File #2730: "2019_Book_NuclearNon-ProliferationInInte.pdf"
Testo
1|Preface|5
1|Contents|7
1|Abbreviations|9
1|1 The Significance of the Human Impact for Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Disarmament|12
2|Abstract|13
2|1.1 Introduction|13
2|1.2 Regulating Nuclear Applications|15
3|1.2.1 The Need for a Social License|15
3|1.2.2 Risks for Human Health and Development|16
3|1.2.3 ‘Legitimate Civil Resistance’|16
3|1.2.4 Gender Perspective|17
3|1.2.5 Liability to Responders|18
3|1.2.6 Disability|19
2|1.3 Striving for Regional Solutions|19
3|1.3.1 African Perspectives|19
3|1.3.2 Indigenous Engagement in the Uranium Industry|20
3|1.3.3 Environmental and Health Effects of Uranium Mining|21
3|1.3.4 Transparency and Public Dialogue|22
3|1.3.5 Environmental Protection of Aboriginal Lands|22
2|1.4 Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons|23
3|1.4.1 Nuclear Deterrence: Morally and Legally Permissible?|23
3|1.4.2 Human- and Victim-Centred Trends in Arms Control Law|23
3|1.4.3 A Plea for Canada’s Active Participation in Nuclear Disarmament|24
3|1.4.4 Is the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Accessible for Umbrella States?|24
3|1.4.5 The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Challenges for International Law and Security|25
2|1.5 Conclusions|25
2|References|26
1|Regulating Nuclear Applications|27
1|2 A Social License for Nuclear Technologies|28
2|Abstract|28
2|2.1 Introduction|29
2|2.2 The Social License Concept|32
3|2.2.1 Background|32
3|2.2.2 Society and Indicators of Consent|35
3|2.2.3 Key Principles|37
4|2.2.3.1 Engendering Trust|38
4|2.2.3.2 Transparency|38
4|2.2.3.3 Meaningful Public Engagement|39
4|2.2.3.4 Protecting Health, Safety and the Environment|42
3|2.2.4 The Role of Regulation|42
3|2.2.5 The Role of Project Proponents and Governments|43
2|2.3 Nuclear Case Studies|45
3|2.3.1 Yucca Mountain Waste Repository|45
3|2.3.2 Swedish and Finnish Waste Repositories|46
2|2.4 Application to Nuclear Technologies|47
3|2.4.1 Nuclear Waste Siting|47
3|2.4.2 Advanced Fission and Fusion Power Plants|49
2|2.5 Conclusion|50
2|References|51
1|3 Nuclear Materials for Human Health and Development|54
2|Abstract|54
2|3.1 Introduction|55
2|3.2 Medical|57
3|3.2.1 Diagnosis|57
3|3.2.2 Therapy|58
3|3.2.3 Equipment and Device Sterilization and Other Medical Uses|60
2|3.3 Industrial|61
3|3.3.1 Radiography and Gauges|61
3|3.3.2 Well Logging|62
3|3.3.3 Material Processing|63
3|3.3.4 Radioluminescence|63
2|3.4 Agricultural|64
3|3.4.1 Plant Breeding|64
3|3.4.2 Pest Control|65
2|3.5 Research|66
3|3.5.1 Tracers|66
3|3.5.2 Calibration Sources|67
3|3.5.3 Neutron Sources|67
2|3.6 Energy|68
2|3.7 The Health Risks of Radiation Exposure|70
2|3.8 Conclusion|74
2|References|75
1|4 ‘We Have To Give Up Business As Usual’: Anti-Nuclear Protests and the Construction of a Defence of ‘Legitimate Civil Resistance’|79
2|Abstract|79
2|4.1 Introduction|80
2|4.2 Reasons for Creating a New Defence of Legitimate Civil Resistance|83
3|4.2.1 Problems with the Necessity Defence|83
3|4.2.2 Problems with Jury Nullification|87
4|4.2.2.1 Positive Aspects Attributed to Jury Nullification|87
4|4.2.2.2 Shortcomings of Jury Nullification|89
2|4.3 The Components of a Defence of Legitimate Civil Resistance|91
3|4.3.1 The Objectives of the Resister-Accused Concern and Seek to Advance an Important and Pressing Matter of Public Concern|93
3|4.3.2 The Conduct Is in Furtherance of International Rights, Obligations, or Principles|94
3|4.3.3 Proportionality of the Resistive Acts|100
2|4.4 Concluding Thoughts|103
2|References|104
