File #2516: "2018_Book_ContractingInternationalEmploy.pdf"
Testo
1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|8
1|List of Abbreviations|13
1|List of Figures|15
1|List of Tables|18
1|List of Boxes|19
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|21
2|1.1 Global Framework Agreements|21
3|1.1.1 The Need for International Governance Structures|21
3|1.1.2 Emergence of Transnational Industrial Relations|22
3|1.1.3 Future Regulatory Potential of Global Framework Agreements|23
3|1.1.4 The Economic Analysis of Law|23
2|1.2 Outline|24
3|1.2.1 Foundations|24
3|1.2.2 Effects of Global Framework Agreements|25
3|1.2.3 Outlook|26
2|1.3 The Added Value of This Book|26
3|1.3.1 Creation of a New Data Set|26
3|1.3.2 Prominent Contributions|26
3|1.3.3 Focus on the Question as to Why Companies Conclude Global Framework Agreements|27
3|1.3.4 Methodological Approach|27
1|Part I: Foundations|29
2|Chapter 2: The Internationalization of Law: The Evolution of Labor Standards in Response to Globalization|30
3|2.1 The Predicament: Governance Gaps|30
3|2.2 The Evolution of Labor Standards in Response to Globalization: Towards a Global Labor Governance Regime|31
4|2.2.1 Responses by International Organizations: Defining International Standards|32
4|2.2.2 Government Responses: Increasing Market Transparency and Corporate Accountability|35
4|2.2.3 Company Responses: Corporate Social Responsibility|36
3|2.3 A Thread in the Web: Global Framework Agreements|38
2|Chapter 3: The Phenomenon of Global Framework Agreements|40
3|3.1 New Phenomenon: Global Framework Agreements|40
4|3.1.1 Development of Global Framework Agreements: Continuous Growth|42
4|3.1.2 Bargaining Partners|44
5|3.1.2.1 Multinational Companies: A European Focus|44
5|3.1.2.2 Global Union Federations|47
4|3.1.3 European Framework Agreements|53
3|3.2 Content of Global Framework Agreements: Major Features and Development Over Time|55
4|3.2.1 Research Sample|56
5|3.2.1.1 Non-standardized and Quickly Developing Agreements|56
5|3.2.1.2 Company Characteristics|59
5|3.2.1.3 Coding of the Research Sample|59
4|3.2.2 References to International Standards|62
4|3.2.3 Regulatory Objectives|66
5|3.2.3.1 Individual Rights|67
5|3.2.3.2 Collective Rights|69
5|3.2.3.3 Provisions Beyond Employment and Industrial Relations|71
4|3.2.4 Scope of Global Framework Agreements|72
4|3.2.5 The Enforcement of Global Framework Agreements|72
4|3.2.6 Monitoring and Dispute Resolution|74
5|3.2.6.1 Monitoring Mechanisms to Detect Deviations|75
5|3.2.6.2 Mechanisms to Modify Behavior|76
2|Chapter 4: Enforcement in Courts or Private Enforcement?|80
3|4.1 Enforcement of Global Framework Agreements|80
4|4.1.1 Literature Review: Legal Status of Global Framework Agreements|82
4|4.1.2 Content Analysis of Global Framework Agreements|86
5|4.1.2.1 Clauses on the Non-binding Character of the Agreements|86
5|4.1.2.2 Third-Party Claims|88
5|4.1.2.3 Choice of Law Clauses|89
5|4.1.2.4 References to a Prevailing Language|91
5|4.1.2.5 References to Alternative Dispute Resolution|91
5|4.1.2.6 References to Duration|92
4|4.1.3 Discussion|92
3|4.2 Terra Incognita: Enforcement of Global Framework Agreements in Courts|93
3|4.3 Global Framework Agreements as Instruments of Self-regulation and Private Ordering|95
4|4.3.1 Extra-Legal Enforcement|95
4|4.3.2 The Sanctioning Power of Global Union Federations|97
5|4.3.2.1 Ceased Cooperation|98
