38
4|1.2 Types of One-Sided Semantics and Their Impact on Theoretical Accounts of Ratio Legis|39
5|1.2.1 Upstream Semantics|40
5|1.2.2 Midstream Semantics|43
5|1.2.3 Downstream Semantics|45
3|2 Inferential Pragmatism in Legal Theory|47
4|2.1 Inferential Pragmatism. An Overview|48
4|2.2 The Value of Inferential Pragmatism in Legal Theory|51
3|3 Relevance of Inferential Pragmatism in Legal Theory to Ratio Legis|56
4|3.1 Inferentialist Account of Ratio Legis by Canale and Tuzet|56
4|3.2 Ratio Legis: Reasons and Actions. Towards an Integrated Account|57
3|References|60
2|Legislative History, Ratio Legis, and the Concept of the Rational Legislator|64
3|1 Introductory Remarks|64
3|2 Legislative History and Legal Interpretation|66
4|2.1 The Definition of Legislative History|66
4|2.2 Between Intentionalism and Textualism|66
4|2.3 The Use of Legislative History in Different Legal Systems|68
4|2.4 Legislative History as Viewed by the Polish Judiciary and Jurisprudence|69
3|3 The Concept of Rational Legislator|71
4|3.1 Humanistic Interpretation|71
4|3.2 The Concept of Rational Legislator|72
4|3.3 Interpretation of Law as an Adaptive Interpretation|74
3|4 Legislative History and the Concept of Rational Legislator|75
4|4.1 General Structure of the Attribution|75
4|4.2 The Conditions of Use|77
3|References|77
3|Court Rulings|79
3|Poland|79
3|South Africa|79
3|United Kingdom|80
1|Part II: What Can Ratio Legis Be?|81
2|The Concept of Purpose in Kant´s Metaphysical Elements of Justice|82
3|1 Endless Purposes as Aimed for with Hypothetical, Categorical, and Legal Categorical Imperatives|83
4|1.1 Two Kinds of Hypothetical Imperatives: Endless Purposes|84
4|1.2 Four Forms of Categorical Imperatives: Purposes for the Internal Legislation|87
4|1.3 Legal Categorical Imperative: Purposes for the External Legislation|92
3|2 Assessing the Interconnections of Both Doctrines and the Classification of Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue|98
4|2.1 Two Different Contexts of Effectiveness (Legal Categorical Imperative Categorical Imperative; Categorical Imperative Leg...|99
4|2.2 The Context of Their Foundation|103
4|2.3 The Classification of Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue|106
3|3 How Do the Different Kinds of Purposes as Found in Kant´s Doctrine of Right and Virtue Matter in Modern Jurisprudence, Espec...|108
4|3.1 Hypothetical Imperatives and Ratio Legis|108
4|3.2 The Categorical Imperative and Ratio Legis|109
4|3.3 The Legal Categorical Imperative and Ratio Legis|110
4|3.4 A Possible Adaptation|111
3|4 Theses|116
3|References|118
2|Nonconsequential Conception of Neutrality|123
3|1 Introductory Remarks|123
3|2 The Philosophical Background of the Discussion|124
3|3 Conceptions of State Neutrality|126
4|3.1 Justificatory Neutrality|128
4|3.2 Intentional Neutrality|132
4|3.3 Expressive Neutrality|134
3|4 Toward the Principle of State Neutrality|137
3|5 Conclusion|139
3|References|139
3|Court Rulings|140
2|Is There an Imitative Ratio Legis, and if so, How Many Are There? Psychological Perspective|141
3|1 Introduction|142
3|2 Three Modes of Argumentation in Support of Rejecting Imitative Ratio Legis|143
3|3 Formulating Moral Judgments by Judges. Psychological Perspective|147
3|4 Idea of Public Reason|158
3|References|159
1|Part III: What Practical Implications Can Ratio Legis Have?|162
2|Immanent Ratio Legis? Legal Forms and Statutory Interpretation|163
3|1 What Is Ratio Legis? The Need to Uncover a Powerful Argumentative Move|163
3|2 Ratio Legis Only as Extrinsic Purpose and Rationality?|165