1|5 Gender Perspective on Nuclear Weapons and Human Rights|106
2|Abstract|106
2|5.1 Introduction|107
2|5.2 Gender, Human Rights and Gender Mainstreaming|108
2|5.3 Sexed and Gendered Effects of the Use and Testing of Nuclear Weapons|111
3|5.3.1 Gender Awareness in Assisting Victims of Nuclear Detonations|114
2|5.4 A ‘Different Angle’ on Security, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control|115
3|5.4.1 Women’s Agency|116
3|5.4.2 Women’s Representation|118
2|5.5 Conclusions|119
2|References|120
1|6 Compensation for Responders to a Nuclear Accident: Where Should the Law Go?|123
2|Abstract|123
2|6.1 Introduction|124
2|6.2 Current Regimes for Compensating Responders|126
3|6.2.1 International|126
3|6.2.2 National|128
2|6.3 Case Studies|129
3|6.3.1 Chernobyl (1986)|129
4|6.3.1.1 Background|129
4|6.3.1.2 Harms Suffered|131
4|6.3.1.3 Compensation for Responders|132
3|6.3.2 Fukushima (2011)|134
4|6.3.2.1 Background|134
4|6.3.2.2 Harms Suffered|135
4|6.3.2.3 Compensation for Responders|136
2|6.4 Issues|140
2|6.5 Recommendations|145
3|6.5.1 Recognize the Immense Complexity of Compensation for Responders|145
3|6.5.2 Define Responders Broadly and Purposively|145
3|6.5.3 Track and Monitor Responders|146
3|6.5.4 Apply Probability to Enable Responders to Demonstrate Causation|146
3|6.5.5 Integrate Various Sources of Responder Compensation|147
3|6.5.6 Give Responders Some Form of Priority or Security for Compensation|148
2|6.6 Conclusion|149
2|References|149
1|7 Human Rights, Disability, Economics and Nuclear Releases|152
2|Abstract|152
2|7.1 Introduction|153
2|7.2 The Economy, Stupid|154
2|7.3 The Meaning of ‘Nuclear Release’|156
2|7.4 Some Connections Between Nuclear Power and Disability|156
3|7.4.1 An Example of One Positive Impact|156
3|7.4.2 Economic Consequences of Disablement|157
3|7.4.3 Unusual and Surprising Disability Issues|158
3|7.4.4 Caring for Those Who Were Disabled Before the Release|160
4|7.4.4.1 Family Care Provision|161
4|7.4.4.2 Paid Service Provision|161
2|7.5 International Law Considerations|164
2|7.6 One Possible Solution?|166
2|7.7 Conclusion|167
2|References|167
1|Striving for Regional Solutions|169
1|8 African Perspectives on Denuclearisation and the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes|170
2|Abstract|171
2|8.1 Introduction|171
2|8.2 A Shift from a Balance of Terror to Humanitarianism|172
2|8.3 African Engagement in Denuclearisation|176
3|8.3.1 The African Regional Treaty on Denuclearisation|177
3|8.3.2 The Influence of the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’|178
3|8.3.3 The Role of African Philosophical Thought|179
2|8.4 Progress, Pitfalls and Prospects|182
3|8.4.1 The Need for an African Spearhead|182
3|8.4.2 Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes|184
2|8.5 Concluding Remarks|186
2|References|188
1|9 The African NWFZ, The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, and the Protection of the Environment|191
2|Abstract|191
2|9.1 Introduction|192
2|9.2 Events Before the Conclusion of the Pelindaba Treaty—The Emergence of the Crime of Dumping Nuclear Waste|193
2|9.3 The Treaty of Pelindaba and the ANWFZ|196
3|9.3.1 Overview|196
3|9.3.2 The Obligations Assumed by the Contracting Parties|199
3|9.3.3 The Institutional Setup—The African Commission on Nuclear Energy|202
3|9.3.4 The Dispute Settlement Methods and Procedures|204
2|9.4 The Treaty of Pelindaba, the Protection of the Environment, the Bamako Convention, and the Revised Convention on Nature Conservation|206
2|9.5 Conclusions (and Some Suggestions)|208
2|References|209
