File #2520: "2018_Book_Multi-dimensionalApproachesTow.pdf"
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1|Acknowledgements|6
1|Contents|7
1|Editors and Contributors|9
1|Introduction|19
1|Law and Policy Dilemmas in Innovation Intensive Industries|24
1|1 Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Understanding the Interplay|25
2|1 Introduction|25
2|2 IP and Competition Law: Main Concerns and Misuses|26
3|2.1 Patents and Competition Law|26
4|2.1.1 Abuse of Market Power via Refusal to License and Seeking Injunctive Relief by SEPs: ‘Smartphone Patent Wars’|26
4|2.1.2 Abuse of Dominance via Misuse of Regulatory Procedures|30
4|2.1.3 Abuse of Dominance via Excessive Pricing|31
4|2.1.4 Anticompetitive Agreements: Restricting Competitors’ Entry to the Market or ‘Paying off Competition’|32
3|2.2 Trademarks and Competition Law|35
3|2.3 Copyright and Competition Law|37
2|3 Conclusion|40
1|2 The Interaction Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law in the EU: Necessity of Convergent Interpretation with the Principles Established by the Relevant Case Law|42
2|1 Introduction|42
2|2 The Adequacy (or Inadequacy?) of the European Commission’s Soft Law|43
3|2.1 Main Provisions in the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines 2011/C 11/01: The Rule (IPR Are Pro-competitive) and the Exceptions|43
3|2.2 Preconditions for Pro-competitive Standard-Setting|45
4|2.2.1 The Central Issue of Access to the Standard|45
4|2.2.2 The Significance of Market Shares of the Goods or Services Based on the Standard|48
4|2.2.3 Result of Standardization Agreements|49
3|2.3 Main Provisions in the Commission Notice Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 TFEU to Technology Transfer Agreements|50
4|2.3.1 The Principle of Union Exhaustion|50
4|2.3.2 No Immunity from Competition Law Intervention|52
3|2.4 The Necessity of Considering the Guidance in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings|53
2|3 The Dynamic Relationship Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Law|54
3|3.1 The US and EU Convergence Regarding the Exercise of SEPs|54
3|3.2 The Commission’s Practice: The Motorola and Samsung Decisions as Basic Examples|55
3|3.3 Did the European Case Law Follow the Commission’s Approach?|57
4|3.3.1 Assessment of the Case Huawei/ZTE (C-170/2013) and Criticism|57
4|3.3.2 Results and Consequences of the CJEU’s Decision in Huawei/ZTE Case|59
4|3.3.3 Unanswered Questions|60
2|4 Conclusion: The Forthcoming Guidance—Should We Expect Undesirable Surprises?|61
2|Acknowledgements|62
2|Disclosure|63
1|3 The Relevance of Standardization in a Future Competitive India and the Role of Policy Makers, Antitrust Authorities and Courts to Promote it|64
2|1 Introduction|64
2|2 Mobile Communications|66
3|2.1 Complex Telecom System: Air-Interface and Backhaul|67
2|3 Benefits of Standardization|69
2|4 Good Faith Negotiations v Hold-out Behavior: Recent Case-Law|71
2|5 Industry Best Practices and the Role of Injunctions|75
3|5.1 ‘Access for All’ Against ‘License to All’|75
3|5.2 Use-Based Licensing v Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU)|77
3|5.3 Portfolio as Welfare Enhancing|78
3|5.4 The Role of Injunctions|79
3|5.5 Enhanced Damages for Unwilling Licensees|80
2|6 Royalty Stacking—A Unicorn that Does not Exist|81
2|7 Price Differentiation and Economic Efficiencies|83
2|8 Antitrust Considerations|87