4|2.1 Interpretation and the Voluntarist Conception of Law|166
4|2.2 Locating ``Will´´ and Purposiveness|167
4|2.3 Immanent Rationality and a Noninstrumental Conception of Law? Introducing an Alternative Conception|170
3|3 Formalism and Law´s Immanent Intelligibility|172
4|3.1 Law´s Autonomous Rationality: From Legislative Intent to Law´s Immanent Purposiveness|172
4|3.2 Legal Forms|174
4|3.3 Coherence|175
4|3.4 Implications of the Formalist Position for ``Understanding´´ and Interpretation|177
3|4 Formalism and Interpretation: Immanent Ratio Legis and a Formalist Method of Statutory Interpretation?|179
4|4.1 Redefining Statutory Interpretation|179
4|4.2 Coherently Expressing Legal Forms in Positive Law: Steps of a Formalist Method of Interpretation|181
4|4.3 Further Limits and Challenges|184
3|5 Conclusion: Immanent Ratio Legis and Legal Interpretation|187
3|References|187
2|How Can Ratio Legis Help a Lawyer to Interpret a Legal Text? Employing the Purpose of a Regulation for Legal Interpretation|189
3|1 Introduction|189
3|2 Adopted Conception of Legal Interpretation|190
3|3 Ratio Legis and the Functional Rules of Legal Interpretation|192
3|4 Employment of Ratio Legis in the Reconstructive Phase of Interpretation|193
3|5 Employment of Ratio Legis in the Perceptual Phase of Interpretation|197
3|6 Ratio Legis and the Systemic Rules of Legal Interpretation|201
3|References|203
1|Contents|9
1|Part I: What Is Ratio Legis?|11
2|The Real Ratio Legis and Where to Find It|12
3|1 When Practitioners Should Think About Concepts and Why|12
3|2 Different Uses of ``the Argument from Ratio Legis´´|17
3|3 Some Possible Clarifications and Qualifications|20
3|4 General Conclusion|25
3|References|26
2|Ratio Legis as a Binding Legal Value|27
3|1 The Assumption of Axiological Rationality of the Legislator|27
3|2 Axiological System of the Legislator|29
4|2.1 Legal Values (Legally Binding Values)|29
4|2.2 Reference Values|31
4|2.3 Universal Values|31
3|3 Axiological Law Interpretation|32
3|4 Ratio Legis as a Value|33
3|5 Rationes Legis System|33
3|References|35
2|Articulating Ratio Legis and Practical Reasoning|37
3|1 Ratio Legis and Legal Interpretation|38
4|1.1 Narrow Focus of Ratio Legis Debates. The Case of Polish Jurisprudence|38
4|1.2 Types of One-Sided Semantics and Their Impact on Theoretical Accounts of Ratio Legis|39
5|1.2.1 Upstream Semantics|40
5|1.2.2 Midstream Semantics|43
5|1.2.3 Downstream Semantics|45
3|2 Inferential Pragmatism in Legal Theory|47
4|2.1 Inferential Pragmatism. An Overview|48
4|2.2 The Value of Inferential Pragmatism in Legal Theory|51
3|3 Relevance of Inferential Pragmatism in Legal Theory to Ratio Legis|56
4|3.1 Inferentialist Account of Ratio Legis by Canale and Tuzet|56
4|3.2 Ratio Legis: Reasons and Actions. Towards an Integrated Account|57
3|References|60
2|Legislative History, Ratio Legis, and the Concept of the Rational Legislator|64
3|1 Introductory Remarks|64
3|2 Legislative History and Legal Interpretation|66
4|2.1 The Definition of Legislative History|66
4|2.2 Between Intentionalism and Textualism|66
4|2.3 The Use of Legislative History in Different Legal Systems|68
4|2.4 Legislative History as Viewed by the Polish Judiciary and Jurisprudence|69
3|3 The Concept of Rational Legislator|71
4|3.1 Humanistic Interpretation|71
4|3.2 The Concept of Rational Legislator|72
4|3.3 Interpretation of Law as an Adaptive Interpretation|74
3|4 Legislative History and the Concept of Rational Legislator|75
4|4.1 General Structure of the Attribution|75
4|4.2 The Conditions of Use|77
3|References|77
3|Court Rulings|79
3|Poland|79
3|South Africa|79