1|10 If the Government Errs, Corporate Losses are Their Own to Bear: Corporate Best Practices for Indigenous Engagement in the Uranium Industry|211
2|Abstract|211
2|10.1 Introduction|212
2|10.2 The Crown Bears the Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples, and That Consultation Must Be Proportionate to the Strength of the Indigenous Claim of Interest and the Likelihood of the Government Action Having an Adverse Impact|214
3|10.2.1 Crown Consultation Overview|214
3|10.2.2 R v. Sparrow|215
3|10.2.3 Haida Nation v. British Columbia|215
3|10.2.4 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia|216
3|10.2.5 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada|217
3|10.2.6 Modern Consultation Framework|218
2|10.3 Corporate Project Proponents Play a Key Role in the Crown’s Duty to Consult and Should Exercise It Well Because the Crown Is Not Civilly Liable When Inadequate Consultation Results in Corporate Loss on a Project|220
3|10.3.1 Corporate Role|220
3|10.3.2 Moulton Contracting Ltd. v. British Columbia|221
2|10.4 Best Practice Recommendations for Corporate Engagement|222
3|10.4.1 Best Practices Overview|222
3|10.4.2 Engagement Strategy|223
3|10.4.3 Consultation Record Keeping|225
3|10.4.4 Memoranda of Understanding Provisions|225
3|10.4.5 Impact Benefit Agreement Provisions|226
2|10.5 Conclusion|228
2|References|229
1|11 Uranium Mining: Environmental and Human Health Effects|231
2|Abstract|231
2|11.1 Introduction|232
2|11.2 The Process of Mining, Milling and Refining|232
2|11.3 Environmental Pollution|234
2|11.4 Human Health Effects|235
2|11.5 Conclusion|236
2|References|236
1|12 Nuclear Law, Oversight and Regulation: Seeking Public Dialogue and Democratic Transparency in Canada|238
2|Abstract|238
2|12.1 Introduction|239
2|12.2 Nuclear Regulation and Oversight in Canada|240
2|12.3 Modernizing Canada’s Nuclear Laws|242
2|12.4 Environmental Assessment Law|243
3|12.4.1 Canada’s Nuclear Regulator Has the Authority to Conduct Environmental Assessments|243
3|12.4.2 Major Nuclear Projects Lack Environmental Assessments|245
2|12.5 Canada’s (Growing) Waste Legacy|247
3|12.5.1 The Waste Bunker—Also Known as the Deep Geological Repository|248
3|12.5.2 Entombing Nuclear Plant Structures and Its Waste—Also Know as In Situ Decommissioning|248
3|12.5.3 The Radioactive Landfill—Also Known as a Near Surface Disposal Facility|250
2|12.6 Emergency Planning and Preparedness|251
3|12.6.1 The Planning Basis and Accompanying Response Measures|251
3|12.6.2 Canada’s International Standing|253
3|12.6.3 Response Planning and Public Input|253
2|12.7 Conclusion|256
2|References|256
1|13 The ‘Inalienable Right’ to Nuclear Energy Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Indigenous Rights of Consultation, Self-Determination and Environmental Protection of Aboriginal Lands|258
2|Abstract|258
2|13.1 Introduction|259
2|13.2 Legislative and Historical Background|260
3|13.2.1 Historic Background and Trial History of Tsilhqot’in|260
3|13.2.2 Jurisprudence of Aboriginal Title Claims|261
2|13.3 Legal Issues in Tsilhqot’in|263
3|13.3.1 Is Aboriginal Title Established?|263
3|13.3.2 What Rights Does Aboriginal Title Confer?|265
4|13.3.2.1 The Legal Characterization of Aboriginal Title|266
4|13.3.2.2 The Incidents of Aboriginal Title|266
4|13.3.2.3 Justification of Infringement|267
4|13.3.2.4 Remedies and Transition|268
4|13.3.2.5 What Duties Were Owed by the Crown at the Time of the Government Action?|269
2|13.4 The Court’s Decision|269
3|13.4.1 Provincial Laws and Aboriginal Title|270
3|13.4.2 Significance|274
4|13.4.2.1 Aboriginal Title Versus Fee Simple|275