2|9 Conclusion|90
2|Disclosure|91
1|4 The Role of the European Commission in the Development of the ETSI IPR Policy and the Nature of FRAND in Standardization|93
2|1 Introduction|93
2|2 European Union’s Initiative|94
2|3 Setting up of ETSI|95
2|4 ETSI’s IPR Policy|97
2|5 Conclusion|102
1|5 All Good Things Mustn’t Come to an End: Reigniting the Debate on Patent Policy and Standard Setting|104
2|1 Introduction|104
2|2 Importance of Standards Setting|107
2|3 IEEE-SA 2015 IPR Policy Change and the WiFi Standard|111
3|3.1 Importance of 802.11 (The WiFi Standard)|111
3|3.2 Developments Leading to the IEEE-SA’s IPR Policy Change|114
2|4 Key Changes and Reactions to the IPR Policy Amendments|116
3|4.1 Key Changes to the IEEE IPR Policy|116
4|4.1.1 Royalty Rate|116
4|4.1.2 Injunctive Relief|119
4|4.1.3 Reciprocal Licensing|121
3|4.2 Major Reactions to the IPR Policy Changes|122
2|5 Policy Implications and the Post 2015 Era at IEEE|124
2|6 Shift in US Antitrust Enforcement vis-à-vis SSO IPR Policies|128
2|7 Conclusion|133
2|Acknowledgements|134
2|Disclosure|134
1|Evolving Jurisprudence in Standard Essential Patents|136
1|6 Interpreting the ‘FRAND’ in FRAND Licensing: Licensing and Competition Law Ramifications of the 2017 Unwired Planet v Huawei UK High Court Judgements|137
2|1 Introduction|137
2|2 What Led to the Unwired Planet Decisions?|138
3|2.1 A Brief History of Unwired Planet|138
3|2.2 Commencement of Licensing Campaign by Unwired Planet|139
3|2.3 Failure of Licensing and Commencement of Litigation|140
2|3 The Unwired Planet Judgements: What Do They Mean and What Do They Add?|141
3|3.1 The 5 April 2017 Judgement|141
3|3.2 The 7 June 2017 Judgement|142
3|3.3 FRAND—New Guidance from the Unwired Judgement|143
4|3.3.1 ‘FRAND’ Means Worldwide|143
4|3.3.2 FRAND—Top-Down and Comparable License Analyses: Is One Superior to the Other?|144
4|3.3.3 The Meaning of FRAND in Light of Evolving Standards|147
2|4 Unwired Planet’s Significance Going Forward: Points for Consideration|150
3|4.1 FRAND Means Worldwide|150
3|4.2 FRAND Should Be a Range, not a Fixed Number|151
3|4.3 Transparency Is the Key to Meaningful Application of FRAND|152
2|5 Conclusion|153
2|Disclosure|153
1|7 Evolving Huawei Framework: SEPs and Grant of Injunctions|154
2|1 Introduction|154
2|2 EC Communication Paper to the European Parliament|155
2|3 Steps Prior to Granting Injunctions in SEP Cases|156
3|3.1 The Huawei Guidelines|156
3|3.2 Implementation of Huawei Guidelines in Subsequent SEP Cases|158
3|3.3 The Judgement in Unwired Planet|163
2|4 Conclusion|164
2|Disclosure|165
1|8 The Development and Theoretical Controversy of SEP Licensing Practices in China|166
2|1 Introduction|166
2|2 Problem with SEP Licensing|167
2|3 SEP Licensing Practice and Regulations in China|169
3|3.1 Guidelines and Judicial Practice Related to SEP Licensing|169
3|3.2 Injunction Issues for Failure of SEP Licensing|170
3|3.3 Negotiation Process of SEP Licensing|172
3|3.4 Royalty Issues in SEP Licensing|173
2|4 Solution to SEP Licensing Lock-in Problems|177
2|5 Conclusion|178
1|9 Regulating Abuse of SEPs in Mobile Communications Market: Reviewing 1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases in Korea|180
2|1 Introduction|180
2|2 Overview of the 1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases|181
3|2.1 Overview of Qualcomm|181
3|2.2 Summary of the 1st Qualcomm Case|181