5|4.3.2.2 Industrial Action|98
5|4.3.2.3 Reputational and Market Sanctions|99
4|4.3.3 Discussion|100
3|4.4 Outlook|101
2|Chapter 5: Interests and Incentives of the Bargaining Partners|103
3|5.1 Why Do Multinational Companies and Global Union Federations Sign Global Framework Agreements?|103
3|5.2 Global Framework Agreements Are Mutually Beneficial|104
3|5.3 Interests and Incentives of Multinational Companies|106
4|5.3.1 Reduction and Privatization of Disputes|106
5|5.3.1.1 Resolving Disputes Without Negative Publicity|108
5|5.3.1.2 Legitimation of Management Decisions and the Reduction of Transaction Costs|110
5|5.3.1.3 Corporate Culture|110
5|5.3.1.4 Better Management of Global Production Networks by Standardization|111
4|5.3.2 Public Relations|112
4|5.3.3 Promotion of Equal Competitive Conditions|113
4|5.3.4 Exogenous Requirements and Avoidance of Regulation|115
3|5.4 Global Union Federations: A Public Choice Perspective|117
4|5.4.1 Interests of Global Union Federations|118
4|5.4.2 Incentives to Sign Global Framework Agreements|118
4|5.4.3 Principal Agent Problems: Extensive Chain of Delegation|119
4|5.4.4 Legitimation Function and Limitations|122
3|5.5 Possible Obstacles to a Bargained Solution|123
4|5.5.1 Risks and Uncertainties|124
4|5.5.2 Transaction Costs|124
4|5.5.3 Non-GFA Alternatives|125
4|5.5.4 Summary of the Possible Obstacles|126
3|5.6 The Prospects of Global Framework Agreements|126
1|Part II: Effects of Global Framework Agreements|127
2|Chapter 6: The Public Relations Effect of Global Framework Agreements|128
3|6.1 Value Creation Through Responsible Business|128
3|6.2 An Intuitive Hypothesis: Global Framework Agreements as Signaling Devices|129
3|6.3 A Simple Conceptualization of Signaling|130
4|6.3.1 Codes of Conduct|132
4|6.3.2 Global Framework Agreements|133
3|6.4 Empirical Evaluation: Explorative and Descriptive Evidence|134
4|6.4.1 An Illustration: The Solvay Case Study|134
5|6.4.1.1 Solvay´s Global Framework Agreement|135
5|6.4.1.2 Evaluation of Solvay´s Website|136
4|6.4.2 Content Analysis of Companies´ Websites|137
3|6.5 Counterintuitive Results and Possible Explanations|138
4|6.5.1 A Closer Look at the Descriptive Statistics|140
5|6.5.1.1 Protection of Employees´ Individual and Collective Rights|142
5|6.5.1.2 Variations Over Time|143
4|6.5.2 Looking Beyond Descriptive Statistics|145
4|6.5.3 Explanations|146
5|6.5.3.1 Coordination Problem: Assumptions About the Uninformed Party|147
5|6.5.3.2 Global Framework Agreements as a Safeguard Against Negative Publicity|148
5|6.5.3.3 Signaling to Different Audiences|149
3|6.6 Conclusions and Implications for Further Research|151
2|Chapter 7: The Implementation of Global Framework Agreements at Subsidiaries, Suppliers and Subcontractors|153
3|7.1 The Implementation of Global Framework Agreements|153
3|7.2 How Global Framework Agreements Enforce ILO Conventions in Colombia: A Case Study|155
4|7.2.1 Carrefour: A Brief Description|156
4|7.2.2 Implementation of the Carrefour Global Framework Agreement in Colombia|157
3|7.3 The Implementation of Global Framework Agreements|159
4|7.3.1 Content Analysis of Global Framework Agreements|160
5|7.3.1.1 Scope of Application in Multinational Companies|160
5|7.3.1.2 Application to Suppliers and Subcontractors|163
5|7.3.1.3 Development of References to Supply Chains|168
5|7.3.1.4 Breadth of the Scope of Application|169