4|13.4.2.2 Comparison to Nunavut|280
4|13.4.2.3 Nuclear Regulation: Between Canada and International Law|281
4|13.4.2.4 Canada’s Nuclear Capacity: Mining, Power and Medical|282
4|13.4.2.5 Aboriginal Title Rights Versus Nuclear Rights|283
4|13.4.2.6 Self Determination|287
3|13.4.3 Comparison with Recent Decisions and Other Cases of Self-Determination|289
2|13.5 Conclusion|292
2|References|293
1|Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons|295
1|14 Is Deterrence Morally and Legally Permissible and Is It a Form of State Terrorism?|296
2|Abstract|296
2|14.1 Introduction|297
2|14.2 Defining Deterrence|299
2|14.3 Moral Arguments for and Against Deterrence|302
3|14.3.1 Moral Arguments for Deterrence and Objections|303
3|14.3.2 Moral Arguments Against Deterrence|308
2|14.4 Legal Arguments for and Against Deterrence|312
2|14.5 Parallels with Terrorism|315
2|14.6 Conclusion|320
2|References|321
1|15 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Further Confirmation of the Human- and Victim-Centred Trend in Arms Control Law|323
2|Abstract|323
2|15.1 Introduction|324
2|15.2 Preparatory Work of the Treaty|325
2|15.3 Preamble (Object and Purpose)|330
2|15.4 Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons|334
3|15.4.1 Use of Nuclear Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law|335
3|15.4.2 Use of Nuclear Weapons Under Human Rights Law|337
4|15.4.2.1 Civil Rights, in Particular the Right to Life|338
4|15.4.2.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Particular the Right to Water|340
2|15.5 Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation (Article 6 TPNW) in Light of the Duties of International Cooperation and Assistance (Article 7 TPNW)|343
3|15.5.1 General|343
3|15.5.2 Focusing on Vulnerable Groups, Such as Indigenous Peoples|345
2|15.6 Concluding Observations|346
2|References|348
1|16 Why Was Canada Not in the Room for the Nuclear Ban Treaty?|352
2|Abstract|352
2|16.1 Introduction|353
2|16.2 A Brief History—Canada and Disarmament Advocacy|355
3|16.2.1 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Peace Initiative|355
3|16.2.2 Canadian Leadership in the Indefinite Extension of the NPT|357
3|16.2.3 The 2000 NATO Nuclear Policy Review|359
2|16.3 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons|360
3|16.3.1 Development of the TPNW|361
3|16.3.2 Legal Obligations in the TPNW|363
3|16.3.3 Why Do We Need the TPNW in Addition to the NPT?|363
2|16.4 Canada’s Stand Against Nuclear Normativity|365
3|16.4.1 The NATO Challenge|366
3|16.4.2 Civil Society Leadership on Nuclear Non-Proliferation|367
2|16.5 Conclusion|369
2|References|370
1|17 Is the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Accessible to Umbrella States?|373
2|Abstract|373
2|17.1 Introduction|374
3|17.1.1 Article 1(1)(d)’s Negotiating History|375
4|17.1.1.1 Ban on Threatened Use of Nuclear Weapons and Jus ad Bellum|378
3|17.1.2 Article 1(1)(d) and Nuclear Deterrence|383
3|17.1.3 Article 1(1)(d) and Nuclear Umbrella|386
2|17.2 Conclusion|387
2|References|389
1|18 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges for International Law and Security|391
2|Abstract|391
2|18.1 Introduction|392
2|18.2 Prevailing Legal Controversies|395
2|18.3 Deficiencies of the New Treaty|399
3|18.3.1 The Absence of Nuclear-Weapon States|400
3|18.3.2 Erosion of Support for the NPT|400
3|18.3.3 Absence of Sufficient Regulation on Verification|401
3|18.3.4 Legal Uncertainties for Nuclear-Test-Bans|404
3|18.3.5 Open Issues|405
2|18.4 Effects on International Security|405
2|18.5 Conclusions|408
