File #2515: "2018_Book_EnvironmentalProcessAndProduct.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|6
1|Contents|8
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|14
1|Chapter 2: Main Arguments Against the Use of PPM Measures|21
2|2.1 Sovereignty, Extraterritoriality and the Interests of Developing Countries|21
2|2.2 Incompatibility with the World Trading System|24
2|2.3 The Influence of These Arguments in the PPM Debate|27
1|Chapter 3: Market Failures, Cooperation Failures and the Management of Resources of Common Interest|29
2|3.1 Market Failures and the Need for State Intervention in the Environmental Field|29
3|3.1.1 Negative Externalities|30
3|3.1.2 Public Goods|32
2|3.2 Market Failures Affecting the International Environment|33
3|3.2.1 Transboundary Externalities|33
3|3.2.2 Global Public Goods|35
2|3.3 Private Goods, Public Goods and Common Pool Resources|37
2|3.4 State Intervention to Address International Environmental Issues|39
3|3.4.1 The Intervention at the Source Principle|39
3|3.4.2 The Free Rider Problem|41
3|3.4.3 The Prisoner´s Dilemma|42
3|3.4.4 The Tragedy of the Commons|44
3|3.4.5 Solutions to Collective Action Problems|45
2|3.5 Consequences for the PPM Issue|47
1|Chapter 4: Principles of International Environmental Law Regarding the Regulation of Production Methods Affecting Resources of...|50
2|4.1 Principles Relating to Sustainable Development|52
3|4.1.1 The Elimination of Unsustainable Production and Consumption Practices|53
3|4.1.2 Sustainable Use|56
3|4.1.3 The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities|57
3|4.1.4 Cooperation|61
3|4.1.5 Conclusion|64
2|4.2 The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|65
3|4.2.1 Significance and Content|65
3|4.2.2 Limits to the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|67
4|4.2.2.1 Prevention of Transboundary Harm|68
4|4.2.2.2 Equitable Use|70
4|4.2.2.3 Common Concern|72
3|4.2.3 Conclusion|75
1|Chapter 5: The Customary International Law Rules on Prescriptive Jurisdiction|77
2|5.1 Trade Measures and the Rules on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction|78
3|5.1.1 Prescriptive Jurisdiction|78
3|5.1.2 The Particular Case of Trade Measures: Sovereignty Over Import Policies vs. Sovereignty to Regulate Activities Occurring...|82
2|5.2 The Principle of Non-interference in Internal Affairs|90
2|5.3 Conclusion|94
1|Chapter 6: National Treatment|95
2|6.1 The Issue of Coverage|96
3|6.1.1 Internal Measures vs. Border Measures in the GATT|96
3|6.1.2 Article III:2|97
3|6.1.3 Article III:4|101
3|6.1.4 Comments|103
2|6.2 The Scope of National Treatment|104
2|6.3 Like Products|107
3|6.3.1 The Concept of Like Products in Case Law|108
4|6.3.1.1 The `Accordion´ of Like Products|108
4|6.3.1.2 The Objective Approach|110
5|6.3.1.2.1 A Focus on Physical Characteristics|110
5|6.3.1.2.2 The Product-Process Distinction|111
4|6.3.1.3 The Aim-and-Effects Theory|115
5|6.3.1.3.1 The US - Malt Beverages and US - Taxes on Automobiles Cases|115
5|6.3.1.3.2 The Japan - Alcohol II Case|116
4|6.3.1.4 The Economic Approach|118
5|6.3.1.4.1 Article III:2, First Sentence|119
5|6.3.1.4.2 Article III:2, Second Sentence|121
5|6.3.1.4.3 Article III:4|123
5|6.3.1.4.4 Likeness and Differences in PPMs|125
4|6.3.1.5 Conclusion|126
3|6.3.2 Scholarly Debates on `Like Products´|127
4|6.3.2.1 The Regulatory Purpose Approach|127