4|7.3.2 Review of Existing Case Studies on the Impact of Global Framework Agreements on Global Supply Chains|171
5|7.3.2.1 Synoptic Table of the Identified Case Studies|172
5|7.3.2.2 Synthesis of the Identified Case Studies|172
3|7.4 Discussion|186
2|Chapter 8: Creating Institutions for International Dispute Resolution|189
3|8.1 Do Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Increase Compliance?|189
3|8.2 Dispute Resolution as a Flexibility Mechanism|190
4|8.2.1 The Difference Between Breach and Violation|191
4|8.2.2 Remedies|191
3|8.3 Application to Global Framework Agreements|193
4|8.3.1 Distinguishing Between a Breach and a Violation in Global Framework Agreements|193
4|8.3.2 Remedies|195
5|8.3.2.1 Remedy for Breaches|195
5|8.3.2.2 Remedy for Violations|196
4|8.3.3 Increased Flexibility|196
5|8.3.3.1 Comparison with a Grim-Trigger Strategy|197
5|8.3.3.2 Comparison with a Tit-for-Tat Strategy|197
3|8.4 The Deterrence Effect of Global Framework Agreements|198
1|Part III: Outlook|199
2|Chapter 9: Looking to the Future: Mediation and Arbitration Procedures for Global Framework Agreements|200
3|9.1 The Voluntary Nature of Global Framework Agreements|200
3|9.2 The Challenge: Improving Accountability|201
3|9.3 Reasons to Develop New Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution|202
4|9.3.1 Intentions of the Bargaining Partners|203
4|9.3.2 Increasing ``Juridification´´|204
4|9.3.3 Increasing Complexity|204
4|9.3.4 Preserving the Relationship Between Global Union Federations and Multinational Companies|205
4|9.3.5 Cross-Border Disputes|205
4|9.3.6 Cost-Effectiveness and Confidentiality|206
3|9.4 Alternative Dispute Resolution Limitations|206
4|9.4.1 Disputes About Rights and Interests|206
4|9.4.2 Different Social Dialogue Traditions|207
4|9.4.3 Limitations of Arbitration|208
3|9.5 The Way Forward|208
4|9.5.1 Start of a Mediation Process|209
4|9.5.2 Defining Types of Dispute Suitable for Mediation or Arbitration|210
4|9.5.3 Costs of Alternative Dispute Resolution|210
4|9.5.4 Refraining from Negative Publicity|211
4|9.5.5 Failure to Agree|211
4|9.5.6 Mediation with Arbitration Clause|212
4|9.5.7 Concluding Remarks on the Proposed Way Forward|212
3|9.6 A Further Layer of the GFA Dispute Resolution Pyramid|213
2|Chapter 10: Conclusions: Future Regulatory Potential of Global Framework Agreements and Implications for the Economic Analysis...|215
3|10.1 Global Framework Agreements: A Meaningful Instrument?|215
3|10.2 Self-regulation Through Global Framework Agreements|216
4|10.2.1 Interests and Incentives of Multinational Companies and Global Union Federations|216
4|10.2.2 Implications: Vast Regulatory Potential for a Limited Number of Companies|218
3|10.3 The Prospects of Global Framework Agreements|219
4|10.3.1 Strengths and Opportunities|220
4|10.3.2 Challenges and Risks|221
3|10.4 Lessons Learned from Global Framework Agreements for the Economic Analysis of the Internationalization of Law|224
4|10.4.1 General Trends in the Internationalization of Law|225
5|10.4.1.1 Shift from Public Regulation to a ``Smart Mix´´ of Regulation|225
5|10.4.1.2 Partial Global Harmonization Leading to National Fragmentation|225
5|10.4.1.3 Formalization in the Absence of Legal Enforceability|226
5|10.4.1.4 Private Demand for International (Self-)regulation|226
5|10.4.1.5 Extended Chain of Delegation|226