2|References|409
1|Index|412
1|Contents|7
1|Abbreviations|9
1|1 The Significance of the Human Impact for Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Disarmament|12
2|Abstract|13
2|1.1 Introduction|13
2|1.2 Regulating Nuclear Applications|15
3|1.2.1 The Need for a Social License|15
3|1.2.2 Risks for Human Health and Development|16
3|1.2.3 ‘Legitimate Civil Resistance’|16
3|1.2.4 Gender Perspective|17
3|1.2.5 Liability to Responders|18
3|1.2.6 Disability|19
2|1.3 Striving for Regional Solutions|19
3|1.3.1 African Perspectives|19
3|1.3.2 Indigenous Engagement in the Uranium Industry|20
3|1.3.3 Environmental and Health Effects of Uranium Mining|21
3|1.3.4 Transparency and Public Dialogue|22
3|1.3.5 Environmental Protection of Aboriginal Lands|22
2|1.4 Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons|23
3|1.4.1 Nuclear Deterrence: Morally and Legally Permissible?|23
3|1.4.2 Human- and Victim-Centred Trends in Arms Control Law|23
3|1.4.3 A Plea for Canada’s Active Participation in Nuclear Disarmament|24
3|1.4.4 Is the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Accessible for Umbrella States?|24
3|1.4.5 The Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty: Challenges for International Law and Security|25
2|1.5 Conclusions|25
2|References|26
1|Regulating Nuclear Applications|27
1|2 A Social License for Nuclear Technologies|28
2|Abstract|28
2|2.1 Introduction|29
2|2.2 The Social License Concept|32
3|2.2.1 Background|32
3|2.2.2 Society and Indicators of Consent|35
3|2.2.3 Key Principles|37
4|2.2.3.1 Engendering Trust|38
4|2.2.3.2 Transparency|38
4|2.2.3.3 Meaningful Public Engagement|39
4|2.2.3.4 Protecting Health, Safety and the Environment|42
3|2.2.4 The Role of Regulation|42
3|2.2.5 The Role of Project Proponents and Governments|43
2|2.3 Nuclear Case Studies|45
3|2.3.1 Yucca Mountain Waste Repository|45
3|2.3.2 Swedish and Finnish Waste Repositories|46
2|2.4 Application to Nuclear Technologies|47
3|2.4.1 Nuclear Waste Siting|47
3|2.4.2 Advanced Fission and Fusion Power Plants|49
2|2.5 Conclusion|50
2|References|51
1|3 Nuclear Materials for Human Health and Development|54
2|Abstract|54
2|3.1 Introduction|55
2|3.2 Medical|57
3|3.2.1 Diagnosis|57
3|3.2.2 Therapy|58
3|3.2.3 Equipment and Device Sterilization and Other Medical Uses|60
2|3.3 Industrial|61
3|3.3.1 Radiography and Gauges|61
3|3.3.2 Well Logging|62
3|3.3.3 Material Processing|63
3|3.3.4 Radioluminescence|63
2|3.4 Agricultural|64
3|3.4.1 Plant Breeding|64
3|3.4.2 Pest Control|65
2|3.5 Research|66
3|3.5.1 Tracers|66
3|3.5.2 Calibration Sources|67
3|3.5.3 Neutron Sources|67
2|3.6 Energy|68
2|3.7 The Health Risks of Radiation Exposure|70
2|3.8 Conclusion|74
2|References|75
1|4 ‘We Have To Give Up Business As Usual’: Anti-Nuclear Protests and the Construction of a Defence of ‘Legitimate Civil Resistance’|79
2|Abstract|79
2|4.1 Introduction|80
2|4.2 Reasons for Creating a New Defence of Legitimate Civil Resistance|83
3|4.2.1 Problems with the Necessity Defence|83
3|4.2.2 Problems with Jury Nullification|87
4|4.2.2.1 Positive Aspects Attributed to Jury Nullification|87
4|4.2.2.2 Shortcomings of Jury Nullification|89
2|4.3 The Components of a Defence of Legitimate Civil Resistance|91
3|4.3.1 The Objectives of the Resister-Accused Concern and Seek to Advance an Important and Pressing Matter of Public Concern|93
3|4.3.2 The Conduct Is in Furtherance of International Rights, Obligations, or Principles|94
3|4.3.3 Proportionality of the Resistive Acts|100
2|4.4 Concluding Thoughts|103
2|References|104
1|5 Gender Perspective on Nuclear Weapons and Human Rights|106