3|2.3 Summary of the 2nd Qualcomm Case|182
3|2.4 Background of the Cases|183
2|3 Conduct Types in Question|184
3|3.1 Conduct in 1st Case|184
4|3.1.1 Discrimination in Collecting Royalties|184
4|3.1.2 Conditional Rebates on Modem Chipsets and RF Chips|185
4|3.1.3 Imposition of Royalties Even After Expiration of Patents|185
3|3.2 Conduct in 2nd Case|185
4|3.2.1 Refusing or Restricting to License SEPs to Rival Chipset Makers|186
4|3.2.2 Linking Chipset Supply with Patent License with Handset Makers|186
4|3.2.3 Imposing Unfair and Unreasonable Licensing Terms|187
3|3.3 Relationship Between Conduct Types of Two Qualcomm Cases|187
3|3.4 Expected Effects on Qualcomm’ Business Model|188
2|4 Some Competition Law Issues|188
3|4.1 Issue of Defining Relevant Markets|188
3|4.2 Determining Whether FRAND Commitment Is Violated or Evaded|189
3|4.3 Competition Law Assessment on FRAND Commitment|190
3|4.4 Theories and establishment of Competitive Harm|191
4|4.4.1 Theories of Competitive Harm|191
4|4.4.2 Extent of Proving Competitive Harm|193
2|5 Comparison with Other Jurisdictions|193
3|5.1 Korea in Comparison with Japan|194
3|5.2 Korea in Comparison with China|194
3|5.3 Korea in Comparison with US: Conduct Types|196
2|6 Conclusion|196
2|Disclosure|197
1|10 Regulating Standard Essential Patents in Implementer-Oriented Countries: Insights from India and Japan|199
2|1 Introduction|199
2|2 Indian Cases and Their Background|201
3|2.1 Overview of the SEP Cases in India|201
4|2.1.1 Global SEP Owners v Local SEP Implementers|201
4|2.1.2 Litigations from Indian SEP Holders|204
4|2.1.3 Discussions on Case Laws|205
3|2.2 Adjudication Process/Legal Framework in India|205
3|2.3 Recent Policy Developments in India|207
4|2.3.1 DIPP Discussion Paper on SEPs (2016)|207
4|2.3.2 TRAI Discussion Paper on SEPs (2017)|209
2|3 Japanese Policy Changes and their Background|212
3|3.1 Legal Framework in Japan|212
3|3.2 Cases Over SEPs|213
4|3.2.1 Apple v Samsung Tokyo District Court Decision and IP High Court Decision|213
4|3.2.2 One Blue Case|214
3|3.3 Amendment of Guideline on Antimonopoly Law|215
3|3.4 Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution System Review Committee|216
3|3.5 Intellectual Property System Study Group for the 4th Industrial Revolution|216
3|3.6 Recent Policy Developments in Japan|217
4|3.6.1 Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2017|217
4|3.6.2 Patent System Subcommittee of Industrial Structure Council|218
2|4 Conclusion|220
2|Acknowledgements|223
2|Disclosure|223
1|Perspectives from Indian Competition and Patent Law|224
1|11 Predatory Pricing in Platform Competition: Economic Theory and Indian Cases|225
2|1 Introduction|225
2|2 Traditional Theories of Predatory Pricing and the Chicago Critique|226
2|3 The Game Theoretic Counter-Critique|228
2|4 The Indian Legal Framework|229
2|5 Platform Competition|232
2|6 The Radio Taxi Wars|237
2|7 Conclusion|243
2|Postscript|243
1|12 Competition Law and Standard Essential Patent (SEP) in India: A Few Critical Issues to Ponder|245
2|1 Introduction|245
2|2 Dominance and Standard Essential Patents|246
2|3 Abuse of Dominance|254
2|4 Conclusion|255
1|13 Interface Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property in the Payment Systems Market in India|257
2|1 Introduction|257
2|2 Interoperability and the Functioning of UPI|258
3|2.1 Working of UPI|258
3|2.2 Interoperability|259