4|10.4.2 Features of Global Framework Agreements That Are Distinctive from Other Internationalization Processes|227
1|Annex|228
1|Bibliography|237
1|Contents|8
1|List of Abbreviations|13
1|List of Figures|15
1|List of Tables|18
1|List of Boxes|19
1|Chapter 1: Introduction|21
2|1.1 Global Framework Agreements|21
3|1.1.1 The Need for International Governance Structures|21
3|1.1.2 Emergence of Transnational Industrial Relations|22
3|1.1.3 Future Regulatory Potential of Global Framework Agreements|23
3|1.1.4 The Economic Analysis of Law|23
2|1.2 Outline|24
3|1.2.1 Foundations|24
3|1.2.2 Effects of Global Framework Agreements|25
3|1.2.3 Outlook|26
2|1.3 The Added Value of This Book|26
3|1.3.1 Creation of a New Data Set|26
3|1.3.2 Prominent Contributions|26
3|1.3.3 Focus on the Question as to Why Companies Conclude Global Framework Agreements|27
3|1.3.4 Methodological Approach|27
1|Part I: Foundations|29
2|Chapter 2: The Internationalization of Law: The Evolution of Labor Standards in Response to Globalization|30
3|2.1 The Predicament: Governance Gaps|30
3|2.2 The Evolution of Labor Standards in Response to Globalization: Towards a Global Labor Governance Regime|31
4|2.2.1 Responses by International Organizations: Defining International Standards|32
4|2.2.2 Government Responses: Increasing Market Transparency and Corporate Accountability|35
4|2.2.3 Company Responses: Corporate Social Responsibility|36
3|2.3 A Thread in the Web: Global Framework Agreements|38
2|Chapter 3: The Phenomenon of Global Framework Agreements|40
3|3.1 New Phenomenon: Global Framework Agreements|40
4|3.1.1 Development of Global Framework Agreements: Continuous Growth|42
4|3.1.2 Bargaining Partners|44
5|3.1.2.1 Multinational Companies: A European Focus|44
5|3.1.2.2 Global Union Federations|47
4|3.1.3 European Framework Agreements|53
3|3.2 Content of Global Framework Agreements: Major Features and Development Over Time|55
4|3.2.1 Research Sample|56
5|3.2.1.1 Non-standardized and Quickly Developing Agreements|56
5|3.2.1.2 Company Characteristics|59
5|3.2.1.3 Coding of the Research Sample|59
4|3.2.2 References to International Standards|62
4|3.2.3 Regulatory Objectives|66
5|3.2.3.1 Individual Rights|67
5|3.2.3.2 Collective Rights|69
5|3.2.3.3 Provisions Beyond Employment and Industrial Relations|71
4|3.2.4 Scope of Global Framework Agreements|72
4|3.2.5 The Enforcement of Global Framework Agreements|72
4|3.2.6 Monitoring and Dispute Resolution|74
5|3.2.6.1 Monitoring Mechanisms to Detect Deviations|75
5|3.2.6.2 Mechanisms to Modify Behavior|76
2|Chapter 4: Enforcement in Courts or Private Enforcement?|80
3|4.1 Enforcement of Global Framework Agreements|80
4|4.1.1 Literature Review: Legal Status of Global Framework Agreements|82
4|4.1.2 Content Analysis of Global Framework Agreements|86
5|4.1.2.1 Clauses on the Non-binding Character of the Agreements|86
5|4.1.2.2 Third-Party Claims|88
5|4.1.2.3 Choice of Law Clauses|89
5|4.1.2.4 References to a Prevailing Language|91
5|4.1.2.5 References to Alternative Dispute Resolution|91
5|4.1.2.6 References to Duration|92
4|4.1.3 Discussion|92
3|4.2 Terra Incognita: Enforcement of Global Framework Agreements in Courts|93
3|4.3 Global Framework Agreements as Instruments of Self-regulation and Private Ordering|95
4|4.3.1 Extra-Legal Enforcement|95
4|4.3.2 The Sanctioning Power of Global Union Federations|97
5|4.3.2.1 Ceased Cooperation|98
5|4.3.2.2 Industrial Action|98
