File #2652: "2019_Book_GoverningCorporateTaxManagemen.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|7
1|Symbols and Abbreviations|10
1|List of Figures|12
1|List of Tables|14
1|Chapter 1 Introduction|16
2|From Plan to Market|17
3|Ownership Reform|17
3|Institutional Reforms|18
3|Tax Reform|19
2|Corporate Taxation and Tax Management|23
2|Problematizing Corporate Tax Management|27
2|Methodology|29
2|Key Questions and Book Outline|29
2|References|31
1|Chapter 2 Corporate Tax Management and Chinese Enterprises|34
2|Introduction|34
2|Theoretical Considerations|34
3|Agency Theory|35
3|Bad News Hoarding Theory|36
3|Helping Hand and Grabbing Hand|37
2|Empirical Studies|39
3|Corporate Tax Management|39
3|Consequences of Corporate Tax Management|40
3|Specific Characteristics of China’s Enterprises|42
3|State Ownership|43
3|Corruption|45
3|Marketization|46
2|Research Gaps|48
2|Theoretical Framework|49
2|Analytical Framework|52
2|References|52
1|Chapter 3 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance|60
2|Introduction|60
2|Analytic Framework|61
2|Methodology and Data|64
3|Measures|64
4|Corporate Tax Management|64
4|Profitability Performance|65
4|Growth Performance|67
4|Market Performance|67
3|Model Specification|67
4|Data and Sampling|68
4|Statistical Modeling|69
2|Empirical Findings and Analysis|71
3|Measurement Model|71
3|Structural Model|73
2|Summary|76
2|References|77
1|Chapter 4 Economic Reforms and Market Outcomes over Time|83
2|Introduction|83
2|The China Context|86
3|Economic Reforms|86
2|Literature Review and Hypotheses Development|88
2|Methodology and Data|92
3|Sample and Data|92
3|Variables Used|95
3|Model Specification|96
2|Results and Analysis|98
3|Descriptive Statistics|98
3|Regression Results|101
3|Robustness Check for Endogeneity Problems|114
2|Chapter Summary|116
2|References|118
1|Chapter 5 Corruption, Institutions, and Markets|122
2|Introduction|122
2|Literature Review and Hypotheses Development|124
2|Data and Methodology|128
3|Sample and Data|128
3|Variables|129
3|Model Specification|132
2|Results and Analysis|135
3|Descriptive Statistics|135
3|Corruption and Corporate Tax Management|140
3|Moderating Effect of Institutional Support|144
3|Corporate Tax Management, Corruption, and Firm Performance|146
2|Chapter Summary|149
2|References|149
1|Chapter 6 Conclusions|154
2|Introduction|154
2|Synthesis of Findings|155
2|Implications for Theory|158
2|Implications for Policy|159
2|Implications for Firms|162
2|References|163
1|Appendix A: Measurement of Firm-Specific Earnings Management (Discacc)|165
1|Appendix B: The Impacts of Three Specific Dimensions of Marketization on the Relationship Between Corruption and Tax Management|167
1|References|171
1|Index|188
1|Contents|7
1|Symbols and Abbreviations|10
1|List of Figures|12
1|List of Tables|14
1|Chapter 1 Introduction|16
2|From Plan to Market|17
3|Ownership Reform|17
3|Institutional Reforms|18
3|Tax Reform|19
2|Corporate Taxation and Tax Management|23
2|Problematizing Corporate Tax Management|27
2|Methodology|29
2|Key Questions and Book Outline|29
2|References|31
1|Chapter 2 Corporate Tax Management and Chinese Enterprises|34
2|Introduction|34
2|Theoretical Considerations|34
3|Agency Theory|35
3|Bad News Hoarding Theory|36
3|Helping Hand and Grabbing Hand|37
2|Empirical Studies|39
3|Corporate Tax Management|39
3|Consequences of Corporate Tax Management|40
3|Specific Characteristics of China’s Enterprises|42
3|State Ownership|43
3|Corruption|45
3|Marketization|46
2|Research Gaps|48
2|Theoretical Framework|49
2|Analytical Framework|52
2|References|52
1|Chapter 3 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance|60
2|Introduction|60
2|Analytic Framework|61
2|Methodology and Data|64
3|Measures|64
4|Corporate Tax Management|64
4|Profitability Performance|65
4|Growth Performance|67
4|Market Performance|67
3|Model Specification|67
4|Data and Sampling|68
4|Statistical Modeling|69
2|Empirical Findings and Analysis|71
3|Measurement Model|71
3|Structural Model|73
2|Summary|76
2|References|77
1|Chapter 4 Economic Reforms and Market Outcomes over Time|83
2|Introduction|83
2|The China Context|86
3|Economic Reforms|86
2|Literature Review and Hypotheses Development|88
2|Methodology and Data|92
3|Sample and Data|92
3|Variables Used|95
3|Model Specification|96
2|Results and Analysis|98
3|Descriptive Statistics|98
3|Regression Results|101
3|Robustness Check for Endogeneity Problems|114
2|Chapter Summary|116
2|References|118
1|Chapter 5 Corruption, Institutions, and Markets|122
2|Introduction|122
2|Literature Review and Hypotheses Development|124
2|Data and Methodology|128
3|Sample and Data|128
3|Variables|129
3|Model Specification|132
2|Results and Analysis|135
3|Descriptive Statistics|135
3|Corruption and Corporate Tax Management|140
3|Moderating Effect of Institutional Support|144
3|Corporate Tax Management, Corruption, and Firm Performance|146
2|Chapter Summary|149
2|References|149
1|Chapter 6 Conclusions|154
2|Introduction|154
2|Synthesis of Findings|155
2|Implications for Theory|158
2|Implications for Policy|159
2|Implications for Firms|162
2|References|163
1|Appendix A: Measurement of Firm-Specific Earnings Management (Discacc)|165
1|Appendix B: The Impacts of Three Specific Dimensions of Marketization on the Relationship Between Corruption and Tax Management|167
1|References|171
1|Index|188