3|2.3 Difference Between Mobile Wallets and UPI Apps|259
2|3 Reserve Bank of India—Reservations on Mobile Wallets|262
3|3.1 RBI Master Direction dated 11 October 2017|262
2|4 European Commission and the Competition Commission of India—Drawing Parallels|264
2|5 The Essential Facilities Doctrine|269
3|5.1 Essential Facilities Doctrine in India|276
3|5.2 Evaluation Under Section 4 of the Act|280
3|5.3 Possible Grounds for a Refusal by Banks|281
2|6 Intellectual Property Defense|282
2|7 Conclusion|284
2|Disclosure:|284
1|14 Towards a Transaction Cost Approach to the Essential Facilities Doctrine|286
2|1 Introduction|286
2|2 Historical Overview|290
3|2.1 Doctrine’s Origin in the US|290
3|2.2 Doctrine’s Origin in Europe|295
2|3 Application of the Doctrine in IPR Cases: Comparing US and EU Approach|299
2|4 Application of the Doctrine in India|303
2|5 Problems with the Indian Approach|306
2|6 Why should Indian Practice be Sympathetic to a Liberal Interpretation of EFD|311
3|6.1 The Property-Liability Framework as Explained Through Transaction Costs|312
3|6.2 Refusal to License and Transaction Costs: View from Bargaining Power Differences|315
3|6.3 Strength of IPR Regime as Explained through Occurrence of Refusal to License|318
3|6.4 Connecting the Variables|321
3|6.5 Why is Indian IPR Regime Weak?|322
3|6.6 Therefore, India needs EFD Expansively|325
2|7 Conclusion|326
2|Acknowledgements|327
1|15 Local Working of Patents: The Perspective of Developing Countries|328
2|1 Introduction|328
2|2 What Is ‘Local Working’?|329
2|3 The Principle Against Discrimination and the Local Working Requirement|330
2|4 Attempting to Reconcile the Conflict|333
2|5 The Approaches in India and Sri Lanka|343
3|5.1 The Law in India|344
3|5.2 The Law in Sri Lanka|346
2|6 Conclusion|349
1|Contents|7
1|Editors and Contributors|9
1|Introduction|19
1|Law and Policy Dilemmas in Innovation Intensive Industries|24
1|1 Intellectual Property and Competition Law: Understanding the Interplay|25
2|1 Introduction|25
2|2 IP and Competition Law: Main Concerns and Misuses|26
3|2.1 Patents and Competition Law|26
4|2.1.1 Abuse of Market Power via Refusal to License and Seeking Injunctive Relief by SEPs: ‘Smartphone Patent Wars’|26
4|2.1.2 Abuse of Dominance via Misuse of Regulatory Procedures|30
4|2.1.3 Abuse of Dominance via Excessive Pricing|31
4|2.1.4 Anticompetitive Agreements: Restricting Competitors’ Entry to the Market or ‘Paying off Competition’|32
3|2.2 Trademarks and Competition Law|35
3|2.3 Copyright and Competition Law|37
2|3 Conclusion|40
1|2 The Interaction Between Intellectual Property Law and Competition Law in the EU: Necessity of Convergent Interpretation with the Principles Established by the Relevant Case Law|42
2|1 Introduction|42
2|2 The Adequacy (or Inadequacy?) of the European Commission’s Soft Law|43
3|2.1 Main Provisions in the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines 2011/C 11/01: The Rule (IPR Are Pro-competitive) and the Exceptions|43
3|2.2 Preconditions for Pro-competitive Standard-Setting|45
4|2.2.1 The Central Issue of Access to the Standard|45
4|2.2.2 The Significance of Market Shares of the Goods or Services Based on the Standard|48
4|2.2.3 Result of Standardization Agreements|49
3|2.3 Main Provisions in the Commission Notice Guidelines on the Application of Article 101 TFEU to Technology Transfer Agreements|50