2|Abstract|106
2|5.1 Introduction|107
2|5.2 Gender, Human Rights and Gender Mainstreaming|108
2|5.3 Sexed and Gendered Effects of the Use and Testing of Nuclear Weapons|111
3|5.3.1 Gender Awareness in Assisting Victims of Nuclear Detonations|114
2|5.4 A ‘Different Angle’ on Security, Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Arms Control|115
3|5.4.1 Women’s Agency|116
3|5.4.2 Women’s Representation|118
2|5.5 Conclusions|119
2|References|120
1|6 Compensation for Responders to a Nuclear Accident: Where Should the Law Go?|123
2|Abstract|123
2|6.1 Introduction|124
2|6.2 Current Regimes for Compensating Responders|126
3|6.2.1 International|126
3|6.2.2 National|128
2|6.3 Case Studies|129
3|6.3.1 Chernobyl (1986)|129
4|6.3.1.1 Background|129
4|6.3.1.2 Harms Suffered|131
4|6.3.1.3 Compensation for Responders|132
3|6.3.2 Fukushima (2011)|134
4|6.3.2.1 Background|134
4|6.3.2.2 Harms Suffered|135
4|6.3.2.3 Compensation for Responders|136
2|6.4 Issues|140
2|6.5 Recommendations|145
3|6.5.1 Recognize the Immense Complexity of Compensation for Responders|145
3|6.5.2 Define Responders Broadly and Purposively|145
3|6.5.3 Track and Monitor Responders|146
3|6.5.4 Apply Probability to Enable Responders to Demonstrate Causation|146
3|6.5.5 Integrate Various Sources of Responder Compensation|147
3|6.5.6 Give Responders Some Form of Priority or Security for Compensation|148
2|6.6 Conclusion|149
2|References|149
1|7 Human Rights, Disability, Economics and Nuclear Releases|152
2|Abstract|152
2|7.1 Introduction|153
2|7.2 The Economy, Stupid|154
2|7.3 The Meaning of ‘Nuclear Release’|156
2|7.4 Some Connections Between Nuclear Power and Disability|156
3|7.4.1 An Example of One Positive Impact|156
3|7.4.2 Economic Consequences of Disablement|157
3|7.4.3 Unusual and Surprising Disability Issues|158
3|7.4.4 Caring for Those Who Were Disabled Before the Release|160
4|7.4.4.1 Family Care Provision|161
4|7.4.4.2 Paid Service Provision|161
2|7.5 International Law Considerations|164
2|7.6 One Possible Solution?|166
2|7.7 Conclusion|167
2|References|167
1|Striving for Regional Solutions|169
1|8 African Perspectives on Denuclearisation and the Use of Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes|170
2|Abstract|171
2|8.1 Introduction|171
2|8.2 A Shift from a Balance of Terror to Humanitarianism|172
2|8.3 African Engagement in Denuclearisation|176
3|8.3.1 The African Regional Treaty on Denuclearisation|177
3|8.3.2 The Influence of the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’|178
3|8.3.3 The Role of African Philosophical Thought|179
2|8.4 Progress, Pitfalls and Prospects|182
3|8.4.1 The Need for an African Spearhead|182
3|8.4.2 Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes|184
2|8.5 Concluding Remarks|186
2|References|188
1|9 The African NWFZ, The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, and the Protection of the Environment|191
2|Abstract|191
2|9.1 Introduction|192
2|9.2 Events Before the Conclusion of the Pelindaba Treaty—The Emergence of the Crime of Dumping Nuclear Waste|193
2|9.3 The Treaty of Pelindaba and the ANWFZ|196
3|9.3.1 Overview|196
3|9.3.2 The Obligations Assumed by the Contracting Parties|199
3|9.3.3 The Institutional Setup—The African Commission on Nuclear Energy|202
3|9.3.4 The Dispute Settlement Methods and Procedures|204
2|9.4 The Treaty of Pelindaba, the Protection of the Environment, the Bamako Convention, and the Revised Convention on Nature Conservation|206
2|9.5 Conclusions (and Some Suggestions)|208
2|References|209