5|6.3.2.1.1 Proponents|127
5|6.3.2.1.2 Opponents|133
4|6.3.2.2 The Pure Economic Approach|135
5|6.3.2.2.1 Proponents|135
5|6.3.2.2.2 Opponents|136
3|6.3.3 Consequences for PPM Measures of the Debates on the Definition of `Like Products´|137
2|6.4 Discriminatory Treatment|139
3|6.4.1 Different Theories on the Definition of Discriminatory Treatment|140
3|6.4.2 De Jure Discrimination|142
3|6.4.3 De Facto Discrimination|143
4|6.4.3.1 Types of Comparison|143
4|6.4.3.2 Protectionist Effects?|145
4|6.4.3.3 Protectionist Objective?|147
3|6.4.4 Conclusion|151
2|6.5 Critique|153
3|6.5.1 The Fluctuations of Case Law on National Treatment|153
3|6.5.2 Comments on the Appellate Body´s Approach to National Treatment|157
4|6.5.2.1 The Definition of Like Products|157
4|6.5.2.2 Discriminatory Treatment and the Relation Between Articles III and XX|159
2|6.6 Conclusion: The Legality of PPM Measures Under Article III|164
1|Chapter 7: The General Exceptions Provision|166
2|7.1 The Policy Goals Listed in the Sub-paragraphs|166
3|7.1.1 The Coverage of Environmental Concerns by the Policy Goals Listed in Article XX|167
4|7.1.1.1 Article XX(b): Protection of Human, Animal or Plant Life or Health|167
4|7.1.1.2 Article XX(g): Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources|170
3|7.1.2 `Extraterritoriality´ and `Coercion´|174
4|7.1.2.1 Case Law|175
5|7.1.2.1.1 The US - Tuna and US - Shrimp Panel Reports|175
5|7.1.2.1.2 The Appellate Body US - Shrimp Report|178
5|7.1.2.1.3 The EC - Seal Products and US - Tuna II (Mexico) Reports|179
4|7.1.2.2 Critique|181
5|7.1.2.2.1 Comments on Case Law|181
5|7.1.2.2.2 Externalities and Proximity of Interests|188
4|7.1.2.3 Conclusion|194
2|7.2 The Means-Ends Relationship in Article XX(b) and (g)|196
3|7.2.1 Article XX(b): The Necessity Test|196
4|7.2.1.1 Case Law|196
5|7.2.1.1.1 The New Necessity Test and the Right to Choose the Level of Protection|196
5|7.2.1.1.2 The Brazil - Tyres case|200
5|7.2.1.1.3 The EC - Seal Products Case|204
5|7.2.1.1.4 The Korea - Beef Case|205
4|7.2.1.2 Critique|206
5|7.2.1.2.1 Necessity, Proportionality and the Right to Choose the Level of Protection|206
5|7.2.1.2.2 A Varying Standard of Review According to the Importance of the Goal Pursued|207
5|7.2.1.2.3 PPM Measures and the Necessity Test|210
3|7.2.2 Article XX(g): The `Relating to´ Test|212
4|7.2.2.1 Case Law|212
4|7.2.2.2 Critique: The Differences in the Means-Ends Relationship in Article XX (b) and (g)|215
2|7.3 The Chapeau Requirements|216
3|7.3.1 Function of the Chapeau|216
3|7.3.2 Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination|221
4|7.3.2.1 `Discrimination´|221
4|7.3.2.2 `Unjustifiable or Arbitrary´ Discrimination|223
5|7.3.2.2.1 Transparency, Predictability, Due Process and Basic Fairness|226
5|7.3.2.2.2 Flexibility|228
5|7.3.2.2.3 Discrimination and International Negotiations of a Multilateral Solution|229
6|7.3.2.2.3.1 The US - Shrimp Reports|230
6|7.3.2.2.3.2 Critical Analysis of the US - Shrimp Reports|233
4|7.3.2.3 Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination `Between the Countries Where the Same Conditions Prevail´|236
3|7.3.3 Disguised Restriction on International Trade|238
3|7.3.4 Critique|240
4|7.3.4.1 A Duty to Negotiate a Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) Under the Chapeau of Article XX?|240