4|2.3.1 The Principle of Union Exhaustion|50
4|2.3.2 No Immunity from Competition Law Intervention|52
3|2.4 The Necessity of Considering the Guidance in Applying Article [102 TFEU] to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings|53
2|3 The Dynamic Relationship Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property Law|54
3|3.1 The US and EU Convergence Regarding the Exercise of SEPs|54
3|3.2 The Commission’s Practice: The Motorola and Samsung Decisions as Basic Examples|55
3|3.3 Did the European Case Law Follow the Commission’s Approach?|57
4|3.3.1 Assessment of the Case Huawei/ZTE (C-170/2013) and Criticism|57
4|3.3.2 Results and Consequences of the CJEU’s Decision in Huawei/ZTE Case|59
4|3.3.3 Unanswered Questions|60
2|4 Conclusion: The Forthcoming Guidance—Should We Expect Undesirable Surprises?|61
2|Acknowledgements|62
2|Disclosure|63
1|3 The Relevance of Standardization in a Future Competitive India and the Role of Policy Makers, Antitrust Authorities and Courts to Promote it|64
2|1 Introduction|64
2|2 Mobile Communications|66
3|2.1 Complex Telecom System: Air-Interface and Backhaul|67
2|3 Benefits of Standardization|69
2|4 Good Faith Negotiations v Hold-out Behavior: Recent Case-Law|71
2|5 Industry Best Practices and the Role of Injunctions|75
3|5.1 ‘Access for All’ Against ‘License to All’|75
3|5.2 Use-Based Licensing v Smallest Saleable Patent Practicing Unit (SSPPU)|77
3|5.3 Portfolio as Welfare Enhancing|78
3|5.4 The Role of Injunctions|79
3|5.5 Enhanced Damages for Unwilling Licensees|80
2|6 Royalty Stacking—A Unicorn that Does not Exist|81
2|7 Price Differentiation and Economic Efficiencies|83
2|8 Antitrust Considerations|87
2|9 Conclusion|90
2|Disclosure|91
1|4 The Role of the European Commission in the Development of the ETSI IPR Policy and the Nature of FRAND in Standardization|93
2|1 Introduction|93
2|2 European Union’s Initiative|94
2|3 Setting up of ETSI|95
2|4 ETSI’s IPR Policy|97
2|5 Conclusion|102
1|5 All Good Things Mustn’t Come to an End: Reigniting the Debate on Patent Policy and Standard Setting|104
2|1 Introduction|104
2|2 Importance of Standards Setting|107
2|3 IEEE-SA 2015 IPR Policy Change and the WiFi Standard|111
3|3.1 Importance of 802.11 (The WiFi Standard)|111
3|3.2 Developments Leading to the IEEE-SA’s IPR Policy Change|114
2|4 Key Changes and Reactions to the IPR Policy Amendments|116
3|4.1 Key Changes to the IEEE IPR Policy|116
4|4.1.1 Royalty Rate|116
4|4.1.2 Injunctive Relief|119
4|4.1.3 Reciprocal Licensing|121
3|4.2 Major Reactions to the IPR Policy Changes|122
2|5 Policy Implications and the Post 2015 Era at IEEE|124
2|6 Shift in US Antitrust Enforcement vis-à-vis SSO IPR Policies|128
2|7 Conclusion|133
2|Acknowledgements|134
2|Disclosure|134
1|Evolving Jurisprudence in Standard Essential Patents|136
1|6 Interpreting the ‘FRAND’ in FRAND Licensing: Licensing and Competition Law Ramifications of the 2017 Unwired Planet v Huawei UK High Court Judgements|137
2|1 Introduction|137
2|2 What Led to the Unwired Planet Decisions?|138
3|2.1 A Brief History of Unwired Planet|138
3|2.2 Commencement of Licensing Campaign by Unwired Planet|139
3|2.3 Failure of Licensing and Commencement of Litigation|140
2|3 The Unwired Planet Judgements: What Do They Mean and What Do They Add?|141
3|3.1 The 5 April 2017 Judgement|141
3|3.2 The 7 June 2017 Judgement|142
3|3.3 FRAND—New Guidance from the Unwired Judgement|143