1|10 If the Government Errs, Corporate Losses are Their Own to Bear: Corporate Best Practices for Indigenous Engagement in the Uranium Industry|211
2|Abstract|211
2|10.1 Introduction|212
2|10.2 The Crown Bears the Duty to Consult with Indigenous Peoples, and That Consultation Must Be Proportionate to the Strength of the Indigenous Claim of Interest and the Likelihood of the Government Action Having an Adverse Impact|214
3|10.2.1 Crown Consultation Overview|214
3|10.2.2 R v. Sparrow|215
3|10.2.3 Haida Nation v. British Columbia|215
3|10.2.4 Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia|216
3|10.2.5 Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada|217
3|10.2.6 Modern Consultation Framework|218
2|10.3 Corporate Project Proponents Play a Key Role in the Crown’s Duty to Consult and Should Exercise It Well Because the Crown Is Not Civilly Liable When Inadequate Consultation Results in Corporate Loss on a Project|220
3|10.3.1 Corporate Role|220
3|10.3.2 Moulton Contracting Ltd. v. British Columbia|221
2|10.4 Best Practice Recommendations for Corporate Engagement|222
3|10.4.1 Best Practices Overview|222
3|10.4.2 Engagement Strategy|223
3|10.4.3 Consultation Record Keeping|225
3|10.4.4 Memoranda of Understanding Provisions|225
3|10.4.5 Impact Benefit Agreement Provisions|226
2|10.5 Conclusion|228
2|References|229
1|11 Uranium Mining: Environmental and Human Health Effects|231
2|Abstract|231
2|11.1 Introduction|232
2|11.2 The Process of Mining, Milling and Refining|232
2|11.3 Environmental Pollution|234
2|11.4 Human Health Effects|235
2|11.5 Conclusion|236
2|References|236
1|12 Nuclear Law, Oversight and Regulation: Seeking Public Dialogue and Democratic Transparency in Canada|238
2|Abstract|238
2|12.1 Introduction|239
2|12.2 Nuclear Regulation and Oversight in Canada|240
2|12.3 Modernizing Canada’s Nuclear Laws|242
2|12.4 Environmental Assessment Law|243
3|12.4.1 Canada’s Nuclear Regulator Has the Authority to Conduct Environmental Assessments|243
3|12.4.2 Major Nuclear Projects Lack Environmental Assessments|245
2|12.5 Canada’s (Growing) Waste Legacy|247
3|12.5.1 The Waste Bunker—Also Known as the Deep Geological Repository|248
3|12.5.2 Entombing Nuclear Plant Structures and Its Waste—Also Know as In Situ Decommissioning|248
3|12.5.3 The Radioactive Landfill—Also Known as a Near Surface Disposal Facility|250
2|12.6 Emergency Planning and Preparedness|251
3|12.6.1 The Planning Basis and Accompanying Response Measures|251
3|12.6.2 Canada’s International Standing|253
3|12.6.3 Response Planning and Public Input|253
2|12.7 Conclusion|256
2|References|256
1|13 The ‘Inalienable Right’ to Nuclear Energy Under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: Indigenous Rights of Consultation, Self-Determination and Environmental Protection of Aboriginal Lands|258
2|Abstract|258
2|13.1 Introduction|259
2|13.2 Legislative and Historical Background|260
3|13.2.1 Historic Background and Trial History of Tsilhqot’in|260
3|13.2.2 Jurisprudence of Aboriginal Title Claims|261
2|13.3 Legal Issues in Tsilhqot’in|263
3|13.3.1 Is Aboriginal Title Established?|263
3|13.3.2 What Rights Does Aboriginal Title Confer?|265
4|13.3.2.1 The Legal Characterization of Aboriginal Title|266
4|13.3.2.2 The Incidents of Aboriginal Title|266
4|13.3.2.3 Justification of Infringement|267
4|13.3.2.4 Remedies and Transition|268
4|13.3.2.5 What Duties Were Owed by the Crown at the Time of the Government Action?|269
2|13.4 The Court’s Decision|269
3|13.4.1 Provincial Laws and Aboriginal Title|270
3|13.4.2 Significance|274
4|13.4.2.1 Aboriginal Title Versus Fee Simple|275
4|13.4.2.2 Comparison to Nunavut|280