5|7.3.4.1.1 The Debate on Unilateralism|240
5|7.3.4.1.2 Suggested Approach|247
6|7.3.4.1.2.1 Assessment of Cooperation Efforts Under the Conditions of the Chapeau|247
6|7.3.4.1.2.2 Controlling the Existence of `Good Faith Efforts´ to Negotiate a Treaty|248
4|7.3.4.2 Consideration of Specific Interests of Developing Countries|250
5|7.3.4.2.1 The Specific Interests of Developing Countries|250
5|7.3.4.2.2 Countries Where the `Same Conditions Prevail´|252
5|7.3.4.2.3 Disguised Restriction on International Trade|259
4|7.3.4.3 The Means-Ends Relationship: The Possible Role of the Disguised Restriction on International Trade Criterion|260
1|Chapter 8: The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement|263
2|8.1 Coverage of PPM Measures Under the TBT Agreement|263
2|8.2 No Less Favourable Treatment to Like Products (TBT Art. 2.1)|268
2|8.3 Necessity (TBT Art. 2.2)|277
2|8.4 International Standards|280
2|8.5 Special and Differential Treatment|281
2|8.6 Link Between the TBT Agreement and the GATT|283
2|8.7 Conclusions|285
1|Chapter 9: Conclusions: A Critical Analysis of the PPM Measures' Legal Regime De Lege Lata and De Lege Ferenda|287
2|9.1 What Is Left of the Product-Process Distinction?|287
2|9.2 The Need for a Flexible System|291
2|9.3 Applying the Existing Provisions While Ensuring Coherence, Legal Predictability and Legitimacy of Case Law: Squaring the C...|296
2|9.4 A Regulatory Framework for PPM Measures in WTO Law|299
3|9.4.1 The Need for a Flexible Interpretation of Article XX|299
3|9.4.2 The Importance of the Conditions of the Chapeau|306
3|9.4.3 Applying the Conditions of Article XX: Particularities for PPM Measures|310
1|Chapter 10: Summary|315
1|Bibliography|329
2|Table of Cases|340
1|Contents|8
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|14
1|Chapter 2: Main Arguments Against the Use of PPM Measures|21
2|2.1 Sovereignty, Extraterritoriality and the Interests of Developing Countries|21
2|2.2 Incompatibility with the World Trading System|24
2|2.3 The Influence of These Arguments in the PPM Debate|27
1|Chapter 3: Market Failures, Cooperation Failures and the Management of Resources of Common Interest|29
2|3.1 Market Failures and the Need for State Intervention in the Environmental Field|29
3|3.1.1 Negative Externalities|30
3|3.1.2 Public Goods|32
2|3.2 Market Failures Affecting the International Environment|33
3|3.2.1 Transboundary Externalities|33
3|3.2.2 Global Public Goods|35
2|3.3 Private Goods, Public Goods and Common Pool Resources|37
2|3.4 State Intervention to Address International Environmental Issues|39
3|3.4.1 The Intervention at the Source Principle|39
3|3.4.2 The Free Rider Problem|41
3|3.4.3 The Prisoner´s Dilemma|42
3|3.4.4 The Tragedy of the Commons|44
3|3.4.5 Solutions to Collective Action Problems|45
2|3.5 Consequences for the PPM Issue|47
1|Chapter 4: Principles of International Environmental Law Regarding the Regulation of Production Methods Affecting Resources of...|50
2|4.1 Principles Relating to Sustainable Development|52
3|4.1.1 The Elimination of Unsustainable Production and Consumption Practices|53
3|4.1.2 Sustainable Use|56
3|4.1.3 The Principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities|57
3|4.1.4 Cooperation|61
3|4.1.5 Conclusion|64
2|4.2 The Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|65