4|3.3.1 ‘FRAND’ Means Worldwide|143
4|3.3.2 FRAND—Top-Down and Comparable License Analyses: Is One Superior to the Other?|144
4|3.3.3 The Meaning of FRAND in Light of Evolving Standards|147
2|4 Unwired Planet’s Significance Going Forward: Points for Consideration|150
3|4.1 FRAND Means Worldwide|150
3|4.2 FRAND Should Be a Range, not a Fixed Number|151
3|4.3 Transparency Is the Key to Meaningful Application of FRAND|152
2|5 Conclusion|153
2|Disclosure|153
1|7 Evolving Huawei Framework: SEPs and Grant of Injunctions|154
2|1 Introduction|154
2|2 EC Communication Paper to the European Parliament|155
2|3 Steps Prior to Granting Injunctions in SEP Cases|156
3|3.1 The Huawei Guidelines|156
3|3.2 Implementation of Huawei Guidelines in Subsequent SEP Cases|158
3|3.3 The Judgement in Unwired Planet|163
2|4 Conclusion|164
2|Disclosure|165
1|8 The Development and Theoretical Controversy of SEP Licensing Practices in China|166
2|1 Introduction|166
2|2 Problem with SEP Licensing|167
2|3 SEP Licensing Practice and Regulations in China|169
3|3.1 Guidelines and Judicial Practice Related to SEP Licensing|169
3|3.2 Injunction Issues for Failure of SEP Licensing|170
3|3.3 Negotiation Process of SEP Licensing|172
3|3.4 Royalty Issues in SEP Licensing|173
2|4 Solution to SEP Licensing Lock-in Problems|177
2|5 Conclusion|178
1|9 Regulating Abuse of SEPs in Mobile Communications Market: Reviewing 1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases in Korea|180
2|1 Introduction|180
2|2 Overview of the 1st and 2nd Qualcomm Cases|181
3|2.1 Overview of Qualcomm|181
3|2.2 Summary of the 1st Qualcomm Case|181
3|2.3 Summary of the 2nd Qualcomm Case|182
3|2.4 Background of the Cases|183
2|3 Conduct Types in Question|184
3|3.1 Conduct in 1st Case|184
4|3.1.1 Discrimination in Collecting Royalties|184
4|3.1.2 Conditional Rebates on Modem Chipsets and RF Chips|185
4|3.1.3 Imposition of Royalties Even After Expiration of Patents|185
3|3.2 Conduct in 2nd Case|185
4|3.2.1 Refusing or Restricting to License SEPs to Rival Chipset Makers|186
4|3.2.2 Linking Chipset Supply with Patent License with Handset Makers|186
4|3.2.3 Imposing Unfair and Unreasonable Licensing Terms|187
3|3.3 Relationship Between Conduct Types of Two Qualcomm Cases|187
3|3.4 Expected Effects on Qualcomm’ Business Model|188
2|4 Some Competition Law Issues|188
3|4.1 Issue of Defining Relevant Markets|188
3|4.2 Determining Whether FRAND Commitment Is Violated or Evaded|189
3|4.3 Competition Law Assessment on FRAND Commitment|190
3|4.4 Theories and establishment of Competitive Harm|191
4|4.4.1 Theories of Competitive Harm|191
4|4.4.2 Extent of Proving Competitive Harm|193
2|5 Comparison with Other Jurisdictions|193
3|5.1 Korea in Comparison with Japan|194
3|5.2 Korea in Comparison with China|194
3|5.3 Korea in Comparison with US: Conduct Types|196
2|6 Conclusion|196
2|Disclosure|197
1|10 Regulating Standard Essential Patents in Implementer-Oriented Countries: Insights from India and Japan|199
2|1 Introduction|199
2|2 Indian Cases and Their Background|201
3|2.1 Overview of the SEP Cases in India|201
4|2.1.1 Global SEP Owners v Local SEP Implementers|201
4|2.1.2 Litigations from Indian SEP Holders|204
4|2.1.3 Discussions on Case Laws|205
3|2.2 Adjudication Process/Legal Framework in India|205
3|2.3 Recent Policy Developments in India|207
4|2.3.1 DIPP Discussion Paper on SEPs (2016)|207