4|13.4.2.3 Nuclear Regulation: Between Canada and International Law|281
4|13.4.2.4 Canada’s Nuclear Capacity: Mining, Power and Medical|282
4|13.4.2.5 Aboriginal Title Rights Versus Nuclear Rights|283
4|13.4.2.6 Self Determination|287
3|13.4.3 Comparison with Recent Decisions and Other Cases of Self-Determination|289
2|13.5 Conclusion|292
2|References|293
1|Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons|295
1|14 Is Deterrence Morally and Legally Permissible and Is It a Form of State Terrorism?|296
2|Abstract|296
2|14.1 Introduction|297
2|14.2 Defining Deterrence|299
2|14.3 Moral Arguments for and Against Deterrence|302
3|14.3.1 Moral Arguments for Deterrence and Objections|303
3|14.3.2 Moral Arguments Against Deterrence|308
2|14.4 Legal Arguments for and Against Deterrence|312
2|14.5 Parallels with Terrorism|315
2|14.6 Conclusion|320
2|References|321
1|15 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: A Further Confirmation of the Human- and Victim-Centred Trend in Arms Control Law|323
2|Abstract|323
2|15.1 Introduction|324
2|15.2 Preparatory Work of the Treaty|325
2|15.3 Preamble (Object and Purpose)|330
2|15.4 Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear Weapons|334
3|15.4.1 Use of Nuclear Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law|335
3|15.4.2 Use of Nuclear Weapons Under Human Rights Law|337
4|15.4.2.1 Civil Rights, in Particular the Right to Life|338
4|15.4.2.2 Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in Particular the Right to Water|340
2|15.5 Victim Assistance and Environmental Remediation (Article 6 TPNW) in Light of the Duties of International Cooperation and Assistance (Article 7 TPNW)|343
3|15.5.1 General|343
3|15.5.2 Focusing on Vulnerable Groups, Such as Indigenous Peoples|345
2|15.6 Concluding Observations|346
2|References|348
1|16 Why Was Canada Not in the Room for the Nuclear Ban Treaty?|352
2|Abstract|352
2|16.1 Introduction|353
2|16.2 A Brief History—Canada and Disarmament Advocacy|355
3|16.2.1 Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s Peace Initiative|355
3|16.2.2 Canadian Leadership in the Indefinite Extension of the NPT|357
3|16.2.3 The 2000 NATO Nuclear Policy Review|359
2|16.3 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons|360
3|16.3.1 Development of the TPNW|361
3|16.3.2 Legal Obligations in the TPNW|363
3|16.3.3 Why Do We Need the TPNW in Addition to the NPT?|363
2|16.4 Canada’s Stand Against Nuclear Normativity|365
3|16.4.1 The NATO Challenge|366
3|16.4.2 Civil Society Leadership on Nuclear Non-Proliferation|367
2|16.5 Conclusion|369
2|References|370
1|17 Is the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty Accessible to Umbrella States?|373
2|Abstract|373
2|17.1 Introduction|374
3|17.1.1 Article 1(1)(d)’s Negotiating History|375
4|17.1.1.1 Ban on Threatened Use of Nuclear Weapons and Jus ad Bellum|378
3|17.1.2 Article 1(1)(d) and Nuclear Deterrence|383
3|17.1.3 Article 1(1)(d) and Nuclear Umbrella|386
2|17.2 Conclusion|387
2|References|389
1|18 The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: Challenges for International Law and Security|391
2|Abstract|391
2|18.1 Introduction|392
2|18.2 Prevailing Legal Controversies|395
2|18.3 Deficiencies of the New Treaty|399
3|18.3.1 The Absence of Nuclear-Weapon States|400
3|18.3.2 Erosion of Support for the NPT|400
3|18.3.3 Absence of Sufficient Regulation on Verification|401
3|18.3.4 Legal Uncertainties for Nuclear-Test-Bans|404
3|18.3.5 Open Issues|405
2|18.4 Effects on International Security|405
2|18.5 Conclusions|408
2|References|409
1|Index|412