3|United Kingdom|80
1|Part II: What Can Ratio Legis Be?|81
2|The Concept of Purpose in Kant´s Metaphysical Elements of Justice|82
3|1 Endless Purposes as Aimed for with Hypothetical, Categorical, and Legal Categorical Imperatives|83
4|1.1 Two Kinds of Hypothetical Imperatives: Endless Purposes|84
4|1.2 Four Forms of Categorical Imperatives: Purposes for the Internal Legislation|87
4|1.3 Legal Categorical Imperative: Purposes for the External Legislation|92
3|2 Assessing the Interconnections of Both Doctrines and the Classification of Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue|98
4|2.1 Two Different Contexts of Effectiveness (Legal Categorical Imperative Categorical Imperative; Categorical Imperative Leg...|99
4|2.2 The Context of Their Foundation|103
4|2.3 The Classification of Duties of Right and Duties of Virtue|106
3|3 How Do the Different Kinds of Purposes as Found in Kant´s Doctrine of Right and Virtue Matter in Modern Jurisprudence, Espec...|108
4|3.1 Hypothetical Imperatives and Ratio Legis|108
4|3.2 The Categorical Imperative and Ratio Legis|109
4|3.3 The Legal Categorical Imperative and Ratio Legis|110
4|3.4 A Possible Adaptation|111
3|4 Theses|116
3|References|118
2|Nonconsequential Conception of Neutrality|123
3|1 Introductory Remarks|123
3|2 The Philosophical Background of the Discussion|124
3|3 Conceptions of State Neutrality|126
4|3.1 Justificatory Neutrality|128
4|3.2 Intentional Neutrality|132
4|3.3 Expressive Neutrality|134
3|4 Toward the Principle of State Neutrality|137
3|5 Conclusion|139
3|References|139
3|Court Rulings|140
2|Is There an Imitative Ratio Legis, and if so, How Many Are There? Psychological Perspective|141
3|1 Introduction|142
3|2 Three Modes of Argumentation in Support of Rejecting Imitative Ratio Legis|143
3|3 Formulating Moral Judgments by Judges. Psychological Perspective|147
3|4 Idea of Public Reason|158
3|References|159
1|Part III: What Practical Implications Can Ratio Legis Have?|162
2|Immanent Ratio Legis? Legal Forms and Statutory Interpretation|163
3|1 What Is Ratio Legis? The Need to Uncover a Powerful Argumentative Move|163
3|2 Ratio Legis Only as Extrinsic Purpose and Rationality?|165
4|2.1 Interpretation and the Voluntarist Conception of Law|166
4|2.2 Locating ``Will´´ and Purposiveness|167
4|2.3 Immanent Rationality and a Noninstrumental Conception of Law? Introducing an Alternative Conception|170
3|3 Formalism and Law´s Immanent Intelligibility|172
4|3.1 Law´s Autonomous Rationality: From Legislative Intent to Law´s Immanent Purposiveness|172
4|3.2 Legal Forms|174
4|3.3 Coherence|175
4|3.4 Implications of the Formalist Position for ``Understanding´´ and Interpretation|177
3|4 Formalism and Interpretation: Immanent Ratio Legis and a Formalist Method of Statutory Interpretation?|179
4|4.1 Redefining Statutory Interpretation|179
4|4.2 Coherently Expressing Legal Forms in Positive Law: Steps of a Formalist Method of Interpretation|181
4|4.3 Further Limits and Challenges|184
3|5 Conclusion: Immanent Ratio Legis and Legal Interpretation|187
3|References|187
2|How Can Ratio Legis Help a Lawyer to Interpret a Legal Text? Employing the Purpose of a Regulation for Legal Interpretation|189
3|1 Introduction|189
3|2 Adopted Conception of Legal Interpretation|190
3|3 Ratio Legis and the Functional Rules of Legal Interpretation|192
3|4 Employment of Ratio Legis in the Reconstructive Phase of Interpretation|193
3|5 Employment of Ratio Legis in the Perceptual Phase of Interpretation|197
3|6 Ratio Legis and the Systemic Rules of Legal Interpretation|201
3|References|203