3|4.2.1 Significance and Content|65
3|4.2.2 Limits to the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources|67
4|4.2.2.1 Prevention of Transboundary Harm|68
4|4.2.2.2 Equitable Use|70
4|4.2.2.3 Common Concern|72
3|4.2.3 Conclusion|75
1|Chapter 5: The Customary International Law Rules on Prescriptive Jurisdiction|77
2|5.1 Trade Measures and the Rules on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction|78
3|5.1.1 Prescriptive Jurisdiction|78
3|5.1.2 The Particular Case of Trade Measures: Sovereignty Over Import Policies vs. Sovereignty to Regulate Activities Occurring...|82
2|5.2 The Principle of Non-interference in Internal Affairs|90
2|5.3 Conclusion|94
1|Chapter 6: National Treatment|95
2|6.1 The Issue of Coverage|96
3|6.1.1 Internal Measures vs. Border Measures in the GATT|96
3|6.1.2 Article III:2|97
3|6.1.3 Article III:4|101
3|6.1.4 Comments|103
2|6.2 The Scope of National Treatment|104
2|6.3 Like Products|107
3|6.3.1 The Concept of Like Products in Case Law|108
4|6.3.1.1 The `Accordion´ of Like Products|108
4|6.3.1.2 The Objective Approach|110
5|6.3.1.2.1 A Focus on Physical Characteristics|110
5|6.3.1.2.2 The Product-Process Distinction|111
4|6.3.1.3 The Aim-and-Effects Theory|115
5|6.3.1.3.1 The US - Malt Beverages and US - Taxes on Automobiles Cases|115
5|6.3.1.3.2 The Japan - Alcohol II Case|116
4|6.3.1.4 The Economic Approach|118
5|6.3.1.4.1 Article III:2, First Sentence|119
5|6.3.1.4.2 Article III:2, Second Sentence|121
5|6.3.1.4.3 Article III:4|123
5|6.3.1.4.4 Likeness and Differences in PPMs|125
4|6.3.1.5 Conclusion|126
3|6.3.2 Scholarly Debates on `Like Products´|127
4|6.3.2.1 The Regulatory Purpose Approach|127
5|6.3.2.1.1 Proponents|127
5|6.3.2.1.2 Opponents|133
4|6.3.2.2 The Pure Economic Approach|135
5|6.3.2.2.1 Proponents|135
5|6.3.2.2.2 Opponents|136
3|6.3.3 Consequences for PPM Measures of the Debates on the Definition of `Like Products´|137
2|6.4 Discriminatory Treatment|139
3|6.4.1 Different Theories on the Definition of Discriminatory Treatment|140
3|6.4.2 De Jure Discrimination|142
3|6.4.3 De Facto Discrimination|143
4|6.4.3.1 Types of Comparison|143
4|6.4.3.2 Protectionist Effects?|145
4|6.4.3.3 Protectionist Objective?|147
3|6.4.4 Conclusion|151
2|6.5 Critique|153
3|6.5.1 The Fluctuations of Case Law on National Treatment|153
3|6.5.2 Comments on the Appellate Body´s Approach to National Treatment|157
4|6.5.2.1 The Definition of Like Products|157
4|6.5.2.2 Discriminatory Treatment and the Relation Between Articles III and XX|159
2|6.6 Conclusion: The Legality of PPM Measures Under Article III|164
1|Chapter 7: The General Exceptions Provision|166
2|7.1 The Policy Goals Listed in the Sub-paragraphs|166
3|7.1.1 The Coverage of Environmental Concerns by the Policy Goals Listed in Article XX|167
4|7.1.1.1 Article XX(b): Protection of Human, Animal or Plant Life or Health|167
4|7.1.1.2 Article XX(g): Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources|170
3|7.1.2 `Extraterritoriality´ and `Coercion´|174
4|7.1.2.1 Case Law|175
5|7.1.2.1.1 The US - Tuna and US - Shrimp Panel Reports|175
5|7.1.2.1.2 The Appellate Body US - Shrimp Report|178
5|7.1.2.1.3 The EC - Seal Products and US - Tuna II (Mexico) Reports|179
4|7.1.2.2 Critique|181
5|7.1.2.2.1 Comments on Case Law|181
5|7.1.2.2.2 Externalities and Proximity of Interests|188
4|7.1.2.3 Conclusion|194
