File #2737: "2019_Book_TransitionalJusticeAndSocio-Ec.pdf"

2019_Book_TransitionalJusticeAndSocio-Ec.pdf

Testo

1|Preface|6
1|Acknowledgements|8
1|Contents|10
1|1 The Linkages Between Corruption and Transitional Justice|15
2|Abstract|15
2|1.1 General Introduction and Background|16
2|1.2 Definition and Discussion of Terms|19
3|1.2.1 Transitional Justice|19
4|1.2.1.1 What Is Transition?|21
4|1.2.1.2 What Is Justice?|22
3|1.2.2 Socio-economic Rights|23
3|1.2.3 Corruption|25
2|1.3 Accountability Mechanisms|28
3|1.3.1 Truth Commissions and Corruption|28
3|1.3.2 Prosecutions and Corruption|30
3|1.3.3 Amnesties and Corruption|32
3|1.3.4 Reparations and Corruption|35
3|1.3.5 Institutional Reforms and Corruption|36
2|1.4 Conclusion|37
2|References|38
1|2 Understanding Corruption and Human Rights|41
2|Abstract|41
2|2.1 Introduction|42
2|2.2 Preliminary Considerations|43
3|2.2.1 Is Freedom from Corruption a Human Right?|43
3|2.2.2 Is Corruption a Human Rights Violation?|44
3|2.2.3 What Links Corruption to Transitional Justice?|45
3|2.2.4 What Is the Distinction Between Socio-economic Rights and Issues?|46
2|2.3 Overview of Corruption and Human Rights Methodologies|47
3|2.3.1 Doctrinal-Research-Based Studies|48
4|2.3.1.1 Direct Violations|48
4|2.3.1.2 Indirect Violations|49
4|2.3.1.3 Remote Violations|49
3|2.3.2 Empirical-Research-Based Studies|50
3|2.3.3 Normative-Research-Based Studies|51
2|2.4 Corruption and Specific Human Rights vis-à-vis the Right to Health|52
3|2.4.1 Background|53
3|2.4.2 Normative Content|53
3|2.4.3 State Obligations and Violations|54
4|2.4.3.1 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR|54
4|2.4.3.2 Tripartite Typology|55
4|2.4.3.3 The ‘4 As’ Typology|57
4|2.4.3.4 Non-Discrimination|58
4|2.4.3.5 Accountability and Participation|59
4|2.4.3.6 Indicators and Benchmarks|59
2|2.5 Towards a Framework|61
3|2.5.1 Step One: Analyse the Situation|61
3|2.5.2 Step Two: Identify the Human Rights Obligations Being Violated|62
3|2.5.3 Step Three: Determine the Causal Link|62
3|2.5.4 Step Four: Attribution|63
2|2.6 Conclusion|64
2|References|64
1|3 The Phenomenon of Corruption and Socio-economic Rights in Zimbabwe|67
2|Abstract|67
2|3.1 Introduction|68
2|3.2 Corruption|68
3|3.2.1 Typology|68
4|3.2.1.1 Sporadic Versus Systemic Corruption|69
4|3.2.1.2 Petty Versus Grand Corruption|69
4|3.2.1.3 Public Corruption Versus Private Corruption|71
3|3.2.2 Legislative Framework|71
4|3.2.2.1 International Legislation|72
4|3.2.2.2 Primary Domestic Legislation|72
5|Constitution|72
4|3.2.2.3 Subsidiary Domestic Legislation|73
3|3.2.3 Policy Framework|75
4|3.2.3.1 Ministry of State Enterprises, Anti-Corruption and Anti-Monopolies|75
4|3.2.3.2 Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission|75
4|3.2.3.3 Auditor-General|76
4|3.2.3.4 The Public Protector (Ombudsman)|77
3|3.2.4 Judicial Framework|79
4|3.2.4.1 Ordinary Courts|79
4|3.2.4.2 Specialised Economic Crimes Courts|79
3|3.2.5 Compliance and Ranking|79
2|3.3 Socio-economic Rights|81
3|3.3.1 Typology|81
3|3.3.2 Legislative Framework|81
4|3.3.2.1 International Legislation|81
4|3.3.2.2 Domestic Primary Legislation|82
5|Constitution|82
5|Administration of Justice Act|83
3|3.3.3 Policy Framework|83
4|3.3.3.1 Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission|83
4|3.3.3.2 Other Independent Commissions and Authorities|84
3|3.3.4 Judicial Framework|84
4|3.3.4.1 Ordinary Courts|84
4|3.3.4.2 Administrative Courts|84
3|3.3.5 Compliance and Ranking|85
2|3.4 Corruption and Socio-economic Rights Violations: The Cholera Outbreak|85
3|3.4.1 Hypothesis One: Politicisation|86
4|3.4.1.1 Facts|86
4|3.4.1.2 Law|87
3|3.4.2 Hypothesis Two: Cronyism|87
4|3.4.2.1 Facts|87
4|3.4.2.2 Law|88
3|3.4.3 Hypothesis Three: Prebendalism|88
4|3.4.3.1 Facts|88
4|3.4.3.2 Law|89
3|3.4.4 Hypothesis Four: Rent Seeking|89
4|3.4.4.1 Facts|89
4|3.4.4.2 Law|90
3|3.4.5 Hypothesis Five: Patrimonialism|90
4|3.4.5.1 Facts|90
4|3.4.5.2 Law|91
2|3.5 Conclusion|91
2|References|92
1|4 Revisiting Methods of Addressing Past Corruption and Human Rights Violations in Zimbabwe|95
2|Abstract|95
2|4.1 Introduction|96