5|4.3.2.3 Reputational and Market Sanctions|99
4|4.3.3 Discussion|100
3|4.4 Outlook|101
2|Chapter 5: Interests and Incentives of the Bargaining Partners|103
3|5.1 Why Do Multinational Companies and Global Union Federations Sign Global Framework Agreements?|103
3|5.2 Global Framework Agreements Are Mutually Beneficial|104
3|5.3 Interests and Incentives of Multinational Companies|106
4|5.3.1 Reduction and Privatization of Disputes|106
5|5.3.1.1 Resolving Disputes Without Negative Publicity|108
5|5.3.1.2 Legitimation of Management Decisions and the Reduction of Transaction Costs|110
5|5.3.1.3 Corporate Culture|110
5|5.3.1.4 Better Management of Global Production Networks by Standardization|111
4|5.3.2 Public Relations|112
4|5.3.3 Promotion of Equal Competitive Conditions|113
4|5.3.4 Exogenous Requirements and Avoidance of Regulation|115
3|5.4 Global Union Federations: A Public Choice Perspective|117
4|5.4.1 Interests of Global Union Federations|118
4|5.4.2 Incentives to Sign Global Framework Agreements|118
4|5.4.3 Principal Agent Problems: Extensive Chain of Delegation|119
4|5.4.4 Legitimation Function and Limitations|122
3|5.5 Possible Obstacles to a Bargained Solution|123
4|5.5.1 Risks and Uncertainties|124
4|5.5.2 Transaction Costs|124
4|5.5.3 Non-GFA Alternatives|125
4|5.5.4 Summary of the Possible Obstacles|126
3|5.6 The Prospects of Global Framework Agreements|126
1|Part II: Effects of Global Framework Agreements|127
2|Chapter 6: The Public Relations Effect of Global Framework Agreements|128
3|6.1 Value Creation Through Responsible Business|128
3|6.2 An Intuitive Hypothesis: Global Framework Agreements as Signaling Devices|129
3|6.3 A Simple Conceptualization of Signaling|130
4|6.3.1 Codes of Conduct|132
4|6.3.2 Global Framework Agreements|133
3|6.4 Empirical Evaluation: Explorative and Descriptive Evidence|134
4|6.4.1 An Illustration: The Solvay Case Study|134
5|6.4.1.1 Solvay´s Global Framework Agreement|135
5|6.4.1.2 Evaluation of Solvay´s Website|136
4|6.4.2 Content Analysis of Companies´ Websites|137
3|6.5 Counterintuitive Results and Possible Explanations|138
4|6.5.1 A Closer Look at the Descriptive Statistics|140
5|6.5.1.1 Protection of Employees´ Individual and Collective Rights|142
5|6.5.1.2 Variations Over Time|143
4|6.5.2 Looking Beyond Descriptive Statistics|145
4|6.5.3 Explanations|146
5|6.5.3.1 Coordination Problem: Assumptions About the Uninformed Party|147
5|6.5.3.2 Global Framework Agreements as a Safeguard Against Negative Publicity|148
5|6.5.3.3 Signaling to Different Audiences|149
3|6.6 Conclusions and Implications for Further Research|151
2|Chapter 7: The Implementation of Global Framework Agreements at Subsidiaries, Suppliers and Subcontractors|153
3|7.1 The Implementation of Global Framework Agreements|153
3|7.2 How Global Framework Agreements Enforce ILO Conventions in Colombia: A Case Study|155
4|7.2.1 Carrefour: A Brief Description|156
4|7.2.2 Implementation of the Carrefour Global Framework Agreement in Colombia|157
3|7.3 The Implementation of Global Framework Agreements|159
4|7.3.1 Content Analysis of Global Framework Agreements|160
5|7.3.1.1 Scope of Application in Multinational Companies|160
5|7.3.1.2 Application to Suppliers and Subcontractors|163
5|7.3.1.3 Development of References to Supply Chains|168
5|7.3.1.4 Breadth of the Scope of Application|169
4|7.3.2 Review of Existing Case Studies on the Impact of Global Framework Agreements on Global Supply Chains|171