2|7.2 The Means-Ends Relationship in Article XX(b) and (g)|196
3|7.2.1 Article XX(b): The Necessity Test|196
4|7.2.1.1 Case Law|196
5|7.2.1.1.1 The New Necessity Test and the Right to Choose the Level of Protection|196
5|7.2.1.1.2 The Brazil - Tyres case|200
5|7.2.1.1.3 The EC - Seal Products Case|204
5|7.2.1.1.4 The Korea - Beef Case|205
4|7.2.1.2 Critique|206
5|7.2.1.2.1 Necessity, Proportionality and the Right to Choose the Level of Protection|206
5|7.2.1.2.2 A Varying Standard of Review According to the Importance of the Goal Pursued|207
5|7.2.1.2.3 PPM Measures and the Necessity Test|210
3|7.2.2 Article XX(g): The `Relating to´ Test|212
4|7.2.2.1 Case Law|212
4|7.2.2.2 Critique: The Differences in the Means-Ends Relationship in Article XX (b) and (g)|215
2|7.3 The Chapeau Requirements|216
3|7.3.1 Function of the Chapeau|216
3|7.3.2 Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination|221
4|7.3.2.1 `Discrimination´|221
4|7.3.2.2 `Unjustifiable or Arbitrary´ Discrimination|223
5|7.3.2.2.1 Transparency, Predictability, Due Process and Basic Fairness|226
5|7.3.2.2.2 Flexibility|228
5|7.3.2.2.3 Discrimination and International Negotiations of a Multilateral Solution|229
6|7.3.2.2.3.1 The US - Shrimp Reports|230
6|7.3.2.2.3.2 Critical Analysis of the US - Shrimp Reports|233
4|7.3.2.3 Arbitrary or Unjustifiable Discrimination `Between the Countries Where the Same Conditions Prevail´|236
3|7.3.3 Disguised Restriction on International Trade|238
3|7.3.4 Critique|240
4|7.3.4.1 A Duty to Negotiate a Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) Under the Chapeau of Article XX?|240
5|7.3.4.1.1 The Debate on Unilateralism|240
5|7.3.4.1.2 Suggested Approach|247
6|7.3.4.1.2.1 Assessment of Cooperation Efforts Under the Conditions of the Chapeau|247
6|7.3.4.1.2.2 Controlling the Existence of `Good Faith Efforts´ to Negotiate a Treaty|248
4|7.3.4.2 Consideration of Specific Interests of Developing Countries|250
5|7.3.4.2.1 The Specific Interests of Developing Countries|250
5|7.3.4.2.2 Countries Where the `Same Conditions Prevail´|252
5|7.3.4.2.3 Disguised Restriction on International Trade|259
4|7.3.4.3 The Means-Ends Relationship: The Possible Role of the Disguised Restriction on International Trade Criterion|260
1|Chapter 8: The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement|263
2|8.1 Coverage of PPM Measures Under the TBT Agreement|263
2|8.2 No Less Favourable Treatment to Like Products (TBT Art. 2.1)|268
2|8.3 Necessity (TBT Art. 2.2)|277
2|8.4 International Standards|280
2|8.5 Special and Differential Treatment|281
2|8.6 Link Between the TBT Agreement and the GATT|283
2|8.7 Conclusions|285
1|Chapter 9: Conclusions: A Critical Analysis of the PPM Measures' Legal Regime De Lege Lata and De Lege Ferenda|287
2|9.1 What Is Left of the Product-Process Distinction?|287
2|9.2 The Need for a Flexible System|291
2|9.3 Applying the Existing Provisions While Ensuring Coherence, Legal Predictability and Legitimacy of Case Law: Squaring the C...|296
2|9.4 A Regulatory Framework for PPM Measures in WTO Law|299
3|9.4.1 The Need for a Flexible Interpretation of Article XX|299
3|9.4.2 The Importance of the Conditions of the Chapeau|306
3|9.4.3 Applying the Conditions of Article XX: Particularities for PPM Measures|310
1|Chapter 10: Summary|315
1|Bibliography|329
2|Table of Cases|340