2|4.2 First Phase: The Post UDI Period (1965–1979)|96
3|4.2.1 Background|96
3|4.2.2 Accountability Mechanisms|98
4|4.2.2.1 Bingham Commission of Inquiry|98
4|4.2.2.2 United Kingdom Government Amnesty for Corruption|98
3|4.2.3 Subsequent Developments|99
2|4.3 Second Phase: Anti-Dissident Period (1981–1988)|100
3|4.3.1 Background|100
3|4.3.2 Accountability Mechanisms|101
4|4.3.2.1 The Sandura Commissions of Inquiry|101
3|4.3.3 Subsequent Developments|101
2|4.4 Third Phase: The Post-One-Party-State Period (1990–1995)|102
3|4.4.1 Background|102
3|4.4.2 Accountability Mechanisms|103
4|4.4.2.1 The Chidyausiku Commission of Inquiry|103
3|4.4.3 Subsequent Developments|103
2|4.5 Fourth Phase: State-Sponsored Violence Post-Mugabe (1998–2017)|103
3|4.5.1 Background|103
3|4.5.2 Accountability Mechanisms|104
4|4.5.2.1 Amnesty|104
4|4.5.2.2 Prosecutions|105
4|4.5.2.3 Institutional Reforms|105
4|4.5.2.4 Truth Inquiries|105
3|4.5.3 Subsequent Developments|106
2|4.6 Conclusion|106
2|References|107
1|5 Rethinking Ways of Dealing with Corruption Under Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe|109
2|Abstract|110
2|5.1 Introduction|110
2|5.2 The Civil Society and Justice in Zimbabwe Symposium|111
3|5.2.1 Background|111
3|5.2.2 Legal Basis|113
3|5.2.3 Mandate|113
3|5.2.4 Findings|114
3|5.2.5 Special Remarks|114
2|5.3 The Organ on National Healing, Integration and Reconciliation|114
3|5.3.1 Background|115
3|5.3.2 Legal Basis|115
3|5.3.3 Mandate|115
3|5.3.4 Findings|116
3|5.3.5 Special Remarks|117
2|5.4 The ILO Inquiry on Truth, Reconciliation and Justice in Zimbabwe|117
3|5.4.1 Background|118
3|5.4.2 Legal Basis|118
3|5.4.3 Mandate|118
3|5.4.4 Findings|119
3|5.4.5 Special Remarks|119
2|5.5 The National Peace and Reconciliation Commission|120
3|5.5.1 Background|120
3|5.5.2 Legal Basis|120
3|5.5.3 Mandate|120
3|5.5.4 Findings|122
3|5.5.5 Special Remarks|122
2|5.6 The National Transitional Justice Working Group of Zimbabwe|123
3|5.6.1 Background|123
3|5.6.2 Legal Basis|123
3|5.6.3 Mandate|124
3|5.6.4 Findings|124
3|5.6.5 Special Remarks|125
2|5.7 Universal Jurisdiction|125
3|5.7.1 Background|126
3|5.7.2 Legal Basis|127
3|5.7.3 Mandate|128
3|5.7.4 Findings|128
3|5.7.5 Special Remarks|128
4|5.7.5.1 African Union Anti-ICC Stance|128
4|5.7.5.2 Prosecuting Corruption Under the ICC Statute|130
2|5.8 Conclusion|132
2|References|133
1|6 Zimbabwe in a Comparative Perspective|135
2|Abstract|135
2|6.1 Introduction|136
2|6.2 Sub-Saharan Africa|136
3|6.2.1 Background|136
3|6.2.2 Law|137
3|6.2.3 Practice|138
4|6.2.3.1 Chad|138
4|6.2.3.2 Sierra Leone|138
4|6.2.3.3 Liberia|139
4|6.2.3.4 Kenya|140
2|6.3 Latin America|143
3|6.3.1 Background|143
3|6.3.2 Law|144
3|6.3.3 Practice|145
4|6.3.3.1 Brazil|145
2|6.4 Asia|146
3|6.4.1 Background|146
3|6.4.2 Law|147
3|6.4.3 Practice|147
4|6.4.3.1 Philippines|147
4|6.4.3.2 Bangladesh|148
2|6.5 Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union|149
3|6.5.1 Background|149
3|6.5.2 Law|149
3|6.5.3 Practice|150
4|6.5.3.1 Poland|150
2|6.6 Middle East and North Africa|151
3|6.6.1 Background|151
3|6.6.2 Law|151
3|6.6.3 Practice|152
4|6.6.3.1 Tunisia|152
2|6.7 Conclusion|154
2|References|154
1|7 Conclusion|157
2|Abstract|157
2|7.1 Introduction|158
2|7.2 Findings|159
3|7.2.1 Can Transitional Justice Mechanisms Address Corruption?|159
3|7.2.2 Is Corruption a Human Rights Violation?|160
3|7.2.3 Did Zimbabwe Violate Socio-economic Rights Through Corruption?|161
3|7.2.4 Should Transitional Justice in Zimbabwe Address Corruption?|161
2|7.3 Challenges|162
3|7.3.1 Broad Mandate|162
3|7.3.2 Pursuing Transitional Justice Without ‘Transition’|163
3|7.3.3 Polarised Environment|164
3|7.3.4 Methodology|165
3|7.3.5 Framing Reparations|165
2|7.4 Recommendations|166
3|7.4.1 Recommendation One: Inclusivity|166
3|7.4.2 Recommendation Two: Consultation|167
3|7.4.3 Recommendation Three: Comprehensive Approach|167
3|7.4.4 Recommendation Four: Synergies|167
3|7.4.5 Recommendation Five: Strengthen Anti-Corruption Mechanisms|167
2|7.5 Final Conclusion|168
2|References|169
1|Table of Cases|171
1|Table of Legislation|173
1|Bibliography|176
1|Index|185