5|7.3.2.1 Synoptic Table of the Identified Case Studies|172
5|7.3.2.2 Synthesis of the Identified Case Studies|172
3|7.4 Discussion|186
2|Chapter 8: Creating Institutions for International Dispute Resolution|189
3|8.1 Do Dispute Resolution Mechanisms Increase Compliance?|189
3|8.2 Dispute Resolution as a Flexibility Mechanism|190
4|8.2.1 The Difference Between Breach and Violation|191
4|8.2.2 Remedies|191
3|8.3 Application to Global Framework Agreements|193
4|8.3.1 Distinguishing Between a Breach and a Violation in Global Framework Agreements|193
4|8.3.2 Remedies|195
5|8.3.2.1 Remedy for Breaches|195
5|8.3.2.2 Remedy for Violations|196
4|8.3.3 Increased Flexibility|196
5|8.3.3.1 Comparison with a Grim-Trigger Strategy|197
5|8.3.3.2 Comparison with a Tit-for-Tat Strategy|197
3|8.4 The Deterrence Effect of Global Framework Agreements|198
1|Part III: Outlook|199
2|Chapter 9: Looking to the Future: Mediation and Arbitration Procedures for Global Framework Agreements|200
3|9.1 The Voluntary Nature of Global Framework Agreements|200
3|9.2 The Challenge: Improving Accountability|201
3|9.3 Reasons to Develop New Mechanisms for Dispute Resolution|202
4|9.3.1 Intentions of the Bargaining Partners|203
4|9.3.2 Increasing ``Juridification´´|204
4|9.3.3 Increasing Complexity|204
4|9.3.4 Preserving the Relationship Between Global Union Federations and Multinational Companies|205
4|9.3.5 Cross-Border Disputes|205
4|9.3.6 Cost-Effectiveness and Confidentiality|206
3|9.4 Alternative Dispute Resolution Limitations|206
4|9.4.1 Disputes About Rights and Interests|206
4|9.4.2 Different Social Dialogue Traditions|207
4|9.4.3 Limitations of Arbitration|208
3|9.5 The Way Forward|208
4|9.5.1 Start of a Mediation Process|209
4|9.5.2 Defining Types of Dispute Suitable for Mediation or Arbitration|210
4|9.5.3 Costs of Alternative Dispute Resolution|210
4|9.5.4 Refraining from Negative Publicity|211
4|9.5.5 Failure to Agree|211
4|9.5.6 Mediation with Arbitration Clause|212
4|9.5.7 Concluding Remarks on the Proposed Way Forward|212
3|9.6 A Further Layer of the GFA Dispute Resolution Pyramid|213
2|Chapter 10: Conclusions: Future Regulatory Potential of Global Framework Agreements and Implications for the Economic Analysis...|215
3|10.1 Global Framework Agreements: A Meaningful Instrument?|215
3|10.2 Self-regulation Through Global Framework Agreements|216
4|10.2.1 Interests and Incentives of Multinational Companies and Global Union Federations|216
4|10.2.2 Implications: Vast Regulatory Potential for a Limited Number of Companies|218
3|10.3 The Prospects of Global Framework Agreements|219
4|10.3.1 Strengths and Opportunities|220
4|10.3.2 Challenges and Risks|221
3|10.4 Lessons Learned from Global Framework Agreements for the Economic Analysis of the Internationalization of Law|224
4|10.4.1 General Trends in the Internationalization of Law|225
5|10.4.1.1 Shift from Public Regulation to a ``Smart Mix´´ of Regulation|225
5|10.4.1.2 Partial Global Harmonization Leading to National Fragmentation|225
5|10.4.1.3 Formalization in the Absence of Legal Enforceability|226
5|10.4.1.4 Private Demand for International (Self-)regulation|226
5|10.4.1.5 Extended Chain of Delegation|226
4|10.4.2 Features of Global Framework Agreements That Are Distinctive from Other Internationalization Processes|227
1|Annex|228
1|Bibliography|237