4|2.3.2 TRAI Discussion Paper on SEPs (2017)|209
2|3 Japanese Policy Changes and their Background|212
3|3.1 Legal Framework in Japan|212
3|3.2 Cases Over SEPs|213
4|3.2.1 Apple v Samsung Tokyo District Court Decision and IP High Court Decision|213
4|3.2.2 One Blue Case|214
3|3.3 Amendment of Guideline on Antimonopoly Law|215
3|3.4 Intellectual Property Dispute Resolution System Review Committee|216
3|3.5 Intellectual Property System Study Group for the 4th Industrial Revolution|216
3|3.6 Recent Policy Developments in Japan|217
4|3.6.1 Intellectual Property Strategic Program 2017|217
4|3.6.2 Patent System Subcommittee of Industrial Structure Council|218
2|4 Conclusion|220
2|Acknowledgements|223
2|Disclosure|223
1|Perspectives from Indian Competition and Patent Law|224
1|11 Predatory Pricing in Platform Competition: Economic Theory and Indian Cases|225
2|1 Introduction|225
2|2 Traditional Theories of Predatory Pricing and the Chicago Critique|226
2|3 The Game Theoretic Counter-Critique|228
2|4 The Indian Legal Framework|229
2|5 Platform Competition|232
2|6 The Radio Taxi Wars|237
2|7 Conclusion|243
2|Postscript|243
1|12 Competition Law and Standard Essential Patent (SEP) in India: A Few Critical Issues to Ponder|245
2|1 Introduction|245
2|2 Dominance and Standard Essential Patents|246
2|3 Abuse of Dominance|254
2|4 Conclusion|255
1|13 Interface Between Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property in the Payment Systems Market in India|257
2|1 Introduction|257
2|2 Interoperability and the Functioning of UPI|258
3|2.1 Working of UPI|258
3|2.2 Interoperability|259
3|2.3 Difference Between Mobile Wallets and UPI Apps|259
2|3 Reserve Bank of India—Reservations on Mobile Wallets|262
3|3.1 RBI Master Direction dated 11 October 2017|262
2|4 European Commission and the Competition Commission of India—Drawing Parallels|264
2|5 The Essential Facilities Doctrine|269
3|5.1 Essential Facilities Doctrine in India|276
3|5.2 Evaluation Under Section 4 of the Act|280
3|5.3 Possible Grounds for a Refusal by Banks|281
2|6 Intellectual Property Defense|282
2|7 Conclusion|284
2|Disclosure:|284
1|14 Towards a Transaction Cost Approach to the Essential Facilities Doctrine|286
2|1 Introduction|286
2|2 Historical Overview|290
3|2.1 Doctrine’s Origin in the US|290
3|2.2 Doctrine’s Origin in Europe|295
2|3 Application of the Doctrine in IPR Cases: Comparing US and EU Approach|299
2|4 Application of the Doctrine in India|303
2|5 Problems with the Indian Approach|306
2|6 Why should Indian Practice be Sympathetic to a Liberal Interpretation of EFD|311
3|6.1 The Property-Liability Framework as Explained Through Transaction Costs|312
3|6.2 Refusal to License and Transaction Costs: View from Bargaining Power Differences|315
3|6.3 Strength of IPR Regime as Explained through Occurrence of Refusal to License|318
3|6.4 Connecting the Variables|321
3|6.5 Why is Indian IPR Regime Weak?|322
3|6.6 Therefore, India needs EFD Expansively|325
2|7 Conclusion|326
2|Acknowledgements|327
1|15 Local Working of Patents: The Perspective of Developing Countries|328
2|1 Introduction|328
2|2 What Is ‘Local Working’?|329
2|3 The Principle Against Discrimination and the Local Working Requirement|330
2|4 Attempting to Reconcile the Conflict|333
2|5 The Approaches in India and Sri Lanka|343
3|5.1 The Law in India|344
3|5.2 The Law in Sri Lanka|346
2|6 Conclusion|349